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ABSTRACT
Fernand Braudel (1972) in his study The Mediterranean and the Mediterranean 
World in the Age o f Philip II suggested, among other things, that the Mediterranean 
world despite its differences should be conceived of as a unit. The present study is not 
an attempt to challenge Braudel’s entire work on historical, empirical or 
pragmatological grounds, but an effort to question the unitary and totalitarian 
conception of the Mediterranean region. Specifically, I explore how a small 
Mediterranean town, Rethemnos, Crete, Southern Greece, was theorized on the back 
of this widespread conception that wants the Mediterranean to be a unit, and how a 
differential reading of the town is possible once various theories and conceptions of 
postmodernism and poststructuralism are put forward with respect to Rethemnos. I 
will be drawing on theories of the consumer society (Jean Baudrillard’s and Zygmunt 
Bauman’s analyses) in an attempt to document that Rethemnos is a society that is 
currently organized by recourse to the internal contradictions of the consumer society 
and on theories of the event and the subject (Alain Badiou’s analysis) in order to 
explain that the Rethemniot subject is undecidable and bound to truth procedures as 
long as there is an event named after an intervention. Prior to that, I will be 
challenging, with respect to how the Greek subject was depicted on the back of the 
unitary fashion of conceiving of the Mediterranean region, a variety of studies of 
anthropological origin, based on Greece; and I will be also criticizing with respect to 
how the Greek social formation was dissected, on the back of the same unitary 
fashion, a variety of other studies of politico-economic origin this time, based on 
Greece as well, by focusing and drawing on certain aspects of Jacques Derrida’s 
deconstructive strategies and Gilles Deleuze’s and Felix Guattari’s geo-philosophy’s 
lines of flight.
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INTRODUCTION
In one of his frequent visits to Rethemnos, Crete, Southern Greece in the early 1980s, 
the anthropologist Michael Herzfeld, accompanied by his wife, was taking pictures of 
some abandoned properties, when a resident came out of a nearby house and asked 
him what was so important about the houses and why would anyone want to take 
pictures of them (Herzfeld, 1991: xii). The inquiry, according to Herzfeld, expressing 
both curiosity and anger, was a consequence of the ban imposed by the Greek state in 
the late 1960s over the entire Old Town of Rethemnos to every possible restoration 
the inhabitants might want to carry out with respect to their houses. I propose that the 
resident need not have asked what’s with the pictures, but might equally have 
declared, ‘There is nothing to see’.
That Herzfeld and his wife were taking pictures of the monuments, like so many 
others have done before them and will continue to do in the future no doubt, is 
probably unimportant, yet the fact that a resident wanted to find out why anybody 
would be interested in ‘such things’ is extremely interesting. For Herzfeld (1991), as 
he tells the story in his book, A Place in History, the resident meant to express his 
opposition to the Greek state declaring the town a ‘scheduled monument’. My account 
of telling the story is rather different. What the resident wanted to say, and the way 
the resident felt about the two strangers taking pictures of the buildings did not have 
to do strictly with a kind of local curiosity about why the couple was showing such 
great interest in the Venetian buildings. The monuments Herzfeld photographed, after 
all, were to be held responsible for having made the town famous and economically 
prosperous over the last thirty years. The task in hand, however, in the following 
pages is to explain, make sense of and understand not the anthropologist’s self- 
evident interest in the monuments, but the speculative statement, which was not 
spoken; that is, the meaning of the non-seen, invisible and hidden place the resident 
hints at by saying, but without actually saying it: There is nothing to see. And 
although Herzfeld produces a whole book out of the antithesis and opposition between 
the residents and the state, what I propose is that a more nuanced understanding of the 
Old Town and its recent transformation is still required with respect to the meaning of 
the speculative statement, ‘There is nothing to see’.
10
The thesis unfolds another way of conceiving of Rethemnos by considering what one 
must not see or that which is not there, that is, the non-place and non-being from 
where the resident above was able to see both what he was seeing (that there is 
nothing to see) and that which Herzfeld and his wife were seeing (the Venetian 
buildings). The experience of Rethemnos, I argue, opens up new ways in conceiving 
of space, place and the subject amidst a highly changing world. Taking up on the 
event of Rethemnos allows a careful and radical reconstruction of the meaning of 
identity and space and of the manner in which these practices are currently negotiated, 
engaging in a perpetual movement that never rests but seeks relentlessly to re-inscribe 
and re-affirm difference.
Without further ado, I term Mediterraneanism the discursive formation which 
predicts, represents and orders Mediterranean societies according to a set of laws or 
rules, which fail to come to terms with the invisible and hidden place from where the 
resident above might have pronounced ‘There is nothing to see’. Mediterraneanism is 
a term derived from Said’s (1978) Orientalism but coined in Mediterranean studies by 
the anthropologist Michael Herzfeld. I do not intend, however, to produce an 
Orientalism of the Mediterranean -  not that that would be an easy task. My scope is 
more modest. I use the term in a rather heuristic, idiosyncratic and symptomatic 
manner, that is, in order to show how Rethemnos can be taken as a case-study that 
brings into considerably sharp focus some of the thorny issues of theory regarding the 
processes of place, space, the subject and their transformations, as they are currently 
swept up by a full-blown consumer society.
But before that, it is worth taking some theoretical precautions. I argue that 
Mediterraneanist discourses are mostly of anthropological, geographical, and politico- 
economic origin, and produce a certain -  biased and imperialist -  picture of Greece. I 
do not, however, intend to discover the real Greece, nor do I think that such a 
formation exists. I want to shed light instead on a differential image of Rethemnos 
based on the baseless ground of a deconstructive and echographic (Derrida, 2002) 
writing of difference that depends on and materializes with reference to the non-seen 
and invisible non-place, from where the ‘There is nothing to see’ starts imperceptibly, 
becoming visible. To that extent, geography, the science par excellence dealing with 
and relying on spatial differentiation (though this is a pleonasm inasmuch as space is
11
already differential and difference in-itself), is important in forming and enabling such 
a deconstructive writing. The theory unfolded below is associated with what is often 
called postmodernism or postructuralism and dissected by such theorists as Bauman, 
Baudrillard, Derrida, Deleuze, Guattari and Badiou. The thesis, however, is at pains to 
explicate and unpack how the above symptoms of difference come to terms with the 
metamorphic deformation of a certain Mediterranean society, Rethemnos in Crete, 
Southern Greece and its recent socio-spatial trajectory, constituting, in other words, a 
means to an end, that is, it brings theory to bear upon the event and experience of 
Rethemnos.
There are various models and hermeneutical attempts that set out to study the 
Mediterranean and even more intuitions that have sought to represent the various 
aspects of the Greek social formation on ethnographic, anthropological and politico- 
economic grounds. I do not have the ambition to produce an exhaustive analysis and 
criticism of all studies ever made on Greece. It is still nonetheless useful to develop 
and build up a theory taking up on the above symptoms of difference in order to 
reconstruct a variety of myths that have been put forward in making sense of 
Mediterranean societies.
The Greek social formation has been dissected on the basis, among others, of the 
following four forms of thought. First, social anthropologists in the 1960s and 1970s 
proposed to study the structure of Mediterranean societies by reference to the values 
of ‘honour and shame’ (Peristiany, 1965, 1967) that were heretofore taken to be 
imminent and inseparable from the structuration of the Mediterranean world. Second, 
another model was coined in the 1980s which set out to undo shame and honour, this 
time proposing a more sophisticated approach to the self-creative and rhetorical 
manliness of the Mediterranean subject on the basis either of a poetic/embedded 
placeness (Herzfeld, 1985, 1987), or in line with the notions of the ‘friends of the 
heart’ (Papataxiarchis, 1991) insisting on a reflexive construction of ‘manhood’ that 
had scarcely to do with the values of shame and honour. Third, another version of the 
same model also appeared, termed ‘poetics of womanhood’, this time taking 
‘mourning’ and ‘suffering’ as the essential rhetorical practices of women against 
domestication (Dubisch, 1995; Herzfeld, 1991). Last but not least, a neo-Marxian 
theorization in terms of space was put forward in terms of a ‘spontaneous spatiality’,
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conceiving of the Mediterranean city in terms of a transitional housing segregation 
(Leontidou, 1990). A number of other studies, associated with the above spatial 
model, will be also set in motion, such as Tsoucalas’ (1977) conceptualization of a 
‘parasitic’ Greece and Vergopoulos’ (1975) theorization of ‘capitalism without 
capitalists’; mainly because of their rationalist, productivist and poetic edifice -  
though, crucially, I reserve a differential reading for parasitism in that it starts, even if 
prematurely, to address the conditions pertinent to a fully-fledged consumer society.
My intention is neither to destroy Mediterraneanist representations of Greece, nor to 
prove them inadequate, even if as the thesis progresses, such a criticism will 
inevitably take hold. My main focus, however, is to deconstruct, affirm, negotiate, 
destabilize, and produce certain differential images of space and the subject that break 
systematically with and swerve away from the four models above. Mediterraneanism 
is susceptible to criticism on a number of grounds. I want, briefly, to refer to some of 
its main problems that may pave the way for a fuller appreciation of postructuralism 
and postmodernism and the manner in which such understandings deliver and 
accomplish a radical re-conceptualization of Rethemnos. First, the shame-and-honour 
model forces difference into the straightjacket of the same, which is, a merely 
conceptual kind of ‘difference’ that represents objects, either as the other of a 
corrupted female nature (Mediterranean women under the value of shame/grace) or as 
the other of a disordered male honour (Mediterranean men under the value of honour). 
It fails, however, to reconsider a difference without concept or identity. Second, the 
dialectical poetic model takes difference either as separation (the one excluded from 
the other: the economy of gift excluded from ‘commensality’ as in Papataxiarchis’ 
(1992) notion of the ‘friends of the heart’, or as negation (the one versus the other: 
local history against a bureaucratic centre) as in the case of Rethemnos’ history 
sketched out by Herzfeld (1991), or as transcendence (the one over the other: poetics 
of manhood over the shame-and-honour model). Third, the poetics of womanhood is 
nihilistic and unbecoming, in that it conceives of women strictly as fully present in 
negative and reactive events of suffering and mourning (death or religious rituals), 
that is, as always having a negative, lacking and approximate (their identities not 
being fully incorporated or complete) status. And finally, the model of spontaneous 
housing segregation is a rationalist and productivist discourse, which takes 
spontaneity as a mirror or an ‘alibi of exchange-value and the commodity form’
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(Clarke and Doel, 2000: 221) objectifying and essentializing some absolute 
geographical characteristics that are supposedly imminently linked to the 
Mediterranean semi-periphery.
The present thesis unsettles and dislodges many of the above misunderstandings, 
which are symptoms of the discourse of Mediterraneanism rather than the 
Mediterranean itself. Specifically, my effort involves two separate but interrelated 
tasks. First, I explore the far-reaching implications a full-blown consumer society has 
for space, place and the subject beyond the Mediterraneanist traits roughly sketched 
out above. And second, I argue that, to the extent that the rearticulation of physical 
and social spaces transforms society and space in the face of a fully-fledged consumer 
society, a similar deformation should take place in the manner in which the meaning 
and experience of the subject is re-constructed. The transformation and restructuring 
of Rethemnos and the identification process of the Rethemniot subject may, 
accordingly, take the form of the following working-hypotheses: 1) The co-relation of 
society and space, which is historically expressed in Rethemnos through the contested 
meaning of the Venetian built environment can be grasped a) by a theory of the 
consumer society and the postmodern divide between the repressed and the seduced 
(after Baudrillard and Bauman) and b) by the art of origami, that is, the art of folding, 
unfolding and refolding social space (after Deleuze and Guattari’s geophilosophy). 2) 
The processive subject formation can be taken as an affirmative (though ambivalent) 
and responsible (though always work in progress) multiplicity that takes flight from 
the traits of shame, honour and poetics, remaining deeply generic, indiscernible, 
undecidable, unanticipated and unexpected, that is, remaining irreversibly bound to 
truth procedures and the post-evental occurrences of radical otherness (Badiou, 2005).
The epistemological grounds on which these terms lie are partially explained directly 
below, yet suffice it to note that a fuller appreciation of them is offered as the thesis 
progresses in an operational way, that is, in relationship to the construction of the 
argument of each chapter and in accord with the overall scope of the thesis. Such a 
way of proceeding does not impose a great deal upon the reader, however, to the 
extent that I do not claim that I have been able to tell the story of the subject and map 
the conceptual vicissitudes of the co-relation of society and space in a final or ultimate 
manner. What I propose, nevertheless, is that one needs to proceed with caution in
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unpacking the contested notions of postmodemity and poststructuralism and in 
bringing these theoretical peregrinations to bear upon the spatiality of an evental 
Rethemnos. Explaining everything at the outset presents and runs into a three-fold 
difficulty. First, it is impossible to tackle all the historical issues and transformations 
of Rethemnos in some kind of empirical or linear documentation of what takes place 
on the ground. Second, it is equally impossible to unpack all the contested aspects of 
a theory that falls under the jurisdiction of postmodernism and poststructuralism, 
simply because these theoretical practices do not arrange, accommodate or determine 
issues in any final manner. In other words, this is not the postmodern theory but only 
my take on what I think resonates with a way of thinking Rethemnos without 
wounding its differential and unassimilated status. And third, even if at first blush, it 
may appear problematic to reconcile theories of difference with the idiosyncrasy and 
historical specificity of the small coastal town of Rethemnos, for me this is exactly the 
challenge, that is, to explore the extent to which a theory unfolds and sets in motion a 
specific empirical problem. This should not be taken as naive empiricism though, for 
there is a certain transcendence in bringing theory to bear upon the Old Town 
problem, in that ‘theory’ tries to integrate various aspects of difference with the 
specific historicity of an embedded ‘placeness’ without violating either deconstruction 
and schizoanalysis or the specificity and dynamics of place. I am not about to offer, in 
short, a detailed historical analysis of Rethemnos; neither do I simply intend to shed 
light on or offer an understanding of deconstruction. What I have found useful, 
however, as I was swept up by the undercurrents of deconstruction, schizoanalysis, 
consumption and the event of Rethemnos, is to bring these theoretical-practices 
together, without violating or downplaying their difference, dissemination and 
disjuncture. The present study is not, therefore, an attempt to theorize a problem but a 
mode of combination of two different accounts of events (postructuralism and 
Rethemnos), and an effort to come to terms with the transformation and experience of 
space, place and the subject in the midst of such a combination.
Doreen Massey (1999: 271) in her discussion of the possible permutations and 
commonalities between physical and human geography, defines difference “as more 
than a place in a sequence, for understanding difference as place-in-sequence is, after 
all, a kind of temporo-spatial version of that understanding of difference that sees 
others as really only a ‘variation on myself, where ‘myself is the one constructing
15
the imagination”. Positionality, accordingly, the place I occupy while I judge or 
represent the Other, or in terms of the methods and techniques I deploy in getting to 
grips with the Other, is crucial in all sorts of social inquiries.
In undertaking the fieldwork that forms a vital component of the present thesis, I lived 
in Rethemnos for almost a year, from September 2006 until August 2007. But I also 
had the pleasure of going back from time to time, for shorter periods, throughout 
2008. My central aim, while staying there, was effectively as simple as to become 
familiar with the present situation in the town; that is, with the place and the people of 
Rethemnos and, of course, the Old Town problem and the manner in which it is 
currently unfolding. In a certain way advanced by Actor Network Theory (Latour, 
2005) I meant to follow the actors and subjects of Rethemnos in order to produce a 
really thick account of what they do rather than explaining why they do it and how 
they do it -  especially because the latter has been the focus of the poetic model. I had 
decided in advance that employing orthodox anthropological or ethnographic methods 
of research, such as interviews and questionnaires, was not the path I wished to 
follow: the unequal power relations between the one who represents and the one who 
is represented would never diminish or dissipate if one resorted to these techniques. 
Given that I had read Johannes Fabian’ (1983) exquisite work on Time and the Other: 
How Anthropology Makes its Object, which had made a great impression on me, I was 
virtually in search of a way of getting to terms with the Rethemniot subject without 
marring or wounding its multifarious identity by simply charting his/her qualities, 
characteristics or inclinations.
In a somewhat different context, Massey (2001: 15) had defined a similar sort of 
positionality in terms of “situated knowledge”, that is, the kind of knowledge one 
possesses once he/she is able to map out or acknowledge the lines of power that run 
through his/her own social positioning and symbolic experimentations and practices. 
In Rethemnos, Herzfeld (1991) has often excused the local population’s suspicion of 
his own work, when they suspected him of being a spy in the late 1970s, by 
recognizing that under the peculiar conditions that prevailed in postwar provincial 
Greece, an American intellectual such as he, who was capable of speaking Greek 
fluently, could be nothing but a spy!
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In my case I have never been accused of spying, given the length of time I spent in 
Rethemnos and the fact that I did have some genuine interest in local politics 
managing to meet the Head of the Old Town Office, to examine the archive and files 
of the Archaeology Service; and to talk briefly to the deputy mayor of the local 
council. People often tended to think of me, however, as someone who had something 
to do with Rethemnos. At the time, I thought of this as something advantageous, in 
the sense that I somehow seemed to belong to the wider context of the town or to be 
‘one of its people’. Actually, that feeling occasionally tended to become even stronger 
than I initially figured, since one of my friends lived in a nearby city, Herakleion, and 
during my stay in Rethemnos I had the chance to go back and forth to Herakleion 
many times, to use his car (with characteristic Cretan plates), even to tell stories that I 
heard from him, his friends or his family, to my new friends and acquaintances in 
Rethemnos. However, this could be also problematic, given that from the moment of 
such recognition I would no longer be excused for any wrongdoing, since by being 
recognized as potentially ‘one of them’, I should know all codes, meanings and 
manners of treating, addressing and responding to the Rethemniot lifeworld and of 
handling matters within this context. The point however of rejecting interviews and 
questionnaires was altogether different. My focus was to trace the links, the paths and 
the associations among those who had been somehow involved with one way or 
another in the Old Town problem and not simply to interpret them. The above could 
also generate the kind of thing Latour (2005: 160) termed “sociology of associations 
[which] tries to associate controversies”.
The point, nevertheless, was not to explain Rethemnos but to follow its actors, events 
and undecidable features that might affect or not, the Old Town problem. My 
intention was not, in other words, to prove that Rethemnos had been this kind of 
problem that needed or required a specific kind of explanation, but that Rethemnos is 
not what you think. Yet Rethemnos should not, necessarily, be taken as a 
representative of the Mediterranean region but ought to be seen as a symptom of the 
way in which many Mediterranean towns have been subject to the cultural logic of 
late capitalism, by which I mean the commodification of almost everything in culture 
and society. Mediterranean towns have been facing their historical and cultural 
centres going through a phase of rapid socio-economic transformation and 
metamorphosis and thus the experience of space, place and the subject in Rethemnos
17
are submitted to complex trajectories that need considerable re-contextualization and 
re-conceptualization beyond the sedentary Mediterraneanist images that conceive of 
space as empty, inactive or objective. In order to map the construction of the subject I 
have chosen to focus on the analyses of both Lacan’s and Deleuze’s theorizations, an 
argument whose full implications are not readily appreciated however, unless one 
further draws on Badiou’s (2005) non-ontological conceptualization of the event, 
stipulating and making sense of not only a relative or relational difference but, first 
and foremost, of what matters to differences and which truth underlies any generic 
procedure aligned with differences. In order to explore the first task, that is, the 
unfolding of the Old Town problem (the contested restoration project and the quarrels 
and struggles between the residents and the Greek bureaucracy) in line with the non­
place and non-seen of the ‘There is nothing to see’, I picked up first, on the 
repressed/seduced division, that is, the postmodern divide of late modernity (Bauman, 
1982, 1987), and second, on the art of spatial science embodied in origami, the 
folding, unfolding and refolding of social space (Deleuze and Guattari, 1983, 1987; 
Doel, 1999). In order to accomplish the second task (the unfolding of the subject 
beyond shame, honour and poetics) I have relied on Badiou’s theorization of the 
event, which I thought of as one of the possible ways to come to terms not only with 
difference, identity and subject formation -  something which I have done 
fundamentally with respect to the theorizations of Deleuze and Guattari (1988) in 
terms of becoming-woman, and the conceptualizations of Derrida (1992) in terms of 
the counterfeit -  but also with a theory which calls forth a true or generic difference 
that matters to subjects beyond the ‘poetic’ and ‘friendly’ individuations of 
Mediterraneanism.
It should be noted that theory, at least in the way taken up by the present thesis, is not 
concerned with a linear progression from a ‘superstructural’ element to the concrete- 
real empirical world ‘out there’. Moreover, I am not, strictly speaking, trying to 
impose or apply a western-based intellectual body of work on a reality that has 
nothing to do with it. For as Althusser would have it, one is never outside the 
contested terrain of knowledge in that theory regards differential modes of 
approaching the real-concrete and negotiating other ways to conceive of the evental 
Rethemnos, which in turn is no less dense or rich than the theoretical parts. The latter 
comes down to saying that what matters to my investigation and discussion of
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Rethemnos is the innumerable differential relationships to the real and their mode of 
combination, permutation, displacement and transformation that refer to other 
relationships of composition, immanence and proximity, rather than the real itself. In 
other words, neither part of the thesis is to be considered privileged, inasmuch as they 
form ‘allegories’ in the sense intended by Clifford (1986: 100) or ‘folds’ in the sense 
Deleuze intends, which intervene from the off, leaking in all possible directions. 
Mediterraneanism, in other words, is a discursive formation of the Mediterranean but 
is not the Mediterranean region itself. And although my experience, as previously 
mentioned, draws mostly on Greece, Mediterraneanism can be taken primarily, as a 
theoretical articulation whose joints can be subject to an irresistible yet joyful and 
exhilaratingly liberating loosening.
If I am taking Rethemnos as an example of Mediterraneanism, therefore, this is 
neither because it constitutes a micrograph of Greek society, nor because it is a 
representative Mediterranean town; and thus Mediterraneanism in this and 
undoubtedly many other respects may not be appropriate. Yet it remains a heuristic 
term insofar as the studies that are susceptible to criticism on the grounds nourished 
by differential, postmodern and poststructuralist ideas of difference are only 
deconstructed, in a Derridean sense, by inhabiting them from within. In short, I do not 
mean merely to highlight the omissions, absences and misunderstandings of 
Mediterraneanism but, rather, to read this discourse according to a plan that refuses to 
nail down differences, simply by letting the Mediterranean go. Writing difference 
otherwise is an on-going process that does not claim that the original Mediterranean 
studies (Peristiany, du Boulay, Friedl, Campbell etc.) failed to deliver or that they 
simply misrepresented the Mediterranean basin. Rather, it is about a mode of thought 
that takes the ostensible success and truthfulness of a dogmatic Mediterraneanism 
seriously, challenging not only its methodological grounds, but also identifying and 
specifying what it presupposes, the grounds on which it is based and the philosophical 
underpinnings that accentuated its tremendous influence and success. Such a 
deconstructive reading has nothing to do with the true or real Mediterranean, but is 
inspired instead by Said’s (1978) deconstruction of western conceptions of the orient. 
Let me briefly unpack, therefore, how the notion of Orientalism lays the groundwork 
for a thorough deconstruction of the Mediterranean.
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Orientalism/Mediterraneanism
To begin with, Mediterraneanism is not immaterial. Nothing could be further from the 
truth. It is a discourse which has considerable material force and consequence and is 
not just a term, an idea, or a superstructure opposed to a dominant material 
infrastructure that rules over a superficial ideological domain. As Said avers, “the 
representation of Orientalism in European culture amounts to what we can call a 
discursive consistency, one that has not only history but material (and institutional) 
presence to show for itself’ (Said, 1978: 308). Mediterraneanism, by the same token, 
is not simply an illusory representation. Rather than emphasising how the 
Mediterranean has been misrepresented, what matters to me is to contaminate and 
disjoint its original points and folds (shame and honour, poetics, spontaneity, 
parasitism, social and monumental history) of reassurance. On the other hand, the 
strength of Mediterraneanism, like that of Orientalism, lies, precisely, in the “cultural 
discourse, a strength too often mistaken as merely decorative or superstructural” 
(Said, 1978: 25). Our task, accordingly, is not to pursue or discover the real 
Mediterranean but to destabilise, set in motion and disadjust the sedentary thought 
that has turned the Mediterranean into a culturally predicted, prognosticated and 
commodified sign. As Said (1978: 12) pointed out in terms of Orientalism, it “has less 
to do with the Orient than it does with ‘our’ world”. Mediterraneanism is knowledge, 
therefore, exactly like Orientalism, “that places things Oriental [or, in this case, 
Mediterranean] in class, court, prison or manual for scripting, study, judgement, 
discipline or governing” (Said, 1978: 41). Orientalism and Mediterraneanism are both 
moral and political projects, having “no existence outside the discourse, the writing by 
which [they are] constantly produced and experienced” (Said, 1978: 146). This is why 
Mediterraneanism, exactly, like “Orientalism, which is the system of European or 
western knowledge about the orient” (Said, 1978: 197), is chiefly about domination, 
coercion and the exercise of power. For “The Orient that appears in Orientalism [is] a 
system of representations framed by a whole set of forces that brought the Orient into 
western learning, western consciousness and later western empire” (Said, 1978: 202- 
203). Mediterraneanism, by the same token, is an effect of theory in its relentless 
attempt to relocate the Oriental Other within the Mediterranean space. No small 
wonder then that the entity of the Mediterranean has no substantial meaning, for “such 
geographical designations are an odd combination of the empirical and the 
imaginative” (Said, 1978: 331). Deconstructing Mediterraneanism, therefore, does not
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have to invent a new orthodoxy in the place of a previous one or to substitute one 
imagination for another. Rather, it is about the “reminder of the seductive degradation 
of knowledge, of any knowledge anywhere at any time. Now perhaps more than 
before” (Said, 1978: 328). Mediterraneanism thus is an attempt to classify, dispose, 
categorise and segregate everything that disseminates, dissipates and disintegrates. In 
fact, as we shall see, the models of shame-and-honour, poetics, friends of the heart, 
poetics of womanhood, and spontaneity are subject to the seductive play of 
deconstruction and schizoanalysis, whose polymorphously perverse strategy of 
writing space, place and the subject are meant to affirm a responsible, non-servile and 
indiscemibly undecidable Rethemniot multiplicity and a spatiality that is neither 
unbecoming, nor dialectical but conjunctive, supplementary and prosthetic.
Setting the Agenda
Be that as it may, moving beyond Mediterraneanist identifications (shame-and- 
honour, poetics, coffee-shop identifications, and poetics of womanhood) means to 
start conceiving of the Rethemniot multiplicity as a responsible subject, beyond 
servility, and as a process in progress beyond social atomism and egoism; in other 
words, as a social construct defiant of honour, shame and poeticity. Such a 
multiplicity should be made, invented and created, however, and not simply 
discovered or represented; it should be made, by subtracting from the rcth dimension 
(«-l) or by changing dimension, drawing a line of flight (Deleuze and Guattari, 1988). 
Moreover, moving beyond Mediterraneanist spatialities means to start opening the 
Old Town to first, the spatialization of the repressed/seduced division and the 
seduction of a full-blown consumer society (Bauman, 1987) and second, to the spatial 
art of origami (Deleuze and Guattari, 1988; Doel, 1999) both of which transcend the 
Mediterraneanist configurations of spontaneity, parasitism, capitalism without 
capitalists and the historical dilemmas of social and monumental time (Herzfeld, 
1991).
Without further ado I propose that Rethemnos is carried along the lines of a full­
blown consumer society and that it is the social logic of the sign that transfigures and 
transmogrifies its geography. The restoration project, that is, the fact that the Old 
Town’s Venetian buildings was declared a monument that needed to be protected and 
carefully preserved, has been, as I have already noted, strongly opposed by the
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residents because it prevented them from intervening and refurbishing their properties 
according to their own will and logic. The residents, however, fought tooth and nail 
against the bogging down of such a prescriptive restoration, instituting an Association 
and demonstrating against the preservation of the Venetian monuments. Things, 
however, have now changed, and the residents actively desire the state to intervene 
and protect them from the massive commodification and exploitation of almost 
everything in town, as they witness that certain parts of the Old Town that are 
beautifully reconstructed, are suitable now only for tourists and visitors who have the 
ability to learn and appreciate the history of the town, take pictures of the Venetian 
buildings, and most, importantly, spend money on food, drinks and entertainment, 
enjoying themselves, as they walk around the labyrinthine streets of the town. In the 
light of this unevenness generated and further perpetuated by the various twists and 
turns of the restoration project, the ‘Old Town problem’ seems to me to be 
indissolubly tied to a theory that takes seriously the consequences of a full-blown 
consumer society, bringing into sharp focus a variety of issues with respect to the 
uneven geographical development of late capitalism and the current mode of 
domination of consumption that go beyond territorial understandings of space, 
ontologies of absence and loss, epistemologies of scarcity and the misery and unitary 
conceptions of identity.
This is so because identity and space are processes that are inextricably and 
ceaselessly intermingled, formed and deformed along the lines of a consumer society. 
Mapping the trajectory of these experiences, does not necessarily mean defining or 
accepting a steady process that monolithically determines and sets out to explain the 
spatial structuration and social identification of Mediterranean societies in a manner 
which is beyond doubt or dispute or as means through which a manifesto of 
Mediterranean studies will come to materialize. Society and space are co-related and 
produced through uneven processes that vary spatially and are socially expressed and 
transformed in pluralistic and occasionally incongruent ways. Drawing on 
postmodernism and poststructuralism, therefore, is not meant to pin down such a 
heterogeneous, kaleidoscopic and fragmented social reality, but is instead a means to 
shed light on and make sense of the changing experience of space, place and the 
subject within a highly dynamic socio-spatial context, bearing always in mind that 
while one measures any possible change to which a given society succumbs, the
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yardstick against or on the back of which such a measures lies, changes as much as 
the change he/she initially intended to measure. Hence pure becoming that prevents 
any sort of identification from ‘bogging down’. As Deleuze and Guattari (1988: 236) 
put it “Becoming produces nothing other than itself’.
One of the greatest and most conspicuous changes, therefore, that took place in 
Rethemnos over the last 30-40 years was by and large stemming from the way in 
which the restoration project had come to be viewed, to the extent that while 
originally the Rethemniots conceived of the Greek state as an external paragon that 
interfered in the Old Town, in recent days they have come to realize that only a 
constant demand for increasing state intervention will redeem or compensate for the 
fierce tourist exploitation to which their town is currently subject. To explore the 
extent to which the shifting attitude of the Rethemniots toward the Greek state is 
indicative of a transition and displacement, from a repressive social organization to a 
culture of seduction-based mechanisms, is thus, in the light of the above one of the 
tasks of the present thesis. A strong assertion can be made that the consumer society, 
which, as we shall see in subsequent sections, constitutes a new mode of domination 
that ‘changes the tablecloth without actually changing the organization of the table’, 
and which reflects a deeper change and conflict in society and space, namely the 
distinction between the ‘repressed’ and the ‘seduced’ (Bauman, 1987), is one of such 
theoritical ‘yardsticks’ that may provide for a reasonably reflexive interpretation in 
counting for what takes place presently in town. As contemporary societies are no 
longer based on relations of production but refer, primarily, and are above all, 
organized according to the logic of consumption, it is the latter’s collective nature that 
can offer a more substantial hermeneutics of the dialectics of change between the 
subject and the city’s current metamorphosis. The ‘repressed’ and the ‘seduced’, a 
fuller account of which is offered in Chapter 7, may be taken to correspond with the 
classification imposed and further spurred by the consumer society, hinting not, 
necessarily, at certain groups or professions of classes, but implying a social territory 
whose liquid ground is occupied by certain groups having a particular relationship to 
the mode of dominion nourished by consumption practices. And although the Greek 
state envisaged the Old Town in the world tourist-market exclusively on the grounds 
of its Venetian past, in the long run it only managed to promote and galvanize a 
consumerist ethos, if only by promulgating the need to preserve the Old Town as a
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‘scheduled monument’. Not everyone, however, was able to comply with or benefit 
from the restoration imperatives insofar as those who were left out of the game of 
tourism and consumption witness now their properties to become, irreversibly, 
enmeshed in processes of unstoppable and rapid decay. For the restoration project was 
extremely effective in spending public money on the not-so-needy by promoting the 
image of the city and ultimately by widening the gap between those at the top of the 
hierarchy and those at the bottom. The ability to rebuild a house, for example, had to 
do with the many forms of capital a resident needed to possess and, to that extent, the 
conflictual reception of the restoration project was not restricted to one between the 
residents and the state, but involved also disputes between those socially 
disadvantaged people who could not renovate and fix their houses and those who 
were able to afford and, most importantly, to understand and make sense, so to speak, 
ideologically -  in a certain Althusserian sense -  of the restoration program.
What is more, the distinction between the repressed and the seduced does not involve, 
on the one hand, house owners and on the other hand, tenants who are unable to buy 
or afford a property. Rather the repressed/seduced social polarization has to do 
precisely with the distinction between those who can use and make something of the 
town in a sophisticated way, understanding its history, finding out about the buildings 
and their architectural style, taking pictures of the buildings, visiting museums, a type 
of elite that keeps relentlessly moving, transcending spatial barriers and all the rest of 
the residents who are, however unwittingly, stuck in their place, and cannot see how 
the ‘museumization’ of the town may deliver a better deal for their local immobility. 
The present study, therefore, is not meant to ‘point to’ a certain group of people, 
professions or social classes that live in Rethemnos, which from now on will be 
referred to as the ‘repressed’ or the ‘seduced’ (Bauman, 1987). As mentioned above, 
the division is primarily considered as a social territory, a space defined on the basis 
of some broader social characteristics that have, above all, to do with the place these 
people occupy with respect to the changing manner in which the restoration project is 
perceived, negotiated and understood and with respect to the role played by the same 
project in reinvigorating a full-blown consumer society. I shall be arguing that as the 
better-off had the right to enjoy the fruits of consumption and the goods offered by the 
market promotion of the Old Town and appreciate it as a space of historical 
importance and aesthetic beauty, constituting to a certain extent the people Bauman
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(1987) describes as the seduced, the kathelotic (from the Greek kathilonen, doomed to 
immobility) status of the rest of the residents, may explain the more recent trend 
toward increasing state intervention, as these people are recently unable or unwilling 
to appreciate the restoration project and the concomitant fruits that derive from the 
latter’s deep involvement in the ongoing identification problematizations that have 
come to blossom by way of consumption.
Deconstructing Mediterraneanist conceptions of the Old Town necessitates, therefore, 
a better grasp of consumption, which is a multifaceted and multidimensional practice 
that requires careful, thoughtful and considered theorization and examination. A 
radical inversion of the understanding and meaning of use-value as pure, neutral and 
natural (Baudrillard, 1975, 1981; Derrida 1994) is necessary, if one is to grapple with 
its richness and complexity. Capitalism does not simply signal the transition from one 
form of value (use-value), to another form (economic exchange-value), but requires, 
critically, a reconsideration of the meaning of the concept of value itself, to the extent 
that utility is as rational and commensurable as exchange-value is.
Rethemnos, however, has been theorized in terms of a strict historical clash between a 
socially based understanding of history (the fact that the residents’ imaginary was not 
compatible and did not want to reckon with the Statist ideology promoted by a 
monumental and bureaucratic conception of time) and the nation-state ideology (the 
fact that the Greek state demanded that the identity of the town should be associated 
in a linear way with its glorious Venetian past expressed today through the need to 
conserving the Venetian monuments) that ignores the social dynamics of place 
(Herzfeld, 1991). Such theorizations, however valuable and useful, are nonetheless 
susceptible to criticism, especially to the extent that they miss the richness and 
complexity of social spaces and the effective power of spacing, remaining enmeshed 
in binary oppositions, contradictory and digestive theorizations of difference, failing, 
in short, to appreciate the motionless trips and voyages in place and the double 
movements of affirmative deconstruction (Deleuze and Guattari, 1984, 1988; Derrida, 
1981; Doel, 1999). I shall return to these complex theoretical issues in subsequent 
chapters.
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For the moment what is still required to take things further is to start mapping the 
affirmative, responsible and generic multiple subject, amidst the abovementioned 
transformations, stressing the need to take up on the importance of the ethics and 
event of Rethemnos by way of Badiou’s (2005) Being and Event. These events, 
however, are not anthropocentric episodes but involve a-signifying, a-subjectifying 
and a-categorizing practices that are pertinent to the driftwork of a generic multiple 
and the truth procedure of an undecidable other. For an affirmative and responsible 
subject to be mapped, the individual of honour, sacrifice, poetics and shame must be, 
effectively, abandoned or swept away. En route from deconstruction and 
schizoanalysis to Badiou’s glorious reconciling of continental philosophy and 
mathematics, the Rethemniot subject will be no longer poetic or honourific but will 
obey the ontological language of set theory taken up by the axiom of foundation, the 
axiom of choice and the matheme of the indiscernible that interrupt the infinite 
regression of being due to the foundational ability of the event to genuinely proceed 
by means of errancy, chaos, osmosis and the void.
Chapters and Subsections
The thesis is divided in four parts. Part 1 (Chapters 1 and 2) opens up the problem of 
the Old Town offering, both a general introduction to Rethemnos and a more detailed 
and analytic account of the methodological and philosophical background with 
respect to the event. Chapter 1 offers some glimpses into the Old Town problem and 
portrays the dynamics of a place through a brief historical sketch. Chapter 2 is both 
methodological and theoretical and involves a general reading of the methodology 
setting out to explain why a theory of the event was selected and how it is used. 
Specifically, it explains the role of what I have termed the ‘ethnography of the event’, 
its underlining theory and philosophy and the manner in which the empirical findings 
are brought to bear upon the proposed theory. I proceed, accordingly, by offering a 
critique of traditional ethnography, which paves the way for Badiou’s theorization of 
the event, introducing the mathematical formulas of set theory, and stipulating a 
certain ethics of the event. Meanwhile, I give details on my research fieldwork and 
sampling of the files of the Archaeology Service and the restoration data, which I 
thought of as a useful ‘operationalization’ of the division between the repressed and 
the seduced, with respect to the changing built environment of Rethemnos and the 
changing manner in which the restoration project is heretofore conceived.
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Understanding and making sense of the social polarization between the repressed and 
the seduced through the alterations and restorations of the town’s houses, as was 
already argued, is not an exegetical or foundational sociological formula but serves as 
a means to an end, that is, as an attempt to explicate how the Old Town problem 
unfolds and resonates with respect to the housing condition of the town.
Part 2 (Chapters 3 and 4) opens up the conceptual space for a deconstruction of 
Mediterraneanist identities. Chapter 3 argues that Mediterraneanist writings which set 
out to study Mediterranean societies appropriate difference using a naive conception 
of space. Geography, however, is not about representation but, on the contrary, 
“concerns iQdX-ization and not reality itself’ (Doel, 1999: 121). Mediterraneanist 
writings, I argue, are susceptible to criticism because they are tied, first, to a Statist 
philosophy and geographical determinism of a transparent community, as in the 
‘shame-and-honour’ model (Peristiany, 1962, 1965; 1968; Davis, 1977; Campbell, 
1964; Friedl, 1962; du Boulay, 1974; Gilmore, 1987); second, because they obey 
dialectical machinations in coming to terms with the Other; and third, because they 
reduce difference to a sublated third term, whether in the form of the ‘friends of the 
heart’ or in the form of the ‘poetics of womanhood’ (Herzfeld, 1982, 1985, 1987, 
1991; Papataxiarchis, 1990, 2005; Papataxiarchis and Loizos, 1991; Dubisch, 1986, 
1995). Hence, Chapter 4 opens up Papataxiarchis’ (1991) notion of the ‘friends of the 
heart’ to Derrida’s (1992) non-reciprocal and non-economic counterfeit and submits 
the subject formation first, to Lacan’s theorization of the symbolic, and subsequently, 
to the schizoanalytic reflections of the Body without Organs and becoming-woman as 
dissected and disseminated by the Deleuzoguattarian nomadic and war-machines. 
Ultimately, such a theorization will pave the way for a reconceptualization of gender 
beyond the negativity and nihilism advanced by the domestication of women and the 
‘poetics of womanhood’ (Dubisch, 1995).
Part 3 (Chapters 5, 6 and 7) opens up the conceptual space for a similar 
deconstruction of Mediterraneanist spatialities. Chapter 5 offers a radically different 
account of the notion of ‘parasitism’ coined by Tsoucalas (1977), and sets in motion 
the account of ‘capitalism without capitalists’ of Vergopoulos (1975), by offering, 
meanwhile a rigorous reconsideration of Leontidou’s model of ‘spontaneity’, and by 
opening up political-economic theories of space and production -  like Harvey’s
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(1990) ‘time-space compression’ and Herzfeld’s (1991) ‘nostalgia of place’ -  to the 
theoretical practices that pertain to the excessive thought of a theory of the consumer 
society. Chapter 6 submits the experience of the geography of Rethemnos to 
postructuralist ideas of space and specifically to origami -  (the Japanese word for 
folding paper) -  that is, the geophilosophy developed by way of Deleuze and 
Guattari’s schizoanalysis, in order finally, to start to address in Chapter 7, a fuller 
appreciation of the systemic role of consumption taken up by Baudrillard’s and 
Bauman’s theories.
Part 4 (Chapters 8 and 9) brings the abovementioned theorizations to bear upon the 
event of Rethemnos, exploring the extent to which the shifting attitude of the 
Rethemniots toward the Greek state can be assigned to a broader socio-economic 
restructuring, namely the emancipation of capital from labour and the spatialization of 
the repressed/seduced division that are both features/elements that are pertinent to or 
can further explain the meaning of a full-blown consumer society. I will be arguing 
that the shifting attitude of the residents toward the Greek state necessitates a 
reconceptualization of the Mediterranean town, which highlights a historico- 
materialist transition which can be described as putative postmodern. Chapter 9, 
finally, explains and demonstrates how the Rethemniot subject is deformed and 
deconstructed through a three-fold conception of a generic and true difference and 
otherness (affirmative/responsibility; beyond servility and egoism; ambivalence and 
indiscernible undecidability) drawing on Badiou’s mathematical ontology of set 
theory, and particularly, on the axiom of foundation, the axiom of choice and the 
matheme of the non-being of the indiscernible, setting out to undo the certainty, unity 
and stability of the Mediterraneanist imaginary.
This is not the end of the story, of course, not least because poststructuralist 
philosophy and postmodern sociology insist on a perpetual regret, postponement and 
procrastination of any kind of dialectical resolution of difference. Space, place and the 
subject are irresistibly and irreducibly differential. I do not mean by this that all 
writings are meant to produce exotic images, appropriating difference according to 
their own digestive, one-dimensional and striated logic. On the contrary, my task is to 
problematize, complicate, potentialize and actualize certain strategies of writing 
difference in a manner that will take flight from all monstrosities of Mediterraneanist
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thought that accommodate and situate difference on the plane of constancy, integrity 
and rigidity. The present thesis, therefore, is a means in order to draw a fuller picture 
of the Mediterranean region focusing on Rethemnos, which, without being necessarily 
true or false, will transform the uneven relationship between the one who represents 
and the one who is represented. Yet to confuse, complicate and problematize such a 
relationship, ascribing to it a meaning that would not erase, erode, annihilate or 
eradicate difference is neither easy nor uncontestable. It is, precisely this challenge 
opened up by poststructuralism and postmodemity, and the conceptualizations and 
symptoms of Derrida, Deleuze, Guattari, Badiou, Baudrillard and Bauman that makes 
Rethemnos such an interesting task. When all is said and done, I would only hope that 
in the following pages, the encounters I had with the above symptoms of difference 
do justice to their arguments grasping the intersecting mobilities of subject formation, 
social spacing and their spatial configuration in the Mediterranean town of Rethemnos 
in a manner which is simply worthy, in a certain sense that probably only Nietzsche 
has been able to fully appreciate.
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PART ONE: THE OLD TOWN PROBLEM
CHAPTER ONE: THE OLD PROBLEM
1.1 Introduction
Since Rethemnos was declared a ‘scheduled monument’ in 1967, many properties 
have been beautifully reconstructed and restored, while a considerable number of 
other houses have been left unconverted; the latter forming a divided urban landscape 
that when seen in comparison to the newly constructed parts of the town constitutes 
but a striking paradox of a city image that seems to have little to do with the overall 
picture of the entire Rethemnos. My suggestion is that the ability to restore a house is 
not solely a problem lying with the local or embedded rebellious behaviour of the 
Rethemniots in their attempt to refuse to adjust to the restoration imperatives, but 
concerns, above all, a symptom of a new social division in the wake of a fully-fledged 
consumer society. Whilst it is true that Rethemnos has long been based on tourism, 
the recent massive touristification and commodification of almost everything in town, 
has produced an uneven geographical landscape that not only divided, exacerbated 
and intensified some already existing spatial inequalities, but also generated novel 
forms of inequity. As one of the residents of the Old Town bitterly stated in a local 
newspaper:
“If this process [of touristification] is going to be continued then why not ‘lock’ the town behind bars 
and open it only when the tourists are around” (RETHEMNIOTIKA NEA, 1984, pgl 1).
Exploring the extent to which the monumentalization of the Old Town is immanent to 
and a result of the antitheses and contradictions of the consumer society is useful in 
making sense of the reasons according to which, the residents’ attitude toward the 
Greek State has radically changed over time. The reversal and radically different 
reception of the restoration project, unexpectedly expressed through and marked by 
the transition from a constant anti-interventionist period to a demand for increasing 
state intervention, illustrates the intensification of the unequal social relations and 
uneven geographical structures triggered by a rapid yet inevitable monumentalization 
and consummation of the geohistory of the Old Town.
Emesto Laclau and Chantal Mouffe (1985: 140) have long ago argued, by way of the 
relatively autonomous role of the state, that “Plurality is not the phenomenon to be
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explained but the starting point of analysis”. Interestingly though such a formulation 
may equally be applied to the various superimposed identitifications that I have come 
to notice in Rethemnos: between the Rethemniot identity, the Greek identity, the 
Mediterranean identity and the Greek state. The essence of such conceptualization is 
helpful in understanding not only the contested meaning of the identity-building 
process in Rethemnos, which is not easily assignable to any person or individual, but 
the role of the Greek state as well, which seems to be all pervasive with respect to 
Greek social life, and which tends to be in conflict with the more informal and 
pragmatic aspects of the Greek lifeworld.
For Herzfeld (1982, 1987), however, the way the Greek state operates seems to be 
totally rejected by the Greeks from the very beginning, that is, from the time the 
Greek nation-state was formally established in 1821. Yet, the tenor of the totality of 
Greek scholarly writing, as much as that of lay/popular travel writing, has invariably 
been about whether Greece had anything to do with the West, and whether it were 
possible for the Greeks to leave aside, forget or even escape the thrust of the 
‘Ottoman/Oriental’ tradition that for almost 400 years ruled over the Balkans, a part 
of which the modem Greek nation-state machine had come to occupy by the 19th 
century. The Oriental influence and the role it played in harnessing anew and patching 
together the infinite threads of Greek identity was thus always a matter of dispute, as 
its persistent role, in both historical and cultural/hegemonic terms, could not easily be 
deflected sapping what was thought to be some unquestionable nationalist ideals (the 
Greek identity continuity throughout the centuries). For to be a Greek had, above all 
else, to do with a certain ambivalence in terms of what it meant to be a ‘European’, in 
a very peculiar though remarkable manner that only a deconstructive intuition might 
comprehend, an intuition of the kind advanced by Derrida (1995) in the Khora, that is, 
that Platonic space of Timaeus which “oscillates between two types of oscillation: the 
double exclusion (neither/nor) and the participation {both this and that)” (Derrida, 
1995: 91) -  or by the same token the liminal geography that is the place of the 
“Limes: mark, march, margin” (Derrida, 1981: 16).
Likewise, Bruno Latour (2005) in his various ‘actor network’ analyses proposed that a 
more truthful interpretation of sociology would be that of following the various actors 
in their ‘physical’ so to speak environment rather than interpreting or explaining their
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actions. Following the actors maybe rather closer to the original meaning of the social 
(Latour, 2005: 6). Bogging down and pitching any identity formation (among the 
Greek, the Mediterranean and the Rethemniot) runs aground, therefore, on the various 
uncertainties with which Latour (2005: 28) associates any ‘group formation’. Identity, 
therefore, should be made, especially if by identity one understands, as I do, 
something that is in a constant state of creation and construction.
Greek identification processes do not have to oppose Mediterranean identities or 
Cretan identities; the thread that ties together these permutations should be but “a 
movement in need of continuation” (Latour, 2005: 37). This is why I have chosen to 
focus on the event rather the structure or the dimension of the social. For any “action 
should remain a surprise, a mediation, an event” (Latour, 2005: 45), like Derrida’s 
(1992) counterfeit money. I will have the opportunity to delve into these weighty 
issues in subsequent chapters, whence I venture to work out how Badiou’s (2005) 
Being and Event might offer a substantially useful theorization in coming to terms 
with how the various aspects of identity among the stratified layers of the ‘Greek’, the 
‘Mediterranean’ and the ‘Cretan/Rethemniot’ can be reconciled or eloquently brought 
to bear upon each other. Accordingly, the question shall not be which one of these 
traits is dominant, but rather how the infinite process and innumerable folds of any 
identification process bounces ideas off any established identity and redraws new 
lines of flight -  not one at a time but all at once, that is, simultaneously and yet 
without denying the specificity and historicity of each of them. As the anthropologist 
David Gilmore observed almost 20 years ago, the “‘Mediterranean’ implies much 
more than geography” (Gilmore, 1982: 177) and thus it would be problematic to have 
the ambition to define once and for all whether the ‘Greek’ is an equivalent of the 
‘Mediterranean’, and/or the ‘Rethemniot’ - in terms of hierarchy (which identity is 
stronger) or priority (which identity comes first).
It is nonetheless true that the Greek statehood, as Herzfeld (1982) argued, has been 
more than keen to represent the Greek people as heirs to the Hellenist culture, which, 
more often than not, is associated with the heritage and achievements of ancient 
Greece. On the other hand, the ethnographic tradition that set out to narrate the history 
of modem Greece has mostly focused on small and isolated communities -  as we 
shall see in Chapters 3 and 4 -  which arguably exhibit how modem Greece maintains
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a conflictual and contested relationship with its past. Being Greek, therefore, as 
Herzfeld (1986: 218) would put it, was always about elaborating on conflictual 
images of “the two faces of Greek national identity that conform to the models of 
public pride and private intimacy”. Yet that sort of negotiation does not seem to be 
easily resolved, neither in practical nor in theoretical terms, inasmuch as it remains 
profoundly aporetic, undecidable and ambivalent. “When talking to a foreigner, for 
example, a Greek may well adopt a Hellenic pose [on the other hand] the Romeic 
model [acknowledges] the importance of Turkish and other non-Westem influences 
on Greek culture” (Herzfeld, 1986: 218).
Now, while I would be to some extent sympathetic with the overall tone of such an 
intuition, I would also like to pursue the argument of the dualistic nature of Greek 
identity beyond Herzfeld’s prescriptive prerogative briefly described above. It is in a 
similar tone, however, that Herzfeld (1985: 4) has already argued that “Glendi’s [a 
pseudonym for the village he conducted a major ethnographic study in Crete] 
relationship to the rest of Crete resembles that of the island as a whole to the Greek 
nation-state”. As he put it, with reference to this unsolved differentiation of Greek 
identity, but also by means of the small provincial villages where he lived whilst 
studying the Greek culture, “The tension between national and political identity forms 
a dominant theme [...]; if authoritarian discourse is characterized by such totalizing 
equivalences as nation and state, or religion and church (cf. Goldschlagel 1982: 13- 
16), then by the same token the Glendiot response is a constant, irreverent 
deconstruction of that discourse” (Herzfeld, 1985: 23). And as he also suggested in 
another of his studies (cf. Herzfeld, 1986), women in Greece can be seen as an 
equivalent of, or as having the role occupied by the ‘Romeic model’ in interpreting 
Greek society as whole; that is, as the mode of thought that takes woman to be 
subversive, submissive but also seductive, irradiating, however, a certain delicate and 
graceful cunning. In all instances, the negotiation and constantly reinstated slippage of 
any solid identity-building process -  among the various levels of correspondence of 
the ‘Greek’, the ‘Cretan/Rethemniot’ and the ‘Mediterranean’ identities -  has been led 
astray and overshadowed. It is for this reason that, in subsequent chapters, I shall 
focus not only on Deleuze’s (1994) lines of flight, but also on the mathematical 
infinity that Badiou’s (2005) analysis lavishly offers.
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For now, however, a brief historical account of the Old Town is offered, which 
focuses chiefly on the Venetian period, though it does not comprise a detailed 
historical analysis opening up instead the history of the town to a deterritorialized 
‘point o f view’ (‘deterritorializations’ and ‘points’ do not go together and this is why 
the italics) in order to help us understand how Rethemnos’ identity was historically 
construed. To explore and explain the extent to which the number of interventions and 
improvements of the properties of the Old Town is a useful illustration of the general 
ability of the residents to afford, appreciate, and appropriate the multifaceted and 
much-contested restoration program, is one of the tasks of the present thesis. Though 
house-tenancy and occupation are not necessarily markers of class-belonging, they 
can be still taken to constitute a trace of socio-cultural capital (Bourdieu, 1984) which 
explicates the grounds on which the suspicion of the residents with respect to the 
monumentalization process resides and the way in which the city’s identity has been 
radically transformed by recourse to the restoration project. The improvements, 
alterations and restorations of the properties stand, in other words, for an equivalent, 
not only of class position/cleavage, but above all, of the general ability of the 
residents in economic, social and cultural terms to accept, participate and support 
whole-heartedly the coveted and seductive game of tourism, and consumption.
The monumentalization of the Old Town has turned the historic centre of the town 
into a vast playground at the disposal of the seduced. Whilst I am not taking, on the 
one hand, the Old Town’s rich residents as necessarily the seduced and, on the other 
hand, the poor residents as the repressed, the spatial formation of this split, that is, the 
difference between the houses that have been restored and eventually turned into 
hotels, tourist-shops, bars and restaurants and the properties that have not been fully 
restored and refurbished, points in the direction of the euphemistic postmodern divide 
between the ‘repressed’ and the ‘seduced’. Such a socio-spatial division is neither a 
totally localizable break in space that divides, categorizes and distributes differences, 
constituting a transcendental exegetical scheme of foundational origin, nor a 
programmatic manifesto of a novel approach to Mediterranean studies. Yet as we 
shall see in Chapter 7, it resonates with the conceptualization of the systemic nature of 
consumption, the sociogenesis of consumerism, the heteronomy of the producers, and 
the reversibility of symbolic exchange. Despite the fact, therefore, that the 
repressed/seduced division, as a theoretical category, neither homologically represents
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nor hermetically coincides with matches the socio-spatial polarization generated and 
sustained by the restoration project, it is still a useful theoretical-practice that allows a 
fruitful experimentation with urban problems on the face of a rapidly changing reality 
that transforms the city in an unprecedented manner.
Much of Mediterraneanist rhetoric conceives of space and place naturally and matter- 
of-factly, that is in a manner which accentuates the power and ability of place to 
unprecedented heights conceiving of it as an authentic expression of local difference. 
Such a strategy, however, is enclosed within the anachronism and structural nostalgia 
of the metaphysics of presence, the impoverished ontologies of space and the 
idealized periodization and historization of the Venetian past. Herzfeld’s (1991) study 
of Rethemnos is hugely implicated and coincidental with such metaphysical 
conceptions that imputed to Mediterraneanist thinking the need to conceiving of place 
as immune and innately pure -  something however that calls for rigorous 
reconsideration. It is time to start reading the Old Town neither as point, nor as a mark 
of Mediterranean difference and uniqueness, nor as limit but above all, as a doubly- 
folded event that oscillates between the repressed/seduced division and the 
ethnography of the event. Rethemnos is neither a clash between social and 
monumental history, nor a parasitic or spontaneous fix that absorbs or irradiates some 
kind of intact Mediterranean authenticity or innocence, for the difference space makes 
does not involve the uniqueness and precariousness of a place which is violently taken 
over by an exterritorial agent. Nor is difference an extreme limit through which place 
is internalized by some kind of poetic ability, which in turn defends in public the 
excellence and performance of a deeply rooted cultural embeddedness executed in 
some kind of rhetorical, verbal or stylistic manner. The poetic Rethemnos is 
unbecoming and ill-mannered, as we shall see in Chapter 4, simply because it insists 
on a good and authentic side of place, which gets violently distorted or exploited by 
mass tourism.
The task of deconstruction by contrast, is to loosen and break out of such an 
impoverished ontology and fetishism of space, place and difference in accord with the 
spatial art of origami and the systemic nature, hyperteleia and suppletion of the 
consumer society (Clarke and Doel, 1994). These issues are further taken up in 
subsequent chapters, yet for the time let me unpack what the ‘Old Town problem’
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stands for and why the tow n’s incomplete and contested identity should not be taken 
as a deviation or an exception o f a solidly produced and historically durable identity, 
but as a way of being or a way o f making sense o f the identification process, which in 
the wake o f consumerism is embroiled in a turmoil that cast its long shadow and 
leaves a heavy imprint on the tow n’s identity. The exposition below is unavoidably 
descriptive and rather empirical, but is useful in that it lays the groundwork for 
Chapter 2, which tries to integrate methodologically, so to speak, the Old Town 
problem with the radical reconceptualization advanced by the ‘ethnography o f the 
event’.
1.2 The Problem
Rethemnos is a small coastal town in Crete, which has recently faced the prospect o f 
considerable growth in terms o f population and economic development. Rethemnos, 
in particular is not an industrial town but it is largely based on tourism, a statement 
that holds true for most islands o f Greece. Yet the Old Town part o f Rethemnos, a 
beautiful Venetian spatial configuration which as Herzfeld (1991: 34) admits is one o f 
the best-preserved Venetian monuments outside Italy, has not been always dependent 
on tourism. It is only after the restoration projection was put forward that tourism 
became o f major importance and its potentials was fully exploited and acknowledged. 
And although many o f the Venetian buildings are in need o f  restoration and 
reconstruction, a process which has already started some 40 years ago, the town still 
preserves many o f its geographical and architectural characteristics from the 17th 
century (Fig. 1).
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Figure 1: Venetian Rethemnos on canvass (Dimakopoulos, 1977: i)
The Venetian town constitutes an important part of the geohistory of Rethemnos, 
which besides the Old Town includes a recently formed and continually developing 
New Town that keeps expanding from Perivolia, Panormo, Skaleta and Misiria in the 
East all the way to Mastaba, Kallithea, and Panorama in the West. All these areas of 
Rethemnos constitute distinct yet interrelated places with their own particular history 
and geography, but the Old Town is still dominant amidst such a social cartography of 
people, histories and places, and has played a key role in the recent economic 
development and restructuring of Rethemnos. And although tourism became the chief 
economic activity over the last 40 years, the restoration of the Old Town was already 
from the very beginning a hotly contested issue among the residents. The original Old 
Town Houses’ Owners Association (OTHOA), formed in the 1970s, has 
characteristically opposed and fought against the restoration project and the fact that 
the Venetian properties should be reconstructed under the law of the ‘scheduled 
monument’. The revival of the residents’ Association (AROOT) however, under a 
new leader, and in a totally and radically new direction in the 1990s, seeking this time 
increasing state intervention and protection, is not only a remarkable change in the 
manner in which the identity of the town is currently seen and negotiated but marks a 
displacement in society and space that necessitates a reconceptualization of the 
Mediterranean town and a retheorization of the Old Town problem.
To demonstrate and explain how and why the residents changed their attitude in terms 
of the restoration project from ardent opponents of the restoration project of which 
they thought to be an inexplicable ordeal, to constant supporters of the need to 
preserve the monumental and historical significance of the town, is an issue that 
deserves closer scrutiny. The question I want to address is whether this change is 
somehow related to the recent development of the consumer society and the changing 
experience and identity formation of the Mediterranean subject; and whether it is still 
plausible to appeal or assign to such transformations the notions of hospitality, 
friendship, poetic purity, spontaneity and creativity that are dominant in 
Mediterraneanist imaginations or the time has come to elaborate on certain 
differential concepts that will most likely stem from conceptions of difference without
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name, identity or negation. Building on such a differential theory of the subject which 
is singular and territorialized but at the same time multiple and deterritorialized, 
undecidable and uninsurable, moral but infinite if not universal too, will allow to 
think the Old Town problem through an understanding of the cultural logic of late 
capitalism (Jameson, 1984), the consumer society (Baudrillard, 1996), and the 
division between the seduced and the repressed (Bauman, 1987). Such a theory is also 
vital, in accomplishing a more perceptive appreciation of the ceaseless deformation 
and reformation of the Old Town and the far-reaching consequences and implications 
the restoration project has for the undecidable experience and multiplicity of the 
Rethemniot subject. What I am going to argue in the following chapters thus is that 
Rethemnos is indicative of such strategies of writing difference regarding our 
understandings of space and identity that emanate by virtue of the discourses of 
poststructuralism.
The ability to restore a Venetian property can be taken to reflect the social position of 
the residents within a social context that is highly determined by the relations and 
structures of consumption which are, by and large, consonant with a cultural hierarchy 
surrendered to the irresistibly seductive forces and contradictions of the market. For 
consumption, as we will see in Chapter 7, is about a mode of domination and a social 
hierarchy that presides over contemporary societies, far beyond any logic that insists 
on taking it as a mere cloth or a superficial accessory of capitalism that manipulates 
and produces a variety of ‘false’ needs (cf. Marcuse, 1964). The monumentalization 
of the town, that is, the fact that the Greek state demanded the restoration and 
preservation of all Venetian properties according to specific guiding rules and 
designing standards, while resulting on the one hand, in the beautiful restoration of 
many of these buildings, on the other hand, has produced a deformed and degenerated 
urban landscape of properties occupied by tenants who were unable, unwilling or 
simply unaware of the need to restore their houses. The number, use and geographical 
distribution of the restorations completed throughout a period of almost 40 years 
constitute a useful, even if schematic and improvised feature, of the emerging 
contested consumer geography of a city, which is currently succumbed to the 
predominance of aesthetic spacing. The revival of AROOT in the 1990s founded this 
time on the grounds of a radically different conception of the state signals, neither a 
temporal break (monumental versus social history) nor a strict spatial polarization
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between the Old Town and the rest of Rethemnos, but mostly the becoming-possible 
and medium through which the repressed and the seduced are opposed in the town. 
Conceptualizing the Old Town as a consequence of the postmodern divide between 
the repressed and the seduced tends to reconsider, therefore, not only the bureaucratic 
and archaeological restrictions of monumental history, but forges a common 
conceptual thread that runs from the event of Rethemnos to the highly shifting socio­
economic context of capitalism. As time and again the monumentalization of the town 
produced an uneven urban landscape of minimum practical use for its inhabitants, a 
fuller understanding of the processes and the manner in which space and identity 
unfold and are mutually determined, becomes more urgent than ever. Of these 
processes, it is mostly the social spaces of the Old Town which constantly depend on 
and are hugely affected by tourism, consumption and the promotion of the place’s 
history in the tourist market, that make the restoration project a profound and visible 
sign of the changing experience of space, place and the subject at the dawn of the 
consumer society.
I discuss below Rethemnos’ history1, and its current spatial organization in a way 
which is simplified to a considerable extent. Such an exposition neither provides a 
complete historical account nor analyzes some major historical events in much detail 
as it is restricted instead to some key historical episodes that largely refer to the 
Venetian period. Yet despite its partial and incomplete character, comprising only a 
caricature of the image of the city from the beginning of the Venetian domination to 
the town’s surrender to the Ottomans, such a periodization is still useful in that it 
helps to make sense of the present situation and spatial structure of modem 
Rethemnos and in that it sheds light on some of the reasons behind the inchoate and 
yet much contested nature of the monumentalization of the town.
Rethemnos, from the Greek reithron + idor (flat stone + water), is the third largest 
town of Crete, located at the northwestern part of the island, between the other two
1 This brief historical introduction is based on Dimakopoulos, I., E. (2001) Rethemnos Houses: A 
Contribution to the Study o f the Renaissance Architecture o f  Crete in 16th- 17th. Athens: TAP, 1st ed. 
1977 (in Greek); Troulis, M. (1998) Rethemnos, History, Contemporary Life. Athens: Mitos (in Greek); 
Ksanthoudidi, St. (1939) The Venetian Domination in Crete and the Struggles o f  Cretans against the 
Venetians. Athens (in Greek); Prevelakis, P. (1980) Chronicle o f  a Polity. Athens: Estia, 1st ed. 1938 
(in Greek); Moutsopoulos, N. and G. D. Zervas (1973) The Old Town o f  Rethemnos. Thessaloniki: 
Aristotle University o f Thessaloniki (in Greek).
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major towns of Crete, Herakleion and Chania. Rethemnos’ climate, like the rest of 
Crete, is hot and dry, and a considerable shortage of water supply was already evident 
in the town especially throughout the Venetian period. Rittimna has existed since the 
Mycenaean period, without necessarily constituting an important settlement at the 
time whilst as legend has it, the island of Crete was originally inhabited by a few 
families of Byzantine origin -  though whether Venetian Rethemnos was constructed 
on what was the site of ancient Rittimna is still a matter of dispute. The town, 
however, irradiates even until the present days, a considerable degree of continuity in 
terms of its spatial structure, streets and building blocks (Fig. 2). In 1206, Rethemnos 
was taken over by Enrico Pescatore’s navy, a Genovese leader who was at the time 
fighting against Venice, although the Venetians finally won the battle against 
Pescatore’s navy, managing to occupy Rethemnos. The period of the Venetian 
dominance was marked by a series of conflicts and struggles between the residents 
and the Venetians to be extended across the whole of Crete. An on-going period of 
tensions and resistance against the invaders began and although many revolts ended in 
bloodshed, and were fiercely and violently paused, the antagonistic spirit of the 
Rethemniots remained inexhaustible. Some of the most characteristic and notorious, 
in terms of their scale and the sorrow, calamity and cruelty they caused, were the 
revolt of the family of Agiostefaniton in 1211, followed in 1217, by the revolt of the 
families of Skordilidon and Melissinon and in 1261, by the revolt of the family of 
Chortatzidon (Ksanthoudidi, 1939). Conflicts occurred, however, not only between 
the Venetians and the Cretans but also between the Venetians of Crete and the people 
of Venice, one of the most famous of which took place in 1363, sadly to be ended, 
nevertheless with the revolt of St. Titos, an endo-Venetian clash between colony and 
metropolis (Dimakopoulos, 1977).
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Figure 2: C ontem porary  street plan o f  R ethemnos (D im akopoulos, 1977: 326)
From 1367 onward Rethemniots and Venetians entered into a period o f  almost three 
hundred years o f peaceful coexistence, although the underlying tensions never really 
stopped. Interestingly, some areas o f Crete scarcely, if ever, saw any Venetian 
presence, with Sfakia to the south o f Chania being one such remarkable exception 
refusing to surrender to any o f Crete’s conquerors. Conflicts and struggles emerged 
also between the peasantry and the Venetian-Rethemniot higher social ranks. In the 
1571 uprising, which was the first Ottoman attempt to take over the town, the 
peasants instead o f protecting the town from Oulouts A li’s attack, robbed the 
abandoned houses o f the aristocrats. It is worth mentioning, however, that the original 
conflicts between the Venetians and the Rethemniots had nothing to do with the cruel 
Ottoman invasion o f 1645, which followed Oulouts A li’s conquest during which 
many Rethemniots were killed and the town was completely destroyed. After the 
Ottoman invasion of 1645, the higher ranks o f the Venetocretans gradually lost their 
strength and power, while a new middle class emerged owing its existence to the 
rapid development o f commerce and a significant increase in population. Fewer and 
fewer conflicts were also reported between the Venetian Catholic and the Cretan
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Orthodox populations, not only because the visible foe was now the Ottomans but, 
above all, because the Cretans of Venetian background were eventually outnumbered 
by the Cretan Orthodox population. By 1453, nonetheless, when the Ottomans 
invaded Istanbul (Constantinople’s ‘fall’, in the Greek nationalist discourse) the 
Greek orthodox element was already dominant in Rethemnos.
The need, accordingly, to protect the town was urgent and thus it comes as no surprise 
that on the Vigla Hill of Rethemnos, the foundation stone of a castle was laid, into 
which all residents had to move. In 1588, the impressive Fortezza was finally built 
making the authorities expressly proud, despite the fact that most of the inhabitants 
unexpectedly refused to abandon their properties and move in the castle, with the 
exception of two or three families. In desperation, the Venetian authorities of 
Rethemnos kept this a secret from the metropolis of Venice, but the fact remained that 
the Fortezza castle was a great disappointment, though remarkable in terms of its 
architecture and design, representing, above all, a significant failure in persuading 
people to relocate to a place that would considerably restrict and control their lives, 
even if it was about offering a safer predicament.
Geographically speaking, the Old Town’s buildings and overall designing tone have 
all kept the original geographical structure, which owes much to the unexpected, and 
more often than not unappreciated by many historians, respect the Ottomans showed 
to the Venetian architecture. The three well-known commercial streets of the town, 
the street of Arkadiou, the street of Ethnikis Antistaseos and the street of Melissinou 
have long been important and famous, leading to the town centre known as Castel
thVecchio. During the 15 century, when most urban formations of Crete were 
undergoing expansive development, Castel Vecchio expanded toward the 
southeastern part of the coast overcoming its initial boundaries. In the eastern part of 
the town, where the remains of the Kara Mousa Pasa mosque lie, an elementary 
defensive position stood, known by the name of St. Varvara or “Gate of Sand” {Porta 
tis Ammou) (Dimakopoulos, 2001: 70), constituting the eastern entrance of the town -  
to be carelessly destroyed, however, during the short Russian domination of 1900, 
soon after the Ottomans abandoned Rethemnos. A similar construction known as St. 
Verieranda that was destroyed earlier in the 17 century, used to stand at the south of 
the town. Today it is only the Guoro Door (Fig. 4 and 5) that survives, named after the
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Rector (Rettore) Giacomo Guoro who designed and built the gate, and unlike the two 
previous entrances, it still appears solid and stable, located in the beginning o f the 
Street o f Ethnikis Antistaseos (Dimakopoulos, 2001). Overall, the roads and streets o f 
the Old Town constitute a fairly complex urban morphology with irregularly sized 
streets cutting acanonically across each other (Fig. 3), something which holds 
particularly true for the Eastern part o f the town.
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Figure 3: Venetian M ap o f  R ethem nos T ow n (D im akopoulos ,  1977: 326)
By contrast, the western part o f the town irradiates a rationally organized space o f 
regular squares. Apart from the three important streets above, a number o f other 
constructions deserve to be mentioned. The building o f Lozza, located in the area o f 
Castel Vecchio, was the place where the noble Venetians gathered, and was 
constructed in the 16th century. It proudly stands now at the com er o f the streets o f
thEthnikis Antistaseos and Palaiologou, housing the 28 Inspectorate o f Byzantine and 
Postbyzantine Antiquities. At about the same time as Loggia was built a Venetian 
sun-clock-tower was also built, only to be destroyed immediately after the Second 
World War. Most o f the Venetian neighborhoods are currently known, and historians 
believe that they are in a position to locate their exact position in the town. The Castel 
neighborhood, we are told, is located close to the Castel Vecchio, whilst the Agias 
Sofias neighborhood is adjacent to the area where the Sohora mosque lies. In addition,
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the Agiou Lazciron neighborhood is the place where the Greek Orthodox Church 
(.Mikri Panagia) stands, whereas the area called Mantraki is believed to be located 
near the old Venetian Porto. Finally, the area known as Ouzoul Sokak (Makri Steno) 
is today the area around the Street o f Nikiforu Foka.
Figure 4: The G uoro D oor top left (D im akopoulos ,  1977: 333)
Figure 5: The G uoro D oor as it currently stands on the right (picture taken by the author)
In 1967 Rethemnos’ Old Town was declared a ‘scheduled monument’ and in order to 
be protected a complicated set o f laws was produced, such as the Ministerial Decision 
OEK [606B/3.10.67] and the more recent corrective OEK [700B/30.8.91]. These laws 
concerned almost the entire Old Town, from Fortezza, to the Street Dimakopoulou, to 
the Street Ethnarhou Makariou, and to the Street Venizelou. A variety o f other 
regulations and bills have been also promoted. Presidential Decree 1.12.75 specified 
the conditions and limitations o f construction [OEK 36A/31.1.1976], whilst 
Presidential Decree 19.10.78 designated Rethemnos a ‘traditional settlement’ [OEK 
594A/13.11.78]. Presidential Decree 10.11.78 added further prohibitions and 
‘conditions o f construction’ [OEK 634A/1.12.78], whilst Presidential Decree 
25.10.84 concerned the ‘Modification o f the Old Town zone plan and free spaces, 
yards and streets’ [OEK 30A/14.2.85]. Two more subsidiary laws, K.N. 5351/32 
about the ‘Buildings built before 1830’ and N. 1469/50 concerned with the ‘Buildings
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built after 1830’, were also introduced in order to complete the canonistic set of bills 
under the jurisdiction of which the Venetian and Ottoman monuments should be 
reconstructed. In terms of its population, the Old Town in 1973 numbered 5,133 
residents, comprising 1,329 families and 423 people living on their own. 1,034 
properties were owned at the time by Old Town residents, whilst 647 were rented 
properties. Most of the residents were of low economic and educational background 
(Moutsopoulos and Zervas, 1973: 117-120). In 1991, the Old Town numbered 7,150 
residents, whilst in 1998 the area reportedly numbered 2,100 houses. At present, 
Rethemnos, the newly constructed parts included, numbers almost 35,000 people. In 
1998 (Table 1) 863 properties were rented or privately owned, 127 were reported 
empty, 342 were made for general commerce, 63 were jewelry shops, 96 tourist 
shops, 42 shops of pure commerce, 18 small business, 10 stores, 94 empty shops, 59 
offices, 13 tourist offices, 39 hotels and rooms to let, 18 bars, 88 taverns, 2 cinemas, 
10 public services, 2 banks, 12 cultural centers (Zivas, 1998: 18).
Table 1: Uses of properties in the Old Town in 1998 (based on Zivas, 1998)
Rented or owned properties 863
Empty properties 127
General commerce (mini markets and stores) 342
Jewelry shops 63
Tourist shops/mini markets 96
Pure commerce (clothing) 42
Small business 18
Stores/super markets 10
Offices 59
Tourist offices 13
Hotels 39
Bars 18
T avems/restaurants 88
Cinemas 2
Public services 10
Banks 2
Cultural centers 12
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Interestingly, however, almost thirty years ago Rethemnos did not look the way it 
looks now. As Herzfeld (1991: 41) would have put it, “Until about 1965 Rethemnos 
was a self-contained, small town that barely overran the enclosure of its Venetians 
walls”. Yet, the Old Town problem is not strictly about the boundaries of 
physical/social space. The boosting tourism industry has significantly problematized 
the manner in which locals think and perceive of themselves and their place’s identity. 
What is more, tourism and consumption have considerably altered and transformed, 
the identification processes and discourses that were, more often than not, associating 
the Cretan identity with a proud individual that resists and fights bureaucracy, the 
state and foreign capital. And as Herzfeld (1991: 86) had already noted with respect to 
the influence and impact tourism would have on what might be considered to be a 
‘Mediterranean’ way of responding to foreigners, strangers or outsiders, indeed some 
“local observers object to the commercialization of social relations -  “tradition” -  that 
has moved, in short time, from hospitable spontaneity to “servility” (dhouloprepeia). 
What is worse from their point of view, this servility is based on commercial 
calculation”. Being servile, therefore, according to Herzfeld’s account seems 
increasingly and inevitably problematic in a small coastal town that has faced the 
prospects and fruits of consumption and tourist development, especially, in moral 
terms as the Rethemniot individual appears now inferior or subversive to the foreign 
capital and its power, and in a way the town is about to lose the traditional hospitality 
on which social relations were previously based. It is questionable, however, whether 
such a conception of Rethemnos which is mostly based on the glosses of lack, 
absence or loss, could serve as a realistic alternative in coming to terms with the 
changing aspects and facets of space and identity in a place where consumption and 
tourism play pivotal roles in the formation of the collective imaginary and the social 
memory of its inhabitants.
Such theorizations, however, that insist on portraying the town in accord with some 
unitary conception of identity that has been sadly or irretrievably lost because of the 
tourist consumption, should not be cause for lamentation, nostalgia or crisis, but 
should instead be given over to and replaced by a careful examination of the excessive 
conditions that are responsible for the changing experience of space, place and the 
subject in the wake of a full-blown consumer society. One should, therefore, let the
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poetic ontologies of loss, presence and scarcity go, making space, for schizoanalysis, 
deconstruction, consumption, origami and the ethnography of the event.
I will have the chance to delve into these huge issues in subsequent chapters. Suffice 
it to note for now, that one of the concerns of the present thesis is to undo the above 
poetic and nostalgic conceptualization of a place and its alleged loss of an identity- 
building process based on proud individuals, and honourific subjects, that appears 
gradually to be left on the hands of a regrettably ruthless servile Cretan subject who is 
after profits and thereby beyond any authentic expression of Mediterranean hospitality 
and tradition. Such a theorization will have to be totally reconsidered and 
reconstructed, and it is one of the tasks of the next chapters to present a fuller account 
of difference that will be truly differential rather than representative or poetic.
It is true, however, that since the town was declared a monument “a largely new 
economic resource has become apparent: houses” (Herzfeld, 1991: 116). Thus the 
restoration project, the Venetian buildings and the need to preserve them have all 
played a key role in transmogrifying the landscape of the town and in altering the 
manner in which space, place and the subject are dis-articulated and unfolded in 
Rethemnos. My own concern with space and the subject, however, is not meant to 
propose that the Rethemniot is not servile and that the spatial organization of the town 
has not been subject to considerable alterations and transformations or that tourism is 
simply an economic and fairly unchallenged activity that benefits all residents 
irrespective of their class position/standing. What I propose is not about denying the 
change, becoming and deformation of the traditional urban landscape and the subject 
formation of Rethemnos, but about thinking of ways in order to map and explore what 
matters to subjects amid such a highly dynamic and changing socio-spatial 
environment and how to make sense of these recent transformations, perceiving 
Rethemnos’ identity through excess rather than lack, absence rather than presence, 
becoming rather than being, space rather than time, deterritorialization rather than 
territorialization and geography rather than history or anthropology. That truths exist 
we know from Badiou (2005)’s marvelous analysis of being. It remains to be seen, 
however, which are the truths that matter to subjects in terms of the allegations over 
servility, the restoration project and the manner in which the dialectics of change 
between the restoration project and the subject’s identity are transformed on the face
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of the Old Town problem and by way of the ceaseless negotiation of the town’s 
identities.
Having outlined some of the basic historical and geographical characteristics of the 
Old Town, I am now in a position to start deconstructing Mediterraneanism by 
opening up Mediterraneanist identities (the shame-and-honour model, the poetic 
model, the notion of the friends of the heart and the poetics of womanhood) to the far- 
reaching implications and effects of differential repetitions (Deleuze), the counterfeit 
(Derrida), and becoming-woman (Deleuze and Guattari). Before that however, I offer 
some glimpses into the underlining methodological peregrinations of what I have 
come to call ‘ethnography of the event’, discussing the manner in which this intuition, 
especially in the way taken up by Badiou’s forceful and persuasive theorization 
(2005), can be useful in further mapping the Rethemniot subject.
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CHAPTER TWO: METHODOLOGY - ETHNOGRAPHY OF THE EVENT
2.1 Introduction
The recent restructuring and tremendous rebuilding of the properties of the Old Town, 
not only intensifies some original differences, and conflicts but creates new divisions 
in and of space. The intense restructuring of the town, the restoration of the Venetian 
properties and the increasing number of tourists that visit the town coincides with the 
irresistible forces of consumerism, which have all turned the use of social space and 
the Venetian buildings into a marketable sign of the meticulous reorganization of the 
town’s identity.
The ethnography of the event is one of the possible ways to study the experience of 
the subject in the face of such a turmoil. Yet it is neither simply a method of some 
interpretive ethnography contained in the form of a mystic local knowledge that begs 
for extra careful unveiling (Geertz, 1983), nor just a technique. Its philosophy, 
therefore, needs further unpacking. I should state at the outset that the ethnography of 
the event begins in the middle of things, re-releasing effects of speed and slowness, 
re-inscribing and re-citing repetitions of the differance in the same itself, rather than 
describing or symbolizing ‘exotic’ or ‘distant’ cultures. And thus, it goes without 
saying, it moves beyond traditional or conventional ways of mapping the modem 
subject, like interviews, questionnaires and the various participant observations. The 
event, above all, is a difference-producing repetition that draws lines of flight 
allowing the subject to make motionless trips in space, precisely because an event is 
not a symptom of presence, but that which affirms the responsible other which is open 
to solicitation, iterability and conjuration. Hereinafter, I am not interested in the poetic 
subject of Rethemnos, but in the event which may occur somewhere, elsewhere, 
otherwise and which the subject faithfully follows in such a manner that states its 
fidelity to it; for “Events arrive” amid the “possibility of non-arrival” (Clarke and 
Doel, 1994: 507). Something may happen exactly when everything, stutters, vanishes 
and dissimulates. Cast of the die, as Mallarme has it, for “Every thought emits a cast 
of dice” (Badiou, 2005: 197). Theorizing the event, therefore, is important in order to 
come to terms with the Cretan subject if one wants to explore and understand not only 
in some relativist sense how the current identification processes work, but most 
importantly the truth that matters to subjects when a generic multiple emerges, which
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is open to the radical alterity and infinite variation of something wholly other -  which 
is not solely associated with the notions of honour, hospitality, poetics and so on. 
What the ethnography of the event maps, in short, is the trace that leaves behind the a- 
signifying and a-subjective individual which forces the undecidable out of the 
indiscernible rather than the meaning, symbolism or honourific poeticity of an 
individual that executes obediently or even skillfully some rhetorical or practical 
tasks. For Badiou however, in order an individual to deserve the name of the subject, 
a truth procedure should break and swerve away from the state of a fully-deployed 
historical situation.
The structure of the present chapter is four-fold. First, I draw attention to the problems 
of the so-called hermeneutical tradition offering a brief criticism and proposing 
another way of doing ethnography beyond the poetic ontologies, focusing mainly on 
Marcus’ and Fischer’s Anthropology as Cultural Critique (1986), which I take to 
constitute one of the major influences in hermeneutical ethnography, not only because 
it is explicitly associated with what is often called ‘postmodern ethnography’, but 
crucially as way of showing that not all accounts of difference are as ‘legitimate’ as it 
is often assumed and that any true difference that deserves its name as such should be 
above all, differential. Second, I take up on the event in order to sketch out how a 
subject amidst conditions of undecidability, manages to withhold, postpone and delay 
any poetic presence and honorific identification, enacting a certain ethics of the event 
and a non-representational ethnography, which is not easily grasped by traditional 
ways of doing ethnography. I proceed, accordingly, following Badiou’s (2003, 2005) 
conception of the subject’s militancy, multiplicity and un-anticipation in an attempt to 
arrive at a difference that can be truly respected as such, beyond the hermeneutical 
ethnography that simply maps differences, without paying attention to the truth that 
matters to the undecidable event that is still to come and to which the subject 
expresses its fidelity -  otherwise the subject is not possible or does not deserve such a 
name, being simply a poetic individual.
In addition, the present chapter explains and demonstrates the manner in which the 
data of the properties that were collected in the Old Town, despite its ostensibly 
empirical and improvised character, holds for a ‘telling’ and more nuanced way in 
getting to grips with the division between the repressed and the seduced, materializing
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in a certain operational sense the way in which the transformation of Rethemnos’ built 
environment resonates with postmodern sociology without claiming any sort of 
generalized validity or application. Finally, I offer some glimpses into the ethics of 
the event, which succinctly summarizes my own concern and experience of the events 
I encountered and engaged in while doing fieldwork in Rethemnos.
2.2 Traditional Ethnography
This is not going to be a detailed critique of social anthropology or ethnography. My 
scope is more modest focusing on those aspects of traditional/hermeneutical thought 
that in my view fail to consider the undecidability and ambivalence of the event and 
the generic multiplicity to which the Rethemniot subject is currently submitted. 
Clifford Geertz (1983: 58) has defined the task of interpretive anthropology as the 
analysis of “the symbolic forms -  words, images, institutions, behaviours -  in terms 
of which, in each place, people actually represented themselves to themselves and to 
one another”. Yet in their Anthropology as Cultural Critique (1986), Marcus and 
Fischer dismiss Said’s (1978) Orientalism, on the grounds of posing no “alternative 
form for the adequate representation of other voices or points of view across cultural 
boundaries, nor does he instill any hope that this might be possible” (Marcus and 
Fischer, 1986: 2). What matters to interpretive anthropology, we are told, is to 
examine the way in which meanings, symbols and languages are negotiated, focusing 
on the “renewed recognition, central to the human sciences, that social life must 
fundamentally be conceived as the negotiations of meanings” (Marcus and Fischer, 
1986: 26).
However, it is exactly on the unevenness of such a negotiation of meanings that Said 
drew, in order to distill from a powerful western discourse the manner in which the 
Orient has been construed, on the back of a variety of imagined geographies that 
successfully merge with various travel writings and ‘true’ representations in order to 
produce and further consolidate a certain image of the Orient. According to Marcus 
and Fischer, nevertheless, one of the tasks of interpretive anthropology is to address 
questions of conceptions of personhood, “which for simplicity of discussion we will 
divide [...] into three groups” (Marcus and Fischer, 1986: 48). First, there is the 
model of psychodynamic ethnographies, which includes works such as Levy’s 
Tahitians: Mind and Experience in the Society Islands (1973) arguing over “a division
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between public surfaces and private behaviour” (Marcus and Fischer, 1986: 50); 
Kracke’s Force and Persuasion Leadership in an Amazonian Society (1978), a work 
which provides “an important experimental initiative by demonstrating how 
psychoanalysis might be pursued in cross-cultural settings” (Marcus and Fischer, 
1986: 53); and there is Obeysekere’s Medusa's Hair: An Essay on Personal Symbols 
and Religious Experience (1981), which shows “how in the effort to explain inchoate 
distress and emotions to themselves and to relieve traumatic pressures, individuals 
appropriate available cultural models and, under patterned social stresses, create each 
individually, significant new patterns” (Marcus and Fischer, 1986: 53). The 
psychodynamic model of ethnography, in general, reveals “a behaviourally and 
conceptually significant level of reality reflecting, contrasting with, or obscured by 
public cultural forms” (Marcus and Fischer, 1986: 54). Second, there is the model of 
realist ethnographies, which examines in a rather functionalist manner the difference 
between public patterns of behaviour and various cultural forms, with two texts 
playing key roles in this doctrine, Evan Prichard’s The Nuer (1940) and Turner’s 
Schism and Continuity in African Society (1957). To explicate further and draw on the 
nature of this functionalism, Marcus and Fischer (1986: 57) employ five 
frames/devices: life history, as the “effort to explore the multiple points of view that 
go into the construction of any life history [...] as they are formed in the 
conversations and interviews of fieldwork” (Marcus and Fischer, 1986: 58); life cycle, 
as the “typical phases and events that each individual passes through” (Marcus and 
Fischer, 1986: 59); ritual, by which they mean “the appropriate vehicle for 
understanding sentiment, emotion, and the endowing of meaning upon experience” 
(Marcus and Fischer, 1986: 61); aesthetic genres, the study of a “strikingly different 
aesthetics than our own” (Marcus and Fischer, 1986: 63); and last but not least the 
dramatic incident, which is about the explanation of “a dramatic incident -  a murder 
in the community in which [one] work[s] -  as an ethnographic display tactic” (Marcus 
and Fischer, 1986: 64). In sum, the realist model “raise[s] epistemological questions 
about representing differences across cultural boundaries [that] are in fact transitional 
to a more sophisticated appreciation for and ability to explore alternative aesthetics, 
epistemologies, and sensibilities that survive strongly and subtly in a homogenizing 
world” (Marcus and Fischer, 1986: 67). Finally, there are the modernist texts that 
“highlights] the eliciting discourse between ethnographer and subjects or [...] 
involve the reader in the work of analysis” (Marcus and Fischer, 1986: 67).
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Without getting into the ins and outs of interpretative ethnography, it is still possible, 
on the back of the brief account offered above, to argue that hermeneutical 
anthropology is susceptible to criticism on a number of grounds. I want to stress here 
only three points that are relevant in discussing and further unfolding the event and its 
rupture and suture to being with regard to a certain foundational situation, which 
seems to escape the above interpretive problematization. First, the psychodynamic 
model is, by and large, based on a superficial distinction between personal behaviours 
and wider cultural forms. What needs further unpacking, however, is not only to 
explain the interrelated and interwoven practices between subject and society, and 
presentation and representation in a rather ‘psychological’ manner which takes place 
through various cultural settings, but mostly to theorize and map what matters to 
individuals, that is, what makes a real difference in their lives and what kind of 
interchanges and interrelationships take place, though always in the form of a constant 
battle and negotiation, between subject and society. It is psychoanalysis, however, as 
opened up by Freud, developed through Lacan’s linguistic turn and, subsequently, 
taken further up by the schizoanalytic accounts of Deleuze and Guattari’s Body 
without Organs, and becoming-woman that may offer an alternative account taking 
seriously the ‘inner structure’ of the subject, along the lines (and beyond as we shall 
see with respect to Deleuze) of the ‘repressive hypothesis’ and the discontents caused 
by the devastating effects and rationalism of modem civilization. Moreover, 
psychoanalysis and schizoanalysis constitute a useful entry point in theorizing the 
event, by way of which a truth occurs, as Badiou explains, on the back of which a 
subject may be possible. Psychoanalysis, on the other hand, does not suggest simply 
that the subject is impotent, as many of the anthropological estimations are afraid of, 
but provides a rather ‘structural’ way in reviewing and discovering many of the 
psychological and subterranean grounds on which not only the behaviour, which is 
taken as symptom of the erotic and death drives/instincts, but the unconscious, with 
its catalytic influence, of the individual, lies.
The second point I want to make is that the model of realist ethnography fails to 
challenge the metaphysics of presence, the poetic ontologies, the ‘miserly thought’ of 
scarcity (Doel, 2009) and the authority of the ethnographer. Interviews and 
questionnaires are based on a pre-conceived perception of what is expected in the 
field and more often than not, sooner or later, the anthropologist insists that what
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takes place in the isolated community is an alternative rationality that interestingly 
may correspond with parts, sentiments or functions of structures that are already 
present in the west (economy, state, exchange etc.). I suggest in the modest and most 
prudent of manners that even classical texts are not immune from such a ‘rationalist 
anachronism’, as Cornelius Castoriadis (1984) put it with respect to Marxism. 
Malinowski (1978), for example, argued that the Kula Ring is an alternative economic 
system possessing an intrinsic rationality and Durkheim’s (1965) Elementary Forms 
o f the Religious Life on the totemic classification, suggested that the totem is the basis 
for all religious phenomena, whilst Mauss’ (1954) The Gift proposed that gift 
exchanges constitute a system of exchanges and obligations more just than the crude 
economism of capitalism. Even Levi-Strauss’ (1973) Tristes Tropiques relied, as was 
shown by Derrida (1976), on a romantic preconception of a society misleadingly 
taken as primitive (without writing), which ignores the poisonous classification of the 
west.
The last point I want to make is that modernist texts that depend on a dialogue 
between the ethnographer and the object of study, seeking to reach a consensus 
between western rationality and the nobleness of an ‘exotic’ or primitive origin, 
remain narrow and unbecoming (as opposed to the becoming-imperceptible of 
Deleuze) in that they simply conceive of the object of study as inherently pure, 
domesticated and innocent, a dubious strategy however, that constitutes a mirror of 
the manner in which the original imperialist model of knowledge was constructed. 
Any ‘native’s point of view’ or ‘common sense’ experience (Geertz, 1983), however, 
is questionable because it always involves not only a certain application of forms of 
thoughts of western origin over a social reality that refuses in vain to adapt or adjust 
to a highly changing or modernizing context, but also a continuous repetition of 
differences that erode any original, so to speak, appeal or claim for a ‘common sense’ 
understanding from the very beginning. For it is not possible to apply anything at all, 
for the simple reason that a supplement is always already applied or supplemented in 
all differential manners (Derrida, 1976, 1981) before any origin or source have come 
to take hold of any pure ‘common sense’.
My task above was not to offer a detailed critique of anthropology but rather to hint at 
the omissions of such a theory hoping that such a point of view will help to take the
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necessary leap toward a truly differential procedure with which a differential subject 
will be from now on associated, dwelling this time on generic multiplicities and 
undecidable and unanticipated events. The ethnography of the event is such a form of 
thought that can supplement the poetics and politics of postmodern ethnography with 
the singularity and spatiality of the event. An event is neither revolutionary, nor 
poetic, nor domestic, nor heroic but simply an expression of the militancy of truth 
(Badiou, 2003, 2005), on the side of which a subject may be found to reside, refusing 
to be named, categorized, pinned down and classified, and yet remaining open to the 
generic multiple and indiscernible undecidability of a wholly other. Even if the event 
ostensibly appears to be in accord with what Clifford (1986: 24) termed “cultural 
poesis -  and politics -  the constant reconstitution of selves and others through specific 
exclusions, conventions and discursive practices”, difference is not only about poesis 
but also about what exists between what is poetic and what is not poetic, or what 
makes the antithesis between poesis and non-poesis possible. The event, moreover, 
may also seem to be in line with some allegoric conceptions of ethnography that take 
it as a story that “has the propensity to generate another story in the mind of its reader 
(hearer), to repeat and replace some prior story” (Clifford, 1986: 100). But again, such 
‘repetitions’ make sense and have meaning only when they are differential, becoming, 
spectral, incorporeal and light, in the way, as we shall in Chapter 4, suggested by 
Bergson (1970) and Deleuze (1994).
Without having to dip into Deleuze’s philosophy, suffice it to discuss at this juncture 
seven points -  or dispositifs as Lyotard (1993: 26) would have it -  that highlight my 
take on the choreoethnography of the event without, however, seeking to pigeonhole 
or pin down its ‘merits’, ‘qualities’ or ‘characteristics’. First, the ethnography of the 
event takes flight from the contested notion of representation, challenging the 
established forms of hegemony between the one who represents and the one who is 
represented. Second, the ethnography of the event refuses to privilege theory over 
praxis -  yet it does not underestimate praxis or historical experience. Third, it refuses 
to privilege the subject over the object. Fourth, it seeks to reconcile theory and praxis 
bringing together, on the one hand, the irreducible dynamics of place, and on the other 
hand, the universal in-consistency of truth, without erasing or dialectically 
transcending or even worse, wounding their disjuncture. Fifth, the ethnography of the 
event remains faithful to truth and the subject, even if such fidelity marks a certain
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rupture with respect to a fully deployed historical situation. Sixth, it is in essence 
fragmentary but not exactly like “Life in the field [which] is itself fragmentary, not at 
all organized around familiar ethnological categories such as kinship, economy, and 
religion” (Tyler, 1986: 131); rather it holds that there is nothing but fragments of 
fragments, or folds of folds, or by the same token transitions upon transitions and so 
on. And seventh, it remains deeply incomplete, that is, it is a never-ending process, a 
work in progress, which refuses to settle down and rest. In sum, the event is bound to 
an interventional fidelity that breaks with any form of Statist represenation and 
remains open to the undecidable other on his/her way back. It is worth recalling, with 
Badiou (2003: 14) -  although a fuller account is offered in Chapter 9 -  how a 
universal singularity works with respect to law and truth:
“If there has been an event, and if  truth consists in declaring it and then in being faithful to this 
declaration, two consequences ensue. First, since truth is evental, or o f the order of what occurs, it is 
singular. It is neither structural, nor axiomatic, nor legal. No available generality can account for it, nor 
structure the subject who claims to follow in its wake. Consequently, there cannot be a law o f truth. 
Second, truth being inscribed on the basis o f a declaration that is in essence subjective, no 
preconstituted subset can support it; nothing communitarian or historically established can lend its 
substance to the process o f truth”.
The ethnography of the event, in other words, is swept up by a truth procedure that 
maps the vicissitudes of a subject beyond identity, embeddedness, jurisdiction and 
Law; and beyond the forced stabilization of minoritarian identities and most 
importantly, beyond the homogenization promoted by the market. It seeks, moreover, 
to transcend the dialectical resolution of difference, which is based on the opposition 
between differentiation and homogenization, that is the “permanent creation of 
subjective and territorial identities in order for its principle of movement to 
homogenize its space of action, identities moreover that never demand anything but 
the right to be exposed in the same way as others to the uniform prerogatives of the 
market” (Badiou, 2003: 10-11).
Likewise, the subject of Rethemnos is neither about the embeddedness of identity nor 
about the homogenizing expansion of the market of tourism and the restoration 
project, but would involve a truth procedure that swerves away from any established 
order of things. Such a multiple singularity will eventually take flight from the shame-
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and-honour model and the poetic model, remaining at the end of day non-reciprocal, 
non-recognizable and non-economic. For such an event is beyond the negativity of 
shame, honour, poetics, domestication and spontaneous flexibility or any other unitary 
identity whatsoever, especially insofar as one knows after Badiou that a multiplicity 
affirms and kindles the ineffaceable threshold of an irreductive difference, despite the 
fact that “there is no hero of the event” (Badiou, 2005: 207); and to that extent a 
generic multiple is not necessarily a hero, but an intervention which refuses to be 
ontotheologically restricted within the confines of the undisclosed potentials of a 
poetic place.
Interpretive ethnography is not necessarily Statist. It is, nonetheless, indifferent, 
unbecoming, in-appropriate and contradictory. Clifford (1986: 7), for example, has 
argued that “ethnographic truths are [...] inherently partial -  committed and 
incomplete” and that to claim otherwise stems from what is called “the constitution of 
the ethnographer’s authority” (Crapanzano, 1986: 53). Likewise, Fabian (1983) and 
Rosaldo (1986: 83) pointed out how anthropology’s inherent anachronism adds to this 
partiality through the deployment of an allochronic discourse that refuses the so- 
called primitives the possibility of a synchronic presence in line with the 
ethnographer’s ‘time-zone’. And Tyler (1986: 109) suggested that ethnographic 
“accounts are clearly no longer the story, but a story among other stories”. But 
however closely such accounts seem to lie with respect to postmodernism and 
poststructuralism, a more rigorous theory of difference is still required, which neither 
represents nor signifies nor simply symbolizes -  as these theories do -  but chimes 
with a difference always in continuous variation, splayed out according to 
innumerable differential calculi; a difference, in short, that will no longer be division, 
contradiction, antithesis and arnesis (negation), (and thus an annulled difference) but 
will form a process, which sets in motion flows upon flows, differences upon 
differences and changes upon changes.
2.3 The Ethnography of the Event
Hence difference must be made. I propose that that the Rethemniot generic multiple is 
indiscemibly ambivalent and undecidably unnameable and thus the subject is possible 
only when taken up by movements of speed and slowness. It is not about representing 
or expressing an individual, therefore, or an identity, but about ex-appropriating
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him/her, writing him/her “otherwise, elsewhere”, on hollow ground (Doel, 1993: 
383); and it is also about mapping a truth that occurs once an event is decided or 
named after an intervention. The ethnography of the event is not about interpretation 
or representation either -  it does not interpret, for example, the words and discourses 
of the Rethemniots through a certain method of poetics, identifying a “good man” 
with “being good at being a man” in the way Herzfeld (1985: 11) does it. While the 
ostensible linguistic/poetic turn of anthropology acknowledges the importance of 
language, it remains a dualistic, dialectical, antithetical, contradictory and nihilistic 
form of thought, opposing one’s actions with a certain poetics and rhetoric that sets 
out to explain why a word or a phrase is more important than the action itself. The 
ethnography of the event, by contrast, moves beyond such binary oppositions, not 
because it thinks of words being less interesting, exciting or significant than deeds, 
structures or actions, but rather because words and actions are nothing but degrees of 
variation, intensities, movements of speed and slowness, in short flashpoints, which 
either affect you or do not (Deleuze and Guattari, 1988). The poetic model seems to 
oppose an infrastructure with a superstructure that is, the economic or social reality 
with a linguistic and cultural discourse subjecting difference to a kind of immaterial 
separation, contradiction and negation. Yet the event is the only model an 
ethnographer has once the antithetical schemata of the dialectic which negates, 
appropriates, erases and disqualifies difference, distinguishing between infrastructure 
and superstructure, language and matter, are ultimately but unregrettably, swept way. 
An event, thus, is both poetic and antipoetic. It does not oppose the poetic but rather 
constitutes an antithesis to the antithesis between poetic and antipoetic. “It thereby 
deconstructs any one-effect” (Badiou, 2005: 30), between linguistic and non- 
linguistic, material and immaterial, representation and reality, virtual/real and the 
actual. Badiou’ conception of the event, accordingly, provides an exemplary basis for 
superseding such poetic and anthropological controversies, in that the event, as we 
shall see briefly directly below and analytically in Chapter 9, is able to make sense of 
the Rethemniot subject by drawing, chiefly, on relationships of belonging and 
inclusion -  rather than on signs, identities and representations.
I now want to pick up on three of the mathematical formulas of Badiou’s (2005) 
Being and Event in order to make space for such a generic multiple Rethemniot 
subject. Given that being is multiple and that a theory of being is fully grasped by set
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theory which is the theory of pure multiple and given that mathematics is ontology, 
(one of Badiou’s fundamental propositions as we shall in Chapter 9), I want to draw 
some attention to set theory, at least the manner in which such a formula is taken up 
by Badiou and the manner in which it is embodied in the present thesis. The models I 
drew upon involve the axiom of foundation, the axiom of choice and the matheme of 
the indiscernible. I used such a mathematical language in order to think of the 
affirmative and responsible Rethemniot subject as work in progress beyond agonistic 
poetics and servility, which is mainly the way through which the subject was seen or 
identified with by Mediterraneanist writings. For my part I will be arguing that the 
Rethemniot individual is a trace left behind by a truth procedure which allows the 
subject to remain deeply and, extraordinarily, open to a wholly indiscernible and 
undecidable other beyond poeticity. Such a theorization serves a three-fold scope. 
First, it seeks to undo and unsettle the honour of the Mediterranean subject in order to 
allow the Two of affirmation and responsibility (the Two of the evental ultra-one) to 
hold sway by transcending the interpretive/poetic anthropology and the 
Mediterraneanist accounts of identification by way of the axiom of foundation -  such 
a theorization is fully explored as was already mentioned in Chapter 9. Second, it 
challenges the conception of the Rethemniot subject as a docile or servile subjectivity 
depending on foreign capital or its negation (a rebellious and undisciplined poetic 
individual) in the place of which it situates the indecision of the ‘non-servile 
servility’, which stems and is heavily inspired from what was termed on a different 
occasion an ‘ interruption-without-interruption’ (Doel, 1993). And third, it opens up 
the Mediterranean subject to an ambivalent and indiscernible other that is yet to come, 
that is a difference without unity or identity. In sum, the two axioms above and the 
matheme of the indiscernible lay the ontological groundwork for an ethnography of 
the event, unpacking the Rethemniot chaosmotic multiplicity on the basis of which an 
affirmative, responsible non-servile and wholly ambivalent Other will be called forth 
to hold sway.
I do not offer a sustained account of Badiou’s subtractive ontology here, not least 
because it is Chapter 9 which deals seriously with such a theory. The present chapter, 
however, offers some glimpses into set theory and serves as an introduction to some 
of Badiou’s more complicated parts of mathematical analysis that follow in an attempt
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to elucidate the way in which these formulas are reconciled or read on the back of 
philosophies of differences.
Badiou suggests that the one is not and that being is a multiple of multiples; that being 
exists in any presentation, and constitutes a presentation of presentation; and that the 
language of being-qua-being is mathematics whilst the new in being happens under 
the name of the event. Although ontology is mathematics and ontology is what exists, 
being’s prohibition of the event does not mean that mathematics cannot, at least 
implicitly, think of the event. Though one should abandon any hope of explicitly 
defining what a multiplicity is, the event leaves a trace that can be fully mapped or 
explored by Cantor’s set theory, Godel’s constructible sets and Cohen’s continuum 
hypothesis. The axiomatization of set theory, which is a means to count, or to make 
sense of the ontological situation of being -  the void -  can further unpack the 
interimplications between being and event. The axioms deployed below are set in, in 
order to provide for an understanding of what a multiplicity is, without having to 
name or pinpoint an event Thus “Axiomatization is required such that the multiple, 
left to the implicitness of its counting rule, be delivered without concept, that is 
without implying the being o f  the one” (Badiou, 2005: 43). The Zermelo-Fraenkel 
(ZF) axiomatization, which is one of the possible ways of axiomatization, contains no 
‘one’ but only relations of belonging e, and thus the elements (sets/multiplicities) of 
these belongings are multiple(s). In ZF axiomatization everything is a set, a multiple, 
to the extent that “every multiple is composed of multiples” (Badiou, 2005: 57). There 
are nine axioms of ZF theory that set out to present the multiple-without-one. I focus 
below on the axiom of foundation, the axiom of choice and the matheme of the 
indiscernible in order to ontologically (to think the being of the event is absurd and 
this explains the italics) un-ground and de-consist an event, bearing always in mind 
that a subject takes place on the side of a truth procedure, which in turn is supported 
by an event. As the thesis progresses, it will be made clear why these specific axioms 
were selected. Suffice it to note for now that these formulas, as Badiou himself 
admits, constitute the cornerstone of his entire ontology because of their 
mefaontological status, that is, they do not simply think being but make space as well 
for historicity, that is, the evental site within which an event may occur, that is, that 
which-is-not-being-qua-being, which swerves away from being.
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For Badiou (2005: 173) being-qua-being, that is ontology, includes the thought of “the 
multiple, general form of presentation; the void, proper name of being; the excess, or 
state of the situation, representative reduplication of the structure (or count-as-one) of 
presentation; nature, stable and homogenous form of standing-there of the multiple; 
and infinity, which decides the expansion of the natural multiple beyond the Greek 
limit”. However important the above analyses are, and although the whole of 
Badiou’s work intends to rethink being and event at once -  and thus any chance to 
methodologically separate them seems rather unjustified -  I concentrate below on the 
event rather on being insofar as it is the event which “is-not-being-supemumerary” 
(Badiou, 2005: 178). I am not suggesting that being is not important especially in the 
way Badiou theorizes it -  the fact that being and event are thought in his analysis in 
one single stroke makes it even harder to isolate one from another. Yet what I suggest 
is that in order to think of the subject in Rethemnos, it is the event on which one must 
draw, especially because from the standpoint of the situation the event is undecidable, 
that is, “the multiple which both represents its entire site, and by means of the pure 
signifier of itself immanent to its own multiple, manages to present the presentation 
itself, that is, the one of the infinite that it is” (Badiou, 2005: 180). The events of 
Rethemnos, therefore, the multiplicities of affirmation and responsibility beyond 
honour-and-shame (the axiom of foundation), the multiplicities beyond servility (the 
axiom of choice) and the ambivalent and undecidable multiplicities beyond poetics 
(the matheme of the indiscernible), set out to enact a disruptive occurrence, which has 
nothing to do with the identities of honour, shame, poetic, servility or the friendly 
subjectivations -  these last issues are also explained in Chapter 3 and Chapter 4 .1 will 
be arguing in general that the Rethemniot generic multiplicity is faithfully connected 
to the undecidable and unnameable other, which should be named (founded), after 
being chosen (choice), by a subject deciding upon its indiscemibility (the 
indiscernible), from the standpoint of the undecidable.
2.4 The Axiom of Foundation
The axiom offoundation gives a considerable pause to the infinite regression of being 
and prohibits the being of the event by halting extraordinary sets from belonging to 
‘themselves’. Ontology and thus mathematics do not allow the existence (the count as 
one) of multiples that belong to themselves. Foundation, in other words states that 
being which is void should be founded always on the basis of some other. Yet the
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event is not only constituted by elements of its site but of the signification itself that it 
is. If being thus which is void could be evental it should be founded on some 
otherness and should be based on the other of void. But the other of the void cannot 
be but void itself and thus the otherness demanded by the axiom foundation would be 
eroded. Foundation, in short, prohibits being’s event because the event should belong 
to itself, and yet to found means to count on some other, while the void, on the other 
hand, has no other. In the light of this, foundation states that “within an existing one- 
multiple, there always exists a multiple presented by it such that this multiple is on the 
edge of the void relative to the initial multiple” (Badiou, 2005: 185). Analytically, the 
axiom of foundation insists that “given any existing multiple whatsoever (thus a 
multiple counted as one in accordance with the Ideas of the multiple and the existence 
of the name of the void), there always belongs to it -  if, of course, it is not the name 
of the void itself in which case nothing would belong to it -  a multiple on the edge of 
the void within the presentation that it is. In other words: every non-void multiple 
contains some Other”: (Va) [(a^0 ) —» (3|3)[(pea) s (Pna= 0)]] (Badiou, 2005: 
186).
Chapter 9 takes up on the above mathematical language in a manner which resonates 
with the Two of the ultra-one event, and the subject of affirmation and responsibility. 
Suffice it to say for now that the axiom of foundation is “a non-void set [which] is 
founded inasmuch as a multiple always belong to it which is Other than it” (Badiou, 
2005: 186). And thus for every sentiment, episode, event or discourse that implies 
honour (the being of Mediterraneanism) there should be an affirmative subject which 
while being part of the discourse of shame-and-honour, stands between itself and the 
void engaging in a behaviour that varies from affirmation to responsibility. In so 
doing, it “affirms through the mediation of the Other, that even though presentation 
can be infinite it is always marked by finitude when it comes to its origin ” (Badiou, 
2005: 187). Such an axiom guarantees, in other words, that every multiple contains 
and necessitates its other and thus beyond or underneath the usual characteristics of 
the cartography of the Mediterranean being (shame, honour, poetics) there should be 
always an affirmative and responsible Other en route from Mediterraneanism to the 
iterability, solicitation and undecidability of the uninsurable Rethemniot multiple. In 
Badiou’s words “The axiom of foundation de-limits being by the prohibition of the
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event” (Badiou, 2005: 190). Situated beneath the strictures of shame-and-honour, the 
axiom of foundation insists that there is still an original foundational affirmative and 
responsible other, which even if it remains unnameable -  an event cannot be named 
by means of or on the grounds of the language of the situation -  may still have a 
chance of happening. And whilst it is true that “Ontology has nothing to say about the 
event” (Badiou, 2005: 90), it can still map “the traces it leaves behind” (Badiou, 2005: 
91). What names an event, however, is not a subject, but a process which is termed 
intervention. “I term ‘intervention’ any procedure by which a multiple is recognized 
as an event” (Badiou, 2005: 202). Intervention “is what presents an event for the 
occurrence of another. It is an evental between-two” (Badiou, 2005: 209). The axiom 
of foundation thus while it prevents being’s event, opens up at the same time the non- 
being of the event to the continuous variation and manifold affirmative responsibility 
of that which breaks with the solidity, fixity and constancy of Mediterraneanist 
identities: an intervention.
2.5 The Axiom of Choice
The interventional form of the event can be recognized in the axiom o f choice. The 
multiple of choice consists, which comes down to saying that it exists. Yet 
intervention does not name a rule of choice but affirms the existence of choice. The 
axiom of choice, “in its final form posits that given a multiple of multiples, there 
exists a multiple composed of a ‘representative’ of each non-void multiple whose 
presentation is assured by the first multiple. In other words one can ‘choose’ an 
element from each of the multiples which make up a multiple, and one can ‘gather 
together’ these chosen elements: the multiple obtained in such a manner is consistent, 
which is to say it exists” (Badiou, 2005: 224). The events drawn upon in association 
with the mathematical language of the axiom of choice affirm that in Rethemnos, the 
residents who are often accused of abandoning the Cretan values and morals -  as a 
result of the recent tourist development and due to the fact that they increasingly 
depend on tourism, as Herzfeld’s account of servility insinuates -  are not, simply, 
alienated or reckless servants submitted to the exploitative forces and spillover effects 
of foreign capital. There is, in short, no clear-cut division between a period of servility 
and a period of pride or Cretan poetic ideals. And although people insist that many of 
the Rethemniots have lost pride and dignity seeking only to make money, my
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suggestion is that such a distinction between a period of poetic pride and a period of 
disgraceful servility, simply does not exist. Pride and poeticity are always already 
interrupted by servility but without actually being interrupted in a linear, 
chronological or hierarchical sense. Both periods extend and overflow into each other 
deforming an uninterrupted non-identity, and marking a period of interruption- 
without-interruption or as I prefer to call it, a period of non-servile servility. Asking 
the residents (which is pretty much what Herzfeld ethnographies imply) which their 
preferred period is, the one before the corruption and massification of tourism or the 
period marked by an unprecedented touristication of the Old Town’s geohistory, is 
highly controversial and unproductive. As Badiou puts it in terms of such infinite sets 
which do not establish a rule of choice, “there is something un-delegatable ” (Badiou, 
2005: 225) about them. The axiom of choice thus affirms the existence of a choice- 
multiple, which does not have to choose between the servile period and the non- 
servile period. The existence of the choice-multiple affirms the non-inscription of a 
rule of choice, the unnameable of a delegate and the non-existence of a law of 
presentation en route from the non-servility period to that of servility admitting, 
purely and simply, that “there are some interventions” (Badiou, 2005: 230).
2.6 The Matheme of the Indiscernible
Such an intervention, however, should be properly thought. It is the matheme of the 
indiscernible that manages to think of the non-place of the above non-choice, which is 
also applicable to what the resident, as was briefly sketched out in the introduction, 
might have said in relationship to the ‘There is nothing to see’. The matheme of the 
indiscernible states that “the set of terms of the situation which are positively 
connected to the event is in no manner already classified within the encyclopaedia of 
the situation” (Badiou, 2005: 336). The indiscernible of truth is not about truth but 
about the being of truth (Badiou, 2005: 355), for truth is always “that which makes a 
hole in a knowledge” (Badiou, 2005: 327). As it should be clear by now “one cannot 
speak of a multiple which is indiscernible ‘in-itself” (Badiou, 2005: 356). The 
general idea, therefore, as Badiou suggests, following Cohen’s mathematical formula, 
is to add the indiscernible to such a set of conditions within which it will not be able 
to be discerned. Let us briefly see -  although a fuller account is offered once again in 
Chapter 9 -  how Badiou constructs his model.
65
In the quasi-complete situation one constructs names for all multiples and for the 
indiscernible as well, without, however, knowing which the indiscernible is. A  
general set of conditions for the indiscernible is “a multiple n of the fundamental 
situation S which is destined to possibly belong to the indiscernible (the function of 
material) and whatever the case may be, to transmit some ‘information’ about this 
indiscernible (which will be a part of the situation S)” (Badiou, 2005: 362). Such a set 
of conditions will be dominated by the principle of information and the principle of 
compatibility. Without getting into formal logic for now and without going into the 
ins and outs of Cohen’s strategy, a set of conditions would be also dominated by the 
materiality of the indiscernible, the existence of more precise conditions than the ones 
a situation knows, the coherency required to describe the indiscernible and the fact 
that there are real choices in describing the indiscernible (Badiou, 2005: 365). 
Accordingly, a correct set of conditions will aim (but not name) at the one multiple or 
at a part (5) of a set © of conditions in deciding whether 8 belongs to the situation. If 
a correct part 8 is discerned by a property X, every element of 8 (every ne8)  would be 
dominated by a condition m  such that (712). The crucial thing here is to define 
domination, which is “a set of conditions such that any condition outside the 
domination is dominated by at least one condition inside the domination” (Badiou, 
2005: 369). Hence, the capital definition of the indiscernible “a correct set $ will be 
generic for  S i f  for any domination D which belongs to S we have D n $  ^  0 ” 
(Badiou, 2005: 370).
The above mathematical forms will be further unpacked with respect to the 
adestination and infinite potentials of the multiplicities of the Rethemniot subject in 
subsequent chapters. Though such ontological language may appear hard to follow in 
terms of the pragmatics and analytics of the experience of Rethemnos, as the thesis 
progresses these experiments will be brushed against the grain of the generic truth of 
the poetic subject once, however, I am done with the reversal and reinscription of the 
Mediterraneanist identifications and spatialities. It should be stated once again that 
events have nothing to do with interpretations, symbolisms and representations but 
occur in a time that is yet to come. Events will have been in the Archaeological 
Service where I was searching the archive and the files regarding the data of the 
restoration of the Venetian buildings; events will have been in the office of the head
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of the Old Town’s Residents Association, where I was looking for old and recent 
publications regarding the Old Town. Non-representational ethnography allows, in 
other words, a fuller appreciation of the rupture which the event, suture to being, 
generates, that is the new, the contingent and the multiple that happens in being, that 
is, “an infinite multiplicity [...] deprived of any limit to its multiple-deployment” 
(Badiou, 2005: 33). It is in there that a true subject may have a chance of happening. 
The event, therefore, which, as we shall see is what the subject militantly and 
faithfully follows in order to deserve its name as such, is a means to an end, that is, it 
can help us to think of a subject which is infinitely open, swerving away from the 
authority of the ethnographer, the bias of the structured interview, the typicality and 
harshness of questionnaires, the metaphysics of presence, the face-to-face 
uninterrupted ‘ideal/consensual speech’ communication, and the dialectical 
appropriation of difference as separation, constancy, unity, and opposition.
To recap, the event opens up the Rethemniot multiplicity first, to the ultra-one of Two 
of affirmation and responsibility (the axiom of foundation); second, to the non-servile 
subject of a period of interruption without interruption (the axiom of choice); and, 
third, to the undecidable subject beyond domestication and poetics (the matheme of 
the indiscernible). These images, however, are not three different identities or subjects 
of the Cretan lifeworld that effectively resist the systemic colonization promoted by 
the ensuing processes of tourism. The ethnography of the event is in search of a truth, 
which vibrates, stutters, stammers and trembles before the subject sitting always on 
the side of a generic extension, which is faithfully connected to the post-evental 
occurrences of an intervention. I am not interested, in other words, in discovering the 
real Rethemniot identity. Rather I am ready to fall for those aspects of a 
polymorphously perverse and absolute contingency of events associated with a truth 
which only when followed by a subjectivation process will allow the name of the 
subject to be assigned to an individual. As time and again the subject cannot be 
represented explicitly, immediately or directly, it should be finally left “to the 
implicitness of its counting rule, be delivered, without concept, that is without 
implying the being-of-the-one " (Badiou, 2005: 43).
I now want to explore how the contested restoration project of the Old Town 
resonates with a theory of the consumer society and the effective power of
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consumerism -  although it is Chapter 7 that unfolds in a more elaborate way the 
systemic nature of consumption. What I am about to offer is rather a ‘technical’ 
explanation of the operationalization of the division between the repressed and the 
seduced of Rethemnos; an attempt arguably that constitutes a prudent as much an 
improvised and idiosyncratic way of theorizing the current socio-spatial polarization 
of the town, but one which I think captures incisively the irresistible dynamics and 
vibrations of place. Given though that I have not adequately explained any of these 
terms so far regarding the consumer society, though a short account is offered below 
in terms of the theory developed by Baudrillard and Bauman, the current presentation 
is certainly limited; as the thesis progresses, however, the data of the restoration 
project will make more sense once brushed against the systemic nature of the 
consumer society (Baudrillard, 1996), the division between the repressed and the 
seduced (Bauman, 1987) and the fetishism of utility (Baudrillard, 1981). Taking up on 
the restoration data of the Archaeology Department is, simply, a way to operationalize 
how theory is brought to bear upon a pragmatic, floating, errant and eventful reality. 
The data of the restored houses constitute, in other words, an illustration, and a telling 
though certainly heuristic metaphor of the forces, contradictions and struggles that 
take place when a full-blown consumer is fully deployed taking over every comer of 
social life by means of the restoration project. What I will be suggesting is that as the 
Venetian buildings are gradually turned into commodities, as a consequence of the 
expansion, intensification and scale of the tourist market of Rethemnos, the Old Town 
problem may be taken to mark a transition in society and space which may be termed 
postmodern.
2.7 The Consumer Society and the Restoration Project
Although a fuller analysis is taken up in Chapter 7, it is cmcial to start discussing here 
what is meant by a systemic theory of the consumer society, how this theory is used in 
the context of Rethemnos, how to make sense of the Old Town problem in the wake 
of the systemic nature of consumption, and whether such a theory can pave the way 
for a more apposite dissection of the processes and transitions to which the 
Mediterranean town of Rethemnos is currently subject.
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Consumption is often taken as a practice that satisfies individual needs. A more 
sensitive approach, however, will make clear that such an argument is far from 
satisfactory. The social logic of consumption is altogether different insofar as 
consumption is an institution, a whole social system, which has nothing to do with the 
mere satisfaction of individual needs. As the so-called ‘structural Marxist’ school put 
it, most convincingly in Althusser’s wording, “A full part of consumption is devoted 
not to the satisfaction of the needs of individuals, but to allowing either simple or 
extended reproduction of the conditions of production” (Althusser, 1970: 165). The 
narrow understanding of consumption as a process involving the personal fulfilment 
of needs fails to take into account that consumption is a mode of domination like 
production. Little wonder, then, that Baudrillard should state that “the act of 
consumption is never simply a purchase [but] it is also expenditure [...]; that is to say 
it is wealth manifested and a manifest destruction of wealth” (Baudrillard, 1981: 112). 
Every attempt, therefore, to associate consumption with the anthropological obsession 
of needs and their teleological satisfaction is an oversimplified and naive suggestion 
for needs are neither about an individual satisfaction, nor do they have anything to do 
with a superficial distinction between affluent and scarce societies. Needs are, first 
and foremost, culturally produced and intend to classify and differentiate social 
groups according to a social logic, based on consumerist preferences, tastes, 
differences and social-class criteria (Bourdieu, 1984). Baudrillard’s and Bauman’s 
theorizations unfold in a very constructive way the manner in which such a systemic 
nature of consumption takes hold and the manner in which the reconstruction of an 
understanding of consumption can help us to rethink and reconsider how capitalism 
works with respect to space. As Canetti put it -  in a somewhat different context -  
“One of the consequences of this increase in production is that more and more people 
are wanted. The more goods we produce, the more consumers we need. The point of 
business is the winning of as many customers as possible; and ideally everyone. In 
this respect it resembles if only superficially those universal religions which lay claim 
to every single soul” (Canetti, 1962: 465-466). The consumer society, therefore, 
socialises the masses as consumers in exactly the same way industrial capitalism is 
about socialising the masses as producers. This is why “A consumer is never isolated 
any more than a speaker” (Baudrillard, 1981: 75). And as Baudrillard (1993) has 
suggested, it is not needs that are the fruits of production but the system of needs, 
which is the product of the system of production. Utility, needs and use-values thus
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are susceptible to and obey the same social logic as exchange-values obey. “In fact 
the liberty to consume is of the same order as the freedom offered by the labour 
market. The capitalist system was erected on this liberty -  on the formal emancipation 
of the labour force (and not the concrete autonomy of work, which it abolishes)” 
(Baudrillard, 1981: 82). Hence, there is nothing real or natural about needs. “To sum 
up: man is not simply there first equipped with his needs [...] for man never really 
does come face to face with his own needs” (Baudrillard, 1981: 86).
The above brief account gives an idea of what is meant by a systemic theory of the 
consumer society and what it means to conceive of needs as a system of cultural 
production, that is, a system as commensurable and quantifiable as the system of 
exchange values is. The Old Town is fully enmeshed in such processes that have led 
to a remarkable transformation of its built environment as a result of the cultural 
consummation of almost everything in town, especially its built environment. The 
restructuring of the spatial configuration of the Old Town, therefore, makes it 
absolutely necessary to integrate the geography of Rethemnos with a theory of the 
consumer society in the wake of the political economy of the sign (Baudrillard, 1981); 
especially since consumption produces an uneven geographical landscape, dividing 
the town roughly in two parts, which nevertheless extend, expand and flow over each 
other. The logic of consumption, however, not only exploits an already existing social 
geography, but sets in motion a spatial configuration, which did not, originally, exist. 
The Venetian past although an immanent part of the town from the very beginning, is 
now given over to the intensification, overaccummulation, and simulation of the 
consumer society, which is not about arguing that the Venetian history is not and 
should not be an integral part of Rethemnos’ identity and its cultural heritage. What I 
am suggesting however, is that the Venetian history was only a part of the history of 
the town, which has been intensively and hugely commercialized, commodified, and 
ultimately turned into the only history that matters in town over the last the thirty or 
forty years.
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As a consequence of the monumentalization of the town, many shops, bars and 
restaurants have now opened and many Venetian properties selling consumer goods 
have been beautifully restored. Yet properties housing families and tenants in the 
western part of the Old Town are left unconverted, a process, as previously 
mentioned, that began from the time the town was declared a monument in 1967, and 
according to which any type of restoration, however small or insignificant, had first to 
be officially approved by the strict criteria and bureaucratic documentation prescribed 
by the Archaeological Service. The Archaeology Service’s documentation and the 
restoration data offer such a useful basis, therefore, on the grounds of which one can 
unpack the way in which a fully-fledged consumer society occupies, exploits and re- 
appropriates the social spaces and built environment of the Old Town, with respect to 
the restorations and alterations that have been carried out on the buildings. The 
changes the built environment has been subject to over the last thirty years is 
indicative of the extent to which the monumentalization of the town altered and 
significantly transformed the geography of the town, by glimpsing, for example, into 
the number of the converted houses, the type and uses of the properties that are now 
dominant, and the extent to which these changes and transitions go hand in hand with 
a fully-fledged consumer society and its geographical variation. The 
operationalization of the division between the repressed and the seduced by taking 
account of the Venetian buildings restorations, however, is not meant as a method that 
seeks to establish in some kind of positivist manner whether the proposed theory is 
useful or applicable. As was already mentioned, Rethemnos holds as an illustrative 
case-study or a symptom that may help us to think of the way in which space, place 
and the subject are negotiated at the dawn of consumerism, opening up new ways in 
order to think about how theory works when is brought to bear upon an errant social 
reality that is irreducibly dynamic. The restoration project is useful, moreover, in that 
it allows us to go beyond the poetic, spontaneous or informal conceptualizations of 
the Mediterranean city. Given therefore, that my intention is to furnish and equip the 
theoretical suggestions with the pragmatics and analytics of a place, the data collected 
in the Archaeological Service are only meant to help us re-considering and re­
constructing our understanding of the implications and far-reaching consequences a 
full-blown consumer society has for the geography of the Old Town.
2 In Foucauldian terms that process may be also termed a ‘documentarization’ o f the town -  a useful 
observation which I owe to Mat Hannah’s patient reading o f my thesis.
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In the archive of the Archaeological Service one can find files containing information 
on the restorations that were approved, applications for restorations that failed to get 
permission, files containing information on illegal interventions and restorations and 
files that had no evidence whatsoever about any restoration. Since I wanted to look at 
the morphological changes and restorations of the properties that were officially 
approved by the Archaeology Service, I had to produce a statistically representative 
sample of the houses that appeared in the files -  with a 10% sample of the properties 
being satisfactory. The sample numbered 180 properties out of a total population of 
1800 buildings -  though the buildings I ended up with were 175. There are currently 
2200 properties in the Old Town, but I did not count 400 properties that were not 
included in the files, either because no documentation was available or because they 
concerned buildings or properties that have never been restored. A very practical and 
improvised way to deal with the ‘representativeness’ of the sample under the 
circumstances -  many files were missing, others were incomplete or lost -  was to give 
a number from 1 to 1800 to each of the files (each file should contain all documents 
and applications made for and referring to one particular house) and write down the 
address, architectural characteristics and recent restorations of each property and then 
using excel, to produce a second column mixing the original 1800 numbers. A third 
column produced in the same manner, and which included the 180 numbers that were 
originally selected, had then to be matched with the first column of the 1800 
properties. We will see in Chapter 9 by way of Badiou’s subtractive ontology how the 
Archaeology Service can be taken to constitute an Encyclopaedia, in the way meant 
by Badiou, of a fully deployed and unfettered historical situation within which an 
evental site may occur and which in turn can set free and unleash the undecidable 
multiplicity beyond the territorial and narrow identification processes to which the 
subject was submitted once Mediterraneanism was in charge.
I set out to map how the houses were used (for example as shops, restaurants, private 
tenancies etc.) and whether these uses had changed in the last 30-40 years, that is, 
from the time the town was declared a monument. Moreover, in more concrete terms, 
I explore the changing geography of these uses in the Old Town in an attempt to 
conceptualize whether the changing attitude of the residents toward the state and the 
restoration project was pertinent to the newly founded Houses’ Owners Association
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(AROOT) in 1994. The original Houses’ Owners Association (OTHOA) of the late 
1970s was strongly posited against any type of state intervention, yet the reinstitution 
of AROOT in 1994, marked not only the creation of a new society but the 
reorientation and changing attitude of the resident toward the state and the restoration 
project. To explore the extent to which the changing attitude of the Houses’ Owners 
Association toward the restoration project is associated with and tantamount to the 
current commodification of the built environment is one of the tasks of the present 
thesis. Mapping in other words how the intense socio-spatial unevenness of the 
predominance of aesthetic spacing and the division between the repressed and the 
seduced in the Old Town resonates with the morphology, uses and restorations of the 
Venetian properties is an attempt to integrate the formal discourses of consumerism 
with the problems and uses of social space on more pragmatical and empirical 
grounds. I did not, however, intend to impose a theory of some western origin, on the 
social reality of Rethemnos, but sought to explore instead and map how a theory of 
consumerism can be brought to bear upon the everyday understandings and discourses 
of the Rethemniots by figuring out the changing Venetian environment, 
acknowledging at the same time that such a mapping is not possible, unless a fuller 
appreciation of the event is to emerge, which makes ethics and most importantly the 
subject, possible. It is to this task that I now turn summarizing not only the above 
discussion, but mostly offering an account and experience of the ethics of the event.
2.8 The Ethics of the Event
The ethnography of the event is the methodological peregrination that establishes the 
non-being of a truly universal singularity in an attempt to take flight from traditional 
ethnography, which never really breaks with the authority of the ethnographer, the 
metaphysics of presence and the detemporalization of social space (Fabian, 1982). 
The event, as was shown above, makes a hole in knowledge and yet truth, as Badiou 
(2003) argues, drawing on the Pauline antiphilosophy, is simply defiant of context, 
even if the subject, which Badiou calls a ‘universal singularity without identity’, may 
follow faithfully the truth procedure after the intervention of an event. Truth, in other 
words, is a process which is set in motion and not an empirically documented reality 
under the jurisdiction of Law -  poetics, the Greek state, officialdom etc. The event, by 
the same token, is affirmative before being negative, contradictory or oppositional. 
Moreover, the event does not pick on some key-informants, insofar as it remains open
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to that which happens, to the inconsistent multiplicity, which is yet to come; a wholly 
other which is totally indiscernible and undecidable and which neither forces nor 
appropriates a subject or a place. The ethnography of the event, moreover, is not 
obsessed with the objectivity, repeatability and generality of the findings of the 
research. This is because first, truth in Badiou’s philosophy is a process and not 
simply an objective or a fact; second, because what is termed ‘universal’ does not 
necessarily mean or coincide with what is implied by ‘objective’; third, because 
repeatability, as we will see, stands for and implies a difference-producing repetition, 
a difference in the Idea, a difference without concept, which is difference in-itself 
rather than the Same, the Analogous, or the Representational (Deleuze, 1994); and 
fourth, because to generalize means to explain how and why a particular event may be 
found useful in making sense of a similar process in another context, whilst as I have 
already suggested, an event is simply what happens, pure multiplicity which escapes 
the jurisdiction of Law, language, prediction and prognostication. This does not, 
necessarily, mean that meanings, symbols and practices, in the way purported by 
Marcus’ and Fisher’s ethnography, are a-contextual or immaterial. Rather, it means 
that meanings and practices are deconstructed with respect to manifold spacings, 
differences in continuous variation, differential repetitions, becomings, supplements, 
prosthetic traces and non-present differences that form a horizon of relations of speed 
and slowness, immanence and consistency, defamilialization and defamiliarization, 
beyond Mediterraneanist and territorial understandings of space. The ethnography of 
the event, in other words, is not defiant of historical sensitivity; it is not a system 
closed upon itself either, but an open and aleatory process composed of inconsistent 
and non-unified multiplicities that yearn for and are fascinated with what takes place 
-  what Doel (1999) suggested in his ‘diabolical art of spatial science’, in relationship 
to space taking place. Finally, the ethnography of the event is subtractive, to the 
extent that it speaks of beings and subjects without reference to their attributes, 
qualities, presences, losses, lacks, substances or identities -  for strictly speaking, no 
reference to ‘ones’ is allowed in the evental constellation. As Badiou (2003: 49) aptly 
sums it up, “the event has not come to prove something; it is pure beginning [...] 
There is no proof of the event; nor is the event a proof’. Rather it presents “itself as 
pure givenness” (Badiou, 2003: 63), a non- dialectical charis -  in Greek both joy and 
unlimited offer -  that is affirmative rather than negative, reciprocal or obligatory. It is 
time, however, to turn to the deconstruction of Mediterraneanist identities starting to
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chart how the symptoms of shame, honour, and poetics have failed to theorize the 
irreducibility of the event.
PART TWO: DECONSTRUCTING 
MEDITERRANEANISM I: MAPPING THE SUBJECT
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CHAPTER THREE: M EDITERRANEANS IDENTITIES
3.1 Introduction
Deconstructing Mediterraneanist identifications (shame, honour, poetics, friends of 
the heart, womanhood), is not, necessarily, about destroying them. To start groping 
around the model of shame-and-honour, dominant in Mediterranean studies in the 
1960s and 1970s and which asserted that it is the values of shame and honour with 
which women and men identify and associate themselves in the Mediterranean region, 
is what I propose now, unhinging what holds such a form of thought together. I argue, 
despite the latter being a mode of thought largely abandoned in recent years, that it is 
still useful to see how poststructuralist theory splays it out and stretches it beyond 
meaning and being, along the lines of active becoming, affirming otherness and 
infinite alterity. Subsequently, I take up on the model of poetics (Herzfeld, 1985), a 
mode of thought which is heavily enmeshed and closely tied to the dialectic, which I 
suggest fails to provide convincing excuses for ‘the sin of Mediterraneanism’ 
(Herzfeld, 2004), in order accordingly, to deconstruct Papataxiarchis’ (1991) 
assertions of the ‘friends of the heart’, and ‘coffee-shop commensality’ as a means to 
transcend the strictures and limitations of gift exchange. Finally, I set in motion 
Dubisch’s (1995) ‘poetics of womanhood’, a mode of thought that conceives of 
women, exclusively, on the side of the negative and the reactive ontologies of 
presence -  as in religious rituals -  in an attempt to reconceptualize and restructure 
how gender is understood once it is given over to the Body without Organs and 
becoming-woman by recourse to Deleuzoguattarian philosophy. While such 
distinctive moments constitute a premature attempt to deconstruct the sedentary 
identitifications of Mediterraneanism, it is Chapter 4 that unfolds and pushes to its 
logical conclusion the full implications of the above movement, reinscribing 
difference on the plane of differential repetition (Deleuze), the counterfeit (Derrida), 
and becoming-woman (Deleuze and Guattari).
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3.2 The Shame-and-Honour Model
As Du Boulay (1974: 4) put it in her anthropological account A Portrait o f  a Greek 
Mountain Village, a small village in Evoia, Greece, where she conducted fieldwork in 
late 1960s, “I have been looking for a village without regular transport and thus 
without too constant communication with the more urban oriented world”. What I 
want to do here is challenge such a unitary conception of place, mostly with reference 
to honour, that haunts the early ethnographic depictions of the 1960s and 1970s as 
indicative of the obsession with the innocence and transparency of place and the 
metaphysics of presence that take honour not as a “commodity which may be gained 
or lost easily in the seesaw of social competition, but something which men and 
women are bom, which they lose only in an extreme situation, and which, once lost, 
tends to be lost for ever” (Du Boulay, 1974: 107). My argument will be that honour is 
already differential before it is subject to such an eternal, undisputed and steady 
system of evaluation which is allegedly not easily violated by the play of differences 
and that not everyone is bom into the same system of honour nor is honour the same 
for everyone nor is the same honour at stake in all different expressions and aspects of 
social life. Honour is a commodity like everything else that classifies and signifies, 
that is, a totally commensurable and quantifiable trace which chimes with the 
acceptance that there are some people being clearly more honourable than others. For 
John Peristiany (1965: 11), the theorist of Mediterranean studies whose influential 
collection of essays Honour and Shame, the Values o f Mediterranean Societies, has 
long ago laid the groundwork for the unitary fashion under the lens of which 
Mediterranean societies have come to be viewed, “Honour and shame are the constant 
preoccupation of individuals in small scale, exclusive societies where face to face 
personal, as opposed to anonymous, relations are of paramount importance”, while 
Pitt-Rivers (1965: 22), in the same collection of essays, throws his backing behind a 
similar reasoning by pointing out that “Honour, therefore, provides a nexus between 
the ideals of a society and their reproduction in the individual through his aspiration to 
personify them”.
Yet what does it mean to say that one is bom into honour or that honour is a social 
attribute, if not that there is a quotation market of signs and differences that differ and 
defer various sizes, portions and levels of honour? Honour, in other words, can be, 
perfectly, comparable and quantified just like any other marketable good, which is
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entirely enmeshed in power relations. The British anthropologist John Campbell, who 
was one of the first anthropologists to undertake fieldwork research and carry out a 
detailed ethnographic study of the Sarakatsani nomadic population of northern 
Greece, promoted the view that “the basis of social reputation for a family is the 
recognition that it has honour (<temi), a word which is also used in Greek language to 
describe the monetary price, or value of an object or service”. But as he, interestingly, 
went on to suggest “Temi expresses the notion of worth whether this is an economic 
value in market or social worth evaluated in a complex of competing groups and 
individuals” (Campbell, 1965: 143-144). It is tempting, therefore, to note that since 
honour is an equivalent of temi, then honour is not the other of temi but no other than 
temi; and that it works in a similar way any other sign works in a market of 
signification and differentiation. Honour, it could be argued, is pure and simple 
commensurability and exchangeability itself.
There are more to come with respect to how honour works in terms of the often 
disregarded and usually unappreciated differentiation that sweeps differences. As Pitt- 
Rivers (1965: 32) logically pointed out, “On the one hand, honour demands keeping 
in faith and to break one’s word or to lie is the most dishonorable conduct, yet in fact 
a man is permitted to lie and to deceive without forfeiting his honour”. This is a 
remarkable statement, though, if attention is paid, in that it affirms that honour exists 
in various stakes and exchanges, and in various shapes and degrees of difference and 
that it holds independently from and irrespective of what one does. For honour, truly, 
fails to be solidly and permanently defined slipping always from any hegemonic 
discourse that wants to block it, given that by managing to be honourable while 
‘permitted to lie’ simply affirms that there are honours that not only are more 
honourable than others but that, occasionally, may go beyond a narrow understanding 
of what is tacitly expected from a ‘honourable attitude’, in that, for example, even a 
lie, occasionally and on condition, can be taken as a mark or a sign of honour.
The anthropologist Michael Herzfeld (1987: 75) has rightly argued that “the old 
‘label’ of honour might be usefully displaced by descriptively simpler and less 
ambiguous glosses such as ‘hospitality’ in order to allow more precisely calibrated 
comparisons”. However, hospitality is no less indifferent or ill-judged than honour, 
even if, theoretically, it goes beyond the Mediterraneanist gloss of honour. For, what
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does comparison mean? Is it about comparing differences across various geographical 
areas? Even if hospitality seems a more sensitive concept on the back of which the 
Mediterranean distinctiveness can be fully or more productively assigned to or 
examined, comparison still inclines toward processes of inclusion and exclusion (for 
in order to compare there has to be some ‘solid’, or ‘stable’ yardstick on the basis of 
which one can account for any difference) that cling on various aspects of 
Mediterraneanist assumptions without avoiding the trap of the unitary conception of 
the Mediterranean; rather the opposite is the case since by ‘comparing’ things, entities 
and traits of a behaviour or a culture novel forms of consolidating Mediterraneanism 
are permitted that can hardly ooze away or wipe out unification. One (a theorist who 
wants to study the Mediterranean) should, therefore, go beyond a conceptual, external 
and representational understanding of difference taking up instead on a difference 
without identity, which will affirm the return not of the same (honour), but of the 
differential repetition, manifold spacing, chance and becoming-other of a wholly other 
honour that in a certain Nietzschean sense returns; but in a way which is eternal 
(‘eternal return’).
The position I am converging on thus is not that honour should be abandoned as a 
means through which one should come to terms with Mediterranean societies, but that 
in Mediterraneanist writings, the concept of honour shores up or presupposes a hidden 
rationality that is not yet disclosed and a unitary fashion that remains to be 
discovered. Such a strategy of writing prioritizes the ‘weak’, the ‘irrational’ and the 
‘object’ of study, without taking into account the fact that the so-called object of study 
is already intoxicated, contaminated and altered by differential doctrines; and without 
reckoning with the fact that difference has been already an organizing principle of the 
Mediterranean societies before honour is called forth. On another Mediterraneanist 
occasion, patronage (an indirect informal electoral-network based on mutual favours 
between citizens and politicians) was often presented as a political form that 
substitutes for the absence of a well-organized capitalist state, something which in a 
certain evolutionist sense implied that patronage should be seen as an inchoate and yet 
incomplete, in the process of becoming, form or infant stage of a fully operational 
state. Kenny (1963: 158), for example, saw patronage “acting as a control, a check, a 
balance and indeed an insurance against the misuse of official institutionalised 
power”, whilst Campbell (1964: 260) argued that “Patronage is the means through
79
which the local community is linked to the wider national society”. Such a rhetoric 
however, still depends on a dubious philosophical theorizing that enhances and 
accentuates the irrational and the marginal, lying on ontologies and geographies of 
presence (the state is present in the form of patronage), loss (the western type of state 
is missing) and lack {patronage is a dysfunctional state but soon to be fully 
operational).
Interestingly, however, such controversies cannot be easily resolved or confronted. 
For one thing because it is hard to tell whether honour is an individual category or a 
social/collective value, and yet for another, as Bourdieu (1965: 211) for his part 
pointed out adding a further twist to the above confusion, because honour is “the basis 
of the moral code of an individual who sees himself always through the eyes of 
others, who has need of other for his existence, because the image he has of himself is 
indistinguishable form that presented to him by other people”. But again, what does it 
mean to conceive of honour through the ‘eyes of the others’? One could argue that all 
men have honour to the extent that all people are seen ‘through the eyes of the others’, 
and yet it can be, easily, counterclaimed that honour is easily violated in the long 
course of the contested and a(nta)gonistic daily affairs of the community because of 
or through exactly the same ‘lens of the others’, insofar as by living in a small 
community one’s actions are always subject to close and careful scrutiny as a result of 
the transparency of social spaces and the greater level of interdependence among the 
members of the community. Thus in Campbell’s (1964: 297) account of the 
Sarakatsani nomads, honour is caught up within, on the one hand the “ideal equality 
of honourable men” and on the other hand, the “inequalities, which differentiate 
families in terms of numbers and wealth and certain other criteria”. Campbell, 
accordingly, thinks honour through an alleged capacity to reconcile and bring together 
two separate systems of classification, the one ideal/religious and it goes without 
saying more ‘just’, the other material/secular, and by implication, unfair, uneven and 
highly discriminating, both of which in many respects and at first glance seem to be 
hugely ineffective, antagonistic and incompatible. What Campbell suggests, however, 
is that to the extent that the ideals and criteria of the Greek Christian Orthodox 
religion (the dominant religion in Greece claiming its own right/ortho glory- 
belief/doxq) are defiant of the wrongs and injustices of life, while by contrast, the 
struggles and battles among the Sarakatsani seem to neglect the ethics and ideals of
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Christianity, honour is able to bring together and reconcile such ostensibly 
incompatible and diametrically opposed social systems of value and classification. As 
Campbell put it, “there remains an opposition between Christian ideals and the values 
of prestige. Fortunately or otherwise, the Sarakatsani, do not see this; partly because 
the two value systems either appear to be complementary as in family or kindred, or 
in other areas of social life they are relatively segregated in their incidence; and partly 
because the individual thinking in egocentric terms cannot see that his own honour, 
prestige, pride and self-regard threaten another” (Campbell, 1964: 356).
Yet this is a metaphysical distinction between an ideal and a material honour, that is, 
an ontoteleotheological expression of the metaphysics of presence, the geographies of 
absence and the ontologies of loss and lack that are part and parcel of the discourse of 
Mediterraneanism; for there seems to be little evidence to suggest that there is a clear- 
cut and undisputable line of distinction between the two classification systems. Not 
only because the Sarakatsani believe in some kind of theological justice in terms of 
honour, but because they fail, precisely, to see the apparent contradiction between an 
ideal and a material expression of honour, that is, because -  according to Campbell -  
“Fortunately or otherwise, the Sarakatsani, do not see this” (emphasis mine). Long 
live the blindness of the primitives! Honour, therefore, is a potential, or a means 
through which to make sense of Mediterranean societies, but only inasmuch as and on 
condition that the Sarakatsani fail to consider how wrongly put honour is when taken 
up by their ‘impoverished’ discourses. As Davis (1977: 96) notes, with respect to 
Campbell’s idealization of honour, “It is difficult to escape the conclusion that honour 
is, in spite of Campbell’s assertions to the contrary, intimately related to wealth” 
(Davis, 1977: 96). The inevitable contradiction to be found in such conceptions that 
want to separate and seclude once and for all an ideal from a material honour, is better 
summarized by Pitt-Rivers’ (1965: 25, emphasis mine) brief comment below, who 
seems to realize or suspect that the controversy should be part of the widely and often 
unquestionably accepted unitary ground which the Mediterranean studies have 
hitherto taken for granted, “No stereotype o f the Mediterranean Countryman emerges, 
but some of the ways in which the rural communities of the Mediterranean differ are 
explained not only in terms of the different cultures to which they belong, but in terms 
of the mode of their integration into the nation of which they are part”.
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The gloss of honour, therefore, and not the practice of it, that is, the fact that honour 
should according to Mediterraneanist a key paragon determining by and large, the 
Mediterranean way of life, depends on dualistic interpretations, contradictions and 
oppositions. On the face of such reasoning, however, a difference should become a 
certain kind of knowledge and thus it should miss, accordingly, the potential of being 
subject to continual and contingent transformations and permutations (which is after 
all what should matters to any real difference). Peristiany and Pitt-Rivers (1992: 6), 
not long ago, have insisted on the fact that “Our aim in treating the Mediterranean as a 
whole was epistemological only and we never attempted to define it geographically”. 
Yet the alleged wholeness, unity or totality of the Mediterranean should be questioned 
and challenged, not only in terms of an empirical or geographical documentation that 
will prove that honour, for example, is irrelevant to the Mediterranean, but crucially 
as a result of a critical examination of the theories put forward to interpret the 
Mediterranean reality. I am not saying, in other words, that honour does not exist in 
the Mediterranean, but what I suggest is that the Mediterranean identity is 
unaccomplished, perpetually negotiated and deterritorialized rather than an imprint or 
a sign of a territorial understanding of difference that should be necessarily assigned 
to or explained through the gloss of an all-encompassing honour. Fazio (2004), for 
example, is not only sceptical about the “paradigm of the Mediterranean honour” but, 
contra Peristiany’s (1976: 2) assertion, that every family “is always of the nuclear 
bilateral type”, Fazio points out that “families in the so-called Mediterranean area 
were not linked by any strict homogeneity of structure” (Fazio, 2004: 267). And even 
if Davis (1977: 11) argues that “there is some sense in which the Mediterranean is a 
useful category”, as he soon goes on to suggest, “honour, is not primarily to do with 
sexual intercourse [...] but with the performance of sexual roles: to be good of your 
kind” (Davis, 1977: 76).
Honour, if such there is, however is not simply performative -  in the sense that it is 
not a social role or a ‘clothing’ played by an actor, who when finished would put it 
away, in order to be readily redeployed when occasion or duty calls. It is both an 
ideological/spiritual trait and a social/material condition of differance, that is, a mark 
of an untraceable non-originary difference, a certain form of ‘dematerialization’ as 
Lyotard (1993: 44) put it, which is not assignable to any Mediterranean idiosyncrasy. 
Honour is neither a matter of quality nor a matter of quantity in the manner in which
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Campbell’s ethnography strives to establish, nor is it a sign of an existent signified in 
the Mediterranean, but involves instead variations in and of difference, and 
differential repetitions, which as we will see with respect to Deleuze’s philosophy, 
refers to a difference-producing repetition. For as Deleuze put it “This is why the 
variations do not come from without, do not express a secondary compromise 
between a repressing instance and a represented instance and must not be understood 
on the basis of the still negative forms of oppositions, reversal or overturning” 
(Deleuze, 1994: 17). If honour is to be taken seriously, therefore, difference should 
not be manifested in a straightforward manner or mediated by identity, representation, 
resemblance or analogy, but should be acknowledged “In its essence, [as] difference 
[which] is the object of affirmation or affirmation itself’ (Deleuze, 1994: 52). For 
honour may be repeated in the various small communities across the Mediterranean, 
but repetition, all these second-comings of difference, are not about the same honour, 
but concern a differential honour, which comes prior to any reflection of honour, as 
“Repetition is a condition o f action before it is a concept o f  reflection” (Deleuze, 
1994: 90). And thus the whole issue is not about the return of the same honour, but, 
on the contrary, “it affirms everything of the multiple, everything of the different, 
everything of chance except what subordinates them to the One, to the Same, to 
necessity, everything except the One, the Same and the Necessary” (Deleuze, 1994: 
115). That honour is difference, comes down to saying, therefore, that it is always 
eternal and intrinsic (in-itself), for “everything is a multiplicity in so far as it 
incarnates an Idea” (Deleuze, 1994: 182).
Herzfeld’s (1985, 1987) and Papataxiarchis’ (1991) accounts do not move effectively 
beyond the above deficiencies and controversies of the shame-and-honour model; and 
thus there is still a need to set in motion the metaphysical, ontotheological and 
teleological nature of the poetic model, which fails to overcome the metaphysics of 
presence, the geographies of absence and the ontologies of lack and loss of the shame- 
and-honour that were made possible and were formed on the back of the unitary 
conception of the Mediterranean. Let us focus, therefore, on the poetic turn which had 
a massive influence in the way in which Mediterraneanist studies were shaped in the 
1980s, as was explained by the anthropologist Michael Herzfeld and his 
ethnographies carried out especially with reference to the island of Crete, Southern 
Greece.
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3.3 The Poetic Model
The model of poetics launched in the Mediterranean imaginary in the early 1980s, set 
out to analyze the behaviours and attitudes of Mediterranean people, and to explore in 
particular how “a man’s performance successfully announces his personal excellence” 
(Herzfeld, 1985: 11). Poetics intended to move beyond the distinction between the 
observer (anthropologist) and the observed (Mediterranean societies), a dualism often 
taken for granted in the classical anthropological texts of the 1950s and 1960s, 
reconciling theory (social anthropology) with a certain practical way of doing 
ethnography in the Mediterranean, drawing, for example, on particular fieldwork 
experiences, like that of Glendi -  a pseudonym for the village where Herzfeld 
conducted his first major fieldwork in Crete (Herzfeld, 1985). I do not seek to deny 
the usefulness of his entire work here, nor do I intend to document its methodological 
flaws -  not that that would be an easy task. I want to criticize, however, but only in an 
attempt to construct my argument by way of a deconstruction of Mediterraneanist 
identities, which I shall further pursue in subsequent chapters, the grounds on which 
the epistemological and ontological presuppositions of the poetic model rest, 
destabilizing and loosening this holding formation that in my view is closely 
associated with the discourse of Mediterraneanism, especially the rationalist 
epistemology, unitary perception, dualistic nature, metaphysics of presence-ontology, 
and dialectical resolution of difference.
In his Poetics o f Manhood (1985), Herzfeld defines poetics as the thought that “does 
not furnish a means of prediction. On the contrary, it is a conceptual and rhetorical 
tool for defending one’s actions [...] subject to negotiation and manipulation for 
individual purposes” (Herzfeld, 1985: 84). What matters to Herzfeld, accordingly, is 
the informal language and discourses of the people that live in the Mediterranean 
region, rather than the more strict, officially derived discourses that obfuscate and 
confuse a socially constructed and meaningful understanding of one’s place. Official 
history is further deconstructed in Herzfeld’s A Place in History (1991) through and 
because of the daily uses and reuses of the words and meanings of the residents that 
reconstruct the official understandings of their place’s identity, in a manner in which 
according to Herzfeld, is defiant of the formal language endowed by the Statist 
ideology of the Greek nation-state. For as Herzfeld sums it up with respect to his 
ethnographic experience in mountain Crete, Glendi is “a world that seems to have less
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and less to do with the official acceptance face of the national culture” (Herzfeld, 
1985: 122).
Official interpretations and unofficial uses of history, however, are not as 
homogeneous as Herzfeld seems to assert. Everyday discourses can leak in all 
possible directions, and not solely or unilaterally against official interpretations of 
history, which are always internal or external to an already existent understanding of 
history, to the extent of course, that the internal is the internal of the external (of the 
internal and so on) or the external is the external of the internal (of the external and so 
on). Once however official history is opposed with a socially constructed 
understanding of a place’s identity, and once this becomes the ‘call of the day’, the 
infinite substitution, supplementarity and prostheses of the suspended marks that 
come between the two instances are considerably threatened. This is why the social 
imaginary of a place that remains intact and untouchable, promoted by the poetic 
model should not, necessarily, oppose the officially and historically incarnated and 
informed conceptions of history with a lay, popular or traditional rhetoric. It is hard to 
tell the difference between the bureaucrat and the local/resident, for example, once 
identity is seen as an unaccomplished and unfinished project that does not await 
accommodation (in the sense that an individual can be at different times a bureaucrat 
and a resident and.. .and.. .infinite) but strives to and leans toward a relentless play of 
unassimilated differences. Du Boulay’s earlier desire to find a place beyond any 
possible urban influence is, I argued, very telling of anthropology’s inability to make 
sense of such intermingled, interwoven and interimplicated identities beyond any 
desire for stabilization and permanence. Herzfeld’s account, however, is not that 
different from such a spatial purity, in that they both presuppose and accept the 
authenticity of place, which is in danger of getting violently taken over by a 
foreign/external ‘evil’ or an additive supplement.
One becomes more suspicious when Herzfeld (1985: 171) points out the “initiation 
into manhood [...] must be convincingly exhibited”, which is an assertion that still 
fathoms Campbell’s attempt to draw a demarcation line between immaterial and 
material forms of honour. In Campbell’s account, recall, it is the immaterial aspect of 
honour that counts, even if the Sarakatsani seem to ignore or to be negligent of how 
oppositional and idealized such a conception of honour remains, when brushed
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against the prestige and wealth of material life. A similar idealism, however, is not 
absent from Herzfeld’s theorization of manhood either, for what else could be, meant, 
by the ‘convincing exhibition of manhood’ other than the fact that ‘we all know that 
you are a man now but, nevertheless, you should act or speak or perform like man’, 
something that further implies, that one does not have to ‘be’ in a very ‘practical’ or 
‘material’, so to speak, sense a man, if such there is, but that he should 
convincingly/ideally ‘show’ or ‘prove’ it?
The above unchallenged idealism is also evident in the manner in which animal theft 
is theorized by Herzfeld, which, as he suggests, nowadays has become an act of 
financial profit, whereas in the past it used to be an equivalent of “personal revenge or 
the creation of new ties of sindeknia [kin relations]” (Herzfeld, (1985: 267). 
According to that, the commodification of animal theft, ought to be considered as a 
consequence of the massive scale of raids, which thwarts the traditional way of 
exposing and negotiating perceptions and meanings of manliness, gagging in that way 
what used to be an explicitly or utterly verbal, expressive or poetic exposition or 
ability to sustain social bonds. Little wonder then, that for Herzfeld “as far as most 
Glendiots are concerned, [it] lack[s] the poeticity that gives simasia [meaning] to 
male action” (Herzfeld, 1985: 268-269). The modem/commodified raid is a threat to 
the original, transparent, meaningful and innocent animal theft on the grounds of the 
scale of the theft and thus by implication some people are entitled to the corollary of 
simasia, whilst others are not. But isn’t that an exotic picture of the original theft? Is 
the seizing of animals only a matter of numbers? How to make sense of or distil from 
the distinction between the poetic raid and its modem counterpart in the light of the 
above, if not by conceiving of the original theft as an innocent, sensible and 
defensible action of poetic meaning, while the recent transformed and corrupted form 
of mass raid, as a perverse metamorphosis that lacks any poetic essence? And isn’t 
that, as Derrida (1976) put it with respect to Levi-Straus’ anthropology, an exoticism, 
which on the grounds of the superficial ‘writing/non-writing’ distinction, thinks of 
itself as progressive liberalism?
In his Anthropology Through the Looking Glass, (1987) Herzfeld has further 
advanced his poetic model by arguing that “Everyday usage breaks the uniformity of 
official definition; istories and dhiafores, quarrels and differences -  the contentions
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matter of actual events -  challenge the verified history of a politically, religiously and 
culturally homogeneous nation state” (Herzfeld, 1987: 141). This is not, necessarily, 
wrong, yet it is one thing to conceive of local culture as a totality composed of various 
everyday practices and quite another to move exclusively from one concept (nation­
state) to another (everyday life/poetics). And despite the fact that Herzfeld (1987: 
185) acknowledges “that no anthropological formulation has much value if it is taken 
out of its historical context”, the Scylla of naive relativism and the Charybdis of the 
fixity, illusory stability and constancy of a place’s history are not swept away, unless 
a differential, non-representational theory of difference is to emerge. Prior to dipping, 
however, into this theorization, let me keep unfolding and unhinging the joints of the 
poetic model in an attempt to specify and draw attention to the ontological bonds and 
ties that stubbornly enough ties and hold this formation steadily together.
Segmentation is another of Herzfeld’s terms, an allegedly plural, affirmative and 
variable image of thought linking the various aspects of social life with the more 
specific attributes and behaviours of the individual. Segmentation does not sit easily, 
however, with Herzfeld’s (1982) earlier work on the ‘disemic nature’ of Greece -  
from dio simia, two signs -  which rests on the binaries, strictures and contradictions 
“between official discourse and social knowledge” (Herzfeld, 1987: 152). If the 
segmentary model is plural, affirmative and active, the model of disemia remains 
dualistic, dialectic, transcendental, constant, and irrevocably negative. How can 
disemia and its strict and Statist philosophy and designations of choice (the one or the 
other), hierarchy (the one over the other), and contradiction (the one versus the other), 
fit and be ascribed to the many, heterological, polymorphous, multiple, infinite, 
manifold, differential and innumerable lines of flight of Glendi’s deterritorialized 
identities? Moreover, the need to “pursue this exercise in doing to ourselves as we 
have done to others” (Herzfeld, 1987: 96), which prompts anthropologists to do with 
theory/anthropology what they normally undertake during their ethnographic 
fieldwork -  most likely, finding out and categorizing the whereabouts of people the 
ethnographer is not familiar with -  is nihilistic and ascetic, seeking only to blame, 
accuse and punish. It is a slave’s poetics, which is deeply reactive, inferior, 
unproductive, submissive, negative and guilty. Little wonder, then, that theories of 
difference and otherness do not seem to be to Herzfeld’s taste, but are mistakenly 
taken (Herzfeld, 1987: 113) as the product of a “fashionable [...] era [that] attack[s]
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any binary code as evidence of the imposition of a foreign system on indigenous 
values”. Yet, this is clearly an oversimplification and misunderstanding of 
poststructuralism. Theories of difference do not simply attack binary codes, but 
instead encapsulate and affirm difference, as repetition in continuous variation, that is, 
a non-present, non-originary and graphematic differance, beyond the One (honour), 
the Other (shame), the Same (poetics) and the Many (friends of the heart).
Even if “a pragmatic concern with display and concealment is a key to the front and 
back door of Greek culture” (Herzfeld, 1991: 40), such a seemingly correct statement 
cannot hide the fact that the poetic model is still based on the domesticity of display 
and concealment, which says more about the relationship of anthropology to the 
Mediterranean rather than it says about the Mediterranean region itself. And even if it 
is generally correct to assert that “monumental history has its place in Rethemnos, but 
Rethemnos has, and is, a place in many histories” (Herzfeld, 1991: 259), one should 
not forget either that any binary code works perfectly well, however one conceives of 
the history or identity of a place as long as these terms are taken up solely on the back 
of the transcendental assumptions and dialectic theorizations of poetics.
Arguing however that such a domestic “alternative rationality [that] recasts the 
relationship between themselves and the state in ways that are quite alien to official 
thinking” (Herzfeld, 1991: 159) is ill-mannered and unbecoming, as I am striving to 
venture thus far, that is, a binary code that does not escape the metaphysics of shame- 
and-honour, is not about denying the creativity and reflexivity of social actors in re­
assembling the social (Latour, 2005), but rather about opposing the 
negation/contradiction itself, the oppositional and contradictory logic of shame-and- 
honour, and the antithesis between poetics and official discourses. Failing to come to 
terms with the irreducible and manifold spacing of such a difference is a symptom of 
a certain epoch of knowledge, that of Mediterraneanism, that describes rather than 
invents, discloses rather than produces and unites rather divides the Mediterranean. 
For truly, there is nothing real, contradictory, dialectical or representational about the 
Mediterranean, inasmuch as there is no reality, only reality effects, as “Reality 
‘cannot be used to explain why a statement becomes a fact, since it is only after it has 
become a fact that the effect of reality is obtained’” (Latour and Woolgar, 1986: 180, 
cited in Doel, 1999: 123). In the light of the above, the Mediterranean difference is
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never present but remains open to the spectrality and ex-appropriation of writing 
(Derrida, 1994) rather than to any capital appropriation of poetics. I will return to such 
a hauntological conception of difference with respect to the transitional state of the 
Mediterranean city in Chapter 4. Suffice it to note for the moment that by ex­
appropriation, I mean the “radical contradiction of all ‘capital’ of all property or 
appropriation, as well as the concepts that depend on it, beginning with that of free 
subjectivity, thus of emancipation as ordered by these concepts” (Derrida, 1994: 90). 
Such is the textual and graphematic resonance of the Mediterranean, which will be 
further pursued with respect to Deleuze’s differential repetitions, Derrida’s counterfeit 
money and Deleuze’s and Guattari’s becoming-woman in due course. It will be then 
possible to ground mathematically the unanticipated multiple subjectivity that sits at 
the edge of an evental site (of Rethemnos) by way of Badiou’s subtractive ontology, 
which will pick from where Deleuze’s deterritorialization and Derrida’s 
deconstruction left off. Let us turn, for the moment, to the friends of the heart, and the 
unwieldy purity of another assimilating effort of Mediterraneanism: commensality.
3.4 The Friends of the Heart
Papataxiarchis’ (1991) study of alcohol consumption in the small Greek coffee shops 
of Lesvos, an ordered and hierarchical reality most likely to be located in a visible and 
recognizable part of the village, set out to break with the restricted economic scarcity 
and obligations of gift exchange. This analysis points to a different kind of sociation 
called ‘friends of the heart’, which is based on the purity and honesty of 
commensality in an attempt to move beyond the obligations of gift exchanges. 
According to Papataxiarchis (1992: 209), the consumption of alcohol in small coffee 
shops is not so much about the quantity (though how much one drinks is always an 
issue) or the type of the alcohol consumed, but rather about the manner, recall the 
poetic excellence noted above, in which a drink is offered and consumed. The manner 
in which one buys a drink in the coffee shop, so Papataxiarchis suggests, points in the 
direction of a possible ‘friendly company’ (pared) whose members’ excellence will 
no longer have to be prescribed, limited or bordered by the obligations of the 
Maussean theory, but due to certain “coffee shop practices”, like the consumption of 
alcohol, will be given the chance of a “cultural construction of manliness” 
(Papataxiarchis, 1992: 212), through the pursuing of a truly pure parea (friendly
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company) (Papataxiarchis, 1992: 216) that in turn will purge the power relations 
surrounding the village’s social life. The one who buys a drink, we are told, prefers to 
pay it not in front of the other members of the parea, but discreetly and almost 
secretly (Papataxiarchis, 1992: 219).
Yet the mannerism, style and aesthetics of such a poetic consumption of alcohol, do 
not really transcend the boundaries, obligations and power relationships of the 
androcracy and hierarchy of the coffee shop. The right to offer a drink is constituted 
by and constitutive of the social hierarchy of the village and thus commensality does 
not seem to lie outside the usual restrictions of gift exchanges. The impossible non­
economic gift, beyond reciprocity and obligation that Papataxiarchis is in search of, is 
not about alcohol which fails to generate novel forms and politics of friendship. I 
propose without further ado that it has to do rather with Derrida’s (1992) theorization 
of the ‘counterfeit’ which as we shall shortly see can be useful in a two-fold sense; 
first, in that it paves the way for and corresponds with processes that flee from 
territorial ways of mapping and understanding identity and the rational, thinking, and 
parochial subject; and second, in that it engages in a sociation that, crucially, goes 
beyond reciprocity, economy and exchange deconstructing the strictures of solidity, 
fixity and constancy of the coffee shop parea, readily remaining at the same time, a- 
signifying, non-reciprocal, non-economic and a-subjective. Such a depersonalized and 
deindividuated multiplicity that corresponds with ‘counterfeit transactions’ will come 
to supplant the unexpected generosity of the coffee-shop by dwelling exclusively on 
the plane of consistency rather than on the repressive, productive and poetic plane of 
the friends of the heart. What the counterfeit allows, in other words, is to move 
beyond the strict boundaries and hierarchies of a coffee shop consumption, in an 
attempt to conceive of a generic and multiple ‘gift’, which will be indiscernible, 
undecidable and unnameable, a multiple, in short, which will not have to further 
promote or consolidate the gingerly power relations that are about to thrive in the 
coffee shop.
The counterfeit, as will be shortly shown, is a far more rich and fruitful theoretical- 
practice that can map the floating experience of space and subject, beyond the 
Mediterraneanist imaginary of the widely shared conception by anthropologists of a 
highly idealized conception of provisional coffee shops. For the gift, says Derrida, if
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there is any, should remain unspoken, non-reciprocal, unacknowledged and should 
hold beyond exchange. It is only such a sliding, and splaying out of difference, that is, 
the gap and distanciation between what one should do in order to be altruistic while 
offering a drink and the choice to ignore or deny such an offer that breaks and 
interrupts the economic cycle. For there is always delay, deferral and postponement at 
stake while offering drinks, that is, a challenge that one may accept or totally leave 
behind. Offering a drink is still very much part of the obligation to give or to receive a 
gift, whether one calls it ‘friends of the heart’ or ‘pure gift’. The counterfeit, by 
contrast, tears the economy apart by launching a non-economic, non-symmetrical and 
non-calculable exchange as the one who gives a gift, experiences the differential 
calculus of a spatial and temporal distance, that is, an intervallic space, which is 
neither about altruism nor about friendship. That the counterfeit goes beyond the 
pointillist anthropology of the coffee shop and can successfully withhold, suspend or 
postpone a gift and the concomitant hierarchies and power relations and their 
repercussions that stem from such a domestic space, is what I will be arguing in 
Chapter 4. Papataxiarchis’ notion of the ‘purity of the gift’, fails to escape the 
Maussean obligations and restrictions of purity and unification, for, rather than being 
pure, a gift is fundamentally aporetic and an aporia cannot be resolved. Whilst 
Papataxiarchis is right in looking for a different conception of the gift beyond the 
Maussean economic regulations, the asymmetrical gift is not about alcohol but about 
the reversibility of symbolic exchange, that is, an untraceable and non-present 
differance that opens a distance between the obligation to receive a gift and the 
negation of this obligation that is not easily or metaphysically spanned. Such is also 
the resonance and undecidability that affirms the spatiality, delay and distanciation of 
the event, which contra Papataxiarchis’ conception of the value of the gift, 
acknowledges and eagerly accepts that the a genuinely lasting gift has a value, which 
is perhaps irremovable (e.g. not exchanged, returned or appreciated as such). While a 
fuller account of the counterfeit is offered in Chapter 4, it is time to turn to Dubisch’s 
poetics of womanhood, which still irresponsibly bathes in the grid of the negativism, 
reaction, bad conscience and guilt of the dialectical denigrations of the poetic model.
3.5 The Poetics of Womanhood
The problem besetting Dubisch’s (1995) poetics of womanhood bounces off a 
possible writing of women’s histories and rites of passage in the Greek island of
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Tinos, where women may appear to have a prominent role in the usually male 
domesticated public spaces, through their participation in religious rituals and rituals 
of mourning. As Dubisch argues, women’s presence in such public spaces allows 
them to reveal their ability, performances and practices in negotiating meanings and 
identities and in displaying and showing excellence in an effort to accomplishing 
specific tasks in places, for example, that are not particularly marked by male 
dominance. Like Herzfeld’s poetics of manhood, however, what matters to Dubisch is 
the rhetorical and poetic performances according to which a woman can perform and 
adequately expose her eagerness of being good “at being a woman” (Dubisch, 1995: 
206). As Dubisch points out, “through gestures, tone of voice, phrasing and appeal to 
bystanders as an ‘audience’, an individual ‘frames’ certain statements and acts” 
(Dubisch, 1995: 205) and thus maternity lies at the heart of such performances on the 
face of which women are enabled to demonstrate and manifest convincing ways of 
excellence. Exposing maternity allows for various and interesting performances to 
flourish in public, as a pregnant woman, for example, will exaggerate the way she 
walks in order to expose in a more dramatic manner her condition. Granted, however, 
that women quite often in Mediterranean studies have been taken to be symptoms of 
or synonymous with an unrestrained sexual behaviour, motherhood offers an 
extremely rich potential, so Dubisch insists, on the grounds of which, women’s 
alleged sinful nature can be effectively exorcised, reversed or redeemed. Reimbursing 
the heretofore unsatisfied and dangerously exhibited sexuality of women through the 
ideal of motherhood, in short, can be taken “as the means by which women redeem 
their inherently sinful nature” (Dubisch, 1995: 208); also, the ability to maintain a 
household, to cook or to participate in religious and rituals of mourning, can be 
among other things, a prominent field in and through which women can constantly 
and further justify their poetic excellence. Such an excellence however, is best 
measured on the back of performances of pain and suffering which give women the 
chance to compete, struggle and fight for a ‘competitive suffering’ (Dubisch, 1995: 
215), to be found, for example, in the various ways through which women participate 
in the religious rituals of Tinos (the Greek Orthodox annual celebration of Madonna, 
Panagia, on the 15h of August), in an attempt to enhance and empower their presence 
in public spaces (Dubisch, 1995: 212-213).
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Yet one cannot but observe that mourning is a highly negative and reactive 
performance, which should be given over to a more radical and perceptive theory of 
gender beyond poetics, being simply too narrow, negative, reactive and ascetic a 
concept. It is Deleuze’s becoming-woman that can effectively make space for such a 
poignantly unsettling theoretical apparatus, which deconstructs the impoverished 
oedipal sketches of a domestic and reactive representation of women, moving beyond 
fixity and domestication by affirming that gender “is a case of a ‘transition’, of a 
‘change’, a becoming, but it is a becoming that endures, a change that is substance 
itself’ (Deleuze, 1991: 37). The reactionary poetics of womanhood when being 
subject to the liberating effects of becoming-woman are cracked open and worked 
over by the imperceptibility, undecidability and indiscemibility of a difference 
without identity, or unity, as the subject, in the light of the above, is neither poetic nor 
friendly, but “a manifold, a multiplicity, a rhizome” (Doel, 2000: 123). For every 
subject is a multiplicity, especially since, “In contrast to the alternative of the either/or 
exclusions, there is the either ... or ... or of the combinations and permutations where 
the differences amount to the same without ceasing to be differences” (Deleuze and 
Guattari, 1983: 70). When all’s said and done, however, becoming-woman knows 
nothing of the presence of women in public and private spaces and suffering, for “the 
present is not; rather it is pure becoming always outside itself’ (Deleuze, 1991: 55).
What is required to take things further is an explication and explanation of the manner 
in which the affirmative and differential conceptions of difference deconstruct and 
inhabit what the above hotly contested and disputed ideologies and modes of thought 
failed to loosen and set in motion, mainly a truly respected difference in accord to 
what matters to the Mediterranean region and which will no longer have to seen 
through the lens of any unitary fashion whatsoever. Such a task is further taken up in 
the next chapter, by picking up on a difference as differential repetition in an attempt 
to move beyond shame-and-honour; the counterfeit, as means to go beyond the 
poetics of the friends of the heart; and becoming-woman, as a means to avoid the trap 
of the poetics of womanhood; meanwhile an account of Lacan’s symbolic register is 
also offered, introducing the bulk of schizoanalysis and becoming-woman. Having, 
accordingly, deconstructed in one but four-folded stroke these Mediterraneanist 
identities, I will be then, hopefully, in a position to undertake a similar deconstruction 
with respect to the manner in which Mediterraneanist spatialities articulate.
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CHAPTER FOUR: DECONSTRUCTING MEDITERRANEANIST
IDENTITIES
4.1 Introduction
I have argued so far that Mediterraneanism, specifically the tropes of shame, poetics, 
friends of the heart, and poetics of womanhood are powerful imaginations swinging a 
pendulum composed of a bizarre conception of a unitary fashion of the Mediterranean 
and an unrestrained poetic ability of subjects, which is nonetheless susceptible to 
criticism on a number of grounds. I stressed the need to move beyond such 
representations that fall for the One, the Same and the Many in order to ex- 
appropriate and in-consist difference without unity or identity. I insisted that 
difference is differential, manifold, kaleidoscopic and fragmented beyond any 
spontaneous or striated theorization. Having laboured a reversal of Mediterraneanism, 
I now want to turn to the reinscription and affirmation of difference, by drawing on a) 
a differential repetitive difference by way of Deleuze’s (1994) theory, which 
substitutes for shame-and-honour; b) the counterfeit of Derrida’s (1992) non­
reciprocal and impossible gift which substitutes for the friends of the heart, and c) last 
but not least, the theoretical-practice of becoming-woman of Deleuze and Guattari 
(1988) that takes over from where the poetics of suffering failed to establish a certain 
differential picture of gender -  though an immature familiarization with Lacan’s 
(1977) theory is also experimented prior to dipping into schizoanalysis and the Body 
without Organs. Accordingly, and having opened the space for an infinite, 
indiscernible and undecidable deindividuation, I will be in a position to pick up on the 
Mediterranean spatiality (Chapter 5) and its deconstruction (Chapter 6) on the 
grounds of the spatial art of origami and the systemic nature of the consumer society 
(Chapter 7), in order, consequently, in Part 4 to pave the way for an evental 
Rethemnos, which is doubly un-folded, once through the reconsideration and revision 
of the Old Town problem (Chapter 8) and once again through the contested 
identification of the choreoethnography of the event and the subtractive ontology of 
Badiou (Chapter 9).
4.2 Differential Repetitions -  Beyond Shame-and-Honour
Difference, I have already argued, is manifold and multiple. And thus Deleuze 
proposition to think of difference independently of the various forms of representation 
that often catch hold of it by means of analogy or representation (Deleuze, 1994: 24).
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Difference is neither conceptual, nor representational but instead singular at the levels 
of Ideas and repetitive, and thus whether in Campbell’s ideological perception of 
honour or in Du Boulay’s account of a place or even in Herzfeld’s notions of 
concealment and display, it still remains contradictory and representational, 
dominated by lack, loss and scarcity. Difference though, in a certain Nietzschean 
sense, should not be mediated, but, instead, should be the object of affirmation and 
excess, even when it returns, “for eternal return affirmed in all its power, allows no 
installation of a foundation -  ground” (Deleuze, 1994: 67). As a consequence it 
escapes the anthropological trap of unity, identity and fixity being simply and purely 
composed of other differences that are not already contradictions. For “It is not 
difference which presupposes opposition but opposition which presupposes 
difference” (Deleuze, 1994: 51), to the extent that difference is “light, aerial and 
affirmative” (Deleuze, 1994: 54), denying the “primacy of original over copy, of 
model over image” (Deleuze, 1994: 66).
To argue that certain behaviours, patterns and structures ‘found’ or attributed to 
Mediterranean societies as portrayed by anthropologists are not real or true or that 
Mediterranean societies do not have anything in common or have nothing to do with 
honour, is mistaken. A differential repetition however does not renounce honour, 
neither refers to objects placed under the same concept, nor is it about the generality 
or similarity of objects classified according to a concept. Rather a differential 
repetition changes something in the mind which contemplates it, to the extent that 
difference in-Itself is “already repetition” (Deleuze, 1994: 124), especially from the 
moment that honour is not the same for all people, nor is everyone entitled to the 
same aspects, degrees, variations and differentiations of honour. Taking honour as a 
representative of Mediterranean societies “fails to capture the affirmed world of 
difference” (Deleuze, 1994: 55), which is neither the one of honour, nor the same of 
shame but instead what “lies between repetitions'’ (Deleuze, 1994: 76). A repetition of 
honour, therefore, is neither about the same honour repeated or constantly reinstated 
across the Mediterranean world, nor about s(h)ame even in a small community; it is 
not about what returns, but instead “a force of affirmation, [which] affirms everything 
of the multiple, everything of the different, everything of chance except what 
subordinates them to the One, to the Same, to necessity, everything except the One,
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the Same and the Necessary” (Deleuze, 1994: 115). For “Repetition is a condition o f 
action before it is a concept o f reflection” (Deleuze, 1994: 90).
When honour is seen as a multiplicity that refers to other differences that differentiate 
rather than identify a place with a certain identity, attitude or behaviour of honour, 
Deleuze’s differential calculus of Ideas becomes all the more pertinent, to the extent 
that it involves “Ideas [that] are differentials of thought [...] a differential calculus 
corresponding to each Idea, an alphabet of what it means to think” (Deleuze, 1994: 
181). For, truly, “everything bathes in its difference” (Deleuze, 1994: 243), in the 
same way, the true difference of honour like the throw of a dice returns not in the 
same or in an identical manner (the same honour on and on and on again), but in a 
way which affirms chance, infinity, chaos and osmosis. Can one, at least, assume that 
honour is of Mediterranean origin? Yes, insofar as one accepts that any origin is an 
origin of another origin and so on in a certain grammatological way Derrida (1976). 
Honour thus is an original difference in the Mediterranean, but only to the extent that 
it concerns a honour of honour (of honour...infinite), which in turn refers to and is 
associated with variations of ‘intensity’ and ‘scrambles’ or ‘dispositifs’ (Lyotard, 
1993) that differentiate honour and do not presuppose a honourific identity 
confidently defined in solid terms and guided by a local poetics that tacitly subjects 
and expects from it to reach an undisputable and absolute perfection.
Honour, from a similar perspective, it can be argued, works in the same manner a fold 
operates. For “A fold is always folded within a fold, like a cavern in a cavern” 
(Deleuze, 1993: 6). This is why when honour is conceived as representation, it blocks 
and ultimately erodes the unfolding of differences and the hope of any deconstructive 
account of writing difference in a manner which will not dash or stave off otherness. 
Yet “The problem is not how to finish a fold, but how to continue it, to have it go 
through the ceiling, how to bring it to infinity” (Deleuze, 1993: 34). A differential 
repetition is not about honour, therefore, but about an event which “is a vibration with 
an infinity of harmonics or submultiples, such as an audible wave, a luminous wave, 
or even an increasingly smaller part of space over the course of an increasingly 
shorter duration” (Deleuze, 1993: 77). In the light of the above, all differences, even 
that of honour should be taken as a process that takes place amid a zone of 
indiscemibility and a zone of undecidability, passing between material perceptions
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and idealistic conceptualizations of honour. A differential repetition of the 
Mediterranean would then have to start “from action, that is, to say from our faculty 
of effecting changes in things, a faculty attested by consciousness and towards which 
all the powers of the organized body are seen to converge” (Bergson, 1970: 67). Such 
a rhizomic thought defies and dislodges the dogmatic Mediterraneanist intuition 
through which, the imprints of shame, honour and poetics unleash only a sterile way 
in coming to terms with difference.
For truly there is nothing hidden or masked in the Mediterranean. “The masks do not 
hide anything except other masks” (Deleuze, 1994: 17). The conclusion to be drawn 
from the above examples thus is simply that differences exist before representing an 
object or a concept. They are affirmative of the multiple, the repetitive, the 
simulacrum, the unlimited and the dynamic. “Difference” in short “is in-itself already 
Repetition” (Deleuze, 1994: 129). Honour presupposes difference against the 
background of a dogmatic thought of truth, recognition, error, problem and 
interpretation, which keeps considering itself as good, common, recognizable, 
representational, and propositional (Deleuze, 1994: 167). Ideas are aerial, differential, 
multiple and infinite, insofar as they incarnate an Idea and thus the true opposition is 
not between Ideas -  e.g. material honour versus ideal honour -  but between an Idea 
and a representation (Deleuze, 1994: 191) -  e.g. a differential perception of honour 
and a Mediterraneanist perception of honour -  in exactly the same way that the 
“virtual is opposed not to the real but to the actual” (Deleuze, 1994: 208; Deleuze, 
1986).
Having laboured a philosophy of difference, which is not about the One, the Many, 
the Analogous, and the Representational, I will keep reinscribing Mediterraneanism 
on the plane of affirmative differentiation and becoming, but at this juncture, I prefer 
to pick up on Derrida’s (1992) counterfeit in order to think of a non-reciprocal and 
unlimited exchange which will be open from the off to a de-personalized and de­
individuated subjectivity, taken hostage this time, not by the purity of alcohol 
commensality and the friends of the heart, but by an unanticipated offer that 
withdraws before any permanent and final decision and the hierarchy, oneness and 
structure of the coffee shop.
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4.3 The Counterfeit -  Beyond the Friends of the Heart
Deconstructing the friends of the heart allows paving the way for a non-economic and 
asymmetrical economy that tears apart the homogeneity, stability and domestication 
of personal bonds, kin obligations and family structures that are playing a key role in 
the formation of the Mediterraneanist imaginary. Derrida’s (1992) analysis of the 
counterfeit and the non-reciprocal, irreducible and aleatory nature of a non-spoken 
gift, opens up the multiplicity of the Mediterranean subject to the molecular Body 
without Organs and becoming-woman, intensifying and accelerating the processes of 
deindividuation and depersonalization by cancelling out the strictures of gift 
exchange. To that extent, the personification, signification and subjectification 
prompted by the gift, that has only come to reproduce power relations and hierarchies, 
is finally set in motion, through a form of thought that affirms the impossibility and 
unbecoming misery of the friends of the heart. The non-reciprocal counterfeit is 
meant, in short, to theorize a multiplicity which is neither reciprocal (as in Mauss), 
nor honorific (as in the shame-and-honour model), nor rational (as in the poetic 
model), but that which causes surprise by way of infinite offer and incalculable 
openness.
A gift which is not present or given, a gift which is not recognized as such, is the 
radically different meaning Derrida’s work reserves or conveys for the gift. The gift, 
if there is such, is something one cannot make a present of, however willing one is to 
give “that rest of the rest of which [one] cannot make a present” (Derrida, 1992: 4). 
For there is a certain in-compatibility between gift exchange and economy, as “One 
cannot treat the gift, this goes without saying, without treating this relation to 
economy, even to money economy. But is not the gift, if there is any, also that which 
interrupts economy?” (Derrida, 1992: 7). Thus while the gift, on the one hand, 
presupposes a certain exchange within specific temporal limits, on the other hand, 
when this happens its truly uneconomic character is irreversibly annulled and 
irretrievably eroded. Little wonder then, that “ft is perhaps in this sense that the gift is 
the impossible” (Derrida, 1992: 7), to the extent that the one who receives a gift needs 
to return another gift, preferably not the present he received, but in that return the gift 
never truly interrupts economic exchange, whether it is altruistic, friendly or pure. Yet 
should not the gift be treated in such a way as if it did not have to be returned within
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the temporal limits of an obligatory exchange? It feels, as though the answer should 
be yes. Indeed, “In any case, time, the ‘present’ of the gift, is no longer thinkable as a 
now, that is, as a present bound up in the temporal synthesis” (Derrida, 1992: 9), 
insofar as, in order to be a gift, “there must be no reciprocity, return, exchange, 
countergift or debt” (Derrida, 1992: 12). For “If the present is present to him as 
present, this simple recognition suffices to annul the gift. Why? Because it gives back, 
in the place, let us say, of the thing itself, a symbolic equivalent” (Derrida, 1992: 13). 
Hence, as soon as the gift is revealed as presence, there is no gift; on the other hand, 
once the gift is not spoken, given or exchanged, there is no gift either. “If there is no 
gift, there is no gift, but if there is a gift held or beheld as gift by the other, once again 
there is no gift; in any case the gift does not exist and does not present itself. If it 
presents itself, it no longer presents itself’ (Derrida, 1992: 15). The gift, therefore, 
must keep its asymmetrical and ambivalent character, staying out of time and 
exchange, for “From the moment the gift would appear as a gift, as such, as what it is, 
in its phenomenon, its sense and its essence, it would be engaged in a symbolic, 
sacrificial or economic structure that would annul the gift in the ritual circle of the 
gift” (Derrida, 1992: 23).
Against the horizon of such an ambivalent undercurrent, the unbecoming essence of 
the friends of the heart, I am convinced is rendered imperceptibly apparent. Like 
Mauss who, “does not worry enough about this incompatibility between gift and 
exchange or about the fact that an exchanged gift is only a tit for tat, that is, an 
annulment of the gift” (Derrida, 1992: 37), Papataxiarchis, I gather, does not seem to 
be aware of the economic and deeply hierarchical nature of commensality. Note 
moreover, that even “The title of ‘Counterfeit money’ is, may be, counterfeit money. 
Counterfeit money is never, as such, counterfeit money. As soon as it is what it is, 
recognized as such, it ceases to act as and to be worth counterfeit money. It only is by 
being able to bq, perhaps, what it is” (Derrida, 1992: 87). In other words, “in order for 
there to be counterfeit money, the counterfeit money must not give itself with 
certainty to be counterfeit money” (Derrida, 1992: 95). The counterfeit is at once thus 
“double annulment, double circle and double annulus of the annulment” (Derrida, 
1992: 115). Such a withheld, postponed, suspended and unacknowledged offer is 
about a form of thought opened up by that which “must not be bound, in its purity, 
nor even binding, obligatory or obliging” (Derrida, 1992: 137).
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By contrast, alcohol commensality still reflects the social hierarchy of the village as 
everyone, for example, knows the social position of the person who offers a drink in a 
parea and because of that, strictly speaking, it cannot “give [only] in the measure of 
the incalculable: therefore only a hypothesis of counterfeit money would make the gift 
possible” (Derrida, 1992: 157). The dissymmetry, infinity and disproportional and 
irreplaceable character of the counterfeit destabilized on the move, differentiate and 
dissociate both the offer and the counter-offer. The aporia of the gift, even of alcohol, 
should be “a love without reserve” (Derrida, 1995: 106), insofar as “one must give 
without knowing, without knowledge or recognition, without thanks [remerciement\: 
without anything, or at least without any object” (Derrida, 1995: 112). In the coffee- 
shop, however, the one who buys a drink for a member of a parea is entitled to do so, 
as a consequence of his/her social position and thus alcohol fails to ‘problematize’ in 
a way Foucault (1980) would have it, the unity, meaning, identity, truth and presence 
of any possible offer that wants to settle and stabilize a relationship or a debt, even if 
it stems from or as a consequence of a friendly obligation.
The friends of the heart are part and parcel of Mediterraneanism, for even if they do 
not refer exclusively to honour such an entity nonetheless, remains bound to the 
concealed rationality of dialectics, poeticity, and reason. Once it is appreciated, 
however, that “The thing itself is a sign” (Derrida, 1976: 49), the coffee shop parea 
deconstructs, inasmuch as a parea exists within a “community immediately present to 
itself, without difference, a community of speech where all members are within 
earshot” (Derrida, 1976: 136). When all is said and done in terms of the metaphysics 
of presence, however, there is still an intervallic space that takes place between the 
one who offers and the one who receives, which does not privilege the one over the 
other. The ‘interval’ (Deleuze and Guattari, 1988) between the two guarantees their 
togetherness but only as double bind and irreducible split, which does not wound their 
disjointure. The differance between an offer and a counter-offer is preserved and 
erased at once, to the extent that “in a single gesture, but doubled” the counterfeit 
“read[s] and write[s]” (Derrida, 1981: 64). Hence the undecidable counterfeit, like 
writing or the pharmakon “can never be simply beneficial” (Derrida, 1981: 99) or 
simply friendly, for “The essence of pharmakon lies in the way in which, having no 
stable essence, no ‘proper’ characteristics, it is not, in any sense (metaphysical, 
physical, chemical, alchemical) of the word, a substance. The pharmakon has no ideal
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identity: it is aneidetic, firstly because it is not monoeidetic” (Derrida, 1981: 119— 
129). The counterfeit affirms the impossibility of the gift, by moving beyond 
hierarchy and reciprocity, friendship and purity, and by giving without actually giving 
or by receiving without actually receiving. It affirms an impossible exchange and a 
non-presentable and non-economic relationship that resonates with the 
depersonalization and deindividuation processes that haunt contemporary 
identifications on the face of a full-blown consumer society. The counterfeit takes 
flight from the obligatory character of gift, presence, being and economy, setting the 
parea in motion and swerving away from shame, honour, poetics and the restricted 
economy of coffee shop consumption and to that extent allows the emergence of a 
subject beyond the coffee shop restrictions, sliding and inclining toward suspension, 
becoming and frustration by avoiding a solid and constant poetic identity. Such an 
unacknowledged “multiplicity without unity” (Doel and Clarke, 1999: 437), forms an 
exemplary basis and a suitable context in order to study the various conflictual and 
contradictory aspects of an identity building process, beyond, the poetics of 
womanhood and mourning, which is a mode of thought deeply enmeshed in the 
negative, reactive and ascetic denigrations of poetics. It also allows to move beyond, 
shame, honour and the personalization of the friends of the heart that are now given 
over to the deindividuation of a machinic, chaosmotic, and multiple transformation, of 
which the most salient feature takes the subject as “flux, flow, becoming” (Doel, 
1995: 232).
I have argued so far that an affirmative, responsible and indiscernible subject dwelling 
on chance, allegory, difference and contingency necessitates a fuller consideration and 
systemic conceptualization of the need to let the dwindling riddles of shame-and- 
honour, poetics and the friends of the heart go, abandoning the anthropology of the 
coffee-shop and the unitary identification politics of Mediterraneanist imaginations in 
favour of differential repetitions oozing with differends, and the counterfeit. There is 
still a need to take up, however, on becoming-woman, in a manner which will not 
only suspend and crack open the poetic identities of suffering, but will admit to a 
totally differential and infinite other to come to pass. Arguably though, it is 
psychoanalysis that may offer initially some useful insights in order to map the 
vicissitudes of the subject on the face of philosophy of becoming, especially in terms 
of the reformulations advanced by Lacan’s work. It is to this task that I now turn,
before setting in motion the molecular art of schizoanalysis by way of which the 
Deleuzean stuttering and interminable intervention of becoming will, consequently, 
take hold of the poetics of womanhood.
4.4 Lacan and the Subject
To undo the domestication model of women en route from Mediterraneanism to the 
depersonalized and deindividuated counterfeit, requires not only to unpack the subject 
formation beyond a happy poetic or honourific conceptualization that rhetorically 
defends manliness or womanhood, but to establish, above all, the manner in which 
Deleuze’s and Guattari’s molecular subjectivity submits the domestication model to 
the schizoanalytic theorizations of an incalculable choreographic becoming-woman. 
Lacan’s work is a useful entry point in making sense of the schizoanalytic discourses 
in that it helps to render apparent and getting a better handle on the poetic limits.
By drawing on Saussure’s distinction between language and speech, Lacan conceives 
of the subject as always spoken and under the law of the signifier. To that extent “the 
unconscious is structured in the most radical way like a language” (Lacan, 1977: 234) 
and thus “is that part of the concrete discourse in so far as it is transindividual, that is, 
not at the disposal of the subject in reestablishing the continuity of his conscious 
discourse” (Lacan, 1977: 49). The ‘I’ thus is something that needs to be satisfactorily 
explained rather than being taken for granted. The dominance of the signifier and the 
concomitant yet irreparable constitutive lack of the subject is a later stage of the 
development of the subject, as prior to it, the subject is identified in the mirror-stage 
in which it recognizes itself as a gestalt even if the recognition and understanding that 
the image one sees in the mirror is always displaced, through the presence of the other 
and, thus, is always about misrecognition. Such an identification process refers to “the 
transformation that takes place in the subject when he assumes an image [...] imago” 
(Lacan, 1977: 2). The mirror stage, in other words, marks “a fantasized identification 
with others” (Grosz, 1990: 32), insofar as the image in the mirror is “an accurate [...] 
as well delusory (since the image prefigures a unity and a mastery that the child still 
lacks)” (Grosz, 1990: 39). Thus the subject “recognizes itself at the moment it loses
3 This ‘he’ does not imply a gender-specific designation. It is a translation o f the French, where the 
subject [le subject] is a masculine term.
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itself in/as the other. This other is the foundation and support of its identity as well as 
what destabilizes or annihilates it” (Grosz, 1990: 41).
Whilst the mirror stage concerns the imaginary identification of the Ego, it is in the 
symbolic register, through the accession of the subject in inter-subjective and inter- 
linguistic relations, that the constitutive lack of the subject becomes pressingly 
apparent. In the symbolic register, “the Other is, therefore, the locus in which is 
constituted the I who speaks to him who hears, that which is said by the one being 
already the reply, the other deciding to hear it whether the one has or has not spoken” 
(Lacan, 1977: 141). It is through the mediation of language that the subject is 
produced as an individual, as language comes to fill a gap, which is constitutive of the 
subject but only at the cost of submitting it to lack. For “The subject is the effect of 
discourse, no longer its cause” (Grosz, 1990: 98). And as Lacan (1977: 86) pointed 
out, ‘I* may be capable of identifying “myself in language but only by losing myself 
in it, like an object”. Language functions negatively, in other words, and the 
differences implied by it have nothing to do with identity.
This is something however, that does fit into the mould of the poetic model and its 
idealized and consensual communication model. While Herzfeld (1991) rightly argues 
that the values of shame and honour constitute ‘shifts’ that determine local differences 
rather than values in-themselves, and should be seen in close relationship to the 
various aspects of the Greek society -  what he terms display and concealment 
(Herzfeld, 1991: 40) -  the poetics of manhood still take the marketization and 
commodification of social relations as a corrupted, fake, untrue and non-poetic event 
of intense self-reflection that owes its existence as much to the unrestrained tourist 
development as to the monumentalization legislation imposed by the Greek state. For 
Lacan, however, the subject is structurally separated from truth, the world or the real, 
insofar as there is always a difference between the ‘I’ of the signifier and the 
signified. The one who talks does not, necessarily, coincide with the ‘I’ of the 
signifying chain as language is always negatively defined, for both Saussure and 
Lacan see everywhere differences. “Language says: ‘You go here, and when you see 
this, you will turn off there’. In other words it refers itself to the discourse of the 
Other” (Lacan, 1977: 85) inasmuch as “the function of language is not to inform but 
to evoke” (Lacan, 1977: 86). Doubtless it is “Man who speaks, then but it is because
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the symbol has made him man” (Lacan, 1977: 65). The poetic model fails to grasp 
such a displacement that takes place between the signifier and the signified; and the 
confusion that lurks behind such a theorization, should be by now obvious not only in 
terms of the ambivalent positionality of honour (is it a marker of wealth or an idea?), 
but also with respect to the unlimited creativity tacitly assumed by the social 
engineering of the poetic model. To put it in a nutshell, the ‘I lie’ of the famous 
Cretan Tiar paradox’ does not mean that I am telling the truth either, for there is 
someone who lies and there is the T  that Ties’ but let us say -  in a language that 
Lacan would not probably approve or recognize as his own -  that it is one thing to lie 
and quite another to say that ‘I lie’. Language turns the subject into an incomplete, 
unfulfilled and lacking social being which has nothing to do with poetic aspirations. 
As Lacan (1977: 165) rhetorically asks “Is the place I occupy as the subject of a 
signifier concentric or excentric in relation to the place I occupy as subject of the 
signified?”; and do I know “whether I am the same as that of which I speak?”
The subject, accordingly, is always placed under erasure; a barred subject that fails to 
result in unity, homogeneity, domesticity, stability, and identity; and although lack 
generates desire, the subject remains split and disencumbered, owing its existence to 
language, by being at once a means and a limit to this lack. If the subject is possible, 
therefore, it is only because it talks but, in turn, it talks only as a result of lack. 
Accordingly, “the symbol manifests itself first of all as the murder of the thing and 
this death constitutes in the subject the etemalization of his desire” (Lacan, 1977: 
104). The symbolic in the way conceived by Lacan, therefore, is beyond the speaking 
capacities of the subject, and thus the desire that comes along in another well known 
statement of Lacan, is always the “desire of the Other” (Lacan, 1977: 58). 
Psychoanalytic conceptions do not sit easily with the positive identifications 
nourished by shame, honour and poetics, whether in Campbell’s idealistic conception 
of honour, built on the basis of ethnographic data collected in a small nomadic- 
community, a place where everyone knows everyone, or with reference to 
Papataxiarchis’ notion of the friends of the heart, however interesting as an 
ethnographic account, which is strictly situated within the androcratic and domestic 
boundaries of provincial coffee-shops, mixing up the salutes of alcohol with the 
allegedly fulfillment and purity a parea offers.
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Lacan’s account, above all, can help us to stress the need for a careful examination of 
the limits to poetics, as a consequence of the subject’s accession in inter-subjective 
and inter-linguistic relations that are always subject to or fathomed with lack. There 
are, of course, limits to Lacan’s own theorization and I want to mention here only two 
points. The first one is that even in its symbolic constitution the subject is derivative 
of and coextensive to familial and Oedipal obligations, constancies, lacks, losses, 
traumata, fixities and oppressions (Deleuze and Guattari, 1983); and thus as Deleuze 
(1993: 54) put it, “There is a mode of individuation very different from that of a 
person, subject, thing or substance. We reserve the name haecceity for it”. One needs, 
therefore, to go with the flow of such a depersonalized and deindividuated line of 
flight, which complicates, potentializes and undoes the familial and familiar triangles. 
The second point I want to make, and which chimes with and extends over the first, is 
that Deleuze’s schizoanalysis is neither about lack, nor about poesis, nor about 
resistance, but about a mode of thought based on excess rather than lack, loss or 
absence, which penetrates and tears apart the repressive unconscious and the 
theorizations that want the subject to be always incomplete and lacking. For the 
subject in schizoanalysis, “has neither beginning nor end, origin nor destination; it is 
always in the middle. It is not made of points, only of lines. It is a rhizome” (Deleuze, 
1993: 56). And even if desire in the theory of Lacan is insatiable, the desire of 
Deleuze is machinic and a machine is always connected to other machines; in 
Deleuze’s words “Desire never needs interpreting, it is it which experiments” 
(Deleuze, 1993: 136). A machinic unconscious resembles, therefore, a factory rather 
than a symbol or an oedipal complex of sexual or poetic repression or expression. 
Machines are neither imaginary nor repressive nor negative but instead, “real ones, 
not figurative ones: machines driving other machines, machines being driven by other 
machines with all the necessary couplings and connections” (Deleuze and Guattari, 
1983: 1).
Hence schizoanalysis is defiant of the rational, thinking and conscious subject, 
opening up the poetic identification to haecceities, singularities and multiplicities that 
work strictly by way of consistency and immanence. Schizoanalysis does not think of 
the subject as impotent or dupe, however, but is simply skeptical when it comes to its 
poetic, rhetorical and spontaneous irradiations in the place of which it wants to make 
space for a truly differential becoming, and the effective processes of solicitation,
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destabilization, iteration and continuous variation. “This is why the question of 
schizoanalysis or pragmatics, micropolitics itself, never consists in interpreting, but 
merely asking what are your lines, individual or group and what are the dangers on 
each” (Deleuze, 1993: 253). Yet the creativity of schizoanalysis should not be 
confused with the creativity of the poetic model, which is irrevocably enmeshed and 
indissolubly bound up with a game of binary polarities and oedipal forces. Let us see, 
therefore, how schizoanalysis that knows only of haecceities, individuations, 
rhizomes, flows and machines, deconstructs the poetics of womanhood.
4.5 Becoming-Woman -  Beyond the Poetics of Womanhood
Schizoanalysis, becoming-woman and the Body without Organs set the domestication
structure and poetics of womanhood in motion helping us to move beyond the 
corrosive Mediterraneanist conceptions of inside and outside, within and without, 
inclusion and exclusion, and public and private (Dubisch, 1986, 1995; Herzfeld,
1986). While women in the Mediterranean face considerable restrictions, 
anthropological and ethnographic studies have rightly suggested that even in small 
and remote villages, women enjoy particular and undisclosed forms of freedom 
(Dubisch, 1986; Loizos and Papataxiarchis, 1991); and that it would be far more 
effective, we are told, to examine “in what ways power [is] exercised. Examining 
power in terms of the private/public distinction allows us a clearer view of the nature 
and dimensions of women’s power” (Dubisch, 1986: 19). Friedl (1986: 51) for 
example, distilling from a variety of tasks and practices with which women are more 
often than not concerned, argued that women “have informal power over household 
economic decisions and over the economic and marital future of their sons and 
daughters”; and Dimen (1986: 59) pointed out that “the domestic scene is the locus of 
a process that reproduces the social relations and contradictions of state and 
economy”, whilst Pavlides and Hesser (1986: 92-93) insisted that “The decrease in 
value and significance of one of women’s major productive activities has coincided 
with the increasing importance of men’s role as wage earners”.
Such conceptualizations are useful in that they exemplify and chart how gender is 
constructed and transformed across various geographical locations, yet, the 
metaphysics of presence, the strict and impoverished boundaries of small community,
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the familiarity of domestic space and the poetic ontologies of place still play a key 
role in the construction of womanhood. I feel, therefore, that a differential theory of 
gender, beyond such conceptions that take the division between public and private for 
granted, is still required in order to overcome the domestication, stability and 
negativity of the performances of women. Dubisch’s (1995) notion of womanhood, as 
was shown in Chapter 3, is a negative image of thought conceiving of women solely 
in terms of their presence in rituals of suffering, pain and mourning. By contrast, 
Deleuze’s and Guattari’s lines of flight unsettle such a conceptual caricature of 
womanhood letting the Body without Organs (BwO) hold sway by drawing more than 
one line of flight, which permit gender in the light of the above, to be seen as a 
process that lies always already outside the integrative and assimilating fixities of the 
division between public and private, manhood and womanhood, poetics and silence. 
These “irreducible dynamisms drawing lines of flight and implying other forms of 
expression than those of myth” (Deleuze and Guattari, 1988: 237), break decisively 
with Mediterraneanist imaginations, to the extent that they dwell on another plane, 
“the plane of consistency [which] is defined only by a longitude and a latitude” 
(Deleuze and Guattari, 1988: 260).
Of that plane, a crucial theoretical practice that has come to play a pivotal role is 
becoming-woman which belongs neither to history nor to any ethnographic or poetic 
enquiry, but is strictly positioned against the illusory stability of symbolism, 
domestication, submission, subversion and the gendered poetics of silence and irony 
(Herzfeld, 1986, 1991). Becoming-woman is also of interest to me for another reason. 
“Becomings belong to geography, they are orientations, directions, entries and exits” 
(Deleuze, 1987: 2). And thus contra Herzfeld’s (1985, 1987) social uses of history, on 
the basis of which a man wills -  his reputation, manhood etc. -  a becoming “wants 
[...] to affirm its difference or to deny what differs” (Deleuze, 1983: 78). Going 
against the stream of thought of Dubisch’s poetics of suffering, thus, a constellation of 
points grounded in silence, irony, and pain, means simply to recall with Deleuze that 
points abuse and suppress becomings and this is why the aphorism: “I do not like 
points” (Deleuze, 1995: 161). Becomings, moreover, are not negative like the self- 
pitying poetics of womanhood but are instead expressive, affirmative and a- 
signifying, compliant with a multiplicity, which do not belong to the plane of 
constancy but on the plane of consistency, which “knows only relations of movement
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and rest, of speed and slowness, between unformed or relatively unformed elements, 
molecules or particles borne away by fluxes. It knows nothing of subjects, but rather 
what are called haecceities” (Deleuze and Pamet, 1987: 92). And thus becomings are 
not about the history of mourning or suffering, but are composed of a thrust of 
nomadic and schizoid fragments, for “nomads have no history; they only have a 
geography” (Deleuze and Guattari, 1986: 73), of which, eventually, (the) cosmos is 
made; for such is “the world [when] made up of divergent series (chaosmos)” 
(Deleuze, 1993: 137); and in which even women are urged to become-woman in 
exactly the same manner becoming-animal is not about imitating an animal, but about 
making “your organism enter into a composition with something else in such a way 
that the particles emitted from the aggregate thus composed will be canine as a 
function of the relation of movement and rest, or of molecular proximity into which 
they enter” (Deleuze, 1993: 123).
Being neither negative, nor reactive, becomings fold, un-fold and refold, “not what 
occurs but what is inside what occurs” (Deleuze, 1990: 149). For “I am forever 
unfolding between two folds and if to perceive means to unfold then I am, forever, 
perceiving within the folds” (Deleuze, 1993: 93). The subversive and silent poetics 
fail to get to grips with such a reasoning incisively captured by Deleuze’s theorization 
of the fold, which “is always folded within a fold [since] unfolding is [...] not the 
contrary of folding but follows the fold, up to the following fold” (Deleuze, 1993: 6). 
Yet en route from honour to shame, from concealment to display, from inclusion to 
exclusion and from gift exchanges to commensality and the friends of the heart, folds 
are neglected, repressed and erased due to an image of thought fraught with negative, 
molar and representative features that have nothing to do with the pluralist and 
manifold becomings. This is why Deleuze and Guattari insist that “it’s too easy to be 
antifascist on the molar level and not even see the fascist inside you” (Deleuze and 
Guattari, 1987: 215). Now clearly, the poetic model is not, necessarily, fascist or 
totalitarian. Yet by being caught up within the negativity of mourning, suffering and 
pilgrimage, and by ignoring at the same time the potential of becoming-woman, and 
the potential to affirm the plural joy of multiplicity, “the thought of pure becoming” 
(Deleuze, 1983: 47) is regrettably lost. For “to affirm is [...] to release, to set free what 
lives” (Deleuze, 1983: 185) despite the fact that “as someone becomes, what he is 
becoming changes as much as he does himself’ (Deleuze, 1987: 2).
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In short, there is no extraterrestrial point in the Mediterranean from where to observe 
the silent suffering of women, in exactly the same way there is neither shame, nor 
honour, nor domesticity, nor any sort of hierarchy between surface and depth that 
suffices to affirm the superiority of poetics. What takes place is nothing but plateaus 
connected to other plateaus and hence domesticity is associated with men, the public 
and agoraphobic spaces with woman, shame with men and honour with women.
Becomings are also set in line with rhizomes and haecceities, which have a 
consistency all of their own. “A rhizome does not begin and does not end, but is 
always in the middle, between things, interbeing, intermezzo” (Deleuze and Guattari, 
1983: 57) and “a haecceity has neither beginning nor end, origin nor destination; it is 
always in the middle. It is not made of points, only of lines. It is a rhizome” (Deleuze 
and Guattari, 1987: 263). Hereinafter, only becomings, rhizomes, haecceities, flows 
and fluxes. This is what schizoanalysis is about. “Flows” that “no longer belong to 
one nor the other but constitute the asymmetrical becoming of the two, a molecular 
sexuality that is no longer that of a man or a woman” (Deleuze and Guattari, 1983: 
82). And thus becoming-woman is neither untrue nor immaterial, for “what is real [is] 
the becoming itself, the block of becoming not the supposedly fixed terms through 
which that which becomes passes” (Deleuze and Guattari, 1987: 238). Becomings 
intensify the fragility, ephemerality and precariousness of identity taking flight from 
the oedipal triangulations of a poetic thought. As the public performances of 
womanhood, poetics, suffering, mourning and pilgrimage, are negative and ascetic 
incarnations of women’s roles in the Mediterranean, becoming-imperceptible and 
becoming-woman constitute infinite multiplicities beyond domestication.
As was pithily summed up by Deleuze and Guattari (1988: 251) “From the viewpoint 
of micropolitics a society is defined by its lines of flight, which are molecular. There 
is always something that flows [...] that escapes the binary organizations”. As a 
consequence, becoming-woman neither negates, nor contradicts nor opposes 
rationality, state, and manliness insofar as to oppose a poetics of manhood (Herzfeld, 
1985) with a similar poetics of womanhood (Dubisch, 1995) is ill-mannered and 
unbecoming. Oppositions are part of the dialectic, engineering and appropriating 
difference according to the standards of Identity, Analogy, Opposition, the One and 
the Same (Deleuze, 1994). And this is why “Our claim is not only that difference in
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itself is not ‘already’ contradiction, but that it cannot be reduced or traced back to 
contradiction, since the latter is not more but less profound than difference” (Deleuze, 
1994: 51). For difference, “must, therefore, refer to other differences, which never 
identify it but rather differentiate it” (Deleuze, 1994: 56).
It should be clear by now that the model of suffering advanced by Dubisch misses the 
effective difference of becoming to the extent that it “becomes an object of 
representation always in relation to a conceived identity, a judged analogy, an 
imagined opposition or a perceived similitude” (Deleuze, 1994: 138). Yet “the equal 
or identical always moves toward the absence of difference, so that everything may be 
reduced to a common denominator” (Deleuze, 1994: 65). This is why one needs “to 
break this unholy bond which subordinates difference to the negative” (Deleuze, 
1994: 269) inasmuch as one is no longer “faced with identity of contraries, which 
should still be inseparable as such from a movement of the negative and of exclusion 
[but] with a positive distance of different elements: no longer to identify two 
contraries with the same but to affirm their distance as that which relates are to the 
other insofar as they are ‘different’” (Deleuze, 1990: 172-173).
It is only when “one has become imperceptible and clandestine in motionless voyage” 
(Deleuze and Guattari, 1987: 199) that the poetics of womanhood (women’s 
appearance in religious rituals), and the domestication of women (the public and 
private spaces) are, ultimately, swept away. Resistance thus if this is at stake in terms 
of the poetics of womanhood, should not involve, necessarily, a structural 
reorganization (of the mode of production) but should be concerned, above all, with 
the mixing and blurring of all possible depths and surfaces. For “everything that 
happens and everything that is said happens or is said at the surface. The surface is no 
less explorable and unknown than depth and height, which are nonsense” (Deleuze, 
1990: 132). No small wonder thus that I argue that the poetics of womanhood is 
symmetrically contradictory to the creative manhood of the Cretan discourses of 
manliness (Herzfeld, 1985), granted that a difference-producing (wo)manhood does 
not need to oppose a masculine speculum of poeticity simply because a direct and 
symmetrical negation of manhood will not do; because it is indifferent and 
unbecoming and fails to be swept up by a femininity that works affirmatively, making 
spacing for a non-identity without manhood, unity and stability. Such is the resonance
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of becoming-woman without manhood, phallogocentrism, public and private 
spatializations and androcentric ideals, once gender is no longer part of any sort of 
poetics but expands, multiplies and leads astray in uncertain, insecure, ambiguous and 
unstable ways. Becoming-woman dissimulates, defamiliarizes and defamilializes the 
conformity to the same (the domestication of women) or to the other of the same (the 
poetics of womanhood versus poetics of manhood); or to put it in nutshell, becoming- 
woman “is the key to all the other becomings” (Deleuze and Guattari, 1988: 277).
Mediterraneanist identifications, I have argued so far, correspond with impoverished 
ontologies and conceptions of space -  small communities, remote islands, nomadic 
shepherds etc. In terms of their epistemology, Mediterraneanist identities are 
reductive, striated, digestive, dialectical and one-dimensional conceptualizations 
taking sides with shame, honour, poetics and womanhood. By contrast, I have 
suggested that differential repetitions, the counterfeit and becoming-woman, move 
beyond such an image of thought. I will be arguing now that the above reformulations 
can sit easily with relational conceptions of space, offering at the same time and 
opening up new ways in order to theorize urbanism and the spatial configuration of 
the Mediterranean city on the back of the spatial art of origami, that is, the 
geophilosophy taken up by Deleuze and Guattari. To explore, therefore, the link 
between differential conceptions of identity and differential conceptions of space is 
the task of the next two chapters.
Having bravely initiated a deconstruction of Mediterraneanist identities (shame, 
honour, poetics, friendship, and womanhood) on the grounds of the incalculable 
differential repetitions of the counterfeit, and becoming-woman, I am now ready to 
turn to a similar unpacking and deconstruction of Mediterraneanist spatialities 
(parasitism, capitalism without capitalists and spontaneity), in an attempt to draw on 
origami, and the co-ordination of cognitive, aesthetic and moral spaces (Bauman, 
1993), lending consistency and teasing out the consequences of such a theorization 
with respect to the events of spacing that are yet to come. I will be, then, in a position 
in Chapter 7, to open up parasitism to the effective power of consumption 
(Baudrillard, 1996) and the division between the repressed and the seduced (Bauman,
1987), in order, consequently, in Chapter 8 and Chapter 9 to be led to Rethemnos and 
the experiences opened up by the ethnography of the event (the
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affirmative/responsible subject, and the indiscernible and totally infinite and 
undecidable other beyond servility). But for now let me turn to the way in which 
space is conceived by Mediterraneanist accounts and the tropes of ‘parasitism’, 
‘capitalism without capitalists’ and ‘spontaneity’ that have been arguably dominant in 
theorizing the spatial imagination of Greece.
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PART THREE: DECONSTRUCTING 
MEDITERRANEANISM II: CONSUMPTION AND
SPACE
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CHAPTER FIVE: MEDITERRANEANIST SPATIALITIES
5.1 Introduction
I have set Mediterraneanist identities in motion because they fail to consider and take 
into account difference in-itself, and for failing to fully appreciate how a non­
reciprocal exchange works beyond the tripartite gift obligation (to offer, accept and 
return) a gift. It remains to be seen, however, how a theory of space resonates with the 
movements of writing difference otherwise, and how identity and space are 
ceaselessly intermingled and woven practices in an attempt to think of the 
transformations, metamorphoses and events that will have taken place in Rethemnos. 
In Chapter 6 ,1 will be in a position, to open up the event of spacing to the spatial art 
of origami in a manner worthy of such multiple forms of subjectivity; a theorization 
which is useful in letting us think of spacing as a ceaseless process of differentiation 
that marks in the Old Town an irreducibly split and a disjunctive joint beyond the 
holding formation and conflictual interpretations of history. Once the Old Town is 
subject to the reading of the kind I propose, it will become clear why a 
reconsideration of the experience of the Old Town problem is needed with respect to 
the virulent and deconstructive strategies of writing difference first, through the 
spatialization of the internal contradictions and conflicts of the consumer society 
(namely the division between the repressed and the seduced and the emancipation of 
capital from labour), and second, through the choreoethnography of the event (the 
subject as affirmation and responsibility, beyond servility sliding toward ambivalent 
undecidability).
Before broaching the question of origami though, that is, the art of spatial science that 
comes on the back of the Deleuzoguattarian drifts (Deleuze and Guattari, 1984, 1988; 
Doel, 1996, 1999), I briefly discuss below Harvey’s politico-economic theory and 
how its ontological requirements subsume consumption and difference under a strict 
anthropomorphic contour. This is not going to be an exhaustive reading of Harvey’s 
entire work, but will be proved useful to the extent that political economic discourses 
constitute an important part of and play a key role in the formation of the discourse of 
Mediterraneanism. Subsequently, I explain, and demonstrate what is essentially 
problematic with the spontaneous imaginary advanced by Leontidou’s (1990) 
Mediterranean City in Transition, regarding the way in which she conceives of space;
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and I also offer a critique of the Marxist school of thought that haunts Greece by way 
of the major contributions of Tsoucalas’ (1977) ‘parasitic’ theorization and 
Vergopoulos’ (1975) ‘capitalism without capitalists’.
I am not concerned, however, with the historical dissection of the spontaneous model 
and the empirico-pragmatic documentation of the making of the working-class of 
Greece. Moreover, the readings I picked are neither representative nor have anything 
to do, at least in a straightforward manner, with the Old Town of Rethemnos. It is my 
conviction however, that a considerable revision of the grounds of the epistemological 
presuppositions on which the works of Leontidou, Tsoucalas and Vergopoulos lie, 
may offer an opportunity in order to discuss how wrongly theorized and ill-informed 
consumption gets, once taken up on the back of the politico-economic stock and 
whether it is possible or not to move from such a restricted economy and miserly 
thinking to a form of thought that takes hold by way of excess and prodigality rather 
than scarcity, loss or lack (Doel, 2009). It will be then possible in Chapter 7 to 
abandon and discharge the negativity of consumption in favour of conceptualizations 
that conceive of it as a mode of domination rather than an epiphenomenal cultural 
accessory of neoconservative origin. I will be arguing, accordingly, that parasitism 
when brushed again the Mobius bands of consumption, paves the way for a systemic 
appreciation of the consumer society, opening up utility and use-value to the 
commensurability, spectrality and fetishism of exchange values.
Mediterraneanist writings conceive of space either as an inactive container of social 
relations or as an objective reality that exists irrespective of the material practices that 
make its appropriation possible. That identity in Mediterraneanist discourses is 
absolutist, authentic and unbecoming, was shown in Chapters 3 and 4, with reference 
to shame, honour, poetics and womanhood and by recourse to differential repetitions, 
the counterfeit and becoming-woman. What is required to take things further is to 
uproot, and unsettle not only a self-defining identity but also the spontaneous spatial 
organization, in an attempt to retheorize the urban configuration of Rethemnos, which 
is currently subject to a tremendous socio-spatial restructuring triggered by the 
development of a fully-fledged consumer society. Prior to dipping into Rethemnos’ 
doubly folded spatiality however, what needs further unpacking is not only a 
deconstruction of the Mediterranean city in transition, but also a fuller appreciation of
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the discourse of political economy on the basis of which the Mediterranean city was 
taken to be firmly associated with spontaneity. I shall turn, first, to a discussion of 
Harvey’s (1973, 1982, and 1990) work on the spatialization of capital, not only in 
order to criticize political economy, but most importantly in order to unfold the 
relationships, implications and co-dependencies between spontaneity, capitalism 
without capitalists and parasitism as a means, above all, to draw a fuller picture of the 
epistemological grounds on which Mediterraneanist spatialities rest.
Offering a critique of Harvey, however, is not intended to provide a complete critique 
of Marxism; nor is it about carving out a totally novel work on Marxist geography. 
The intention here is not to construe a new agenda that will re-work and re-invigorate 
some major meanings and concepts of Marxism either -  that have been bluntly, 
though regrettably, misunderstood or misinterpreted. In fact, there are many writers 
besides Harvey (such as Smith, 1984; Peet, 1977; Castells, 1977; Sayer, 1989; and 
Massey, 1991, to mention but a few) who have led the way in opening up novel, 
diverse, exhilarating and exciting inquiries with regard to the ‘classic’ or ‘orthodox’ 
Marxist image of thought. Yet it is an essential part of the present discussion of 
Harvey that capitalism should be conceived, above all, as a discourse that needs to be 
considerably reconstructed if it is going to convey or retain something of the radical 
‘openness’ of a certain spirit of Marxism. From a feminist politico-economic 
perspective, for example, and seeking to remain faithful to such a dissemination of 
Marxian discourse, Gibson-Graham (1996) have produced a well-stated case by 
recourse to the ambivalence and contingency of certain Marxist concepts. Before 
delving into Harvey’s reworking of political economy by way of its spatial 
implications, however, one should at least acknowledge that not all Marxist 
ramifications and repercussions of politico-economic discourses are susceptible to a 
strict totalitarian or one-dimensional reading.
Laclau and Mouffe (1985: 94-96), for instance, have convincingly inclined toward 
one of the most nuanced approaches to Marxism from a Gramscian perspective, 
reworking some basic analytic categories of Marxism. Though their work still 
revolves around a certain Althusserian conception of social formation, a totally novel 
understanding of the concept of overdetermination that heavily shaped the 
structuralist Marxist agenda, which appeared in France in late 1960s, has blossomed
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on the back of their analyses, which has come to mean, amongst other things, that “the 
social constitutes itself as a symbolic order. The symbolic -  i.e., overdetermined -  
character of social relations therefore implies that they lack an ultimate literality 
which would reduce them to necessary moments of an immanent law” (Laclau and 
Mouffe, 1985: 97-98). This is probably why “abstractions like ‘production’, [...] only 
have meaning in terms of concrete system of social relations” (Laclau and Mouffe, 
1985: 99). The fact, therefore, that economy should be in the last instance what 
determines any society whatsoever -  a vague interpretation of the Althusserian school 
of thought -  does not appear compatible with the openness and ‘hiatuses’ with which 
Laclau and Mouffe -  and Balibar (1970) to a certain extent -  want to associate the 
entity of over determination.
Jason Read (2003, 2004) for his part -  an American scholar specializing in 
continental philosophy, although convincingly exposing and exhibiting how different 
and yet productive Deleuze’s and Guattari’s writings can be -  ends up by advancing a 
certain ‘abridgement’ between political economy, psychoanalysis and schizoanalysis. 
I do not mean to get into any serious discussion of the problems of such a position 
here. I would insist, however, given that I have already pointed out how 
schizoanalysis and the Body without Organs are taken up by the present undercurrent, 
that in order to make something of Deleuze’s and Guattari’s schizophrenic machines, 
one should rather follow, fall for and invent certain unexplored lines of flight, instead 
of, strictly speaking, applying their theory to some ready made theoretical questions. 
Not that Read is doing that. Yet, the point is about using, drawing and inventing lines 
of flight by way of innumerable and differential repetitions, rather than about 
representing, proving or testing them against the backdrop of or with reference to the 
legacy of Marx, Freud or Lacan. This is why a statement such as the one that follows 
(Read, 2003: 31), makes little sense in the context of my approach to these matters:
“At the center of Deleuze and Guattari's neologisms and conceptual inventiveness is an attempt to 
produce a reading o f Marx that is not only adequate to the production of desire necessary to so-called 
consumer society, but to the various "neo-conservatisms" that seize hold o f desire. Beyond these 
possible uses, Deleuze and Guattari present us with a new possibility o f thinking history after Marx 
[...] not a history o f necessity, or even a historicism o f completed epochs, but a contingent and 
differential history o f the lines of force, and desire making and unmaking us in the present. It is these 
lines o f force and their relations that are the precondition for a future different from the present” .
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The point is not about illustrating the continuities between Marxian concepts and 
Deleuzoguattarian discourses. As I have already stressed, the intention of the present 
section is to lay the groundwork for a rigorous reconsideration of Harvey’s dissection 
of capitalism and urbanism in an attempt to theorize the spectres that still haunt 
Mediterraneanist geography, and thus any systematic conceptualization of class and 
class structure lies beyond the scope of the present theoretical articulation. Yet it 
seems as though some basic lines of argument with reference to social class, class 
struggle and social formation should be drawn, even if they scarcely refer or are not 
directly related to Harvey’s analysis of the spatialization of capital.
Thus, for example, Stuart Hall’s keen suggestion to explore, from a cultural or rather 
a humanistic perspective, which should not maim the maturity of a certain 
symptomatic reading of Marx proposed by Althusser, how “Marx’s ideas on classes 
and class struggle differ, at different periods of his work; and of how they advance” 
(Hall, 1977: 19). The articulation of the political and the economic seems, according 
to Hall’s eager assertion, to be more complex than a simple reductionist conception 
implies or wishes to establish; that is, specifically, the fact that every instance and 
moment of the socio-political milieu should be ultimately determined by the 
‘economic’ and that the ‘economic’ and the ‘political’ are somehow deterministically 
responsible to one another. Yet such an “articulation is accomplished only through a 
series of displacements and disarticulations” (Hall, 1997: 47), in a similar tone that 
Laclau and Mouffe have already picked up on the breaks and internal differentiation, 
with respect to the concept of overdetermination; and it is by way of an analogous line 
of flight that Hunt (1977: 85) criticized Poulantzas for producing “an essentially 
economistic treatment of social classes”, especially in terms of the distinction between 
productive and non-productive labour, which Poulantzas unproblematically, or so 
Hunt assumes, associates with the production of surplus-value; basically, by depriving 
the so-called ‘white collar’-labour of any ‘productive role’. We will shortly have the 
chance to gather how such a distinction prompted another Greek scholar, Tsoucalas 
(1977), to dub the Greek social formation ‘parasitic’.
For Nicos Poulantzas, however -  the prominent Greek political scientist, who lived in 
Paris from early 1960s until his death in 1979, and whose name has been chiefly 
associated with Althusser’s thought and Castells’ (1977) early work, even if the latter,
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in his later ‘grassroots’ restatement (1984) has clearly distanced himself from 
Althusser, “Salaried non-productive workers have a specific class membership [but] it 
is nevertheless important that we understand that this is never an automatic or 
inevitable process” (Poulantzas, 1977: 116).
In the cases briefly mentioned here, I have refrained from going into the ins and outs 
of the so-called ‘Althusserian formalistic’ school of thought and its problems. All I 
have intended to propose is that, while I am critical of Harvey on certain points of his 
theorization that lie at the nexus of the spatialization of capital and Marxism, political 
economy is not a unified conceptual body of inquiry or a methodological tool beyond 
dispute. Thus we return to Laclau and Mouffe’s convincing exposition of the 
contingency of the concept of overdetermination, or what they prefer to call, that 
“field o f  identities which never manage to be fully fixed, [...] the field o f  
overdetermination” (Laclau and Mouffe, 1985: 111). In other words, what I contend 
is that Marxism cannot be taken as a unified or fully deployed discursive repertoire, a 
closed unit of analysis that unobtrusively represents a highly ossified reality or is 
superimposed on the ‘real world’ out there; and that the reason I have chosen to select 
Harvey’s hugely influential work has primarily to do with the fact that certain aspects 
of his theorization of capitalism and space may help us to understand what made the 
discourse of Mediterraneanist geography not only possible, but, crucially, a 
hegemonic discursive practice that wittingly sought to tell the ‘truth’ of the 
Mediterranean.
Before picking up on Harvey, however, I will follow some of the lines of criticism 
drawn out by one of his most cogent critics, namely Doreen Massey, whom, from a 
feminist political-economy perspective, conceives of Harvey’s work as being guilty of 
a certain reductionism, sexism and economism. I would rather not focus, however, on 
her thorough depiction of the Spatial Divisions o f Labour (1984), and the whole 
rhetoric and problematic of industrial geography, the labour process and the various 
structural determinations that, in late 1970s, dominated the research agenda of the 
British geographical thought, but will lay out, instead, a criticism by way of her 
appreciation and evaluation of Edward Soja’s (1989) Postmodern Geographies and 
David Harvey’s (1989) The Condition o f Postmodernity or what she calls ‘flexible 
sexism’ (Massey, 1991).
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One of the points Massey strongly opposes regarding Soja’s work is that it is 
construed in a linear manner, which “omits, not just other themes, but other voices” 
(Massey, 1991: 36). For example, patriarchy is simply mentioned in passing by Soja 
but does not receive consideration in its own right; that is, as an axis of power with 
considerable material implications and consequences. Likewise, Harvey’s The 
Condition o f Postmodernity, according to Massey, has clearly downplayed the point 
of the social and authoritative construction of masculinity, which, in his many 
discussions of postmodemity, tends not to be subjected to any sort of serious 
questioning; indeed, the “male is not even recognized to be gendered. He is the 
universal” (Massey, 1991: 43). And thus “By not taking account of the feminist 
literature, a whole line of argument central to the relationship between modernity, 
space and social relations has been closed o ff’ (Massey, 1991: 46).
I am not suggesting here that Harvey’s work should be entirely retheorized in 
relationship to what Massey’s pointed attack insinuates regarding his work’s 
omissions and flaws. Yet, I still think that certain points of Harvey’s laborious 
theorization could be reviewed by reference to a broader and more general embrace of 
culture and the political economy of the sign (cf. Baudrillard, 1981; Bauman, 1974). 
The above programmatic comments, nevertheless, amount to useful entry points that 
can allow us a glimpse into a more mature perspective in terms of the criticism I shall 
shortly engage in by recourse to Harvey’s theory and the role it has played in 
inspiring, grounding and further solidifying, even if inadvertently, the discourse of 
Mediterraneanist geography. It will be then possible, in Chapter 6 to deconstruct 
Mediterraneanist spatialities first, by way of the hauntology of use-value (Derrida, 
1994); second, by recourse to origami, that is, the folding, unfolding and refolding of 
social space (Deleuze, 1994; Doel, 1999); and third, by considering the co-ordination 
of moral, aesthetic and cognitive spacings (Bauman, 1993), in order finally, in 
Chapter 7 to pave the way for a more consistent analysis of the consumer society 
suffused this time with the excessive thoughts of Baudrillard and Bauman.
5.2 The Political Economy of Space
Politico-economic discourses take space not only as a means to accommodate and 
absorb a crisis-prone capitalist development but “as likely to contribute to the problem 
as resolve it” (Harvey, 1982: 429). The geographical re-structuring of the Old Town
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may be taken as an example that reflects such processes that divide, segregate and 
polarize society in order to reproduce and perpetuate various forms of spatial 
unevenness. Space reflects, in short, and constitutes an expression of the dominant 
social relations that prevail in our consumer society, but is also what occasionally 
deforms and transforms social relationships. It is to that extent that the implications 
and consequences of the interrelationships and mutual dependencies between space, 
place and the subject are vital for an understanding of the imaginative geographies of 
the Mediterranean city. Harvey’s (1982, 1985, and 1990) dissection of the 
urbanization of capital is arguably one of the most profound and consistent 
theorizations of the uneven spatialization of capitalism. Yet when it comes to space a 
fuller consideration and theorization of the consumer society and the political 
economy of the sign (Baudrillard, 1981) is also required, especially to the extent that 
consumption has recently become an important feature that organizes and stratifies 
contemporary societies (Bauman, 1982, 1987). The urbanization process demands, 
therefore, a further unpacking of consumption in a way which will reveal the infinite 
merging of the uneven, contradictory and antagonistic spatialities of capitalism with 
the inherent contradictions of a full-blown consumer society. The task of the present 
chapter, consequently, is to show that politico-economic theories of space fail to 
disclose the extent to which the uneven geography of late capitalism is indissolubly 
enmeshed with and depends on a full-blown consumer society. If tourism and 
consumption are intimately associated with the meticulous restoration of the Venetian 
properties of the town of Rethemnos however, it is only by means of a formidable 
appreciation and fuller consideration of consumption that the Old Town problem 
should make any sense. It is, therefore, incredibly necessary to undo the restricted 
economism that lies at the heart of productivist discourses in order to understand the 
mutually invaginated structurations of the consumer society and the Mediterranean 
city.
As it is well-established by now the survival of capitalism depends on its spatial 
surroundings in order to overcome, produce and achieve new forms of capitalist 
accumulation. But given that as Harvey (1982: 379) notes, “devaluation, arising for  
whatsoever reason, is always particular to a place, is always location specific”, one 
of the key terms in his reformulation of Marxist political economy is the concept of 
social justice, which actually permits planners and theorists alike to think “about
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urban problems and how by virtue of such thinking [they] can better position [them] 
selves with respect to solutions” (Harvey, 1992: 888). Positionality, the social place 
from where one discusses, decides or makes up his mind on which form or meaning 
social justice should take is “fundamental to all debates about how to create 
infrastructures and urban environments for living and working in the twenty-first 
century” (Harvey, 1992: 888). But such a discussion of social justice cannot be 
tackled on the basis of some cultural logic of diversification, which as Harvey 
suggests, (Harvey, 1992: 389) with respect to Tompkins Square Park’s colourful 
mixing of people and images in New York, “On a good day” will allow “to celebrate 
the scene within the park as a superb example of urban tolerance for difference, an 
exemplar of what Iris Marion Young calls ‘openness to unassimilated otherness’”. For 
as he immediately goes on to suggest “there is an immediate question mark over that 
suggestion: in what ways, for example, can homelessness be understood as 
spontaneous self-diversification, and does this mean that we should respond to that 
problem with designer-style cardboard boxes to make for more jolly and sightly 
shelters for the homeless?” (Harvey, 1992: 390).
Yet deconstruction and philosophies of difference, which is what Harvey above seems 
to imply and hint at, is not about making ‘more jolly the shelters for homeless’. 
Moreover, what positionality suits such an ironic caricature of difference? As Harvey 
(1992: 391) explains “we cannot understand events within and around the park or 
strategize as to its future uses without contextualizing it against a background of the 
political-economic transformations now occurring in urban life”. Historico- 
geographical materialism, accordingly, offers practical ways of dealing with poverty 
putting forward some key issues in solving urban problems like, efficiency, economic 
growth, aesthetic and historical heritage, social and moral order, environmental issues, 
distributive justice and communitarian bonds, and is not merely ‘celebrating 
difference’. What is required to take things further, Harvey (1992: 392) notes, is to 
“provide the basis for consensus” in what seems however to be not only what 
political-economic theories provide, as a strategic plan in order to ‘solve urban 
problems’ but, above all, what is required as a presupposition on which the politico- 
economic stock should draw and on the back of which it should be justified. What is 
more as, Harvey (1992: 393) points out, there has to be also some higher-order 
argument, “the phrase that was most frequently used to describe it was social
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rationality”. Political-economic discourses, therefore, necessitate an understanding 
and acceptance that some arguments are more valid than others through which and as 
soon as this is understood consensus should be reached regarding planning. But isn’t 
such conception a vicious circularity based on the hysteron proteron confusion? Is 
consensus required in order to decide whether a decision is rational {let’s all agree, 
this is rational) or is rationality going to decide whether consensus will be reached on 
a certain issue {this is rational le t’s all agree)!
By wrangling over the issue of difference, Harvey’s theorization does not clarify the 
point, and moreover, his conception of social justice and its alleged universal 
application does not shed light on the issue either. The dispute on whether social 
justice necessitates a universal appeal or universalism comes, inevitably, prior to it in 
order social justice to be possible is never resolved, to the extent that universalism can 
hardly affirm how ‘just’ a policy is, in terms of the solutions it offers, the people it 
targets and the problems it solves. What universalism does is simply to turn social 
justice into a sign within a market of policies and politics that go hand in hand with 
the two other key modem concepts, that of consensus and rationality. A universal 
acceptance of the value of social justice is not, necessarily about a universal justice 
though, for it is obvious that such a term would be absurd. What it would mean, after 
all, a ‘universal justice’? Would it mean justice for all or justice for each one 
according to his/her logic and needs? And who is going to decide over what is logical 
or useful and for whom?
Building on this discussion will help us to understand why a better treatment of 
Rethemnos needs Baudrillard rather than Marx, Deleuze rather than Herzfeld, Derrida 
rather than Peristiany, and Badiou rather than Dubisch. In Harvey’s The Condition o f  
Postmodernity (1990), postmodemity is closely associated with cultural forms that 
correspond with certain politico-economic practices that in turn mark a new round of 
time-space compression. And although Harvey (1990: 9) relates postmodernism to 
“heterogeneity and difference as liberative forces in the redefinition of cultural 
discourses”, what he soon goes on to argue is that these elements are as much about 
postmodernism as about modernism, and that what postmodernists oppose today is 
only a certain aspect of modernism, that is, the fact “that there was only one possible 
mode of representation”, which in any case “began to break down” (Harvey, 1990:
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28) long before the claim on the postmodern condition was couched in terms of an 
‘incredulity toward metanarratives ’ (Lyotard, 1984). Postmodernists thus maybe right 
in judging, criticizing, and condemning the unified conception and representation of 
the world but they are wrong in casting modernity as the mode of represenation that 
nourished and reproduced a unified and totalitarian image of the world. 
Postmodernists should be accused thus not because of their insistence on ephemerality 
and fragmentation, but, so Harvey insists, in that they wrongly and rather 
simplistically ascribe and assign the denial of differentiation, pluralism and 
heterogeneity to the discourse often called modernity. This is not necessarily wrong, 
yet it is one thing to argue that modernism is not what many theorists think and 
understand, and quite another to suggest, as Harvey (1990: 33) does, that the 
universality of modernism generated a kind of reactionary modernism of the kind 
advocated by Heidegger’s destruction of traditional ontology, “a counter-myth of 
rootedness in place and environmentally-bound traditions as the only secure 
foundation for political and social action in a manifestly troubled world” (Harvey, 
1990: 35). For even if it is true that many postmodernists seem to have misunderstood 
modernism, that, however, they ought to be read as being in close alliance to the 
reactionary politics promoted by fascist ideologies, is highly, of course, questionable, 
not to say disappointing.
Where postmodernists and Harvey appear quite close, though, is when postmodernism 
is taken to signify two interrelated things, “a departure (if such there is) in ways of 
thinking about what could or should be done about that social condition, or else [...] a 
shift in the way in which capitalism is working these days” (Harvey, 1990: 112). And 
yet the consequences of such a suggestion are never pushed to a logical conclusion -  
that is, the fact that one should engage in novel forms of theorization in getting to 
grips with the newly transformed social situation. Even when Harvey and 
postmodernism appear quite close, for example, in statements such as “if the only 
thing certain about modernity is uncertainty, then we should, surely, pay considerable 
attention to the social forces that produce such a condition” (Harvey, 1990: 118), the 
potential to reconcile historico-geographical materialism with ideas of difference 
appear, to say the least, inappropriate, given that Harvey, consistently, denounces 
postmodernism as a nihilistic and neoliberal camouflage that promotes what he calls
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the “aestheticization of politics” (Harvey, 1990: 210), pursuing in that way the 
dissection of some kind of likeness between postmodemity and Nazism.
The dialectical machinations advanced by Harvey above nourish the constants, 
integrities and points of a theory of place that fails to consider the folds, joints, 
multiplicities and haecceities of a difference without unity or identity. Difference 
under the jurisdiction of historico-materialist determinations is never fully unpacked 
and appreciated and thus a more perceptive and rigorous understanding of spacing and 
origami (Deleuze and Guattari, 1988; Doel, 1999), is still required. When such an 
effective processing of spacing is put into service, difference then resonates with the 
major task of geography, that is, the obsession it should have with multiplicity and the 
fascination it ought to have for the thought of non-being, in order for the universal 
consensus Harvey insinuates, to be finally given over to an undecidable, indiscernible 
and non-originary other.
The dialectical understanding of the spatialization of capital ought to be viewed, 
therefore, with skepticism, especially because the dialectic subsumes “within itself 
everything else that is happening in the social situation in which it is produced and 
consumed” (Harvey, 1973: 156). But when the flows, folds and undecidable events of 
spacing, are seen through the lens of the historico-materialist dialectic, their effective 
differential character is regrettably petrified, solidified and lost. Poststructuralism, by 
contrast, does not oppose points, stases and positions but opposes the oppositions, 
contradictions and disputes between flows and points, fluxes and stases, and so on. It 
takes place in the middle of events that are posited contra events and fluxes amid 
other fluxes that in turn cut and flatten out the great ephemeral skin of the 
spontaneous body of the Mediterranean city in a way which is not yet-fully-grasped. 
The dialectics of place and historical materialism of Harvey oscillate between, on the 
one hand, an attempt to privilege solidity, stability and constancy and, on the other 
hand, an attempt to affirm fluidity, positionality and relationality, forgetting however, 
that solidity and fluidity, are both “effects of folding” (Doel, 1999: 17), rather than 
ready-made theoretical-practices and pre-given philosophical suppositions.
And thus to the extent that Marx’s political economy focuses on “contradiction within 
and between structures and consequent transformation of the totality” (Harvey, 1973:
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294), one should depart from both Marx’s and Harvey’s politico-economic 
theorizations, inasmuch as the differential events of spacing neither come as points, 
nor as relations nor as structures but, on the contrary, slide and slip through points, 
relations, structures and folds. For events undo and set in motion all possible 
contradictions focusing on metamorphoses, transformations and deformations. 
Harvey’s theory (1973), however important or useful cannot offer a fuller 
appreciation of difference qua difference and of consumption, beyond the teleology 
and rationalist theorization of political economy, remaining faithful to Marx’s original 
depiction of production:
“Production [...] distribution, exchange and consumption are [...] links o f a single whole, different 
aspects o f one unit. Production is the decisive phase [...] That exchange and consumption cannot be 
decisive elements is obvious, and the same applies to distribution in the sense o f the distribution of 
products. Distribution o f the factors o f production on the other hand, is itself a phase o f production. A 
distinct mode o f production thus determines the specific mode o f consumption, distribution, exchange 
and the specific relations o f these different phases to one another. Production in its narrow sense, 
however, is in its turn also determined by the other aspects. For example, if  the market, or the sphere of 
exchange, expands, then the volume o f production grows and tends to become more differentiated. 
Production also changes in consequence o f changes in distribution, e.g., concentration o f capital, 
different distribution o f the population in town and countryside, and the like. Production, is finally, 
determined by the demands o f consumption. There is an interaction between the various aspects. Such 
interaction takes place in any organic entity” (Marx, A Contribution to the Critique o f  Political 
Economy, 204-5, cited in Harvey, 1973: 296).
There are three interrelated points I want to stress here. First, consumption is a far 
more rich, complex and systemic practice with a logic all of its own than the above 
account allows. Second, while the concept of totality can be seen in relation to the 
elements that constitute the whole, there is nothing organic about it, in some kind of 
biological or naturalist sense. And third, and most importantly, prioritizing one stream 
over another -  production over exchange or consumption -  is totally outside the logic 
and philosophy of difference, which refuses the ability of any holding formation to 
stabilize relations, crystallize constancies, block differences and prioritize one mode 
of thought over another. Let me quote another paragraph from Harvey (1996), which 
in my view explains the suspicion of political economy over theories of difference -  
which is exactly why I am suspicious of materialism’s own philosophy (be it either 
historical of dialectical).
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“While it is formally true that everything can be reduced to flows [...] we are in daily practice 
surrounded by things, institutions, discourses, and even states o f mind of such relative permanence and 
power that it would be foolish not to acknowledge those evident qualities. There is, I believe, little 
point in asserting some sort of ‘dissolution o f all fixity and permanence’ in the famous ‘last instance’ 
if, as far as we human beings are concerned, that last instance is nowhere in sight. The ‘solid rock’ of  
historical-geographical materialism [...]” (Harvey, 1996: 17).
What Harvey argues above is that despite all liquidity there has to be -  “there is little 
point in asserting some sort of dissolution of all fixity” -  some kind of stability and 
permanence most likely to be found in and most importantly to be explained by the 
“solid rock of historical materialism”. Such a politico-economic ‘reading’ however is 
not unrelated to the previous dissection and link between universalism, rationality, 
and consensus and yet when space is seen through the lens of this materialist solidity, 
it can hardly get to grips and let itself go with the movements of differance and the 
effective power of spacing that unhinge the stability and constancy of the evental 
Rethemnos. Politico-economic approaches because of their obsession with stability, 
permanence and integrity fail to see the richness and spatiality of the events of 
becoming that will have taken place in Rethemnos when space and identity are 
subject to the ceaseless folding, unfolding and refolding of origami and the consumer 
society.
It is a similar failure to appreciate the ceaseless deformation of space that is evident in 
the notion of the spontaneous Mediterranean city advanced by Leontidou (1989). It is 
to this task that I now turn.
5.3 The Political Economy of the Mediterranean
Leontidou (1989) set out to map certain aspects of the idiomorphous, spontaneous, 
and flexible spatial organization of Athens, in accord to the battles of the working- 
class to occupy urban space. For my part, I will argue below that first, spontaneity is 
unbecoming in that it ignores the multiplicity, variety, transformation and becoming- 
other of space, which is always already a transformer and deformer of social relations 
and thus it should not be necessarily associated with a particular class; and second, 
that spontaneity ignores the fetishism of use-values and the systemic role of 
consumption, which is something that characterizes most discourses that stem from or
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incline toward a politico-economic orientation. I do not, simply, denounce 
spontaneity, therefore, for being untrue or imprecise on empirical grounds but rather I 
propose that spontaneity in-appropriates and un-becomes spatial difference because it 
rests on an empiricist, rationalist and productivist perception of geography and space. 
A differential reading of spontaneity, therefore, is required in order to intervene in the 
middle of things offering a more nuanced understanding of how consumption and 
space are interminably invaginated structures, a point that I have already started 
stressing with respect to Harvey’s spatialization of capital and the ill-mannered 
attempts into which the politico-economic stock delves in order to take up on 
consumption on the face of a form of thought that knows only of scarcity and lack. 
Opening up consumption to a differential and deconstructive reading, accordingly, 
may pave the way for unblocking and dissociating parasitism from the original 
negativity with which it has been heretofore enclosed and associated, especially in 
Tsoucalas’ (1977) work, undoing at the same time the allegations over a dysmorphic 
capitalism without capitalists (Vergopoulos, 1975).
Parasitism, I will argue, is neither unproductive nor a marker or a sign of a peripheral 
space-economy but a theoretical-practice that affirms consumption, seduction, the 
fetishism of use-values and the systemic nature of needs. Parasitism, consumerism 
and spontaneity are not features, therefore, of a deformed capitalist model, and do not, 
necessarily, amount to a passage or a transition from the one to the other, from 
precapitalist to capitalist, from flexibility to spontaneity, from modernity to 
postmodemity and so on. On the contrary, by dwelling on the Mobius bands of 
consumption, something which is further taken up in Chapter 7, the manifold, non- 
localizable, irreducible, unsettling and discontinuous parasitism is turned into a 
phantom without flesh that takes place when it does not take place, being a fusion not 
of the ‘either/or’ principle but of the ‘neither/nor’ affirmation: Ypf|v (hymen) 
(Derrida, 1981: 213). Consumption, in other words, splays out spontaneity, by 
insisting that parasitism is not an aberration or a deviation of production, but a 
theoretical-practice, which is neither the equivalent of an epistemological break nor a 
kind of oppositional reading -  I do not propose that the Greek social formation is 
postmodern, postindustrial etc. -  but, instead that, which affirms the current mode of 
differentiation having neither beginning nor end but only an undecidable value, which 
is neither historical nor official (like the disputes over Rethemnos’ history). Such a
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writing of a difference flies from the pointillism, reactive and negative implications of 
Mediterraneanism and once theorized beyond the negativity and productivism of 
politico-economic discourses, starts charting, even if prematurely, the conditions 
intrinsically pertinent to a full-blown consumer society. Such a disseminative writing 
leaves the Mediterranean difference open from the off, in perpetual suspense and 
regret, allowing seduction and symbolic exchange, and deconstruction and 
schizoanalysis to lend consistency to the innumerable events and choreoethnographies 
of Rethemnos. Suffice it to note for now that these duplicitous strategies of writing 
exhaust rather than exterminate, invent rather than discover and return rather than 
commence meaning and difference.
At this juncture I unfold the polyvalent meaning of parasitism in order to withhold 
any final decision between a parasitic economy and a consumerist parasitism until 
Chapter 7, where I reinscribe parasitism as it runs aground on the plane of 
consumerism, seduction, the fetishism of utility and the systemic nature of use-value.
5.3.1 Parasitism
For Tsoucalas the overgrowth and hypertrophy of the Greek state is a characteristic of 
the Greek social formation (Tsoucalas, 1987: 24), which among all other countries of 
OECD has the greatest percentage of students registered in law schools and schools of 
social sciences. Because of the underdeveloped industrial sector of the country, we are 
told, students prefer to study law and social sciences, professions, in short, that are not 
directly related to the job market of the productive sector.
Yet such an empirical depiction of parasitism, based also on a variety of similar data 
regarding the scale and size of the Greek public sector, presents certain problems. On 
the one the hand, in that it seems to condemn the capitalist model of Greece because 
of its poor performances in terms of industrial production, an argument caught up in a 
rationalist trap (the ‘progressive’ imaginary of capitalism), whilst on the other hand, 
in that by being critical of capitalism and exploitation, it remains at the same time 
faithful to an ideological trap, (the class-based imaginary revolution of capitalism). 
Such a doubly-faced limitation is not a mere dysfunction of a theory wrongly 
transferred to or imposed on the Greek social reality as a strict hermeneutical tool, but
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is chiefly based on the theoretical priority and ontological predominance production 
possesses in politico-economic discourses. Even if the Greek capitalists failed to 
invest and develop any productive activity within the territory of their own country 
(Tsoucalas, 1977: 19), the failure to accomplish or achieve a standard level of 
capitalist production, should not be, necessarily, associated with a parasitic social 
formation. As time and again the Greek economy of the late 19th century relies 
heavily on conspicuous activities marking in a profound manner the postwar 
economic landscape of Greece, the point is not about associating the huge public 
sector with some oriental or underdeveloped traits to be located in countries that have 
never been ‘capitalist’, but about proposing a convincing and more consistent theory 
of ‘parasitism’ that will not have to be directly or diametrically opposed to the glosses 
of absence, loss, lack and misery that fundamentally shape the grip of political 
economy.
Yet Tsoucalas insists, on the one hand, that there exists a ‘state-class’ (the people 
working in the public sector or the people struggling to get a job in the public sector?) 
that may form the kernel of a possible future revolutionary strategy, while on the 
other hand, he seems to purport the fact that the same class consists a means through 
which capitalist unevenness is further perpetuated -  e.g. the fact that ‘public servants’ 
do not form a class with a real revolutionary potential/orientation. This is not 
necessarily wrong but to suggest that the Greek capitalists should be blamed for 
failing to invest and further promote an indigenous capitalist production, should sound 
at least an oxymoron, especially when you call yourself a Marxist! Granted, for 
example, that the capitalist apparatus is inherently tied to processes of economic and 
geographical unevenness, how is it possible to criticize the Greek social formation for 
being a dysmorphic, dysfunctional capitalist model and not a fully-developed 
exploitation system? That the Greek space-economy constitutes an unfinished project 
imperfectly connected to the accumulation processes of capital, does not have to be 
linked, necessarily, to the unprecedented expansion of the Greek service sector as a 
result of a failed model of capitalism. For Tsoucalas however, the urban configuration 
of Athens is a non-industrial urban formation; something that marks in a profound 
manner the alternative way in which urbanism and the intersecting mobilities of 
capital and labour take up on the geography of the Mediterranean city. But is that 
because capitalism in Greece is different or is it because there is a certain sense in
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which capitalism and accumulation processes are differential all the way down, 
allowing always value to slide over a baseless ground, which is not as solid as is often 
assumed by the language of historical materialism? Tsoucalas, for example, notes 
with respect to Athens, that while, on the one hand, a rapid urbanization takes place 
and the city population thrives and boosts during the whole 19 century, on the other 
hand, there exists a socio-economic structure dominated by an impressively non­
productive urban population (Tsoucalas, 1977: 163); and thus the level of urban 
concentration is significantly higher than one would normally expect in terms of the 
level of industrialization (Tsoucalas, 1977: 197). Greece in short, is primarily, 
characterized by a socio-economic structure with intense service-sector 
characteristics, dominated by a petty-bourgeoisie state-class and non-productive 
activities, within which a particularly high number of public-sector employees 
dominates (Tsoucalas, 1977: 209).
Yet this is not the only possible interpretation of parasitism, which should not be the 
negative, reactive, residual and non-productive activity Tsoucalas wants us to believe. 
Parasitism can be instead a way of being, a form of life, which opens up the 
Mediterranean first, to the seduction of consumption, the fetishism of use-value and 
the reversibility of symbolic exchange (Baudrillard, 1981, 1996) and second, to the 
division between the repressed and the seduced (Bauman, 1987). When parasitism 
inclines toward a theorization that swerves away from the ardent negativity of 
productive discourses, that is, when it is no longer perceived through the non­
productive, negative and oppositional lens that take consumption to be the immediate 
opposite of production, there is no reason to keep directly relating or accusing 
parasitism of not exploiting the Greek proletariat class (Tsoucalas, 1977: 518). For 
truly, this does not seem much of a problem to me! To put it bluntly, if a radically 
differential theory of consumption is not fully deployed parasitism will, necessarily, 
be embroiled and caught up within the contradictions of political-economic 
approaches that block a further appreciation of the active and systemic role 
consumption plays in forming and deforming the capitalist landscape and the 
urbanization process of the Mediterranean city. My suggestion thus is that space, 
place and the subject amid the current socio-spatial trajectories of late capitalism can 
be drawn upon in far a more productive way, once parasitism is freed from 
conceptions that conceive of it as the monstrous face of capitalism’s
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underachievement. Parasitism can lay bare, in other words, some of the most intrinsic 
and structural dimensions of consumption, once however it is no longer taken as a 
failed or deformed model of capitalism. As Tsoucalas suggests in his more recent 
works, after all, the definition of the political in firm opposition to the economic is 
problematic, incomplete and conceptually uncrystallized (Tsoucalas, 1986: 74), and 
thus the conceived representations that define and draw an absolute distinction 
between economy and politics, private and public, and society and state require 
radical reconsideration and reconstruction (Tsoucalas, 1986: 79).
It is thus “possible to imagine capitalism with more complicated, internalized 
contradictory and less oppressive mechanisms that tame the working-class” and with 
“less totalitarian forms of subjecting labour to capital” (Tsoucalas, 1986: 184). Less 
totalitarian, nevertheless, does not meant the absence of any classification or social 
stratification, for the consumer society, as will shall see, is equally uneven and 
divided. It means, however, that parasitism need no longer be interpreted solely as a 
consequence of the ineffective and unproductive huge Greek state (Tsoucalas, 1986: 
95), for even if there are less totalitarian forms at work that subject labour to capital, 
domination is not over. A possible leap therefore, from a parasitic state to a social 
formation based on seduction and consumerism may start, imperceptibly, becoming 
possible once it is appreciated that consumption should not be confused with 
negativity, underproduction and parasitism. As Tsoucalas himself admits the Greek 
public sector should not be submitted to the same criteria and evaluations to which the 
one-dimensional, commensurable and goal-oriented market is usually submitted 
(Tsoucalas, 1986: 106), once it is accepted that the public sector has a social dynamic 
and a logic all of its own not merely posited in direct opposition to the function of the 
market. The huge scale of the public sector in Greece, in short, is neither less 
capitalist nor more parasitic for the same reason. Having said that, parasitism moves 
now, imperceptibly, beyond the imaginary of a negative, reactive, nihilist and 
contradictory aspiration as capitalism does not appear to be unthinkable without a 
proletariat (Tsoucalas, 1986: 159). Such a radical reconstruction of the understanding 
of parasitism and capitalism when pushed to its logical consequences, can be taken to 
be, extremely, close to what Bauman’s and Baudrillard’s analyses on consumption 
propose, which is, a crucial step en route from a negative parasitism to conceiving of 
parasitism as a structural characteristic of a society based on the systemic organization
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of needs, the fetishism of utility and the system of objects. Parasitism therefore, 
neither concerns underproduction nor involves underdevelopment or despotism, but 
necessitates a radical inversion of the meaning of value, which cannot be documented 
empirically, but only through a theoretically oriented and conceptually elaborated 
intervention that takes seriously the systemic organization of needs, the division 
between the repressed and the seduced and the fetishism of utility, following 
Baudrillard’s and Bauman’s insightful interventions. And whilst this is not probably 
what Tsoucalas originally had in mind, it may offer a radical alternative re-assembling 
and re-connecting parasitism to the prodigious, conspicuous, celebratory and orgiastic 
differential play of consumption.
In sum, a negative conception of parasitism is unbecoming and rationalist and this is 
why it is important to start seeing parasitism through a form of thinking that goes 
hand in hand with the Mobius bands of sign-value, the fetishism of utility and 
symbolic exchange. Explicating how parasitism can be affirmative -  beyond the 
productive nihilism -  and systemic -  beyond the anthropomorphism of consumption -  
can further permit us to understand the displacement and trajectory the Old Town is 
currently subject to. Let us turn, however, for now to Vergopoulos’ (1975) notion of 
the dysmorphic ‘capitalism without capitalists’, a mode of thought which needs to be 
also set in motion -  although it differs significantly with respect to parasitism in one 
important aspect, that is, in that the deformed agriculture of Vergopoulos is parasitic 
not in spite o f capitalism, which was the case according to Tsoucalas, but precisely 
because o f being capitalist.
5.3.2 Capitalism without Capitalists
That Greek agriculture should be dubbed a ‘capitalism without capitalists’ is a 
modernist conceptualization of the Greek agricultural system, coined by Vergopoulos 
in the early 1970s (Vergopoulos, 1975: 18), according to which, the main 
characteristic of Greek agriculture is its family-based organization, something 
however profoundly ideological, not in the sense of not being pragmatologically true, 
but rather as a means though which the truly uneven character of capitalism is 
disguised or concealed. As Vergopoulos noticed the contemporary ‘agricultural crisis’ 
is not a crisis of its familial organization but rather a crisis of the whole social system 
of which agriculture constitutes only the Achilles heel (Vergopoulos, 1975: 22). This
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is why under conditions and circumstances of peripheral capitalism the reproduction 
of the system depends not only on the progress and growth of the relations and forces 
of production, but chiefly on processes of creative destruction that necessitate, apart 
from growth, the dismantling and disintegration of certain sectors and geographical 
areas. That both Tsoucalas and Vergopoulos have to take as their starting point an 
alleged dysmorphy, deviation or exception -  be it either underproduction, the huge 
public sector, conspicuous consumption or a poorly developed agriculture -  of the 
Greek social formation is not necessarily a problem. But that in particular, 
Vergopoulos has to suggest that the Greek agriculture is underdeveloped not as 
consequence of the small scale family-based business but as a result of the operation 
of the whole capitalist system (Vergopoulos, 1975: 136) is not flawless. The land, we 
are told, is not so much in the hands of a small minority of economically viable 
farmers, but is shared and owned by many farmers, whose properties, in order to be 
profitable demand intensive cultivation and constant care. Yet capitalism treats the 
farmer as a source of profit without throwing him off of his land or out of his property 
(Vergopoulos, 1975: 149) and thus only in terms of its articulation and esoteric, so to 
speak, structure, can agriculture be considered underdeveloped, fragmented or 
oriental. The small family-based land system, consequently, is vital in reproducing 
and further sustaining the whole social system (Vergopoulos, 1975: 172), and modus 
operandi of Greek capitalism. Despite the plethora of agricultural properties thus the 
family-based agriculture of Greece is less a remnant of a communal/oriental 
organization, than it is an outcome that survives alongside the domination and 
operation of a fully-fledged industrial capitalism. The major contradiction, so 
Vergopoulos asserts, is not between a family-organized agriculture and a capitalist 
one that exploits the poor small landowners, but exists fundamentally between two 
distinct yet interdependent productive sectors, agricultural production and the 
capitalist industrial sector (Vergopoulos, 1975: 205). It is such a paradox that 
Vergopoulos (1975: 214) terms a ‘capitalism without capitalists’.
I do not intend to offer here an exhaustive criticism of Vergopoulos’ work, which is 
beyond the scope of the present thesis. A couple of points, however, deserve closer 
attention and scrutiny with respect to the inherent ambivalence that haunts politico- 
economic analyses. First, in Vergopoulos’ analysis, agriculture is supposed to be 
capitalist due to an empirical documentation of the profits, productivity and
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technological means used to cultivate the land. Vergopoulos understands capitalism as 
a mode of social reproduction under the jurisdiction of which some sectors of the 
economy remain underdeveloped in order for others to expand and grow. The crisis- 
prone uneven capitalist development, in other words, can only survive through 
expansion in order to resolve its internal and deeply embedded contradictions, but this 
expansion can only lead to the formation of novel controversies and crises that, in 
turn, lead to specific forms of devaluation -  of capital, labour power and geographical 
areas. Vergopoulos, in other words, theorizes agriculture’s hysterisis not in spite of 
capitalism -  which is how Tsoucalas conceives of parasitism -  but precisely because 
of being capitalist. The implications, I think, are quite vast. Vergopoulos’ 
documentation of a crisis-prone agriculture depends not only on the understanding 
that the underdevelopment of its esoteric structure is an inherent necessity, but that it 
is heavily coincidental with the achievements and development of other sectors -  like 
industry -  and thus takes the capitalist unevenness for granted, not by saying that 
Greece is non-capitalist, but by insisting that whether developed or not, the Greek 
agriculture is based on or is a consequence of a capitalist form of organization.
Second, for Vergopoulos (1975: 207) the small farmers had somehow to be kept 
occupied insofar as their labour was not of immediate use. They are seen, therefore, as 
a reserve army of labour who had to stay on hold waiting for their turn. But do the 
small farmers constitute or form a class? In many respects their economic position 
and ideological orientation does not sit easily with the ‘ideology’ of the working class 
(farmers own small parts of land and their labour is, strictly speaking, going to 
benefit, prior to anything else, themselves and their lot). Moreover, it is mostly the 
farmers who wanted their children to study finding a way out of and escaping from 
the poorly organized and roughly lived small and rural communities of the Greek 
countryside -  interestingly for Tsoucalas it is this same thing that generated, sustained 
and further promoted parasitism. But while in Tsoucalas’ theorization, the trend for a 
massively and widely accepted need for education that swept the Greek imaginary of 
the 19 and 20 centuries, is synonymous with a ‘parasitic’ social formation and 
marks intensely the existence of a non-capitalist formation, for Vergopoulos works 
the other way round, that is, as an indicator or a sign of a fully operational capitalist 
society. The students descending from small towns and villages on their way to study 
in Athens throughout the whole 19th and 20th centuries, wanted above all to transcend
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and overcome the strict class barriers of their predicament, which by contrast, is for 
Tsoucalas what turned Greece into a parasitic formation.
The contradiction between these two theorizations is inevitable and yet the tension 
does not seem to be easily solved. Both ways of perceiving of capitalism are 
stubbornly enough assigned to a revolutionary expectation or a rhetoric, which claims 
that equity and justice will be sooner or later fulfilled. This is doubly problematic 
though, not only because such a revolutionary hope conceives of the owners of the 
small properties as a revolutionary class, but first and foremost, because at the same 
time it secretly implies and irradiates a counter-revolutionary suspicion over the roles 
of education (Tsoucalas) and land fragmentation (Vergopoulos), as factors or 
paragons that may occasionally reproduce the status quo of current power relations.
It is in a similar way -  a theorization that fails to see its own limitations in terms of 
this doubly-folded structuration of the discourse of political economy -  that 
Leontidou’s (1989) text is construed and her notion of spontaneity articulates. It is to 
this task that I now turn.
5.3.3 Spontaneous Spatiality
As Leontidou (1989) suggests regarding Athens, the interaction between the working 
class and the city is thinkable only from the time the Greek proletariat is fully 
crystallized -  a point of reference might be the year 1909 (Mavrogordatos, 1983). Her 
conviction is that urbanism has been theorized in a manner which ignores the specific 
history of place (Leontidou, 1989: 13) and that theory appears deprived of any 
empirical evidence that can help us making sense of how to come to terms with urban 
problems. Such a conception, however, is still about a certain theoretical level of 
abstraction for it is hard to see how reality can independently and unobtrusively offer 
substantive models of interpretation, provided that even if it is true that reality 
‘speaks’, ‘exposes’ or ‘reflects’, this can only happen on behalf of and through a 
constellation of practices and signifiers within which a certain subject grows.
Leontidou’s intention is to build a theoretical model in order to analyze the experience 
of the urbanization process of the Mediterranean city in a way which will be sensitive 
to history, practice, and social action. Yet her effort remains deeply problematic and
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limited from the very beginning. By insisting on the importance of rendering apparent 
the class-origin of housing segregation in Athens, she never really breaks with linear 
and evolutionary notions and models of development. The fact that the geography of 
Athens is seen through the lens of a model that draws on the American experience -  
the Chicago School of urban ecology and Burgess’ model of concentric zoning -  is a 
narrow, oppositional and contradictory attempt to come to terms with the 
Mediterranean geography. Overall her argument is that the working classes of Athens, 
managed ‘spontaneously’ to take over the urban space of the city in a manner which is 
the exact opposite of the way in which the American city was structured and formed. 
It is hard not to see, however, that there is a certain sliding by recourse to the way in 
which the above ‘spontaneous’ occupation is accomplished. Is spontaneity, for 
example, capitalist or peripheral? And if it is capitalist, is it capitalist in the way ‘we’ 
(‘we’ the westerners? ‘we’ the intellectuals? ‘we’ the geographers?) know of 
capitalism? Be that as it may, while Leontidou (1989: 127), on the one hand 
constantly renounces parasitism, arguing that capitalism has been fully developed in
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Greece by the 19 century, something that Tsoucalas saw as a non-capitalist form of 
life and Vergopoulos as an inevitable stage of a world capitalist development, on the 
other hand, she suggests that the spontaneous appropriation of urban space -  the 
illegal houses built by the working-class at the suburbs of Athens -  is a defensive 
strategy of the proletariat resisting the devastated and highly uneven mechanisms 
nourished at the dawn of the capitalist market.
The weaknesses of such a position will be gradually become apparent, and yet in a 
way they do not necessarily concern or coincide with her inadequate treatment of 
theory. They ought to be seen, instead, as closely related to the immanently 
ambivalent character of political-economic discourses, and in accord to the fact that 
the ensuing tension between capitalism and spontaneity is never resolved. Spontaneity 
is susceptible to a two-fold stuttering, first, in that it takes the relentless effort of the 
working classes to buy or build illegal properties as revolutionary, and second, in that 
it asserts, at the same time, that ‘illegality’ -  the illegal occupation of urban space -  is, 
surreptitiously, promoted or allowed by the dominant classes, in order to further 
exploit the proletariat -  by selling houses for example, to the labourers. The 
spontaneous language is, interestingly though inevitably, inherently immersed with 
the antithetical and contradictory fissures, textures and fractals that extend, overflow
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and penetrate politico-economic discourses, however insistently these heterogeneities 
were sought to be hidden or disguised. Even if for Leontidou (1989: 243) the workers 
took control of areas on the outskirts of Athens, which were peripheral but close to 
their works, cheap but owned by them, excluded from the plan of the city but soon to 
be ‘legalized’, such a spontaneous and illegal allocation fails to result in any kind of 
unity. I do not mean to oppose spontaneity here on some empirical or pragmatological 
grounds, but I only seek to disclose what it wants to hide, that is the fact, that it is 
profoundly posited in contradictory and antithetical terms, presenting the 
Mediterranean city in terms of a paradoxical yet transitional rationality. For even if 
the houses of the working class are located in the suburbs, such a model is but a 
superficial inversion of the American capitalist experience that can hardly deliver a 
radical change in the way one understands, contemplates or thinks and experiences 
urban problems under conditions of a full-blown consumer society. Paradoxically, 
spontaneity’s failure to block the ceaseless differentiation and disadjustment of space, 
that is, to block the motionless trips and voyages of and in space, constitutes its 
ostensible but characteristic success. It is a success in that it renders apparent how 
hard it can get to avoid the “harsh law of spacing” (Derrida, 1976: 200), that is the 
fact that space is both what forms and deforms social relations and, moreover, what 
affirms heterogeneity; and thus on the one hand, spontaneity admits that there is an 
external and conspicuously invested foreign capital, which is responsible for the 
parasitic geo-economy of Athens, whilst, on the other hand, it seems to propose that 
the working-class ‘spontaneously’ invades and takes over the peripheral urban space, 
resisting and fighting capitalism. It is a success, finally, because in the light of the 
above sliding, the joyful liberation and affirmative spatial differentiation that hesitates 
at every step becomes more persistent, pressing and tentative, as spontaneity fails to 
present and accomplish -  and this is what makes it a success -  what initially set out to 
do, that is, to explain the antithesis between a privileged form (foreign capital), and a 
subordinate or inferior element (the domestic informal sector/spontaneous allocation). 
The incalculable choreographies and events that are yet to come in subsequent 
chapters, therefore, are meant to reinscribe not only parasitism but also spontaneity, 
on the plane of fetishist consumption, and the experience of place which is not already 
formed, stabilized, pinned down and calculated in any whatsoever poetic or 
spontaneous manner. Spontaneity should be allowed thus to go with the flow, events, 
continuous variation and differential repetitions that avoid the negativity and
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contradiction of the productivist milieu, and are most likely to be swept up by the 
counterfeit, becoming-woman, and the spectrality, hauntology and fetishism of utility, 
that is the innumerable spirits of Marx, and the ‘no more one/more than one spectres’ 
that haunt political economy (Derrida, 1994).
To recap, in the preceding pages, I have denounced a dwindling parasitism for 
dwelling on negative, ill-manner and unbecoming theorizations luring space and 
geography into an indifferent Mediterraneanist state. Consequently, I have attempted 
to open up space to the becoming, fetishistic, and systemic nature of the consumer 
society which has taken pains to deliver a rigorous reconstruction of the meaning of 
parasitism. That attempt however was not meant to imply a new orthodoxy, but 
merely to reorganize what has already been said and done affirming the irreducible 
snags and events that are yet to come with respect to consumption, place and the 
subject in Rethemnos. Parasitism is not simply mistreated, in the above writings, but 
oscillates between two ex-positions, the underdeveloped agriculture (part of the 
capitalist system), and the spontaneous allocation (a revolutionary occupation of 
urban space of the semi-periphery). Suffice it to say that I did not mean to oppose 
parasitism, spontaneity and the non-capitalist capitalism, but sought instead to bring 
them to bear upon the twisted and twirling events of consumption, that is events 
which as we shall see, traverse and transmogrify the historical clash between official 
and social interpretations of the Old Town, engaging in novel forms of theoretical 
terrorism.
A fuller deconstruction of the above Mediterraneanist spatialities, therefore, on the 
grounds of a hauntological use-value (Derrida, 1994), (the) origami (Deleuze and 
Guattari, 1987; Doel, 1999) and the moral, aesthetic and cognitive spacings (Bauman,
1993) will be now taken up.
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CHAPTER SIX: DECONSTRUCTING MEDITERRANEANIST
SPATIALITIES
6.1. Introduction
I have already deconstructed the oft-tarnished Mediterraneanist ideals in Chapters 3 
and 4 -  the models of shame, honour and poetics -  allowing for a difference- 
producing repetition, the counterfeit and becoming-woman to glare and I have also 
started imperceptibly to point in the direction of a similar deconstruction of 
Mediterraneanist spatialities. The disturbing and disintegrating geography taken up by 
such a theory breaks with the pointillism of politico-economic conceptions -  the 
‘time-space compression’ of Harvey, the poetic Old Town of Herzfeld and 
Leontidou’s spontaneous model. What I will be arguing argue now is that such a 
deconstruction is not complete unless Rethemnos is unfolded in association with the 
notion of origami, that is, the geophilosophy launched by Deleuze and Guattari, which 
makes it possible to subtract the recent trajectory of the Old Town from the Oneness 
of Mediterraneanism (the One of history: poetic resistance; the One of anthropology: 
the values of shame-and-honour; and the One of geography: authenticity of place).
An origamic conception of space admits that there is no Old Town without New 
Town, no social time, without monumental time. In short: “No one without two. No 
first without second” (Doel, 2001: 557). To affirm the difference the Old Town makes 
means simply to affirm that “Place and placeness are no longer opposed, as the 
humanistic geographers believed. Hereinafter, a place is both NowHere and 
NoWhere” (Doel, 2000: 124). The Old Town is neither a point nor a limit, but both a 
spatial fix and an irreducible split that allows difference to take hold: “Letting space 
take place. That’s all” (Doel, 2000: 132). To say that space takes place means simply 
that place is a process which once set in motion unsettles the points of spontaneity, 
parasitism, and informal history, going against the flow of a holding formation, and 
preventing the One from deciding, naming, categorizing or separating the Old Town 
from the New Town. The (s)playing out of place, in other words, affirms not only that 
the two parts of the town are inseparable but that relations exist only to the extent that 
they engage in a perpetual movement of constant negotiation. Such is the resonance of 
(the) origami that sets the Old Town in motion, in a way which allows to extend its 
old part into the new parts and the new parts into the old part of the town. On the back
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of such a suspended invagination, therefore, between the various parts of the town 
‘nothing is constant but everything is a transformer’ (Doel, 1999).
I have already demonstrated how politico-economic theories fail to be swept up by 
such an origamic understanding of space, especially with respect to Harvey’s three­
fold scheme of rationality, consensus and universalism. I have also taken up on 
parasitism, capitalism without capitalists and spontaneity in an attempt to demonstrate 
how their epistemological and ontological presuppositions are part and parcel of the 
politico-economic ontologies of Mediterraneanism. I now want to brush the 
Mediterranean city against the grain of a fantasmatic (from the Greek fainesthai -  
both what appears and what is lost, a ghost/phantom) conception of value that 
deconstructs once the ‘more than one/no more one’ spectres of Marx, are put forward 
by Derrida (1994). Subsequently, I shall go with the flow of an origamic 
understanding of space, based on the geophilosophy of Deleuze and Guattari (1994) 
before finally, picking up on the processive character of spacing by way of Bauman’s 
(1993) theory regarding the cognitive, moral and aesthetic spacings. The latter will, 
finally, lay the groundwork for a fuller understanding of consumption, which is 
analytically exhibited and taken up in Chapter 7.
6.2 Hauntology-Spectrology -  Beyond Spontaneity
The spontaneous Mediterranean in transition, I have argued, is an unbecoming spatial 
practice that bathes in rationalism, revolutionary hopes and productivism. I have 
asserted in Chapter 3 that the Mobius bands of utility, the fetishism of use-value and 
symbolic exchange submit the Mediterranean space to a consistent restructuring with 
reference to the consumer society that is neither unproductive, nor negative, nor 
parasitic, nor spontaneous. It is time thus to start picking up on one of these bands, 
specifically the speciality of use-value, in order to specify how such a theory can 
effectively set free and unleash a non-parasitic appreciation of urban space which has 
hitherto been blocked and discharged by the naturalization, and territorialization of 
the spontaneous denigration. A Mobius band is a mode of thought that turns the 
outside into the inside and the inside into the outside, and thus “It is infinite and 
contrary to the representative cube, intensities run in it without meeting a terminus, 
without ever crashing into the wall” (Lyotard, 1993: 4). I have already followed such
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a band in the last subsection of Chapter 3, where I began to discuss the permutations 
and implications between parasitism, spontaneity and capitalism without capitalists. I 
now want to pursue the above unfolding in a more consistent and intense manner in 
order to map the effects of the more than one/no more one spectres of Marx (Derrida,
1994), once space is subtracted (withdrawn from any presently speaking spontaneous 
movement) from the Oneness of spontaneity.
A spectre, according to Derrida, can be unfolded in the following manner. “First of all 
mourning [for] One has to know. One has to know it. One has to have knowledge [...] 
Next, one cannot speak of generations of skulls or spirits [...] except on the condition 
of language [...] Finally [...] the thing works whether it transforms or it transforms it 
self, poses or decomposes it self: the spirit, ‘the spirit of the spirit’ is work’ (Derrida, 
1994: 9). Thus a spectre on the basis of the above three-fold reasoning might be taken 
to refer to political economy, even Marx’s, on condition that “what has been uttered 
‘since Marx’ can only promise or remind one to maintain together, in a speech that 
defers, deferring not what it affirms but deferring just so as to affirm, to affirm justly, 
so as to have the power (a power without power) to affirm the coming of the event, its 
future-to-come itself’ (Derrida, 1994: 17). A spectre, and political economy by 
implication, should have a future, but only by means of a promise that is yet to come 
and which at present is ‘out of joint’. This is why “there is tragedy, there is essence of 
the tragic only on the condition of this originarity, more precisely of this pre-originary 
and properly spectral anteriority of the crime -  the crime of the other, a misdeed 
whose event and reality can never be present themselves in flesh and blood but can 
only allow themselves to be presumed, reconstructed, fantasized” (Derrida, 1994: 21).
Always already trapped in the contradictory depiction of a theorization that works by 
way of a double bind (either/or...both/and), a spectre, accordingly, is ‘out of joint’, in 
exactly the same way in which spontaneity, as was shown in the previous chapter, 
follows the logic of a double bind, once when the illegal working-class housing is 
taken as a spatial form that constitutes a revolutionary tactic of the proletariat (against 
the commodification of urban space) and once again when it is taken as a capitalist 
way of exploiting and dividing the city (and thus a means to perpetuate the existent 
power relations). Spontaneity haunts the urban space of Athens by being ‘out of 
joint’, therefore, not because it is illegal but precisely because of being haunted by a
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spectre which points in the direction and ghostly presence of a double bind -  being 
both an antidote to the fierce commercialization of urban land and what further 
exploits labour, housing and social space.
Put differently, on the one hand, illegality and spontaneity undo and dis-articulate the 
law by way of a future that is yet to come (the state promising that the illegal 
constructions of the workers will be soon legalized); on the other hand, spontaneity is 
what makes possible a further exploitation of urban space and thus it is not as 
revolutionary as often assumed (breaking the building legislation does not really 
change anything in the way capitalism works in Athens). The question, accordingly, is 
how just (dike in Greek) is such a spatial organization or by the same token, how 
peculiarly Mediterranean(ist) spontaneity is? Is the statement ‘the time is out of joint’, 
relevant at all to this justice of and in space? Heidegger interprets dike as “joining, 
adjoining, adjustment, articulation of accord or harmony” (Derrida, 1994: 23), while 
adikia “to the contrary [...] is at once what is disjoined, undone, twisted and out of 
line, in the wrong of the unjust, or even in the error of stupidity” (Derrida, 1994: 23). 
The dike of illegality, therefore, is what restores and compensates for the adikia of the 
capitalist production of space and thus “the disjointure in the very presence of the 
present, this sort of non-con-temporaneity of present time with itself (this radical 
untimeliness or this anachrony on the basis of which we are trying here to think the 
ghost) is, according to Heidegger ‘said and unsaid’” (Derrida, 1994: 25). Spontaneity 
is obliged to reckon with this ‘said and unsaid’ of a dike which is always already 
beyond law and calculation “over and above the market, above market, bargaining, 
thanking, commerce, and commodity” (Derrida, 1994: 26). But it should also reckon 
with what is concealed in Leontidou’s spontaneity, but is still implicitly present there, 
that is, the fact that spontaneity does not really break with the way in which the 
system works. For spontaneity is spectral, not in the sense of being unreal or untrue 
but exactly because of being composed of fractals and fragments that haunt the 
assumption of a self-defining revolution (the illegal occupation of a space as a means 
to resist the capitalist production of space) which at the same time tacitly nourishes 
the suspicion of being (the illegal housing) a capitalist trick. The illegal and 
spontaneous occupation of space -  if it has any meaning at all as a distinct 
Mediterranean characteristic -  should cope, therefore, with such a ghostly play of a
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justice which is open from the off to innumerable choreoethnographies and 
calculations.
Without taking into account and without reckoning with this spectre, the spontaneous 
spatial practice is already caught up in the trap of reactionary politics. Seen through 
the lens of a double bind, by contrast, spontaneity avoids such a negativity once it is 
acknowledged that there is no way to appeal or count for anything spontaneous unless 
it is both a possible strategy of emancipation, and what restricts or prohibits its 
imminently revolutionary apprehension. It is in the light of this impossibility that 
Derrida (1994: 31) speaks of differance as the condition of thought that cannot be 
dissociated from alterity, singularity and the irreducibility of spacing, involving as 
such “a matter of linking an affirmation (in particular a political one), i f  there is any, 
to the experience of the impossible, which can only be a radical experience of the 
perhaps” (Derrida, 1994: 35). If spontaneity meant to be in any true or radical sense 
revolutionary, therefore, it should retain something of such an impossible double bind 
that does not hold onto a reserve but constitutes both an illegal spatial practice and 
what inadvertently supports capitalism. Being spectral, therefore, means, that “there 
are reasons to doubt this reassuring order of presents, and especially, the border 
between the present, the actual or present reality of the present, and everything that 
can be opposed to it: absence, non-presence, non-effectivity, inactuality, virtuality or 
even the simulacrum in general, and so forth” (Derrida, 1994: 39).
Spontaneity, parasitism and the capitalism without capitalists are productivist and 
rationalist discourses that deconstruct, once the Mobius bands of such a ‘doubting 
over the reassuring presents’ are taken seriously. For any genuine or spontaneous 
Mediterranean, should be taken in accord to the event of a spectre, which is “the 
impossible itself, and that this condition o f  possibility of the event is also its condition 
o f impossibility” (Derrida, 1994: 65). Spontaneity is neither a politico-economic 
revolutionary spatial planning, nor an ineffective or convenient logic of 
informal/illegal housing. Rather it is a spirit which opens up a future that is yet to 
come, an intuition or “promise and decision, which is to say, responsibility” (Derrida, 
1994: 75), compliant with the unbearable ambivalence of a type of spatial planning 
that should never be fixed or solid.
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The spontaneous spatial organization has to be illegal, in other words, as a means to 
compensate for the injustice -  the capitalization and commercialization of urban space
-  but at the cost of being always suspected of being implicitly or surreptitiously 
promoted by capitalism as a means through which a further commodification of urban 
space in the name of a Mediterranean rationality, will be achieved. Without reckoning 
with this spectre, spontaneity will be always a pseudorevolutionary local anarchism 
that does not really take hold of or grasp the dynamic of a Mediterranean space which 
is full of possibilities, rich potentials and fraught with comers, creases, cavities, and 
multiplications, that is, a surface without holes, for “There are no holes, only 
invaginations of surfaces” (Lyotard, 1993: 21). Such intensities that are neither good 
(revolutionary), nor bad (oppressive), constitute decompressions that dissimulate, and 
differentiate delivering a difference within identity, a chance event and a passion 
within reason (Lyotard, 1993: 52). Housing thus even in its spontaneous form is less a 
necessity, which in Athens has to be illegal in order to overcome the commodification 
of urban land, than it is a fold of libidinal economy invested and taken up by desire.
As spontaneity is now imperceptibly given over to the double bind and affirmative 
postponement of a spectre, it is worthwhile recalling with Derrida how Marx’s theory 
of commodity fetishism is associated with use-value, which “haunts the thing, its 
specter is at work in use-value” (Derrida, 1994: 151). Utility, on the face of this, is 
already a form, a fetish, and a value, even in the case of housing, before it is an idea 
of a superstructural origin. The necessary spontaneous allocation, for example, was 
already spectral from the very beginning before a house becomes a commodity -  e.g. 
to be the owner of a house in the Greek imaginary was and still is one of the most 
powerful ideas and most praised achievement one can accomplish. The commodity- 
form thus under which housing is now recognized in the shape of the illegal 
occupation of urban space sets in motion an already ghostly use-value and does not 
take over from a transparent use-value that allegedly satisfies certain residential 
needs. The commodity, according to Derrida’s reading of Marx is a strange creature 
which is neither alive nor dead but that which has a chance of a certain autonomy: 
“Facing up to the others, before the others, its fellows, here then is the apparition of a 
strange creature: at the same time Life, Thing, Beast, Object, Commodity, Automaton
-  in a word, specter” (Derrida, 1994: 152). Being spectral thus means to remain 
faithful to the commodity fetishism of Marx’s political economy (Derrida, 1994: 156),
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and to the always already fetishized social relations that preside over capitalist 
conditions. What commodities would say if they could speak as Marx has famously 
suggested -  though he never pushed such a conception to its logical conclusion -  is 
that “our use-value may interest men, but it does not belong to us as objects. What 
does belong to us as objects, however, is our value [...] We relate to each other [...] 
merely as exchange values” (Derrida, 1994: 157).
One is tempted to ask, therefore, when exactly the commodity -  in our case housing -  
was not already capitalized and commodified, that is, when it was not already a 
ghostly, spectral and spiritual ‘kind of being’ that recites differences? How is it 
possible for any use-value to avoid spectrality? For if the neutrality of housing in 
Athens “is not guaranteed, then one would have to say that the phantasmagoria began 
before the said exchange-value, at the threshold of the value of value in general, or 
that the commodity-form began before the commodity-form, itself before itself’ 
(Derrida, 1994: 160). The spontaneous model of Leontidou is a useful spatial model 
once its undisclosed potential is submitted to the spectre of a value which slides over 
a dike which is yet to come. Such is the resonance of an undecidable event that takes 
place in the urban history of Athens, in which spontaneity is always already 
contaminated and intoxicated by a spectre that is excessive, superfluous and given 
over to the undecidability and ephemerality of an event. If spontaneity is to be 
differential thus it should remain faithful to an event ‘out of joint’; which is beyond 
the presence of the illegal and informal housing spatial structure that is now taken 
hostage by a promise that neither adjudicates nor calculates nor prognosticates a 
method or a practice of spatial resistance. A more sophisticated approach regarding 
space, therefore, is required in order to go beyond such a Mediterraneanist conception 
of spontaneity. This is why I have to turn now to origami.
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6.3 The Spatial Art of Folding: (the) origami
“Geography spaces” writes Doel (1999: 103) in an attempt to suggest that space is 
always already caught up within the solicitation, reinscription and reiteration of 
movements of slowness and speed interrupting, defamiliarizing and defamilia/izing 
the world -  or forming, deforming and reforming the world rather than simply 
representing it. The major concern of geography thus is to differentiate, intensify, 
remark, and experiment rather to integrate, represent, interpret or signify. Embarking 
on such intuition is about arguing now that space is relational, unstable and 
decompressed, rather than a clash between social history and monumental time.
Deleuze’s notion of the fold fits the above assumption to unsettling, and 
deconstructing any politico-economic spatial fix, which is fraught with poetical social 
histories and the integrity, pointillism and unbecoming constancies, permanencies and 
solidities of an oppositional resistance. Rethemnos when seen as a fold captures 
incisively the Old Town’s transformation and trajectory, through a theorization that 
insists on the decompression, deconstruction and destabilization of space that 
ceaselessly marks the shifting attitude of the residents toward the Greek state and the 
restoration project. For being a fold, above all, means also that the Old Town is 
pointless, which comes down to saying, not that it is without meaning, but that it is 
not made or composed of points, for “Space, place and dwelling [...] comprise 
pointless points” (Doel, 1996: 423). The split between the houses that have been 
restored and the properties left to careless decay thus is not reproduced but suspended, 
insofar as to reproduce “implies the permanence of a fixed point of view that is 
external to what is reproduced: watching the flow from the back” (Deleuze and 
Guattari, 1986: 36). For a fold takes up on space in a way that unfolds and refolds, in 
a similar way a shop or an area in the Old Town is turned into or resembles a fold, 
when it opens on the basis of the number of tourists that come and go, in order to be 
unfolded (during the winter) waiting to be refolded again (in the summer). In an 
attempt to remain faithful to the meaning and experience of folding, therefore, 
Deleuze takes sides not with reproduction but with the notion of following inasmuch 
as “following is something different from the ideal of reproduction. Not better, just 
different” (Deleuze and Guattari, 1986: 36). Following subtracts Rethemnos from a 
fully deployed situation that is, from the One of history (contradiction), the One of 
anthropology (poetics) and the One of geography (authenticity), reducing from the «th
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power (h-1) and lending consistency to spacing and becoming. For truly, becomings 
do away “with all integral, molar and majoritarian categories [...] Becoming is 
therefore a radicalization of relations, of the spacing of relations, and of relationship 
space, wherein the conjunctive ‘and’ takes all” (Doel, 1996: 426, 427). This is why 
one has to deconstruct the Old Town problem “by force of restraint at the level of 
dimensions already available by making n-1” (Deleuze and Guattari, 1983: 10), that is 
by, working against the dialectic of an embedded placeness -  the contradictory 
polarity between official and social conceptions of history. The Old Town problem 
should be set in motion following the n dimensions of its neighborhoods, small streets, 
and abandoned buildings that are connected to each other via irreducible double 
b(l)inds, dis-joints and conjunctive ‘ands’, comprising not only hierarchies but above 
all rhizomes, plateaus and folds. It is such a spatial configuration exemplified by the 
fold and the rhizome that make Rethemnos, call more urgent than ever: “use me” 
(Lyotard, 1993: 64). As Deleuze and Guattari put it in association with the rhizome:
“[it]connects any point with any other point, and none o f its features necessarily refers to features of  
the same kind. It puts into play very different regimes o f signs and even states of non-signs. The 
rhizome does not allow itself to be reduced to the One, or the Many. It is not the One that becomes two 
or that might become three, four or five etc. [...] It has neither beginning nor end, but always a middle, 
through which it pushes and overflows. It constitutes linear multiplicities in n dimensions without 
subject or object, which can be laid on a plane o f consistency and from which the One is always 
subtracted (« -l)” (Deleuze and Guattari, 1983: 47-48).
A rhizome is what comes between the Old Town and the rest of Rethemnos, for the 
“rhizome does not begin and does not end but is always in the middle, between things, 
interbeing, intermezzo” (Deleuze and Guattari, 1983: 57), potentializing and 
actualizing more than one line of flight as “Difference does not separate, detach, 
divide, split, shed, fragment or cast-off’ (Doel, 1993: 379), but marks the ceaseless 
spacing that keeps under continuous suspense, threat and regret any kind of separation 
between the folds of the Old Town and the rest of Rethemnos. Folds are not simply 
divided but perpetually folded around other folds growing, expanding and leaking in 
all possible directions, like an irreducible difference-producing repetition that opposes 
not a substance or a trait but the opposition between substances and traits -  e.g. social 
history versus monumental history. A fold, moreover, is not immobile or static, but 
should be seen in terms of flows “that no longer belong to the one, nor the other but
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constitute the asymmetrical becoming of the two” (Deleuze and Pamet, 1983: 82). 
Mediterraneanism -  shame, honour, poetic, friends of the heart, parasitism, capitalism 
without capitalists, spontaneity, and official history -  succumb to a social logic that 
“goes from one opposite to the other only by means of imprecision” (Deleuze, 1991: 
44). The fold and the rhizome, by contrast, de-limit, re-cite and re-inscribe the Old 
Town problem and its practices -  honour to women, shame to men, poetics to silence 
and parasitism to consumerism -  without pinning down, naming or pigeonholing 
difference.
Such a movement of writing difference based on the effective origami, which is 
further composed of events, rhizomes and folds can be usefully explicated with 
reference to the undisclosed potentials of the conjunctive AND, for a simple 
demarcation line cannot separate the Old Town from the rest of Rethemnos. It is only 
a suspended and withheld split that can take up on the inbetweeness of the Old Town, 
which comes as a disjunctive conjunction reassuring that “whenever there is an ‘and’ 
there is never a clean-cut separating distinct and immutable term” (Doel, 1996: 422). 
It is hard to tell, therefore, which part of the Old Town is outside and which is inside. 
The difference the Old Town makes is not hierarchical but resembles a trace, a 
supplement and a graphe of incalculably blurred, blended and intermingled folds, 
which is precisely about what the conjunctive ‘and’ stands for, that is, “this new­
found emphasis on the affective power of joint-action” (Doel, 2000: 118). Thus one 
must understand that each part of Rethemnos is always in the middle of the other in 
the same way that “the world is always in the middle of things” (Doel, 1996: 424); 
something which has been already stressed by both Bergson (1970) and Deleuze’s 
(1986) cinematic philosophy; and that the folds, rhizomes, heterogeneities and 
discontinuities that fascinate poststructuralist geography are all composed of similar 
conjunctions. To quote from Deleuze (1983) once again:
“The AND, as something which has its place between the elements or between the sets. AND, AND, 
AND -  stammering. And even if  there are two parts in town, there is an AND between the two, which 
is neither the one nor the other, nor the one which becomes the other, but that which constitutes a 
multiplicity. For the conjunctive and does not form “a dialectical opposition, but opposition to the 
dialectic itself: differential affirmation against dialectical negation, against all nihilism and against this 
particular form o f it” (Deleuze, 1983: 17).
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In order to write, therefore, the difference space makes in a radically different manner 
to what has been already proposed by Mediterranean!st writings, (the) origami is of 
paramount importance. Such a molecularly differential writing of space is always 
suspicious of historical, materialist, anthropological and other molar types of 
resistance, which are associated with small groups, pure identities, gift exchanges and 
authentic remote places. Conceiving of the Old Town as an expression of official and 
social appropriations of history in a manner which rests strictly on the power of small 
groups is neither creative nor affirmative nor for the same reason productive. Small 
groups as Deleuze should warn, after all, are full:
“[...] o f micro-fascisms that exist in a social field without necessarily being centralized in a particular 
State apparatus. We have left the shores o f rigid segmentation and entered a realm that is no less 
organized where each one plumbs his own black hole, thereby becoming dangerous, confident about 
his own situation, his role, his mission. This is even more disturbing than the certitudes o f the first live: 
Stalins o f little groups, neighborhood, dispensers o f justice, the micro-fascisms o f gangs etc. [...] We 
have been interpreted as saying that for us the schizophrenic is the true revolutionary. We believe 
rather that schizophrenia is the collapse o f a molecular process into a black hole. Marginal groups have 
always been the object of fear and sometimes o f horror. They are not so clandestine” (Deleuze and 
Pamet, 1983: 98).
I am not suggesting that the poetic model is fascist. But the fact that it overestimates 
the power of molar groups, thinking “too much in terms of history, whether personal 
or universal” (Deleuze and Pamet, 1987: 2), while having nothing to say of the 
effective power of spacing, and the indiscernible events that interrupt and break with 
the interminability of the Old Town, is a highly limited conception that fails to stave 
off the effective origami. It is worth recalling once again with Deleuze that 
“Becomings belong to geography they are orientations, directions, entries and exits” 
(Deleuze and Pamet, 1987: 2), rather than being assigned to historical or 
anthropological grounds. The effective origami unfolds space and complicates official 
and monumental times and thus no small wonder that what the resident meant to say 
when Herzfeld and his wife were taking pictures of the Venetian monuments is that 
‘There is nothing to see’. For as Deleuze and Guattari point out with respect to such a 
material clinging on the face of ethnography, there is “nothing to understand, nothing 
to interpret” (Deleuze and Guattari, 1987: 4), except from the fractal and spectral 
effects of speed and slowness, and the events that will have been -  untimely. Origami
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irradiates, therefore, through its folds, rhizomes and plateaus, a fascination for an 
infinite multiplicity -  the simplest question in the origamic universe being always, 
does this multiplicity work for you? If not, then take another fold, or unfold an already 
existent one, but in a manner which is simply worthy. Folding, refolding and 
unfolding. Such is the resonance of origami and the differential repetitions that crack, 
cut open and seep through the evental, unknown and undecidable Rethemnos.
This is not to suggest that the split between the Old Town and the rest of Rethemnos 
is unreal in a metaphorical sense. The issue is not about a metaphor but about a totally 
and absolutely real and material transition, but what is crucial, however, is that such a 
reality or transition is “irreducibly split: a double ‘agent’ -  but no less a schizophrenic 
for that” (Doel, 2001: 147). The social rhetoric of everyday history its ethnographic 
value notwithstanding, remains imprisoned and trapped within the striated space of 
state philosophy, despite the fact that it constantly denounces such a state ideology. It 
still conceives however of social identities, by way of contradiction and negativity, 
reaction and lack, misery and insufficiency, seeking to pan out and block everything 
that takes flight from the constants and fixtures of place. A philosophy of difference, 
by contrast, seeks only to make space for a “thought that would affirm life instead of a 
knowledge that is opposed to life” (Deleuze, 1983: 101), for to “affirm is not to take 
responsibility for, to take on the burden o f what is, but to release, to set free what 
lives” (Deleuze, 1983: 185).
Hence the task of geography: not to represent, interpret or make sense of the Old 
Town problem, but simply and purely “all those articular intervals that open up the 
forced stabilization and self-identity of what appear to be points” (Doel, 2000: 120). 
This is why opposing the state-bureaucratic explanations of monumental history and 
the Greek officialdom with some local mythologies, social rhetoric, the Cretan 
manhood and history, is still ill-mannered and unbecoming; and pointillistic (Doel, 
1999). For the Old Town is neither a self-sustained geographical area in physical or 
geographical terms nor a constant analytic category -  place, locality, milieu etc. 
Instead it is “nothing but bands of intensity, potentials, thresholds and gradients” 
(Deleuze and Guattari, 1983: 19). Meanwhile, everywhere, space is a transformer and 
deformer of social relations, signs and identities.
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If Rethemnos is worthy of the decompressed events of dissemination, deconstruction, 
schizoanalysis and the ethnography of the event, therefore, this is because the 
motionless trips and Mobius bands of difference, affirm the relations that come 
between the Old Town and the rest of Rethemnos, suspending, postponing and 
withdrawing from any permanent contradiction between the Old Town and 
Rethemnos; and affirming the in-betweeness, stuttering, interminable and trembling 
ffactality of space. For such is the effective power of origami when composed of 
folds, rhizomes and plateaus, which are always already interrupted, in a manner in 
which affirms dis-junction, heterogeneity and postponement; and hence an 
“interruption without interruption” (Doel, 1992: 163), insofar as difference “is always 
an undecidable and irreducible double [...] suspending] itself between these two 
possibilities” (Doel, 1992: 166). Betweeness though “does not designate a localizable 
relation ‘going’ from one thing to the other and back again but a perpendicular 
direction, a transversal movement that sweeps the one and the other away, a stream 
without beginning or end that undermines its banks and picks up speed in the middle” 
(Deleuze and Guattari, 1987: 25). Once this double bind is set in motion, the Old 
Town is no longer about opposition, contradiction or negation but about everything 
that stutters, stammers and trembles; in a nutshell: Rethemnos, recall, is not what you 
think.
Mediterraneanists would counterclaim that the careful collection and recording of 
empirical data is a far more pragmatic and realistic way than origami, in order to 
disclose the potentials and hidden possibilities of a place like Rethemnos. Yet one 
should know from Deleuze and Guattari that “there is no ethnological interpretation 
for the simple reason that there is no ethnographic material: there are only uses and 
functionings” (Deleuze and Guattari, 1983: 180). Humanistic approaches to space and 
place, for their part, would insist on the need to “uncover the nature of the social 
world through an understanding of how people act in and give meaning to their own 
lives” (Eyles, 1989: 2). And as a place-based perspective approach would have it, the 
crucial question is to study “how [...] the human being [is] related to the earth and 
cosmos” (Tuan, 1997: 88). Even a recent turn in human geography dubbed 
‘thirdspace’ (Soja, 1996) may occasionally feel uncomfortable with the traces left 
behind by origami and the geophilosophy put forward by Deleuze -  though at other 
times it appears to be sympathetic to the notion of the postmodern (cf. Soja, 1989).
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Yet things are far more complicated than these accounts allow and perhaps go a bit 
too far in the direction of an evental adestination than people assume or are ready to 
accept.
To recap, origami is an expressive, stretched, distanciated, deconstructed and 
affirmative movement in and of space, dwelling on “neither a this-side of nor a 
beyond: it is the boundary line between the two-Incest, that slandered shallow stream 
-  always already or not yet crossed” (Deleuze and Guattari, 1983: 161). The spatial 
binds and double joints of the origamic universe destabilize on the move the 
embeddedness of the Old Town, which is jointly disjunctive, yet this is a “disjunction 
that remains disjunctive and that still affirms the disjoined terms, that affirms them 
throughout their entire distance, without restricting one by the other or excluding the 
other from the one” (Deleuze and Guattari, 1983: 76). What matters to the origamic 
universe is simply the “masses or flows, with their mutations, quanta of 
deterritorialization, connections and accelerations” that outwit the “classes or 
segments with their binary organization, resonance, conjunction or accumulation and 
line of overcoding favouring one line over the others” (Deleuze and Guattari, 1987: 
221). And thus it is only by way of the interval and the in-between that the Old Town 
counts or makes sense, for “the interval takes all, the interval is substance” (Deleuze 
and Guattari, 1987: 478). When all is said and done, therefore, every difference 
brushed against an origamic conception of space serves a single purpose, to “Mark [a] 
distance. What is mine is first of all my distance; I posses only distances” (Deleuze 
and Guattari, 1987: 319), as it gets imperceptibly apparent that nothing is historical, 
anthropological or philosophical about the Old Town; though, admittedly it can 
always be a certain sense of philosophy or history at stake or at work as long as of 
course, “philosophy is geophilosophy in precisely the same way that history is a 
geohistory” (Deleuze and Guattari, 1994: 95).
I have so far covered considerable ground opening up difference to the movements of 
deconstruction in order to unsettle certain nihilistic representations that negate 
otherness -  the stifling images of thought presented by poetics, friends of the heart, 
shame, honour, and the spontaneous parasitic spatial practice. I have, moreover, 
argued that Mediterraneanism should be altogether abandoned because it dwells on 
the molar plain of constancy, remaining ethnocentric, metaphysical, unbecoming,
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striated and digestive. On the back of the driftwork of such a deconstructive 
supplement, I have set out to loosen the purity of the friends of the heart, letting them 
go with the flow of the counterfeit, which is a non-reciprocal and non-economic social 
form beyond the economic and obligatory character of gift exchanges. In addition, I 
have picked parasitism and the Mobius bands of the consumer society (though more 
bands are still to come in Chapter 7) in order to start making sense of the implications 
and consequences a full-blown consumer society has for splace, place and the subject, 
transcending the modernist, rationalist and productivist discourses and narratives of a 
spontaneous capitalism without capitalists, which take consumption as a 
deformed/failed companion of capitalism. A differential conception of gender has 
been also pursued in Chapter 4, grounded in the baselessness of a theoretical-practice 
that knows only of schizonomadic machines, becoming-woman and differential 
repetitive choreoethnographic differences that move beyond shame, honour, 
domestication and poetics. Given that certain forms of subject formation correspond 
with and reflect certain socialities and spatialities, I have been led, consequently, to 
explore the manner in which the above differential conceptions of identity resonate 
with differential conceptions of space. At this juncture, I have found exemplary the 
task of unfolding space as relational, fractal, fragmented, polymorphous, perverse, 
affirmative and disjunctive, in order to deconstruct the Mediterraneanist accounts of a 
certain absolute, inactive and objective space on the grounds of origami. I have also 
proposed, directly above, that the folding, unfolding and refolding of social space is 
far a more fruitful way to grapple with the thorny issues of space, place, and the 
subject formation of Rethemnos, rather than any poetic model of history. The full 
implications of such a suggestion in terms of the Old Town problem will start making 
sense in due course. Meanwhile, prior to dipping into this unraveling -  and the way in 
which the geophilosophy of Deleuze and Guattari resonates with the Old Town 
problem -  what is still missing is an adequate interpretation of how space and 
consumerism are indelibly linked structurations.
Baudrillard’s, and Bauman’s theories -  on different occasions -  have all been on 
various occasions, radically misread and misconceived by geographers. Thrift (2000: 
109), for example, commented on the relationship between consumption and 
postmodemity in the following manner. “In the most apocalyptic of postmodern 
pronouncements, the chief reason for existence has become consumption; signs of the
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commodity have become more important than the commodity itself and people have 
begun to lose their identity in the melee of consumption (Baudrillard, 1998a; Bauman, 
1993 [sic. -  1996a]; Clarke, 1997 [a])”. And Miller et al (1998: 8) have characterized 
Bauman’s theory ‘a hysterical’ interpretation of consumption. Even Harvey (1990: 
352), in his otherwise sober depiction of what he calls a ‘new round of time-space 
compression’ conceives of Deleuze’s and Guattari’s (1983) exquisite coupling of 
capitalism and schizophrenia as an extreme, if not superficial, account of capitalism. 
This is, however, a serious misinterpretation of both postmodemity and consumerism. 
Suffice it to say for now that Baudrillard’s analysis does not simply promulgate that 
‘the sign is more important than the commodity’, nor is Bauman’s work ‘hysterical’ -  
but will have the chance to work on these issues in Chapter 7. What needs further 
unpacking, therefore, is not only a more substantive theorization of the consumer 
society in order to undo these inadequate interpretations and caricatures of 
postmodernism and consumerism but also an attempt, to move beyond the negative 
and reactionary parasitism, and the spontaneous modernist accounts of space. Coming 
to terms with the systemic nature of consumption necessitates an understanding of 
Baudrillard’s and Bauman’s accounts of consumerism (Chapter 7), which in turn will 
help to shed light on the manner in which the Old Town problem (the way in which 
the restoration project is perceived by the residents and the conflicts and battles 
surrounding it) is currently transformed (Chapter 8). There is still a need, however, to 
explore the manner in which space is used in order to promote a fully-fledged 
consumer society and the manner in which consumerism organizes and is related to 
space and the geography of the postmodern city. It is Bauman’s (1993) theorizations 
of the association and coordination between cognitive, aesthetic and moral spaces that 
acutely offer such a scrupulous depiction of the necessary link between geography 
and consumption that paves the way for a fuller consideration of consumption. It is to 
his theory that I now turn.
6.4 Cognitive, Aesthetic and Moral Spaces
Bauman’s (1993: 145), theorization of cognitive, aesthetic and moral spacings may 
provide a useful entry point for a theorization that is of considerable importance in 
order to map the recent twists and turns of the Old Town problem.
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The primordial and deeply embedded ability of human nature, Bauman suggests, to 
perceive and make sense of the world, is “so simple and ‘matter-of-fact’ that we 
hardly ever give it a thought” (Bauman, 1993: 146). It is “the knowledge we all have 
without knowing that we ‘have’ it” (Bauman, 1993: 147). But while such an 
understanding is in a certain sense pre-given or so to speak intuitive, knowledge by 
contrast “picks up from the point of breach, disruption, mzs-understanding” (Bauman, 
1993: 148). And thus the further away one moves from the intimacy pole of social 
proximity where understanding is unquestioned and unchallenged, the less one knows 
of the people who inhabit the social spaces marked by anonymity. “The more 
‘strange’ the stranger is (the less knowledge I have of her), the less am I confident in 
my decision to assign her to a type” (Bauman, 1993: 149). That kind of physical 
proximity which was characteristic of traditional societies was based on the mutual 
trust and familiarity among those who lived close, and the persons one knew about 
and was most familiar with, though not always a friend. Familiarity, above all, 
concerned the satisfactory amount of knowledge one possessed, in order to get to 
grips with and make sense of others. And thus “What truly distinguished the 
neighbour from the rest was not therefore sympathy felt toward him, but the fact he 
had always been potentially within sight, always leaning towards the intimacy pole, 
always a prospective partner of intercourse and biography-sharing” (Bauman, 1993:
151). At some point, however, en route from traditional forms of life to modem ones, 
when the strangers appeared “inside the confines of the life-world” (Bauman, 1993:
152) such an understanding and classification which was based more on a pre­
reflexive state of knowledge than a reasonably calculated and carefully estimated 
account of the risks that waited round the comer, turned out to be opaque, insufficient, 
and inadequate, for “The most striking and off-putting trait of strangers is that they 
are neither neighbours nor aliens” (Bauman, 1993: 153). In many ways, therefore, the 
radical transformation of the social poles of familiarity and anonymity due to the 
appearance of the stranger have made the heretofore traditional social spacing 
obsolete and misleading (Bauman, 1993: 159). And thus as time and again, strangers 
“are indispensable in the modem business of life” (Bauman, 1993: 159), being the 
“products of the same social spacing which aims at assimilating and domesticating the 
life-world” (Bauman, 1993: 160), relying on traditional forms of classification was no 
longer sufficient.
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Strangers would be constantly on the move, however, and would hardly stay in a 
place, refusing to settle down, causing anxiety, insecurity and curiosity. Curiosity was 
above all, one of the fundamental characteristics surrounding the mythic figure of the 
stranger. Not only in the sense of strangers being curious, observing and watching 
carefully over people and places as the they were going or passing from one city to 
another, but also in the sense of the ‘city-people’ being curious about and interested in 
the lots and whereabouts of strangers. For the spaces strangers came to occupy, or 
tended for a short time to be occupying, were neither the well-documented and 
charted areas where cognitive spacing was dominant, nor were the intimate, secure 
and safe spaces of small communities. Such spaces, above all, were the visible 
aesthetic spaces of the open markets and the public spaces of the cities which 
intensify “precisely our feeling of being lost, of not knowing how to act and what to 
expect, and the resulting unwillingness of engagement” (Bauman, 1993: 149). Money 
economy was one of the most formidable and prominent ways in order to deal with 
and engage in this perpetual art of ‘mismeeting’, the basic function of which in city 
life, marked by the appearance of an increasingly silent but saliently indifferently and 
neutral so to speak -  when it came to its whereabouts, intentions and thoughts -  urban 
crowd, has come profoundly to saturate modem times (Bauman, 1993: 153).
What Bauman (1993: 164) calls proteophobia, literally the fear of Proteas -  a feature 
of Greek mythology that could take many forms and shapes -  is produced exactly by 
the overexposure and increasing number of strangers that imperceptibly have started 
to occupy the aesthetic spaces of modem cities. What cognitive spacing thus would 
accomplish, above all, was to categorize and classify the city according to the 
totalitarian and all-encompassing ideology of reason, and order within which and 
because of which the anxiety caused by strangers by simply being there, by being 
visible, or simply at sight, should be remedied. “Proteophobia refers therefore to the 
dislike of situations in which one feels lost, confused, disempowered” (Bauman, 
1993: 164). Cognitive space orders, mles and classifies thus social space assuring that 
nothing out there will ever again generate fear, anxiety and aporia, or so it would 
hope, and claiming that such sediments generated by the stranger’s appearance should 
be kept at a safe distance. The modem city, accordingly, was a result of a spacing that 
wanted to garden and protect its members from the strangers, the outsiders, and the 
unclassifiable and the concomitant aesthetic spacing, something which resonates with
157
what Bauman (1993: 168) terms proteophilia -  literally the love of Proteas -  which 
basically refers to “the uneven distribution of interest, curiosity, capacity to arouse 
amusement and enjoyment” (Bauman, 1993: 168). For as Bauman put it “The joy of 
strolling in the city (in a well-policed city, a city with the job of social spacing 
properly done) is the joy of playing. ‘Wandering without aim, stopping once in a 
while to look around’ (this is how the activity of the flaneur -  the character made into 
the epitome of the modem urbanite by Baudelaire and his most famous interpreter, 
Walter Benjamin -  is described) is, one may say, the ultimate play” (Bauman, 1993: 
169).
On the face of the above, it is aesthetic spacing that has become a central and key 
strategy in charting and organizing the city in line with the contours drawn to our 
attention by the play and incessant movement of strangers. For, today “We are all 
players. The urban flaneur is the travelling player” (Bauman, 1993: 172).
The above theorization can be useful in unfolding the Old Town problem. The fact, 
for example, as we shall see, that the town of Rethemnos should be organized and 
designed in order its Venetian past to be visible and recognizable, is a profound case 
of such a cognitive spacing. Like every ruling or hegemonic spacing however, the 
charting of the town in line with its Venetian past was not without disputes and 
struggles, especially from the side of those who had felt in the most painful and cruel 
manner the repressive dominion of the monumentalization project that prevented all 
possible restorations of the properties unless authorization was acclaimed by the 
Archaeology Service.
One of the possible ways to theorize such a resistance might be poetic history. It is not 
the only way though. Another, more daring, so to speak, way of proceeding, can 
materialize also by turning to moral spacing, which is crucially in conflict with the 
cognitive spacing of the restoration project, and which partly explains the original 
enmity of the residents toward the project of restoration. For, “The objects of 
cognitive spacing are the others we live with. [While] The objects of moral spacing 
are the others we live for” (Bauman, 1993: 165). The original rejection of the 
restoration project, therefore, was not necessarily a sign of a reactionary and locally 
based perception of politics, but an expression of the difficulty to reconcile the
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presence of the stranger with the infinite and asymmetrical responsibility of moral 
spacing, which is “the sole resource of founding the moral space” (Bauman, 1993: 
166). For “moral spacing is negligent of reasons, refers to no communicable 
knowledge and is unable to mount an argued self-defense, let alone convince those in 
doubt to accept its results” (Bauman, 1993: 166). The restoration project organized 
social space according to a conceptualization of history that saw in the Old Town the 
glory of Venetian past, ignoring simultaneously the current problems and concerns of 
the residents. The initial cognitive spacing of the restoration project, however, turned 
the public spaces of Rethemnos into a commodified scenery of Venetian glimpses into 
the world stage, as the monuments were not only a mark of official interpretations and 
ideologies of history but contributed, even if by default, to the concomitant but 
unprecedented tourist development and consummation that affected the geography of 
the whole town. It is such a mutual and subdued dependency and interwoven 
implications between aesthetic and cognitive spacings that turned the precariousness 
and fragility of a place into a site of idealized resistance -  as in Herzfeld’s social 
history. Thus the marketization of the geohistory of the Old Town is not only 
subversive of the traditional values of hospitality of the Rethemniots, as many 
Mediterraneanist accounts assume, but, above all, clashes with the non-calculable, 
unanticipated, asymmetrical and non-reciprocal processes of moral spacing.
Again this can be tremendously useful in coming to terms with Rethemnos where 
today it is only the tourists and the visitors who can effectively pursue the amusement 
and play of the aesthetization of the Old Town, calling something of the original 
figure of the stranger. The monumentalization of the Old Town channeled into and 
followed by the need to preserve the Venetian properties, not only reduced 
significantly the ability of the residents to intervene and fix their houses, but 
sustained, fundamentally, a parallel and incessant charting of the town in line with the 
pleasures, fruits and requirements of consumption. The cognitive spacing of a state- 
based history however, is not simply negligent of the needs, wills and desires of the 
residents but is, readily, associated with the mode of domination which substitutes, 
seduction for repression, needs and public relations for class-interests and use-values 
for economic exchange-values (Bauman, 1987). Consumption/tourism processes and 
the restoration project, therefore, are highly consonant and indelibly congruent 
structurations that do not sit easily with moral spacing. It is, accordingly, such a
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conflict between these two interrelated processes of social spacing that ceaselessly 
deform and transform the attitudes of the residents toward the restoration project. It is, 
moreover, in the light of this coupling and coordination of aesthetic and cognitive 
spacings that a better understanding of consumption is possible in an attempt to 
unpack how the recent transformation of the Old Town resonates with a theory of the 
consumer society and the ethnography of the event. If hospitality, therefore, the 
subliminal Mediterranean ideal put forward by Mediterraneanist writings as the 
cornerstone on and the background of which Mediterranean societies should rest and 
be usefully dissected and explained, has any meaning at all it should be linked to the 
above disputes and battles generated by the coordination of cognitive, aesthetic and 
moral spacings.
That Herzfeld (2001: xi) therefore, should keep perceiving of theories and 
philosophies of difference as “a self-satisfied nihilism”, should by now appear highly 
unjustified. Even if “we should also recognize that most bureaucrats are neither the 
heartless lackeys nor the choiceless victims of some generic teleology -  the state, 
postmodern hegemony, colonialism” (Herzfeld, 1991: 13), to imply that the subject in 
postmodern theorizations appears as ‘passive’ or ‘dupe’ makes for a limited 
understanding of poststructuralism. Philosophies of difference, after all, seek only to 
affirm the multiplicity, singularity, haecceity and differential mode of a 
subjectivation, beyond honour, poetics and shame.
One last point deserves attention with respect to consumption and the coupling of 
cognitive, aesthetic and moral spaces. Herzfeld (1991: 86) argues that the traditional 
trait of hospitality is “object to the commercialization of social relations -  ‘tradition’ -  
that has moved, in short time, from hospitable spontaneity to ‘servility’” (Herzfeld, 
1991: 86). The necessity of “Accepting tenants (nikarides) turns hospitality into 
business. In the old days, most of the tenants were village boys, whose actions were at 
least fairly predictable and whose families understood the rules of reciprocity. Today 
few tenants offer any such reassurance” (Herzfeld, 1991: 116). But isn’t that an 
idealization that goes hand in hand with the metaphysics of presence? Doesn’t this 
nostalgia nourish the impoverished ontologies of space that I have already sought to 
deconstruct and set in motion in accord to differential repetitions, the counterfeit, 
becoming-woman and the spectrality of utility? And is that a genuine reconstruction
160
of the city’s identity and its cartographies of place or is it still part and parcel of a 
theorization that takes place as being always in danger of losing its supposed 
authentic essence?
A more considered approach, therefore, is required with respect to the 
commodification and recent geo-restructuring of Rethemnos under conditions 
advanced by late capitalism that will not merely mourn, or be cause for lamentation 
for an alleged loss of some traditional and heretofore unobtrusive and pure values. 
Unlike the processes Herzfeld describes, proteophilia and the aestheticization of the 
Old Town will make it possible to think the Old Town problem not only in terms of 
production, parasitism, spontaneity, loss, lack and absence (if one after all said and 
done by now is still keen to move along such lines of thought) but also with reference 
to notions of excess, prodigality, conspicuous consumption, affluence and expansion. 
The aesthetization of the geography of the Old Town was possible in Rethemnos 
once, however, cognitive spacing had fully charted the town according to the 
imperatives and prerogatives of the official and bureaucratic restoration. The 
amusement offered by the aesthetic spaces of Rethemnos is not, therefore, part of a 
strategy that overcomes the cognitive boundaries, but is chiefly about a process which 
coincides with the obligation to learn, make sense of and respect the Venetian history. 
What is miraculous about the Old Town, however, is that such a social/cognitive 
spacing managed both to structure, stabilize and predict social space according to the 
standards and requirements of the official history of the Greek state and at the same 
time to preserve “the fuzziness and movable partitions, the shocking value of novelty, 
of the surprising and the unexpected, expectations that always move faster and stay 
ahead of fulfillment” (Bauman, 1993: 179). That the cognitive and aesthetic spacings 
overlap in the Old Town, therefore, makes it absolutely necessary to integrate the 
geography of Rethemnos with a mature understanding of the systemic nature of 
consumption, the fetishism of utility and the abstractedness and commensurability of 
use-value. It is to this task that I finally turn, in an attempt to break with the 
unbecoming and pointillistic perspectives of spontaneity, parasitism and the sterile 
accounts of history, putting forward some new perspectives, first, in reconsidering the 
urban affairs of Rethemnos and second, in unpacking the various peregrinations of the 
subject formation by recourse to events and trajectories that will have taken place 
beyond a narrow poetic historical periodization.
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CHAPTER SEVEN: THE CONSUMER SOCIETY
7.1 Introduction
Mediterraneanist identifications, I have argued so far, conceive of the Mediterranean 
region in accord with the values of shame, honour and poetics, insisting on the 
struggles and poetic ability of men and women as they are at pains to reconstruct and 
adequately exhibit and accomplish their identities. They are however, susceptible to 
criticism, because of their ontological disallowance of space and their dialectical 
conception of difference as separation, contradiction and negation. I have set out to 
undo the friends of the heart, the poetics of womanhood, spontaneity and the purity of 
the gift, taking up on a difference-producing repetition, the counterfeit, the schizoid 
machines of becoming-woman, and the ‘more than one/no more one’ spectres of 
political economy. I have also sought to open up the event of space to cognitive, 
aesthetic and moral spacings, and the splaying out of place and origami that fold, 
unfold and refold geographical imaginations. I am now in a position to explain the 
extent to which a theory of the consumer society resonates with the deconstruction of 
the discourses of Mediterraneanism and the geography of the Mediterranean city.
Spontaneity, parasitism and capitalism without capitalists, when submitted to the one­
sided curved surface of a Mobius strip, as was shown in Chapter 5, offer a rich 
potential in mobilizing the driftwork of the spectrality of use-value, the division 
between the repressed and the seduced and the fetishism of utility. A more perceptive 
theory of late capitalism, is therefore required, which will not only differentiate and 
affirm the continuous variation and geography in things and people drawing new lines 
of flight beyond the known negative spontaneous semi-periphery, but will also 
disclose how an affirmative parasitism comes to terms with urbanism and the 
changing experience of space, place and the subject in the Mediterranean city, which 
is currently undergoing a posturban transition.
Such a theorization will also help to come to terms with the events drawn upon in 
Rethemnos, which as we will see in Chapter 9, call forth a subjectivation process 
through which an individual deserves the name of subject, once he/she is subtracted 
from being (the theory of pure multiple) when truth is at stake. A theory of the 
subject, however, is not complete, unless a more perceptive analysis of the material
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processes within which it grows and expands is carefully laboured. To unpack what is 
meant by a systemic theory of a full-blown consumer society is thus the subject of the 
present chapter. As Clarke (2003: 3) has noted, with respect to consumption, it “has 
remade the city in its own image”. It is not for nothing, therefore, that a more 
sustained understanding of consumption is required, in making sense of Rethemnos, 
especially insofar as consumerism and tourism are social practices that are 
indissolubly associated with the manner in which space is organized under the 
jurisdiction and effective monumentalization of the Old Town. Politico-economic 
discourses, as has already been shown, with reference to Harvey’s theory and in terms 
of Leontidou’s notion of spontaneity conceptualize space as a means to accommodate 
and absorb mainly production, the labour process and the crisis-prone capitalist 
system that divides, segregates and classifies society. Space, however, reflects and 
constitutes also an expression of the dominant social relations that prevail in our 
consumer society. To that extent, the implications and consequences of the 
interrelationships and mutual dependencies between space, place and the subject are 
vital in order to make sense of the way in which consumption arranges the spatial 
structuration of Rethemnos. Though Harvey’s (1982, 1985, and 1990) depiction of the 
urbanization of capital offers a generous understanding of the uneven geographical 
development of capitalism, the current state of capitalism necessitates a fuller 
consideration and systemic theorization of the consumer society and the political 
economy of the sign (Baudrillard, 1981). And thus as the urbanization process of 
contemporary societies begs for a more thoughtful unpacking of consumption, 
Bauman’s and Baudrillard’s theorizations can be useful in conceiving of the often 
contradictory and antagonistic spatialities that are ultimately associated with 
consumption. In drawing out the implications of such a theorization I have only 
sought to draw on those ideas that will accomplish a fuller appreciation of the Old 
Town problem reconciling the formal discourses of consumerism with the more 
pragmatic and empirical concerns of the residents of the Old Town.
Consumption is often taken as an individual practice that satisfies human needs. This 
is, however, a highly mistaken and simplistic idea that misses the richness and 
complexity of consumption. One of the principal tasks of the present chapter is to 
unpack the collective nature of consumption, beyond the narrow understandings that 
characterize it as an individual capacity that fulfills given needs. A theory of the
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consumer society is neither about a neoconservative trait nor a capitalist trick that 
goes hand in hand with the dominance of neoliberalism (Habermas, 1985; Harvey, 
2005). Such conceptions fail to disclose the extent to which space, consumerism and 
capitalism are indissolubly connected, imbricated and interwoven practices beyond 
the anthropologism nourished by politico-economic discourses. Building on this 
discussion, moreover, is vital not only as an attempt to clarify the limitations of the 
type of theory advanced by Harvey and Leontidou, but also in demonstrating the 
changes, transformations and transitions to which Rethemnos is currently subject. If 
tourism and consumption are intimately associated, it is only by means of such a 
serious appreciation and fuller consideration of the systemic nature of consumption 
with respect to what Clarke (2003: 13) notices - “In a fully-fledged consumer society, 
consumption performs a role that keeps the entire social system ticking over” -  that a 
more cogent explication of Rethemnos is to be accomplished. Given that Baudrillard’s 
and Bauman’s theories have been radically misread and misconceived, however, not 
only by geographers but by other social scientists, there is much to say and do in 
terms of delivering a more sustained view and nuanced understanding of how 
consumption works. It is, therefore, necessary to start conceiving of and explaining 
consumption by carefully undoing the restricted economism, negativity, and 
rationalism that lie at the heart of productivist discourses.
It is true however that consumption is still the heir to capitalism, even if the cultural 
logic of late capitalism is different to the logic of industrial capitalism, in that the 
latter has remade the city of modernity according to the internal relations of 
production, while the former works basically in accord with the power relations of a 
seduction-based consumer society. This is to be sure, not the only way to deal with 
urbanism but I hold that it is one of the possible ways to stimulate new ideas in order 
to make sense of Rethemnos, unfolding the spatial structuration of the Old Town in a 
manner analogous to the way in which Harvey has taken pains to unfold the relations 
of production, explicating the transformation and immensely wide implications of 
production and industrialism for the modem city - ‘filling Harvey’s shoes’ should be, 
of course, a superficial ambition but points in the direction the present thesis ponders.
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7.2 The Consumer Society: Setting the Agenda
The profitable marketization of the geohistory of the Old Town is an inevitable turn in 
the history of Rethemnos at the dawn of a fully-fledged consumer society. And thus 
the Old Town problem is not only about the manner in which the residents perceive of 
the restoration project but, fundamentally, about the changing experience of space, 
place and the subject in the Mediterranean city whose major not to say paramount 
characteristic can be taken to be in recent years a genuine restructuring with respect to 
tourism. But if today the residents seek increasing state intervention in order to 
preserve the Venetian architectural character and identity of the town, which 
according to their view is bluntly ignored and extirpated due to an intense round of 
tourist development, in the past they fought tooth and nail against the grip of the 
rigidity and formality of the restoration procedures. The restoration project has 
produced however a spatial configuration, which left many parts of the town hidden 
and silent, whilst allowing other parts to be beautifully and vividly remade. The 
overexposure of the geohistory of the Old Town, which served as the backcloth of the 
restoration of the Venetian properties divided the city on grounds that sit easily with 
and can be explained by the theoretical-apparatuses that come on the back of the 
driftwork of seduction, consumption, deconstruction, schizoanalysis and the 
choreoethnography of the event. The monumentalization of the Old Town, I suggest, 
may bring into sharper focus, not only the twists and turns of a theory of a full-blown 
consumer society, but can also reveal and deliver a more empirical so to speak, 
understanding of the transition in which Rethemnos is currently subject to from a 
modem society of coercion to a consumer society based on seduction. A careful 
reconstruction of the material conditions and historical presuppositions that made 
consumption the dominant mode of reproduction, beyond spontaneity, reactive 
parasitism and the regulations of time-space compression, is therefore, crucial not 
only in making sense of Rethemnos but primarily as means through which to 
appreciate consumption’s totally collective nature.
To begin with, consumerism is an institution which, like production, is virtually 
unlimited (Baudrillard, 1998), to the extent that every single taste or consumer choice 
affirms the superiority of one class over another insofar as goods, tastes and lifestyle- 
choices differentiate and discriminate, solidifying and transgressing social boundaries 
using various forms of cultural, educational and social capital (Bourdieu, 1984). As
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Bourdieu once remarked, however, consumption does not have to be conspicuous in 
order to be symbolic, and yet even if consumption is symbolic, it is not necessarily 
hedonistic as has been suggested by Campbell (1987). It is above all, an institution 
and not an individual act. If it is symbolic though, in the sense implied by Bourdieu, it 
means that even in its slightest, smallest and insignificant manifestation consumption 
involves competition, emulation and struggle that stem from and intend to show, 
perform and enhance the status and position of the person who disposes or consumes 
a certain commodity -  a line of thought most conspicuously defended by Veblen 
(1994). For as Baudrillard has pointed out “the act of consumption is never simply a 
purchase [but] it is also expenditure [...]; that is to say it is wealth manifested and a 
manifest destruction of wealth” (Baudrillard, 1981: 112). This is crucial, if one wants 
to understand the systemic and totally collective nature of consumption, and how the 
objects possessed, disposed or consumed do not come to correspond with an atomic 
and individualistic conception of needs but purport, above all, and obey the strategic 
logic of an entirely and altogether differential system. Needs, by the same token, are 
culturally defined, pertaining to a whole universe of objects that classify and 
differentiate social groups according to their own social logic (Baudrillard, 1981, 
1996). And thus the objects that come to fulfil or satisfy these needs do not 
correspond with a metaphysical functionality, but work instead at a systemic level 
(Baudrillard, 1993). In the light of the above consumption “is not [about] the quantity 
of money that takes on value, as in the economic logic of equivalence, but rather 
money spent, sacrificed, eaten up according to a logic of difference and challenge” 
(Baudrillard, 1981: 113). In the same way that gift exchange (Mauss, 1970) is beyond 
the exchange of objects as mere economic values, consumption is beyond the non- 
commensurability, naturalness and ideality of use-values. Consumption, in other 
words, follows “neither use value nor (economic) exchange value” (Baudrillard, 1981: 
64) but “the logic of sumptuary values” (Baudrillard, 1981: 115).
In the preceding chapters, I have subjected parasitism to the speciality and 
hauntology of use-value, and the coordination of cognitive, aesthetic and moral 
spaces. I now want to bring parasitism to bear upon Baudrillard’s and Bauman’s 
theories, the gist of which was slightly touched in the paragraph directly above, in an 
attempt to unfold the division between the repressed and the seduced, symbolic 
exchange and the mode of domination of consumerism, taking flight from and
166
breaking with the negative, spontaneous and productivist embraces of 
Mediterraneanism. Letting parasitism go with the flow and driftwork of a systemic 
theorization of consumption serves a three-fold purpose. First, I lay out the 
sociogenesis of consumption, in order to show that consumerism can be grounded in 
accord to Bauman’s (1982, 1983) depiction of the transition and transformation of 
regimes of power; the latter being also an attempt to demonstrate and explain the 
meaning of the postmodern divide between the repressed and the seduced; second, on 
the face of the above reasoning I pick up on consumption as a mode of domination 
that takes off from where the mode of industrialism left off (Baudrillard, 1975, 1981); 
and third, I also offer a brief account of symbolic exchange, which according to 
Baudrillard (1993) may pave the way for elaborating a possible resistance against the 
totalitarianism or a way out of the structural law o f value (Baudrillard, 1981). All 
three aspects have been raised or implied to some extent, in the preceding pages in an 
unsystematic and sporadic manner, but will now take a more cogent and appropriate 
form, opening up another route into the attempt to reconstruct our understanding of 
consumerism.
7.3 The Sociogenesis of Consumption
Bauman’s (1993) account of the coupling of social and physical spaces, as was shown 
in Chapter 6, permits a useful unfolding of the manner in which space is socially 
produced and constituted. I have already taken up on the theorization of cognitive, 
aesthetic and moral spacings and have also explicated the meaning of the splaying out 
of place and origami that surge through the Old Town, once geography is taken as a 
deformer and transformer of identities and spaces. A fuller version of Bauman’s 
theory is now offered in association with his apt dissection of the sociogenesis of 
postmodemity and consumption.
All societies, Bauman suggests, drawing on Foucault, are based on the deployment of 
a certain type of power that keeps them integrated, bound and sustained. The mode of 
reproduction of traditional societies was heavily reliant on a system of mutual trust, 
and thus what further allowed the sustainability of the system was the demand that the 
physical distance between people correspond with their personal bonds and social 
relationships. That type of power, the sovereign type of power, as Foucault had
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already proposed, organized traditional societies in a manner that intervened from the 
outside by subtracting, for example, a part of the communal surplus, without, 
however, either arranging the way the surplus was produced or the means, methods 
and the time used for its production. The coupling of social and physical spacing in 
traditional societies, therefore, did not require vigorous surveillance over the time, 
means and process of production but was somehow ‘naturally’ imposed, though not 
accidentally, and was accomplished due to the ‘transparency’ of social spaces.
En route from traditional societies to modem societies, however, another form of 
power emerged, which was considerably different to the type of power briefly 
discussed above, and which was necessary in order to further seal and reassure the 
reproduction and sustainability of the social system. Of this modem regime of power, 
the factory system was a key and most recognizable feature, in which the modem 
subject was bom and which the new power meant to incarcerate and confine as a 
consequence of the attempt to supervise all those people who were left unattended by 
the bankruptcy of the traditional regime of power, that is, of the ‘I watch you, you 
watch me’ principle (Bauman, 1982). Industrialism, in other words, in which the 
factory system had taken its most oppressive and all-embracing form, demanded that 
the ‘masterless men’ who had been somehow left unattended (for various 
demographic and economic reasons), had to work in order to be visible, useful and 
disciplined in order to maintain the coordination and coupling of social and physical 
spaces in a status as readable as it was in its traditional version. It is within such a 
transitional state of regimes of power, from traditional modes of reproduction to 
modem tropes of discipline and coercion that Bauman situates and with which he 
associates the sociogenesis of industrial capitalism and class. Such a theorization is 
particularly interesting and useful for Rethemnos given that it stresses the need to 
appreciate how historically consumerism has involved as a sort of civilizing process 
(Elias, 1994).
Due to the unprecedented demographic expansion of the 1750s, a variety of social 
groups that were more often than not considered to be ‘dangerous’, ‘idle’ and 
‘parasitic’ have come to surge through the public spaces of many European towns. 
Those people were vagabonds, beggars, drifters, poor and unemployed, whom by 
having nothing better to do or nowhere else to go, were drifting and strolling from city
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to city, and from town to town, causing anxiety, and insecurity. The self-enclosed 
ranks of the small communities and the sovereign type of power that was dominant in 
places where these dangerous forms of life kept unrestrainedly arriving, were found, 
by and large, inadequate and unprepared to ‘keep an eye on’ and control or tame these 
people. Traditional forms of life, in other words, were not well equipped in order to 
confront the unknown, unclassifiable and unassignable strangers and were unable and 
insufficiently organized in order to control these ‘dangerous classes’. That social 
system, therefore, which time and again was becoming less and less relevant or useful 
in coming to terms with the needs of a highly expanding social body that was not to 
be easily educated, trained or ruled through the methods usually employed by a form 
of power that was to certain extent external to the social body and was presenting 
itself only through its various representatives when the collection of the social surplus 
was deemed necessary, had to be replaced or enriched by new techniques and 
methods of supervision and social control.
What was required thus in order to go and cope with the flow of the strangers, the 
drifters and the beggars who were threatening social order by simply being there, by 
being visible, or by just being at sight, was another form of social power. It was 
needed, in short, another social system that would have to watch over, keep an eye on, 
and distill from the wills, desires, actions, even the thoughts of these people, those 
ideas, thoughts and deeds that would most suitably fit the scope of the needs of the 
emerging modem society. Hence the factory was invented as the most appropriate and 
most formidable social form that would rule over, train, educate and socialize the 
masses that have appeared and so gradually the great confinement began, of which the 
most eloquent analyst remains until now, Michel Foucault.
What was still a matter of dispute however, and would be probably causing trouble in 
the future, was the fact that given that the factory system was about to produce not 
only moral order but products and goods to be traded and sold in the market, the 
craftsmen and the skilled labour that in traditional societies were those who were 
feeding the market, would found themselves useless or redundant given that their job 
would be now taken by the hundreds of hands employed in and subjected to the 
factory labour. Craftsmen would still have to be, certainly, subjected to the same 
training the factory system had already submitted the poor, yet their opposition and
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bargaining power, as it was expected, was by and large stronger than the resistance of 
the ‘dangerous classes’, given the formers’ more prestigious and higher social 
position. And so the bargaining between the factory system and the skilled workers 
who had to be also part of a similar training as the poor had been, was about to begin. 
Out of this negotiation, whose repercussions and turmoil are visible even in present 
days, among other things, what was to emerge was social class, which was a response 
and reaction of those skilled labourers whose autonomy over the means of production 
was irretrievably lost in the poor houses, the work-houses, and the factories, as a 
means through which to forge a generalized resistance against the newly implemented 
disciplinary organization. Social class, therefore, was a result of this problematization 
of the regime of power, an outcome of the transformation of social power from a 
traditional regime of self-reproduction to an industrial regime of panoptic and 
coercive orientation. And it was, in all likelihood, because modem industrialism 
necessitated another kind of power, disciplinary power, that a fully deployed 
productive system was made possible. Production, in other words, was not the aim per 
se. As Bauman, aptly, put it “Class was bom of social conflict” (Bauman, 1982: 38), 
for if the poor and the working-classes were easily forced to work within the strict 
barriers of factories, the craftsmen had to be generously compensated, in order to 
surrender the usual autonomy they had over the means of production. Money and 
market-interest were the most convincing means used in order to reassure that such a 
labour-aristocracy would give up the freedom it usually enjoyed in the autarkic and 
transparent traditional societies. And as Bauman (1982: 38) once again insightfully 
puts it, “In other words, the conflict, triggered by the attempt to extend over the 
skilled part of factory labour the disciplinary forces developed in dealing with the 
unskilled part (or the fear of such an extension), was displaced and shifted into the 
sphere of surplus distribution”.
Such a theory intermingles and merges with -  though there is no space here for 
adequately developing a mature theory of postmodemity -  the recently (not that 
recent as a matter of fact given that some of the theories go back to the 1960s, like 
Bell’s, Touraine’s, Offe’s,) debate on postindustrialism and the rest. What made 
industrial capitalism possible however, not to say desirable, was the incapacity of the 
standard categories of social spacing of traditional societies, to produce a meaningful 
classification of society, an incapacity however, which was firmly exacerbated by the
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appearance of the stranger. For as Bauman explains “Strangers are neither a part of 
‘us’ nor a part of ‘them’. Neither friend nor foe. For this reason they cause confusion 
and anxiety” (Bauman, 1990: 53). Moreover, the stranger “is a constant threat to the 
world’s order” (Bauman, 1991: 59) and this is why “industrial employment was seen 
as just one conventional way of dealing with a much wider problem of taming the 
‘dangerous classes’” (Bauman, 1982: 68). It is within this tentative, contradictory, 
conflictual and unstable situation of regimes of power and their transformation that 
industrial capitalism was bom and in which social class had come to emerge as a 
result of the disciplinary mechanisms of modernity. Put another way “Disciplinary 
power [...] was first and foremost about bodily control. It was the human body which 
for the first time in history was made, on such a massive scale, an object of drill and 
regimentation. Later consumerism was a product of failed resistance to such a drill 
and regimentation” (Bauman, 1983: 40).
It is a similar transformation of the regime of social power that takes place in 
contemporary societies that turned consumption into a mode of domination rather 
than a eudemonic state of capitalism. As the communal bond of reproduction that was 
dominant in traditional forms of life was given over to and gradually replaced by 
industrialism and discipline, it is in a similar way in which industrialism is now given 
over to and replaced by consumerism, which takes from where industrialism failed to 
further assure social integration and systemic reproduction. This is why 
“Consumerism is not about the emancipation of the body from control; it is about the 
joy of controlling the body of one’s own will, with the help of sophisticated products 
of technology which offer all the visibility of the formidable power of one’s 
controlling agency” (Bauman, 1983: 40). And thus the freedom the producers and the 
craftsmen had once over production was surrendered to the market in exchange for 
some heteronomous satisfaction they would allegedly get from the sphere of 
distribution. By implication accordingly, the power conflict was transformed from 
what was once a battle over autonomy to a struggle situated firmly on the terrain of 
heteronomy simulated and shaped by distribution and consumption. This is why “The 
channeling of the initial power conflict into the sphere of distribution was based on 
the promise of greater levels of wealth, security and living standards: everything, in 
fact, except the autonomy in the productive sphere relinquished in this momentous 
exchange” (Clarke, 2003: 141). Consumerism thus was bom, as Bauman avers “as a
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twice removed offshoot of the frustrated resistance against disciplinary power, which 
penetrated and finally conquered the field of productive activity” (Bauman, 1983: 40). 
There is no evidence, therefore, that an unprecedented affluence will sweep away the 
scarcity of the world, providing for individual happiness and the satisfaction of needs 
and desires heretofore uncompleted and unmet. Consumption is simply “the 
equivalent and the extension, in the twentieth century, of the great indoctrination of 
rural population into industrial labor, which occurred throughout the nineteenth 
century” (Baudrillard, 1988: 50).
Not everyone, of course, is credited access to the market. And while it is true, that in 
productive societies there were people formerly known to be excluded, who were 
usually the unemployed and the poor, it is also true that in the long course and overall, 
sociologically speaking, they were taken at the same time to constitute a reserve 
labour army. They had their chances, in other words, and would sooner or later, in one 
way or another, be part of the labour and production processes. In contemporary 
societies, however, and in terms of the manner in which the current regime of power 
is deployed, such a role seems to be increasingly irrelevant and on the way out. For it 
can hardly make any sense to have a reserve army of consumption today, simply 
because the people who are excluded from the market are not suitable and cannot fit 
or perform their roles as consumers, and thus are considered as having no access to or 
rights on the fruits of consumption. To put it in a nutshell, these people simply do not 
have a role. These are the people who may be taken to be the ‘repressed’, the people, 
in short, who will not be used and will not use the market; the people whose lives are 
linked to and depend on state benefits and who will be easily punished or criminalized 
once they will ask for or demand a bigger portion or a more generous part of the 
surplus of production and for whom the market has simply reserved only a highly 
moral characterization, as the ‘undeserving poor’ (Bauman, 1987, 1998). Their way of 
being and social existence, however, comes in sharp contrast with the people who 
have access to the market, travel around and use their credit cards, the people, who in 
other words, are fully-paid members of the consumer society; the people, in short, 
who may be considered to be the ‘seduced’. Both social categories are the sides of the 
same coin. They are both parts of our world, though they differ from each other in a 
very strategic manner, in that the repressed are virtually excluded from what has come 
to be the organizing principle of current societies, that is consumption, and are not
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simply excluded from employment. Yet despite their differences both worlds co-exist, 
interact and depend on their mutual exclusion. It is conceivable to suggest, therefore, 
that “The division between the ‘seduced’ and the ‘repressed’ is vital to the new 
systemic arrangement. It is perhaps the postmodern divide” (Clarke, 2003: 113).
Economic conceptions of class fail to take into account the richness and complexity of 
such transformations and metamorphoses of the regime of social power that marked in 
a profound manner, the system of industrialism, which were set to replace the self- 
monitoring practices and social spacing of traditional communities. Disciplinary 
power, as was shown, was not necessarily, about production but it was instead 
associated with the taming of the classes who were set free when the communal 
regime of social reproduction broke down and collapsed. It was only after the 
confinement, the training and the ‘day by day’ ceaseless discipline, that production as 
a process became a profitable and useful solution. Production and the expansion of 
capitalist development, in other words, were a result of the rationalization and 
effectiveness of the factory training initially imposed on the masterless men who 
somehow had managed to avoid the social spacing of communal life. Modernity, a 
constellation of discourses and practices at the heart of the capitalist mode of 
domination, is closely related to this transformation of the regime of power, which 
sought to overcome the ontological insecurity and ineradicated ambivalence of the 
traditional world by way of the legislative accounts of reason, truth, progress, 
meaning, and order. The attempt, however, to rid the world of the inherent and 
esoteric contingency was not as successful as was intended, insofar as “reason can 
carve out a niche for itself [...] only in opposition to its subordinated other” (Clarke, 
1997: 220).
I propose that it is in such a manner that one should start seeing consumption, that is, 
as an excessive, prodigious and sufficient regime of power that takes from where 
industrialism left off, rather than a negative mirror stage as opposed to production. 
But as capitalism, at a certain point of its growth and expansion needed a more 
inclusive, all-embracing form of social reproduction, to the extent that the abstract 
measures and laws based solely on coercion and the work-ethic of the factory system 
were no longer effective or adequate, consumption had to take over and socialize the 
masses as consumers in the same way industrialism socialized people as producers.
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What separates the two modes of reproduction, industrialism from consumerism, thus, 
is that consumer capitalism “distinguishes itself by the substitution of seduction for 
repression, public relations for policy, advertising for authority, needs-creation for 
norm imposition” (Bauman, 1987: 167-168). Even if social class, therefore, was once 
a means to interpret spatial unevenness and social inequality, it has become 
imperceptibly, “subject to a metastatic proliferation -  which sees the progressive 
disappearance of the possibility of any authentic meaning for class or class struggle” 
(Clarke, 1997: 231).
And this is why consumption is neither parasitic, nor individual, nor spontaneous, but 
a pre-eminent mode of domination, which came to replace industrialism emanating by 
virtue of mechanisms that were purposefully set in as a means to impose control over 
the social body. Little wonder then, that the contemporary “search for freedom is re­
interpreted as the effort to satisfy consumer needs through appropriation of 
marketable goods” (Bauman, 1983: 38). Put another way, if it was the struggle for 
autonomy that triggered the transitions from a traditional mode of communal 
reproduction to the state of modem industrialism and subsequently, to postmodern 
consumerism, rather than some individual or class-based strategy against exploitation 
and alienation, then consumption has nothing to do with the satisfaction of individual 
needs but is instead a structural characteristic of the capitalist system that fulfills in an 
incredibly effective way its compensatory role and thus it is immanently linked to and 
constitutive of the uneven geography of the postmodern city.
Such is the new brave world consumption promises to deliver. It involves new 
divisions, categorizations, classifications and hierarchies, and is a result of an 
unabating process that charts and harnesses anew, rules and criteria of domination, 
exploitation and hierarchy, albeit not in the usual disciplinary and bureaucratic 
manner. One has to turn to Baudrillard, however, to find a fuller and more penetrating 
account of consumption as an institution and a mode of domination.
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7.4 Consumption: A Mode of Domination
That consumption operates beyond the satisfaction of individual needs is clear. It is 
Baudrillard, however, who has underlined in the most emphatic way the need to 
unfold and unpack the systemic nature of consumption, moving beyond political 
economy, even its Marxist incarnation, which constitutes one code out of the many 
that interpret the world according to their own standards and in terms of their own 
logic. Political economy, Baudrillard argues, speaks of productive forces, 
productivity, development, growth, equality and economic exchange, when it is itself 
a product of the same commodity-fetishism it set out to demystify. This vicious 
circularity, Baudrillard notes, makes critical and Marxist theory more fetishistic than 
the fetishism it promises to unmask. It is not a critical metalanguage, therefore, that 
can adequately interpret the world, for by “Failing to conceive of a mode of social 
wealth other than that founded on labour and production, Marxism no longer 
furnishes in the long run a real alternative to capitalism” (Baudrillard, 1975: 29). This 
is because consumption is, fundamentally, an ambience or a system of objects. For 
“Strictly speaking the humans of the age of affluence are surrounded not so much by 
other human beings as they were in all previous ages, but by objects” (Baudrillard, 
1998: 25). By implication then, objects neither correspond with a given need nor 
simply signify and stand for the prestige and status of their master. In the terms 
Baudrillard employs, “Today objects are with us before they are earned [...] their 
consumption precedes their production” (Baudrillard, 1996: 159, italics in original). 
The object in the Baudrillardean oeuvre thus is a rational form spoken by a certain 
technological language (Baudrillard, 1996: 5). As objects constitute a system, which is 
no longer practically consumed or empirically experienced but instead, works as a 
language, what they “embody is no longer the secret of a unique relationship, but 
rather, differences, and moves in a game” (Baudrillard, 1996: 21). Objects, in short, 
should be understood in terms of a discourse that obeys a social logic “of a 
combination of signs, [which] is irreversible and limitless” (Baudrillard, 1996: 41).
Such a theorization is particularly useful in that it allows an appreciation of the 
significance of consumption as a collective practice that classifies human beings 
rather than satisfies individual needs. As Baudrillard (1996: 47, italics in original) 
points out thus “this systematic connotation at the level o f objects is what I  am calling 
ATMOSPHERE\  Objects, therefore, are subject to a code, which transgresses any
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singular or ideological function that takes needs as singular or natural. On the other 
hand, having the right to choose, if this is at stake in terms of consumption, does not 
make the system less oppressive. Rather the opposite is the case. “Choosing one car 
over another may perhaps personalize your choice, but the most important thing about 
the fact of choosing is that it assigns you a place in the overall economic order” 
(Baudrillard, 1996: 141). And thus “Consumption may indeed be deemed a defining 
mode of our industrial civilization” (Baudrillard, 1996: 199), but as long as it is 
conceived of as “an activity consisting o f the systematic manipulation o f  signs” 
(Baudrillard, 1996: 200, italics in original). Such is the radically different meaning 
Baudrillard’s theory conveys for consumption, which breaks with the mirror of 
production and the rationality, progress, and teleology of labour with which the 
discourses of political economy usually associate objects and needs. No small wonder 
then that as Baudrillard (1996: 204) should argue “THERE ARE NO LIMITS TO 
CONSUMPTION”.
Like Bauman, who theorized consumption in accord with the transformation of 
regimes of power, beyond any anthropomorphism or prosopopoiea, Baudrillard 
argues that “The industrial system, having socialized the masses as labour power, had 
much further to go to complete its own project and socialize them (that is control 
them) as consumption power” (Baudrillard, 1998: 82). To that extent “consumer man 
never comes face to face with his own needs any more than with the specific product 
of his labour; nor is he ever confronted with his own image: he is immanent in the 
signs he arranges” (Baudrillard, 1998: 192, italics in original). This is why 
consumption is a mode of domination, one that marks a transition from industrial 
capitalism and repressive modes of reproduction to a mode of domination largely 
stemming from mechanisms of seduction. Political economy for its part assigns to 
value and thus to labour a two-fold meaning, the quantitative and abstract meaning of 
exchange-value and “the moment of use-value: concrete, differentiated and 
incommensurable” (Baudrillard, 1975: 26). Yet this distinction is in line with 
bourgeois thought and the obsession with production, finality, progress and rationality 
and thus no small wonder why Marx ultimately failed to break with the system of 
thought which renders “unchallengeable the evidence of production as the 
determinant instance” (Baudrillard, 1975: 33). Labour, as the irreversible telos of 
man’s own existence, is never seriously questioned by Marx, who fails to understand
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that society is not only about production and labour -  whether in it is concrete or 
abstract form -  but also about the prodigality, squandering and purposeless 
destruction of wealth. Terms, for example, such as ‘dialectics’ and ‘history’ may be 
suitable to explain industrial society in its recent capitalist form, but have nothing to 
do with the modus operandi of so-called primitive societies. Even if political 
economy gives priority to economy, rationality, science, production and labour it does 
so only on condition that the critique launched against capitalism does not go beyond 
the mirror of production, progress, growth and so on. So-called primitive societies, 
however, are subversive of and have no meaning or understanding of what in 
productivist discourses is often associated with the entity of value.
At the heart of so-called primitive societies, a different mode of exchange is 
dominant, that is, “the condition of symbolic exchange and circulation [and] not the 
socio-cultural realm that limits ‘potential’ production; instead, exchange itself is 
based on non-production, eventual destruction, and a process of continuous unlimited 
reciprocity between persons, and inversely on a strict limitation of exchanged goods” 
(Baudrillard, 1975: 79-80). So-called primitive societies, therefore, are structured on 
the social logic of symbolic exchange, debt, reciprocity, and destruction that “sets up 
a relation of exchange in which the respective positions cannot be autonomized: 
-neither the producer and his product;
-nor the producer and the user;
-nor the producer and his ‘concrete’ essence, his labour power;
-nor the user and his ‘concrete’ essence, his needs;
-nor the product and its ‘concrete’ finality, its utility” (Baudrillard, 1975: 102-103).
Such a limitless and ambivalent symbolic exchange, as we shall shortly explain, still 
haunts consumer societies and as Baudrillard (1981: 31) has suggested drawing on 
Veblen’s notion of conspicuous consumption, “just as the slave is not fed in order that 
he eat, but in order that he work, so one does not dress a woman luxuriously in order 
that she be beautiful, but in order that her luxury testify to the legitimacy or the social 
privilege of her master”. Objects, therefore, will never exhaust themselves in the 
function they are often taken to serve through lens of a functionalist discourse, but 
will always designate the social rank of their master, “social pretension, and 
resignation of social mobility and inertia, of acculturation and enculturation of
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stratification and of social classification” (Baudrillard, 1981: 38). It is in the light of 
the above that symbolic exchange may be taken to haunt consumer societies, but to 
haunt alone, not to rule or govern; as a consequence therefore, there is no “vital 
anthropological minimum that would be the dimension of ‘primary needs’ -  an 
irreducible zone where the individual chooses himself, since he knows what he wants: 
to eat, to drink, to sleep, to make love, to find shelter, etc” (Baudrillard, 1981: 80). 
This is why consumption should be understood “not only structurally as a system o f 
exchange and o f signs, but strategically as a mechanism o f power” (Baudrillard, 
1981: 85, italics in original).
Hence there are no limits to consumption. As Baudrillard (1998: 74) insightfully sums 
it up “The truth is not that ‘needs are the fruits of consumption’ but that the system o f  
needs is the product o f the system o f production” (italics in original). For “Even the 
most ‘rational needs’ (education, culture, health, transport, leisure), [when] cut off 
from their real collective significance, are taken up, in the same way as the incidental 
needs deriving from growth, into the systematic future perspectives of that growth” 
(Baudrillard, 1998: 65). Needs, therefore, are neither true nor false, as a naturalist or 
anthropological intuition assumes. Rather “The truth of consumption is that it is not a 
function of enjoyment, but a function o f production, and hence, like all material 
production, not an individual function, but an immediately and totally collective one” 
(Baudrillard, 1998: 78, italics in original). In Baudrillard’s words once again, (1998: 
81, italics in original), “It is difficult to grasp the extent to which the current training 
in systematic, organized consumption is the equivalent and extension, in the twentieth 
century, o f the great nineteenth-century-long process o f the training o f rural 
populations for industrial work”.
I have attempted so far to think of consumption as a mode of domination, in order to 
pave the way towards an appreciation of the trembling and changing geography of 
Rethemnos and its recent restructuring, and in order to allow and further accelerate at 
the same time the dismantling of the productivist Mediterraneanist spatialities of 
parasitism, capitalism without capitalists and spontaneity. What needs further 
addressing, however, is the question about whether there is a way out of the infinite, 
labyrinthine type of power that subjugates human nature to the irreversible alienation
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advanced by consumerism. For Baudrillard the only alternative to consumption is 
symbolic exchange.
7.5 Symbolic Exchange
If symbolic exchange is destined to haunt a place such as Rethemnos, it is felt that a 
thesis that draws on Baudrillard’s and Bauman’s elaborations should have something 
to say about the theoritical-practice of symbolic exchange. I will briefly refer to 
symbolic exchange, therefore, but only as a means to conclude the theory presented 
above. Symbolic exchange is an ambivalent social practice based on the principles of 
reversibility, the counter-gift and the counter-offer, remaining crucially beyond the 
law, value, and unconscious desires. As Baudrillard states, “the real rupture is not 
between ‘abstract’ labour and ‘concrete’ labour but between symbolic exchange and 
work (production, economics)” (Baudrillard, 1975: 45). So-called primitive societies 
know nothing of economic exchange but only of “symbolic disorder [that] can bring 
about an interruption in the code” (Baudrillard, 1993: 4). This is why Baudrillard 
should insist on “the inadequacy of the concepts of labour, production, productive 
force and relations of production in accounting for, let us say, pre-industrial 
organization” (Baudrillard, 1975: 101). For “Historical materialism [...] is incapable 
of thinking the process of ideology, of culture, of language, of the symbolic in 
general” (Baudrillard, 1975: 109).
In contemporary societies, production, labour, and money have lost all finality 
constituting signs, phantoms and simulations without any referent and devoid of any 
meaning. It is no longer effective, therefore, to fight the system by way of the plane of 
the real, that is, by “direct, dialectical revolution of the economic or political 
infrastructure” (Baudrillard, 1993: 36). The only superior challenge to capitalism 
would have to be “reversal, the incessant reversibility of the counter-gift and, 
conversely, the seizing of power by the unilateral exercise of the gift” (Baudrillard, 
1993: 36). Putting everything in symbolic terms, in other words, is what destroys the 
system, which in turn has to respond with a bigger challenge, which is exactly what 
labour fails to do, that is, to get to grips with such a powerful reversibility that will 
effectively abolish power relations. For labour constitutes a “slow death. This is 
generally understood in the sense of physical exhaustion. But it must be understood in 
another sense. Labour is not opposed, like a sort death, to the ‘fulfillment of life’,
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which is the idealist view; labour is opposed as a slow death to a violent death. That is 
the symbolic reality” (Baudrillard, 1993: 39).
While in economic exchange-value the object finds meaning in relation to other 
objects “according to a hierarchical code of significations” (Baudrillard, 1981: 64), in 
symbolic exchange the object has “neither use value nor (economic) exchange value” 
(Baudrillard, 1981: 64). Symbolic exchange thus “defines itself precisely as 
something distinct from and beyond value and code” (Baudrillard, 1981: 125). The 
symbolic however “is the destruction of the value code (exchange and use) not the 
destruction of objects in themselves” (Baudrillard, 1981: 134). And thus needless to 
say, it breaks with the equivalence and code of the gift and signification insofar as its 
basic function is not to offer but to return. For “if no counter-gift or reciprocal 
exchange is possible we remain imprisoned in the structure of power and abstraction” 
(Baudrillard, 1981: 211). What destroys power relations is one single form: 
“reversibility, cyclical reversal and annulment put an end to the linearity of time, 
language, economic exchange, accumulation and power” (Baudrillard, 1993: 2). The 
social forms and practices that pertain to symbolic exchange, however, cannot be 
totally and fully present in a metaphysical conception of being as presence. It is 
always a kind of “displacement”, a “detour by way of the signifier” (Baudrillard, 
1993: 140) that takes place. As the symbolic annuls every single duality and dual 
code of signification, “7/ is the u-topia that puts an end to the topologies o f  the soul 
and the body, man and nature, the real and the non-real, birth and death. In the 
symbolic operation, the two terms lose their reality” (Baudrillard, 1993: 133, italics in 
original).
I have argued so far that theorizing consumerism is vital in deconstructing 
Mediterraneanism and in setting in motion the socio-economic structure of a 
spontaneous Mediterranean city that rests unproblematically on the plane of 
parasitism and on the striated space of certain well-entrenched digestive, stable and 
solid strictures and discourses that pertain to and are littered with identifications of 
honour, shame, poeticity and commensality. I have stressed the need, moreover, to 
move beyond the negative and oppositional readings of parasitism in order to start 
charting the conditions pertinent to a full-blown consumer society. In Chapter 3, I 
have taken up first, on a differential and repetitive understanding of difference in
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order to transcend the model of shame-and-honour and, subsequently, I have picked 
up on the counterfeit in order to open up the personalization and economic character 
and obligation of gift-exchanges to haecceities, de-individuations and becomings, 
something which, consequently, led me to the poetics of womanhood currently swept 
up by becoming-woman. Last but not least, I have put at the service of the 
abovementioned deconstruction of Mediterraneanist identifications, a similar 
deconstruction of Mediterraneanist spatializations, taking up on the ‘more than one/no 
more one’ spectres of Marx, the systemic and spectral utility/fetishism of use values, 
the origamic differential spacing and the coordination of cognitive, moral and 
aesthetic spacings, in an attempt to loosen and destabilize spontaneity, parasitism, 
capitalism without capitalists, and the historical contradictions of social and 
monumental time.
Finally, I explored, directly above, the extent to which the Mobius bands of 
consumption, that is, the division between the repressed and the seduced, the 
sociogenesis of consumerism and the fact that consumption is a mode of domination 
rather than an anthropomorphic trait, are useful in order to lay the groundwork for a 
more apposite understanding and dissection of the Old Town problem. What is 
required to take things further is to pull the above threads together bringing them to 
bear upon the choreoethnographies, events and rhythmanalyses of Rethemnos and the 
processes and mechanisms that lie at the heart of the contested restoration project. It is 
to a fuller appreciation, trying to put some flesh on the bones of the above theories, 
that I now turn, first, by opening up the Old Town problem to the systemic nature of 
consumption and, second, by taking up on the Rethemniot identification process, on 
the back of the subtractive ontology and choreoethnographies of some undecidable 
events that will have been.
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CHAPTER EIGHT: THE RESTORATION PROJECT
8.1 Introduction
Bringing the previous peregrinations to bear upon the choreoethnography of an 
evental Rethemnos, and equipping them with Badiou’s mathematical ontology and his 
subtractive depiction of the non-place of the event is the task of this last part of the 
thesis. I will put at the service of such a form of thought three devices from the 
specialized mathematical language of Badiou, namely, the axiom of foundation, the 
axiom of choice and the matheme of the indiscernible as a means to unfold the 
generic multiple Rethemniot subject by way of forcing, a process according to 
Badiou, through which a subject is faithfully connected to an ungrounded truth that 
comes after the intervention of an event. Prior to that however, there is still a need to 
take into account the restoration project of the Old Town, offering a pragmatic 
illustration of the dynamics, manifold spacing, continuous variability and far-reaching 
implications consumption has for the town. This is not going to be a fully detailed 
historical analysis of a place’s changing identity but rather the delineation of some 
key moments of the town’s recent history with respect to how its geography is 
transformed and how such changes and metamorphoses resonate with the theories and 
philosophies of difference developed in previous chapters. This is not, moreover, the 
only possible way to reconstruct the history and geography of the Mediterranean town 
of Rethemnos, but is still a useful approach in that it brings consumption to bear upon 
some of the problems that currently haunt the socio-spatial imaginary of the 
Mediterranean city.
As previously mentioned, the Archaeology Service has occasionally accused the 
residents of ignoring the architecture and history of the Old Town due to the careless 
improvements, alterations and destructions they delivered on many of the properties. 
From 1967 onward when the Old Town was declared a scheduled monument, the 
inhabitants who wanted to repair a house should consult with the Archaeology 
Service, as a result of the ambition of the Greek state to garden and protect the Old 
Town along the lines of a history that would mostly had to be derived and stem, in a 
linear kind of way, from the glorious Venetian past. It was then that the residents 
founded an association in order to oppose the monumentalization of the Old Town 
(OTHOA), in a movement that would come to unite all ranks and social groups of the
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town, rich and poor alike, agreeing on the fact that the state should not be credited 
with a role when it conies to the formation of the modem identity of the town and 
especially to its built environment and houses. Yet some of the rich residents had 
already seen in the monumentalization project a prospect which in the long run would 
bring money and profits inasmuch as the restored residences could be easily converted 
into luxurious hotels that would attract tourists. Three observations must be made at 
the outset. First, the majority of the properties in the 1960s needed immediate and 
decisive restoration and inevitably the residents had somehow to repair them. Second, 
the residents were proud of the town’s history and identity, even without having the 
adequate educational capital and knowledge to appreciate and fully recognize the 
architectural and monumental greatness. And third, the proposed restoration project 
demanded more money than what any regular restoration would require and thus to 
deny the restoration imperatives and procedures was not only a consequence of the 
residents’ inability to appreciate the culture heritage and importance of the Venetian 
history, but also a practical issue of economic affordability. Accordingly, the original 
enmity toward the restoration project was neither irrational nor simply an effect of 
poetics, ignorance, indifference or an opposition to the state’s ambition to interfere in 
the Rethemniot life-world, but above all, a reflective reaction and attitude toward a 
way of ‘going on’ with the urban affairs of the town that was now highly influenced 
and determined by the official language of the state, which had little to say or do 
about the needs of the residents. The changes, transformations, transitions, and spatial 
arrangements that took place as a consequence of the restoration project, the way 
these changes were conceived by the residents, and the manner in which the 
relationships between the residents and the state changed in accord with the varying 
experience of space, place and the subject on the face of the consumer society, 
comprises what is generally called these days, the ‘Old Town problem’.
The newly founded Houses’ Owners Association (AROOT) instituted in the 1990s 
under a new leadership and with a totally different approach to the town’s urban 
affairs, marked not only the changing attitude of the residents toward 
monumentalization -  culminated in the struggles and fights between the residents and 
the state all those years -  but most importantly, signaled the way in which a 
displacement in society and space would take place which is immanently linked and 
tantamount to the transition from an oppressive mode of state reproduction to a
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seductive mode of market domination. The marvelous reconstruction of the Venetian 
properties and the increasing number of tourists that periodically visit, enjoy and 
appropriate the town have all significantly transmogrified the landscape of Rethemnos 
in a manner which, as Henri Lefebvre pithily observed, turned the city into “an object 
of cultural consumption for tourists” (1996: 148). Fernand Braudel for his part, had 
already suggested, several years ago, that the Mediterranean region should be taken 
“as a unit, with its creative space, the amazing freedom of its sea-roots [...] with its 
many regions, so different yet so alike, its cities bom of movements” (Braudel, cited 
in Sartre, 1976: 169). Yet the monumentalization of the Old Town and its effects 
cannot be seen or recognized always in the colourful picture drawn out above by 
Braudel, as the restoration of the Venetian properties coincided with the opening of 
many new shops, bars and restaurants which while not, necessarily, a prerequisite or 
an indicator of unevenness, produced a landscape extremely divided and polarized as 
a consequence of the market-based and seductive-oriented organization that opened 
the economy of the town to the global market of tourism. Making sense of such a 
socio-spatial expansion and openness regarding the conflictual, incomplete and 
unfinished project of the town’s identification, by way of the data of the restored 
houses, that is, by way of the use, geographical location and type of transformation of 
the buildings, seems to me to offer a useful insight in explaining the changing 
experience of space, place and the subject in Rethemnos beyond the territorial and 
place-based perspective of a ‘monumental’ theorization.
185
8.2 The Consumer Society and the Old Town
The restoration program forced everyone in the Old Town wanting to built, redecorate 
or refurnish a house to follow carefully designed and consciously accepted laws of 
construction, as the owners of the properties had, initially, to have their proposed 
restorations approved by the Archaeology Service and the Ministry of Town Planning, 
though interestingly, the two offices often clashed with the latter usually permitting 
what the former prohibited. Since the permission of the Ministry of Culture was 
essential and the criteria strict, the problem seemed to lie exclusively, though 
disappointingly as well for the residents, with the jurisdiction of the Ministry of 
Culture. It is all “Archaeology’s fault” (‘7  archaiologia fta iei”), the people often 
angrily remarked every now and then regarding houses whose restoration and 
refurbishment had irritatingly stopped because of the administered and comprehensive 
regulations of the Archaeology Service. In the 1960s and 1970s, the growing 
difficulty of restoring a property resulted in the formation of an association (OTHOA) 
whose aim was to back the right of the residents to carry out any necessary 
reconstruction in whichever way they wished, given that the residents felt at the time 
that the way in which a restoration should be materialized should not be the concern 
of the state and that it should be the owner who would arrange how, when and which 
parts of a house would have to be fixed, according to his/her logic and in line with 
his/her economic ability. It is true nevertheless that given that most of the residents 
were poor, the original restorations, those alterations in other words the residents had 
keenly adopted, had not been, properly speaking, compliant with or attuned to the 
overall Venetian designing style and tone of architecture the state wanted. In order to 
entice the residents the state vowed to contribute financially to the general restoration 
of the houses and thus many of the restorations of the 1970s and early 1980s had been 
partly funded by the state. Over a period of a decade or so, however, the OTHOA 
would no longer hold, as the rich and higher social ranks realized that by having their 
properties restored under the proposed scheme more profits were on the way, by 
renting their houses or by turning them into shops, taverns and restaurants. And thus 
as a consequence, while the town had begun, imperceptibly, becoming in the 1980s a 
considerably famous and well-known destination for tourists due to its Venetian 
architecture, OTHOA started running out of steam. Theoretically, in order to obtain 
permission to restore a property, a civil engineer had to produce the plans and designs 
of the proposed restoration, but practically, such a time-consuming process was
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extremely costly and to that extent not all residents could afford or even understand 
the thoroughly modem ambition of a project that wanted to preserve a sheering 
memory of a past that was considered foreign or marginal to the town’s current 
identity. As only a small number of residents managed, therefore, to restore their 
properties and benefit from the Old Town’s monumentalization, the majority of the 
residents despite being constant supporters of the ‘right to intervene’ slogan, have 
sadly come to discover that even the smallest and insignificant improvement was far 
from affordable -  not to mention works that had to do with the reconstruction of the 
entire property.
The transformation of a small coastal town into a tourist resort that bases its 
reputation and most importantly its economy on its historical heritage is not probably 
a unique case in the urban history of peripheral capitalism. It gets however, extremely, 
important and interesting when the need to preserve the monuments, an ambition 
sustained and promoted by the state overlaps with the tourist development and 
aesthetic promotion of the town. The latter’s significance becomes even greater once 
it is appreciated that the building legislation that banned any improvised alterations 
from the standpoint of the residents, unless authorization was given by the 
Archaeology Service, had a direct and immediate impact on the geography and spatial 
arrangements that surged into and saturated the material constitution of the town. One 
of the most forcefully felt and vividly experienced trends that had to do primarily with 
the new geography under formation in the face of the monumentalization process, was 
the significant drop of restorations regarding residential uses and properties housing 
families and tenants. As Table 2 shows, while the residential uses were dominant in 
the Old Town from the very beginning (approximately 25% shops and 60% 
residences) of the restoration project, the restorations that took place over the course 
of the last 40 years, were more about some general reconstructions (usually applied to 
converted shops) than a full restoration (usually referring to residences). But while it 
is, moreover, worth noting that 32% of the properties irrespective of their use have not 
been repaired at all throughout the same period, whereas 2% of the properties have 
been repaired and turned into shops, as Table 3 shows, only a 7.4% of the 
restorations concerned residential uses; while another 7.5% were about various other 
consumer uses -  once one adds the variables permission (to operate a new shop: 
4.6%), transform to shop (2.3%) and transform to rent rooms (0.6%). And yet there is
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still a 40% of a general type of restoration, mostly associated with shops and other 
commercial uses -  compared to the 7.4 % of the residential restorations -  that makes 
a strong a point in the direction in which the restoration headed, and which strongly 
corresponded with the ensuing tourist activity. The implications are quite significant. 
By adding up the variables general restorations, permission to new shop, transform to 
shop and transform to rent rooms -  that all refer to commercial restorations -  one 
ends up with a 47,6%, which is significantly greater than the number of the residential 
restorations (7,4%) even made in the area. It is such a trend that readily shows how 
the restoration project effected the built environment, which buildings were selected 
and promoted and which uses and geographical areas benefited from such a 
restructuring.
Table 3: Type of restoration
Frequency Percent
General
(shops)
Restoration
(residences)
70
13
40,0
7,4
illegal 7 4,0
permission 8 4,6
no change 57 32,6
expropriation 1 ,6
tranform to 
shop
transform to 
rent rooms 
Total
4
1
161
2,3
,6
92,0
Missing 0 14 8,0
Total 175 100,0
Table 2: How the properties are used
Frequency Percent
shop 45 25,7
residence 106 60,6
abandoned 4 2,3
preserved 1 ,6
monument 1 ,6
public 4 2,3building
Total 161 92,0
Missing 0 14 8,0
Total
175 100,0
As I have already stated, the division between those who were able to restore their 
properties and those who were unable or unwilling to restore them, do not necessarily 
coincide with the division between the seduced and the repressed. What I have also 
argued however, is that the postmodern divide between the repressed and the seduced 
refers, above all, and is incumbent to a social territory which is currently split and 
divided due to the unfettered existence, on the one hand, of a group of people who 
appreciate, fully enjoy and are able to consume the history of the town, and on the 
other hand, a group of people who need to be kept at a sufficient and safe distance, as 
the increasing important role of the Old Town, within the broader socio-economic
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environment of Rethemnos, is about to take gradually hold. Class, of course, is not 
irrelevant to Rethemnos’ recent socio-geographical cartography, yet given that the 
Old Town accrues from and is inseparably implicated and indelibly linked to an 
increasingly uneven geography that is vividly expressed in the unevenness of the 
restoration project and the restoration of the houses, it is a fuller theorization of 
consumption that permits a radical reconstruction of our understanding of the Old 
Town problem. The uneven geographical development of the Old Town and the gap 
between the restored properties and those that were left unconverted, is intrinsically 
associated with and subtended by the ceaselessly exacerbated systemic nature of 
consumption. An increasing resemblance, therefore, exists between posturban forms 
of spatiality, as the one materialized and brought to the fore, however inadvertently, 
by the restoration project of Rethemnos, and the commodification and marketization 
of almost everything in culture and society, with which the postmodern culture is 
often associated.
Originally, as was already underlined, the majority of the residents were against any 
kind of state intervention of which they thought as an external evil that cynically 
ignored the endemic needs of the town. Yet, other voices, even in the 1970s when the 
anti-interventionist was dominant, opposed such an argumentation which tended to 
neglect the historical and aesthetic importance of the Old Town and which they 
thought, should be, somehow, preserved. For Herzfeld however, endorsing and 
echoing the opinion of many Rethemniots at the time, the inhabitants of the Old Town 
were right in complaining about the newly formed situation in which the state had the 
role of adjudicating on matters that should not be its business. As he approvingly cites 
one of the residents’ comments on the housing issue:
“That his house essentially does not belong to him, and that the house he has belongs to the 
Archaeological Service. And, further, to that, the entire secret [i.e. issue] is that the Old Town is a 
monument and you all live o ff it. All right. Nobody has any doubt about that. We said, we have it as 
dowry (procio)\ but we could exploit this dowry in a suitable way” (Herzfeld, 1991: 205).
Yet as an anonymous columnist’s comment, who passionately disagreed with the 
forceful opposition that coloured most of the disputes surrounding the restoration 
project, in a daily newspaper put it (KRITIKIEPITHEORISI, 21-6-1983, pg. 1):
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“Nobody said that the old buildings should be left to collapse or that people should live in decaying 
houses. One should be free to rebuild one’s house with new material as long as the material is covered 
with the traditional setting buildings used to be built of. One should also be able to construct a floor 
between the ground floor and the first floor but covering only 50% o f the size o f the property and only 
in houses with height over 4,20m. It is also unacceptable that two agencies exist deciding on the 
building and reconstruction processes. What the Archaeology Service demands is not a mere 
“reconstruction” (ftiasidoma). The Archaeology Service is not against “renewal” and “modernization” 
and indeed all towns have been above all “living organisms”. Those, however, who have the money to 
construct a “third floor” let them buy apartments in the New Town after they have finished with the 
restoration. If the “third floor” is the issue how come people did not build them before the protective 
legislation declared the Old Town a “monument”?”
The original Old Town House’s Owners Association (OTHOA) replied to this caustic 
commentary in the following way (KRITIKI EPITHEORISI, 21-6-1983, pg. 1).
“The Old Town and its residents have been condemned and their properties withheld for ever. There 
are only forty buildings out of 1800 that exist in the Old Town that deserve to be restored”.
Kostas Hliakis, the current president of AROOT, the new association founded in 1994 
was already from the 1980s one of the few individuals who supported a more 
sensitive and soft approach about whether certain restoration proposals and standards 
should be taken under consideration in line with the oft-tamished legislative 
restrictions imposed by the Archaeology Service, blaming, however, OTHOA’s leader 
as a ‘hard liner’ demanding to ‘tear everything down in the town and rebuild it from 
scratch’. In fact it was Andreas Andrianopoulos, a member of New Democracy, the 
right wing party who promised to reconsider and withdraw the designation of the Old 
Town as a scheduled monument. In 1979, the then minister of culture, Mr. Nianias, 
visited Rethemnos and heard many complaints from the locals as they were 280 
residents who had already applied in order to restore their houses, but only 8 of them 
saw their applications reaching the next stage -  at the time the restoration, as was 
mentioned, of the properties was partly funded by state grants. Most of the properties, 
however, appeared to be in bad condition, the houses were collapsing and the damp 
was, according to the reports and complaints of the residents, almost everywhere. 
Granted though that every single restoration required a tremendous amount of time 
and money, the residents felt significantly powerless to adjust to the highly 
demanding prerogatives and the confusing and perplexing bureaucratic documentation
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that had to be followed in order for any restoration to be finally permitted. As some of 
the residents most dramatically, described their lives at the time (RETHEMNIOTIKA 
NEA, 1979, pg. 4), implying that things ‘should be moving faster’ and that ‘there was 
no time to waste’ with all this bureaucracy :
“Here, do you see my fridge? I only keep it in order to throw it away. It is useless from the damp o f the 
walls during the winter. I use my hands to get rid of the cockroaches. I used to have mice as well but I 
have now blocked the holes”.
“The rooms on the ground floors have damp. The walls have damp as well. There is damp all over the 
entire house. I cannot do anything about it”.
“The Archaeology service left unfinished many of the proposed restorations. It looks good from outside 
but from inside has a concrete construction and the wind gets through so the house is always cold. My 
wife and I have become ill because of it, which was not previously the case. This is the ‘good’ done to 
us by the Archaeology service. Now it is like we live in a shelter”.
“The commitment we had to make to the Archaeology Service has condemned us and ,apart from that, 
we are not allowed to do anything unless we get a written permission from the ministry. Until that 
moment everything is in danger o f collapsing”.
And as one anonymous commentator put it in a local newspaper (RETHEMNIOTIKA 
NEA, 1979: 7), epitomizing the suspicion of the residents regarding the ideology of 
the Greek state and the impossibility, if not absurdity of the restoration project, which 
wanted to impose over a highly errand reality the meaning and modem ambition of a 
history that had clearly nothing to do with how the residents felt or thought of the 
town at the time:
“There is no financial capability to preserve and restore the houses nor to keep its characteristic 
architectural physiognomy, nor its historical heritage. All the laws concerned with the Old Town are 
essentially against the residents”.
No one could ever possibly imagine, of course, how the town would look today, as the 
picture on the right shows.
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Figure 6: Chania, top left and the Venetian port o f  R ethem nos bottom left (D im ak op ou los ,  1977: 
342).
Figure 7: On the right R eth em n o s’ port as it currently  stands (picture taken by the author).
In all fairness, the restoration project was clearly a modernist ambition that sought to 
impose laws over a constantly and highly changing and erratic reality, putting 
everything in its place and cultivating the history o f Rethemnos according to the 
jurisdiction o f the Greek nationalist anthology, which saw in the Venetian built 
environment a firm basis on which the tow n’s identity was finally to be built, as an 
exhibition, in short, that would expose, stage and communicate the tow n’s greatness 
to the word -  the ‘world as exhibition’ as Gregory (1994) once put it. The Old Town 
problem was subject thus and this is exactly what the restoration project amounts to, 
in all its conflictual, and contested forms and shapes, an ideology that sought to 
preserve and restore the Venetian properties; an attempt, however, that coincided with 
the unmitigated predominance o f aesthetic spacing, and hence the remarkable inter­
implication, and coordination o f cognitive spacing (the restoration o f the Venetian 
past) and aesthetic spacing (the rapid tourist development o f the area) that marked in 
the most profound way the conflicts between the residents and the state. The 
commodification of the Venetian history o f the town is neither, therefore, about a 
parasitic form of socio-spatial development, nor about spontaneity, but what tended to 
reinforce the residents’ hostility toward the bureaucratic administration o f Athens, 
insofar as the knowledge, practices and restoration imperatives nourished by the 
project were difficult to be reconciled and went beyond the scope and meaning of the
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moral spaces of the Rethemniot lifeworld. The disputes, however, were mostly about 
simple things. A major concern, for example, of the anti-interventionist period was 
about the prolonged demand of the residents to construct a third floor ‘leaving 
something for their children’ and, the need to remove the Venetian doorways and the 
arched placements and to demolish, rebuild and reconstruct the entrances of the 
houses, replacing the original doors with modem constructions.
The ongoing struggle between the residents and the state in the 1970s and 1980s 
inevitably led many of the inhabitants to abandon their houses, especially in the 
Southwestern part of the town, as now it is the ambitious and hard-working 
immigrants, mainly of Albanian origin who buy or rent the relatively cheap old 
properties at the heart of the Old Town. A two-floored house, for example, with a 
bathroom and backyard in the street of Koronaiou, costs 160 Euros per month to rent. 
Given though that as Table 4 shows 38% of the Venetian properties of the Old Town 
are located within the historical centre, while 60% of them are situated elsewhere in 
the Old Town, the fact that many of the residents have abandoned their residences in 
the place of which commercial shops popped out, a significantly different landscape is 
now under formation and a rather different social geography grows in demographic 
and ethnic/racial terms. It is not only the immigrants, of course, that have found the 
Old Town attractive. Students from across Greece who study at the University of 
Crete, one faculty of which, social sciences and humanities, are based in Rethemnos, 
have also thought of the Old Town’s housing stock as a relatively affordable chance 
of accommodation. As Table 5 illustrates, the buildings that are now situated within 
the boundaries of the historical centre are hugely used as tourist shops, whilst 80% of 
the properties that house residential uses have been moved outside the historical 
centre and are now relocated elsewhere in Rethemnos.
Table 4: Location of Properties
Frequency Percent
Historical Centre 67 38,3
Rest o f Old 108 61,7Town
Total 175 100,0
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Table 5: Location and use of properties
Geographical Area Total
Historical Rest o f the
Centre Old Town
Use shop 28 17 45
62,2% 37,8% 100,0%
residence 27 79 106
25,5% 74,5% 100,0%
abandoned 4 0 4
100,0% ,0% 100,0%
preserved 1 0 1
100,0% ,0% 100,0%
monument 1 0 1
100,0% ,0% 100,0%
public building 2 2 4
50,0% 50,0% 100,0%
Total 63 98 161
39,1% 60,9% 100,0%
Be that as it may, even if is true, as one of the employees of the Archaeology Service 
told me once, that originally the historical centre of the Old Town has accommodated 
both residential and commercial activities, it is equally true, as things currently stand 
that the gap between a highly developing commercial historical centre and a silent, 
hidden and banal housing zone is far a more salient, intense and polarized divide than 
what initially stood. The historic centre, which includes the Gazi Housein Mosque and 
the areas around the Streets of Arabatzoglou, Messologiou and Nikiforu Foka -  Makri 
Steno -  are now commercially exploding and have nothing to do with the spatial 
structuration of the Southwestern Old Town, which contains mostly poor, abandoned 
and mould decayed houses within which mostly old people live, whose children have 
fled to Herakleion, Chania or even Athens. And as a young Rethemniot told me once I 
observed that her father’s house in the Old Town seemed to be abandoned:
“You do not expect to make something o f it. It is a complete waste o f time. I do not think o f going back 
in there because of the damp, the mice and the total lack o f parking space.”
It was for that reason that the residents, who have witnessed their houses gradually 
losing their economic value, tended to conceive of the state as an external invader that 
restricted and weakened their ability to decide over their lives.
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The year 1994 marks a radical change in the way the Greek state appeared to the eyes 
of the residents however; now it is the state that seems to be the most reliable and 
trustworthy feature that can guarantee and further protect all those who have been left 
out of the game of consumption and restoration. It is in such a way that the dialectic 
of change and preservation of the socio-spatial polarization between the historical 
centre and the residential zone of the Old Town resonates with the current division of 
the posturban city, that is, the fact that “the walls built once around the city now 
crisscross the city itself and in a multitude of directions” (Bauman, 1998: 48). Being 
unable to visit, walk through, or even enjoy today certain areas of the Old Town, the 
poor residents had invariably to turn to the administrative and authoritative 
predicament provided by the state, whose gardening aspirations they long ago 
denounced and rejected.
What brings together the fetishism of utility, the revival of AROOT and the changing 
attitude of the residents in terms of the way in which the restoration project is 
currently received, is neither a deeply embedded placeness that resists the historical 
interpretations of officialdom nor a behavioral characteristic of a characteristically 
untamed and ceaselessly passionate Mediterranean psyche. What consumerism and 
the restoration project signify, in a profound sense, is the responses, reactions and 
feelings of the residents as a consequence of the strategic “replacement -  or better, 
displacement -  of the repression-centred mode of social integration by new, 
seduction-centred mechanisms [which] comes about in direct proportion to the extent 
to which systemic reproduction is better achieved by letting social integration be 
guided by ‘needs’ rather than ensuring it be constrained by norms” (Clarke and 
Bradford, 1998: 875). To that extent the monumentalization of the Old Town is 
intrinsically tied and attuned to the consummation and aesthetization of the Venetian 
geohistory and co-ordination between aesthetic and cognitive spacings that inevitably 
leave a particularly heavy imprint on the town’s geography.
That the Venetian Old Town is heavily influenced by consumption nowadays, which 
has turned the use of buildings into commodified signs of a glorious past, does not 
mean, necessarily, that its histories, events, trajectories and narratives are elusive or 
immaterial. It rather connotes that the monumentalization process that has been 
proliferating all over the town in an unprecedented way in the last 40 years, faces now
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a new round of intense and hostile receptions triggered off mostly because of the 
ardent consummation process of tourism. As most of the streets, shops and restaurants 
are named after some Venetian leader, whilst even a coffee-shop in the place where 
the Venetian sun-clock stood was named ‘Clock’ after the monument, the question is 
no longer about how to preserve, restore or even respect and communicate the 
historical meaning, symbolism and value of the Venetian properties, but rather, and 
this is not ironic at all, about whether there is anything in the Old Town that is not of 
Venetian origin. And while the Venetian past is virtually resurrected and constantly 
reinstated and resuscitated across the physical space and territory of the whole of 
Rethemnos, its history and identity are, imperceptibly, turned into a phantasmagoria 
and a vast playground of aesthetic values, simulated histories, overcoded signs and 
satellite images that scarcely refer to any real, authentic or historical truth. For, truly, 
it is hard to find in the Old Town anything that is not of monumental type or of 
Venetian origin. That the Venetian geohistory is almost everywhere is what makes the 
Rethemniot landscape a simulated Venetian history, which is more real than reality 
itself. And as Baudrillard (1988: 166) claims this “is no longer a question of either 
maps or territory”, but about what happened to the geography of things once “there is 
no longer a scene, when everything becomes transparent” (Baudrillard, 1999: 67).
I am not proposing that the commodification and tourist expansion of Rethemnos 
signals the end of history or the end of the Old Town. For as Baudrillard has also 
pointed out being out of the visible or productive order does not, necessarily, mean 
the end of history. Rather such a strategy of aesthetic domination signals the ec-static 
transformation and metamorphosis of the Old Town which having turned its history 
into a commodity is now paying the price of disappearance, for when everything is 
Venetian nothing is Venetian any more. That the Old Town is about simulation that 
irradiates only signs and images of a glorious past is exactly what is meant by the 
figure of the hyperreal therefore, which is “The truer than true” (Baudrillard, 1990: 
11). And this is why “Simulation threatens the difference between the ‘true’ and the 
‘false’, the ‘real’ and the ‘imaginary’” (Baudrillard, 1994: 3). Of such a fractal stage 
of consumerism, however, which postulated the whole of the Old Town as a Venetian 
monument, and forced the inhabitants to fight and oppose by all means 
monumentalization, the residents’ lifeworld or the town’s urban affairs, are no longer 
entirely under the residents’ will and jurisdiction.
196
8.3 Old Conflicts, New Coalitions
That the Old Town appears to have little to do with the struggles, lives and concerns 
of its inhabitants can be also supported by the fact that the shops and restaurants, 
especially those around the old Venetian port, do not usually seem keen to serve the 
residents. They remain closed during the winter and the same holds for many hotels 
and bars located across the eastern part of the town, from Perivolia, to Missiria and 
Panormo; a rather indirect but still effective manner of sanctioning, segregating and 
purging all those whose profile or lifestyle choices does not appear to follow or fit the 
highly valorized, for his expenditure capacity, figure of the tourist. Such nice places 
are more often than not expensive -  and this is why do not appear to be to the 
residents’ taste, though this become evident only when seen retrospectively that is 
after the owners of the shops have already abandoned any hope of targeting local 
customers -  having produced a certain ghettoization and purification of the area. It 
comes as no surprise, therefore, that the reasons that should lie behind the inevitable 
institution of AROOT in 1994 have to do primarily with the suppression and 
limitation of the local population within specifically designated areas that are not 
entitled to be touristically ‘exploited’ ‘overloaded’ or ‘oriented’. AROOT for his part, 
as its declaration-statement put it, meant to develop relationships of friendship 
between those who live in the Old Town, contribute to the educational and cultural 
level of the inhabitants, watch over the problems of the Old Town and communicate 
them to wider audiences, and the social actors and agencies involved in the town. As 
the members of AROOT suggested:
“The Old Town problem is a problem o f all Rethemniots and not only of those who live strictly within 
the boundaries o f the Old Town”4.
AROOT is open to all citizens who live permanently in the Old Town and are over 18 
and to those who have tourist shops, small-business and various entrepreneurs in the 
area with the exception of bars, restaurants and disco-owners, who are among those, 
considered to be responsible for the recent experience of anxiety, convolution, 
contortion and confusion that have never stopped to surround the entire 
monumentalization process of the Old Town. Things have now changed dramatically
4 The statement constitutes a small paragraph of the foundational declaration o f AROOT, which I read 
in the Old Town’s office having the permission o f Maria Hliaki, a founding member o f the association.
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however not only in terms of the manner in which cognitive and aesthetic spacing 
proceed apace in Rethemnos, but also with respect to how the residents perceive of 
the restoration project and the state. In the anti-intervention period, even some local 
politicians, the mayor and would-be members of the parliament passionately would 
defend the widely shared anti-interventionist rhetoric of OTHOA, with Arkhondakis 
and Skouloudis, the rivals for the municipal office in the 1980s having already taken 
sides against it. As Herzfeld (1991: 120) put it in his account of Rethemnos “Dimitris 
Arkhondakis, chosen by the rightists to lead their slate, was a local man, a high school 
teacher and philologist much admired for his learning in the ‘town of letters’ [...]”. 
And as one of the residents expressing his preference for Arkhondakis observed:
“Skouloudis [...] hasn’t slept a single night in the Old Town to see what ‘Old Town’ means, to see in 
the morning when he gets up how the sheet is raw (nopo) from the damp [ ...]” (Herzfeld, 1991: 120).
In the 1990s nevertheless, the on-going tensions between the residents and the state 
was about to take an all together different turn, with the radical transformation of 
AROOT’s ideological orientation being a consequence of the current intense geo­
restructuring of the historical centre, which coincided with a significant drop in the 
residential improvements as a result of the further marketization of the historical 
centre. While prior to 1994, 85% of the properties repaired concerned by and large, 
residential uses, after 1994 only 15% of the works completed involved improvements 
and renovations of residences. Inversely, only a 35% of the renovations completed 
prior to 1994 were related to shops, whereas after 1994 the shop improvements rose to 
65% (Table 6).
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Table 6: Type of property and year of intervention
Type Year
until 1994 after 1994
shop 16 29
35.6 % 64.4 %
residence 90 16
84.9% 15.1%
abandoned 3 1
75.0% 25.0%
preserved 1 0
100.0% ,0%
monument 1 0
100.0% ,0%
public building 4 0
100.0% ,0%
Total 115 46
71.4% 28.6%
The rapid and unprecedented commercialization of the Venetian properties, roughly, 
illustrated by the above numbers, is indicative of the far-reaching implications a full­
blown consumer society has for space, place, and the subject as they are disseminated 
on the face of the effective spacing of restoration. The considerable co-ordination 
between cognitive and aesthetic spacings in the Old Town generated a tremendously 
ossifying spatial unevenness and as many conflicts and quarrels as the original 
impoverished geography -  which the restoration project ambitiously administered -  
set out to resolve. And as it was rightly observed, “Few indeed are those who can 
afford the prohibitive cost of conforming to the requirements of the historic 
conservation office” (Herzfeld, 1991: 246). Thus the question is no longer about 
affording the restoration costs but has to do mostly with the failed promises and 
unfulfilled expectations, ambitions and challenges the restoration project had 
cultivated or surreptitiously induced, but was ultimately unable to deliver or meet. 
AROOT’s members, for example, insist on taking the local administration to court for 
neglecting foundational obligations and commitments the mayor had made just before 
the 2002 local elections, when he won another four years in the office. As AROOT 
sharply put it:
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“Our association represents and protects residents and owners o f the Old Town o f Rethemnos. The Old 
Town constitutes a public good and is a source o f profit for all citizens. The enjoyment o f this good 
belongs to everyone and no one (citizen or the mayor) has the right to underestimate it. The streets o f  
Arkadiou, Ethnikis Antistaseos and Palaiologou, which are the more commercial streets o f the town, 
are not fixed and make the situation problematic. Because passengers are in danger; because the 
situation is bad for tourism; because the tourist period is just about to begin and there is an immediate 
need to repair the streets; because we receive daily complaints from residents o f the Old Town whose 
interests we support; because it is unacceptable within such a short period for this damage to reappear; 
because the only person responsible for the situation is the mayor; because it is impossible to fix the 
damage while tourists are here -  for all these reasons we are suing the mayor for his inappropriate 
attitude toward the problems of our town” (AROOT, 19-3-2004).
The growing inability of the local polity and its failure to protect the residents from 
the current unrestrained tourist development makes life difficult for all those who are 
unable to comply with the newly formed situation and the unabating consummation 
processes that followed the attempt to substitute an acutely designed housing 
condition for a more free and reflexive way of dealing with the properties’ 
renovations.
The inability of politicians to respond and satisfy the lower social ranks’ expectations 
offering a safer predicament and a way to get to grips with the emerging situation is 
not necessarily a sign of a general incapacity to halt or even partly remedy the highly 
uneven capitalist development and is not necessarily about the end of the political era. 
Yet a strong assertion can be made that at the dawn of consumerism, the inability of 
politics to perform its proselytizing and gardening role is a structural impotency and 
deficiency of the whole social system impeding the traditional way of political 
represenation. And although Arkhondakis was usually conceived of as an Old Town 
child, bom and raised in the area and thus the most suitable candidate for the job, 
today the residents hold him responsible for neglecting and compromising 
foundational promises he made at the beginning of his leadership some 40 years ago. 
This is neither a personal rejection of the mayor nor is it about a general suspicion of 
the effectiveness, honesty and meaning of politics, though politicians have been 
always considered as unreliable and characteristically untrustworthy persons in 
Greece. Such a political impasse is not about passivity or indifference either, or a 
blase attitude on behalf of the residents who do not understand how politics and
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economy are recently transformed. It marks instead a different kind of politics beyond 
the anomie of the modem anti-interventionist period whence the Archaeology Service 
took over and its strict prohibitions regarding the reconstmction of the Venetian 
properties were triggered off holding sway.
En route from the anti-interventionist and anomic apparatuses of the 1970s to the 
more intense interventionist call for state protection of the 1990s, the politics of the 
Old Town slide, imperceptibly, toward the intensification and massification of a 
generalized procrastination when it comes to decisions that obscure the function of the 
market, which can be taken as a symptom of the metamorphosis and transition from a 
banal modem clash between monumental and social history to a fatal contestation 
between the repressed and the seduced. Through the Venetian overhistorization of the 
town, with the many streets named after Venetian leaders, with festivals like the 
Fortezza-Renaissance festival taking place every summer, with the souvenirs, pictures 
and maps of the Old Town that promote a thoughtless and banal picture of the city, 
what is repeatedly affirmed time and again in Rethemnos is a Venetian overexposure, 
which merges and immeasurably coincides with the glorious past and western 
heritage, on which Rethemnos’ history has supposedly, but not accidentally, come to 
converge. The call for increasing state intervention, therefore, marks a shift in the 
attitudes of the residents in response to this image of the town which has been 
gradually promoted and nourished by the state over the last 40 years and which is now 
spawned and further exacerbated by consumerism.
The political imaginary of the 1960s strongly believed that in the course of a painful 
but solid, and durable reform, the restoration project would deliver a better-deal not 
only for the identity and overall image of the town but also for its residents. As things 
currently stand, however, such an understanding is beyond imagination as the anomie 
of the first years of the restoration project has, however imperceptibly, turned into a 
call for immediate state intervention as a result of the monumentalization which 
presided over the town. The crisis of representation and overexposure of the Venetian 
geohistory went hand in hand with the residents’ disappointment and suspicion of the 
mayor’s policies, but it was only when the almost absolutely proximity of the 
Venetian representation was found to be inseparable from the history of the Old 
Town, to the extent that there is nothing around but monuments, that the fierce
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opposition and anti-interventionist rhetoric broke down and collapsed. For even 
properties and buildings that have nothing to do with the Venetian past have been 
named or reconstructed in a fashion that remarkably, though in a certain banal 
manner, resembles now some famous Venetian architectural designs.
Be that as it may, on the back of the passage from OTHOA to AROOT and the far- 
reaching implications of such a trajectory in terms of the way in which the residents 
understand, experience and think of the restoration project, new conflicts emerge, not 
only between the residents and the state but also within the agencies actively involved 
in the urban affairs of the town. Let me further illustrate the point with another 
episode from the field.
In 2003, Kostas Hliakis became the new president of AROOT. He received 70% of 
the votes, while three years later in the local elections of 2006 he was elected deputy 
mayor in Rethemnos alongside the mayor Marinakis. Marinakis and Hliakis were both 
affiliated to PASOK, the socialist party that run the country from 1981 to 2004, with a 
small break in the period 1990-1993 when New Democracy, the neoconservative 
party, was in the government. Hliakis, nevertheless, in the wake of his electoral 
victory was asked to leave AROOT as its members insisted that the deputy mayor 
should not be at the same time president of AROOT. In November 2006 AROOT met 
in order to discuss the double role of Kostas Hliakis, with the then vice president of 
AROOT maintaining that Hliakis should give up one of his position. Tf you quit, we 
would have 20 members in the council and not just one’ he told the summit, meaning 
that if Hliakis and the rest 19 members of AROOT did not hold any official position 
in the council, AROOT would be far more effective in promoting the interests of the 
Old Town. If Hliakis was to hold both offices, on the other hand, he would not be able 
to fight for AROOT’s interests, for it was firmly entrenched in the minds of 
AROOT’s members that the local council would never stop promoting a further round 
of commodification.
The clash, sketched above, is not only meant to show that there is gap between some 
bureaucrats of formal history (the city council) and a local understanding of history 
strictly oriented to territorial understandings of history (AROOT), but shows, above 
all, that similar disputes also exist within the supposedly homogeneous and unified
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perception through which the restoration is usually conceived of by AROOT’s 
members.
The revival of the Houses’ Owners’ Association exemplifies, precisely, how the 
original reactionary defense of the social history of Rethemnos against the restoration 
project is gradually given over to the fast-growing forces of the market that triggered 
in turn an unexpected defense of monumental history. While it is true that in the anti­
interventionist period, the former OTHOA had the full support of the local 
administration, it now becomes apparent that it was only after AROOT emerged or at 
about the same time, that the residents started accusing the mayor for recklessly 
promoting tourism and for ignoring the needs and problems of the town. But even if 
AROOT requires now a more effective cognitive charting of the town, this time there 
is a crucial difference, in that the state is unable to protect those who virtually depend 
on its repressive mechanisms in order to support their lot. The general disaffection 
and discontent of the residents toward the state and the local polity and the 
heterogeneities, contradictions, disputes and struggles between the various agencies 
and social actors of Rethemnos, make clear, therefore, that a dualistic way of thinking 
and perceiving of the Old Town problem is ineffective and non-productive, especially 
since even within AROOT there are as many conflicts as there exist between the local 
council and AROOT. The local state sees the Old Town’s prospect and future as 
inseparable from the aesthetic spacing, that is, the rapid and unstoppable 
commodification of the town, enhancing, in other words, even if it is through the 
negligence and absence of policies, the growth, proliferation and multiplication of the 
irresistible forces of the market, which is, financially, exploiting the social spaces of 
the historical centre by outnumbering the residential uses. AROOT by contrast, 
stresses now the need for a more intensive reinscription of monumentalization as the 
roles of the state and the market have considerably changed. Once, it was the state 
that adamantly advanced the monumentalization of the town; now it is the residents 
who further support and would fight for its further survival. If the Old Town problem 
is to be taken seriously, therefore, in terms of the way in which the residents 
experience and evaluate the actions and policies of local agencies and how they 
perform and operate within the urban context of the town, a careful reconstruction of 
certain understandings of identity and space should be founded and grounded in the 
successful coordination of cognitive and aesthetic spacings. That the residents
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conceive of politics with skepticism is partly a result of this failure to break and 
disarticulate the immanent link and unholy bond between these two kinds of spacing 
that co-exist, inter-connect and depend on each other. The crucial difference being 
now, however, that what once constituted the rigidity, negation and fixity against 
which the original anti-interventionist period was turned and focused on, is now 
replaced by the overexposure of the Venetian history and the hyperteleia (beyond any 
possible telos or scope) of consumerism.
Table 7 shows how the restorations are geographically dispersed before and after 
1994 when AROOT called forth the need to view and reevaluate restoration in a 
fundamentally and radically different manner, that is, from the time it was understood 
that the state having cynically, monumentalized the town will now eagerly stir it or let 
it go with the flow and stream of consumerism. But although the restorations in both 
the residential areas of the Old Town and the historical centre are significantly fewer, 
it is only within the residential zone that the restorations have most dramatically 
dropped by almost 50%, from 77% to 22%.
Table 7: Restorations before and after 1994
year
area until 1994 after 1994
Historical Centre
Rest of the Old 
Town
Total
45
67,2%
84
77,8%
129
73,7%
22
32,8%
24
22,2%
46
26,3%
An essential part of this new aesthetical scenery of consumption that unexpectedly 
surge through the Old Town are the bars, discos, clubs and restaurants that appear in 
almost every comer of the town. They are only the epiphenomena of a continuously 
growing and ensuing consumer society which evolves and grows in an unprecedented 
manner, despite the fact that many of them operate in the historic centre illegally. 
Unsurprisingly, the local administrators have characteristically ignored the complaints 
of the residents, who after all, are less significant in their roles as consumers than the 
tourists. As a consequence, AROOT threatened to take to court many of the club- 
owners who did not have permission for their business, but still interestingly all
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appeals made against the club-owners focused on the excessive and hyperbolic 
behaviour of tourists (in terms of alcohol consumption, noise etc.), rather than the 
illegal operation of clubs -  even the local media, for example, often show images of 
drunken tourists in Hersonisos and Mallia asking the viewers to ‘imagine what they 
do in their countries’, disregarding the fact that the tourists are only the tip of the 
iceberg and that were not for the clubs, little would be left to attract tourists in the first 
place. Yet the poor residents do not have a chance of winning any of the verdicts of 
the cases, especially since the owners have the best legal advice and since the local 
council is not in conflict with the club-owners, who are occasionally forced to pay a 
fee in order to keep ‘business as usual’; and thus it is anticipated that it is in the 
interest of the administrators to maintain the illegal status of such places. No small 
wonder then, that being poor in the period when OTHOA was in charge is totally 
different to being poor in a place in which cognitive and aesthetic spacings overlap 
and merge. As Bauman has aptly put it “If ‘being poor’ once derived its meaning from 
the condition of being unemployed, today it draws its meaning primarily from the 
plight of a flawed consumer” (Bauman, 2005: 1). The flawed consumers and poor 
residents of Rethemnos have few options on offer, however, not only because, as was 
already shown, it is now almost unaffordable to repair a house and this is why most 
restorations in the residential zone have actually stopped since 1994, but mostly 
because in such a “wanting society” such people are simply “unneeded, unwanted, 
forsaken -  where is their place? The briefest of answers is: out of sight” (Bauman, 
2005: 116). And thus as these people are withdrawn “from the orders of the visible 
and the articulable” (Doel and Clarke, 1997: 15), and “have to be disciplined by the 
combined action of repression, policing, authority and normative regulation” 
(Bauman, 2005: 181), the restoration has not only turned the Old Town into an 
aesthetic play of values but engineered a punitive mechanism that watches over the 
poor.
The incapacity of the state to offer any substantive solution in terms of the Old Town 
problem, is not only about the residents’ attempt to fight bureaucracy in any poetic 
manner whatsoever, but, crucially, is a symptom of the transition from OTHOA to 
AROOT, from anti-interventionism to interventionism, from oppression to seduction, 
from the figure of the political to a state of affairs defiant of anomie, and eventually 
from modernity to postmodemity. The following incident may further illustrate the
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point. Just four months before the 2006 local elections, the 60/2001 Regulation Act, 
which prohibited the opening of new bars in the Old Town, was surprisingly 
withdrawn in what marked another twist that would baffle and further infuriate an 
already anxious and dissatisfied population. The decision was made in favour of all 
those who owned bars in the area but also encouraged, the opening of more bars and 
clubs. Theoretically, the 60/2001 Act permitted the operation of cafeterias and 
coffees-shops, although, most of them were kept open until very late at night 
operating, in fact, as clubs. The act was withdrawn, however, when a majority of the 
council’s members voted against it, something that was clearly ‘un-constitutional’ 
(<antisyntagmatiko), given that a consensus of all members of the council was required 
in order for the act not to hold. Given that some members of the council strongly 
disagreed, the issue had to be discussed at a future meeting, yet until then, the act 
would not hold. As I have already suggested this is not about the bankruptcy of 
politics, the informality, precariousness and peculiarity of a place and the poetic 
reasoning and reassuring of a solid identity or even an informal, spontaneous reaction 
and opposition to the nationalist anthology systematically promoted by the Greek 
state -  as the Mediterraneanist literature has harboured so far, with Herzfeld being 
among others, one of the most cogent representatives of such a line of thought. Rather 
it has to do with the prohibition and anomie of the anti-interventionist period, which is 
now imperceptibly swept up by, and turned into a Kafkaesque world of suspension, 
indecision and infinite procrastination in which the residents’ call for increasing state 
intervention becomes the best way to rise to the challenge of aesthetization.
To slacken the hold of Mediterraneanism is the crucial undertaking I have been 
engaged in thus far. Bearing this in mind, I argued that the vicissitudes of AROOT’s 
changing perception of the restoration project which embodied the territorial dreams 
of the Greek nation-state imposing on Rethemnos a strict version of Venetian history 
as the only tale that matters in town, materialize in a conflictual context within which 
the identity of the city is currently situated and negotiated. But if there is a lesson to 
learn from the controversies and innocuous relationships that arise out of the 
contested and purposefully designed building legislation, it should be about the 
increasingly important role consumerism has come to play in the city, whose far 
reaching and effective implications and consequences with respect to space and 
history, not only weakened the residents’ suspicious of the restoration project, but
206
turned them into ardent supporters of the monumentalization project. Such is the 
general disaffection of a fully-fledged consumer society through which the residents 
conceive of their town’s identity, and which, serves as a marker of the tentative and 
contestable reception of a state-derived history. That the residents should fall for the 
state does not mean, necessarily, that they think of it as less oppressive, but crucially, 
that the current aesthetic spacing is now breeding an aesthetic image of the city on the 
side of which there is no room left for them.
And thus AROOT appealed on 23-2-2005 to the Department of Hygiene of the 
Prefecture to shut down a tavern in the Street of Vemardou, which despite being 
called ‘Old Town’, and located directly opposite the Popular Art Museum of 
Rethemnos, insisted on using the backyard of the property for cooking until the early 
hours of the morning, polluting the atmosphere, and forcing the residents to keep their 
windows shut. The case was not solved and the owners, who appealed against the 
decision, will probably, have to pay a fee, but the tavern will still be operating.
In all the twists and turns of the above episodes, some critics have mistaken the 
residents’ discontent in alliance with a poetic or heroic resistance which refuses to 
adjust to a highly changing and dynamically metamorphosed social territory (cf. 
Herzfeld, 1982, 1985, 1987). In all the above episodes, I see, however, the various 
consequences of a full-blown consumer once cognitive spacing was put into practice. 
The rhetoric of AROOT does not simply defend the monumental character of the 
town, but is an expression of the sociospatial segregation and separation intensified by 
the internal contradictions of the consumer society. The effective power of 
monumentalization, which was progressively followed by the manifested 
predominance of aesthetic spacing, the dissymmetry and dissimulation of the 
incontestable marketization process and the rapid and irreversible commodification of 
the Venetian properties, forced the poor residents to abandon any hope of restoring 
their houses. After failing to surrender to the aesthetic metamorphosis of the town, the 
residents wish now to preserve the Old Town’s monuments, its cultural heritage and 
architecture, but chiefly as a survival or reminiscent of a collective memory that was 
unsuccessfully and a for short period put forward when the state was advancing 
restoration. It is at this juncture that the contradictions and inherent unevenness of the 
consumer society become apparent, as the massification and overexposure of tourism,
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as AROOT insists, has destroyed not only the Venetian geohistory o f the town but 
most importantly the lifeworld o f the residents, forgetting however, that the present 
aesthetization has only come to complete or supplement what the original cognitive 
spacing and monumentalization launched some 40 years ago. It comes as no surprise, 
therefore, that AROOT has asked for the completion o f one o f the greatest Ottoman 
monuments in the Old Town, the Gazi Huseyin Mosque, which has been under 
reconstruction for the last ten years, but which in the years o f OTHOA’s dominion 
was adamantly considered to be a ‘Turkish' remnant. Indeed, in the 1960s when “a 
representative o f the military government visited Rethemnos [he] suggested that the 
unusually tall minaret o f  the celebrated mosque o f the gazi (warrior o f the faith) 
Huseyin Pasa should be tom down” (Herzfeld, 1991: 199).
Figure 8: T he Lozza building top left and the Rimondi w ater  provider  (D im ak op ou los ,  1977: 
355).
Figure 9: The Lozza building (on the right) (picture taken by the author).
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Figure 10: The R im ondi Krini as it currently stands (p icture taken by the author) .
The events drawn upon above frustrate and upset the established political agreement 
between the residents and the local polity and as was already seen the question is no 
longer about an effective or sensitive policy but should concern, above all, the general 
use of space o f the Old Town. The residents’ suspicion o f the current political 
situation in the Old Town is, accordingly, an essential part o f the displacement which 
marks a transition from the banal modernist aspiration and the official interpretations 
o f a modem conception o f history to the overexposure, overgrowth and proliferation 
o f a commercialized Venetian present that saturates every corner o f the geography o f 
the town. What is masked in the above transition is not only some locally embedded 
spirit o f resistance pertinent to the Mediterranean idiosyncratic way o f dealing with 
contemporary challenges, but mostly reflects the division and exacerbated 
polarization in a society whose two major social poles’ conflictual coexistence, that of 
the seduced and the repressed, continues to grow apace.
Little wonder then, that as was suggested in the introduction, what the resident have 
probably meant to say is that ‘There is nothing to see’. Sadly the poor residents have 
been left now with the fatality, apathy, and radical passivity o f a generalized and 
perplexing confusion in coming to terms with the contestable and negotiable character 
o f the Venetian monumentalization. For the Rethemniots not only have been subject
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to the cognitive spacing of the original monumentalization of the town, but are now 
vastly excluded from and feel the pressure of aesthetic spacing. It is to that extent that 
the division between the repressed and the seduced is central in making sense of the 
Old Town problem as the people, who complain, feel excluded, suffer and appear 
irrelevant to the current urban affairs, constitute the repressed. Inversely, the residents 
who are defiant of or manage to adjust and, perfectly, connect to the 
cognitive/aesthetic imperatives, understand, appreciate and enjoy the aesthetic spaces 
of the Old Town, taking, for example, pictures of the magnificent monuments, 
constitute the seduced. For the consumer society is, above all, a mode of domination 
“in a similar profound and fundamental sense in which the society of our predecessors 
[...] used to deserve the name of a ‘producer society’ in spite of the fact that people 
have produced since the beginning of the human species and will go on producing 
until the species demise” (Bauman, 2005: 24). In such a consumer society the current 
marked contrast thus is “between a residualized minority reliant on a dwindling public 
mode of provision [...] and a majority who are increasingly integrated by their 
common experience of private consumption (whatever their class position) (Clarke 
and Bradford, 1998: 871). The division between the repressed and the seduced 
however neither corresponds strictly with the cognitive/aesthetic spacings nor is it in 
any sense, an equivalent of the number of the houses restored. It is nevertheless a 
theoretical construction, which with the benefit of hindsight, can be seen as a way that 
begins to outline the conditions pertinent to the postmodern state of space. Both the 
cognitive and aesthetic spacings, invent, complicate and propose another way of 
seeing and another way of proceeding with urban problems and their structuration, 
putting consumption at the centre of the social concern and problematization when it 
comes to the social stratification of the Mediterranean city. While the repressed are 
excluded, prevented, punished or even disciplined on the basis of their illegal 
reconstructions and their poor understanding of the historical importance of the Old 
Town, the seduced, by contrast, are only too eager to go with the seductive consumer 
flows and streams that pioneered a significantly different way in order to stroll in the 
postmodern city. That the quarrels and struggles of the Rethemniots and the disputes 
over space have been associated not only with the cognitive spacing but with the 
aesthetic spaces, illustrates precisely the shifting balance between repression and 
seduction on the grounds of which contemporary posturban formations depend. The 
transition from OTHOA to AROOT thus is an equivalent of what takes place
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“between modes of domination, not between kinds of society” (Clarke, 2003: 108). 
The division between the seduced and the repressed is one of the possible ways to 
make sense of and theorize the unevenness generated by the restoration project with 
respect to the buildings that were reconstructed and the properties that were 
abandoned or left unconverted. Even if the intention of the original restoration project 
was to allow the residents to take part in and become fully-paid members of the 
consumer society, the inherently uneven character of its implementation did not 
prevent the production of a newly formed landscape of characteristic unevenness 
between a highly tourist and consumption zone and those parts of the Old Town that 
failed to take advantage of the restoration potentials and prospects.
The monumentalization of the Old Town, accordingly, has produced as many 
problems as it allegedly set out to resolve. “Today” wrote Herzfeld (1991: 224), 
almost 20 years ago, “the situation is reversed in one important sense. Now it is the 
poor, who want to alter, demolish and rebuild”. Yet, I think a strategic shift of a 
different kind was already on its way well before the clash mentioned above. The 
poor residents were an inevitable and integral part of the OTHOA society from the 
very beginning but at that time, rich and poor alike, opposed the restoration project 
and it was only when it became clear that it would benefit mostly the higher social 
ranks, through a further aesthetization of space and through the reconstruction of the 
Venetian properties that OTHOA began gradually becoming suspicious of the 
restoration. Such an uneven socio-spatial trajectory of the urban affairs of the Old 
Town explains AROOT’s recent radical inversion in terms of how the restoration is 
now perceived, seeking and preaching for a more consistent cognitive spacing, as a 
consequence of the building activity and spatial reorganization of the last 40 years, 
which enhanced dogmatically the tourist and commercial uses and the restoration 
mostly of buildings that were later to be turned into shops, bars and clubs. What the 
shifting attitude of the Old Town’s residents toward the state illustrates is the 
noticeable transition and displacement in society from a cognitive/repressive mode of 
exclusion to an aesthetic/seductive mode of attraction associated with the current 
diversification and stratification of a society which falls under the jurisdiction 
advanced by consumer capitalism.
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It was Herzfeld (1991: 191), once again who had observed that “The inhabitants 
complain that the Old Town no longer exists for them. It has been appropriated by 
forces they neither control nor particularly admire -  government, foreign tourism, a 
few wealthy entrepreneurs from out of town”. But that was not simply because the 
poetic and social history of the Old Town had nothing to do with the Venetian 
homogenization prompted by the state, but rather because the spatial appropriation of 
the irreversible forces of the market had been neither desirable, nor easy to control nor 
to understand, due to their uneven, and in a very structural and strategic manner, 
unjust way of harnessing urbanism.
New lines of power (Olsson, 1991), therefore, are drawn in terms of the built 
environment, and between those who accept or can afford the effective 
cognitive/aesthetic spacing and those who simply fail to take into account and obey 
the rules and prescriptions of consumerism. It is true, nevertheless, that nowadays the 
residents have hardly a say in what is going on in the town and can scarcely intervene 
in the ongoing process of tourist consumption. The latter however was something 
totally ignored during the anti-interventionist period, when the different class-based 
interests and relations of the members of OTHOA were completely disregarded, being 
thought of as some tenuous and inevitable disputes of a community-bond that in 
essence meant to remain enduring and untouchable for the years to come, irrespective 
of the selective affinity and highly uneven effects of the cognitive/aesthetic spacing, 
which in the wake of the restoration project, distributed disproportionately losses and 
gains.
The frequently asked question these days, ‘Where is the Archaeology Service?’ (Pou 
einai i Archaiologia;) points, exactly in this radically new direction and shift in the 
inhabitants’ views and their conceptions of the restoration project. The odds are 
definitely against the residents who by demanding now increasing state intervention, 
fail dramatically to see that the state is no longer willing or able to offer any help 
whatsoever. Herzfeld (1991: 201) for his part had rightly foreseen that “now there is 
even talk of reviving OTHOA in a radically reversed form, under the leadership of a 
faction that repudiates the founders’ virulent enmity toward the historic conservation 
office and includes in its ranks at least one major former critic of the original 
OTHOA”. The problem is, however, that the conflict was not merely about a
2 1 2
contested interpretation of history between abstract agencies and moral individuals 
that fail to surrender or succumb to the nationalist ideology, even if it is now the poor 
who want to reconstruct, demolish and rebuild. The poor dwellers supported 
OTHOA’s anti-interventionist policy from the very beginning, and did not simply 
want to prevent the reconstruction of the Venetian houses, but hoped mainly to 
oppose the specific cognitive spacing/aesthetic spacing, which was far beyond their 
scope, means and ability to understand. It was only when the cognitive spacing of the 
monumentalization processes coincided with the on-going and effectively ensuing 
aesthetic spacing that the poor residents had to turn invariably to state protection. 
Being the underdogs of a process that becomes increasingly irrelevant to their own 
social being, finding themselves eventually expelled and excluded from the game of 
tourism and consumption, the Old Town’s poor residents, as cynical as this may 
sound, now demand repression.
8.4 One Town, Two Worlds
The changing attitude of the residents and their suspicion of bureaucratic agencies, as 
it should be clear by now, casts a long shadow on the restoration project when the 
latter is seen through the lens of an antagonistic or opinionated local history. I take it 
to reflect a broader shift and trajectory in society, which widens the gap between 
those who rely on the state’s safety net and those who participate fully and whole­
heartedly in a full-blown consumer society. The restoration project and tenancy 
condition of the Old Town enforced the poor residents to turn to state control when 
the market took over from where the oppressive-based mechanisms of official 
discourses and the cognitive, territorial and nationalized trap of the Greek state left 
off. The poor residents who opposed and fought restoration and were unable to restore 
their houses, however schematic and improvised this may sound, occupy in the 
aesthetic social space of the Old Town a territory (not only material/physical but also 
cognitive/mental with respect to how they perceive of the restoration) that calls for 
increasing state protection. The essential and strategic difference, therefore, between 
the two periods marked by the changing reception of the restoration project, can be 
considered fundamentally as a symptom of the dedifferentiation and blurring between 
state derived policies of charting the city and private/consumer means of classification 
and stratification. Whilst in the anti-interventionist period the poor residents still had a
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role, the latter has been irretrievably lost once the market turned the residents into 
some redundant, useless and undeserving social beings. The state having 
monumentalized the Old Town through cognitive spacing, appears to be now willing 
to surrender the town to the seductive power and practices of aesthetic spacing, even 
if repression is always ready to deploy its totalitarian and oppressive mechanisms for 
all those who do not fit in the market-based enclaves, for it is only, “the seduced of 
society [who] need not fear the stick of repression, insofar as they willingly accept the 
carrot of seduction” (Clarke and Bradford, 1998: 876).
The opposition of the Old Town’s residents to the mayor’s policies is an example, as 
was shown, of the changing significance of the roles of the state and the market. The 
experience of space and place in the wake of consumerism can help us, therefore, to 
reconsider and reconstruct our understanding of the proselytizing modem conception 
of the Old Town as a scheduled monument and traditional settlement, starting now to 
conceive of it as a consequence of cognitive spacing which was surreptitiously given 
over to the market. The unforeseeable turnaround of AROOT in 1994 and the 
increasing demand for state intervention, which took its full force only once the town 
had been fully and irreversibly flared up in the tourist market as a remarkable example 
of Venetian architecture, has come to complete the original cognitive spacing that 
charted the town in terms of its historical and monumental significance. The glaring 
marketization of the Old Town’s geohistory allowed, moreover, only a privileged 
minority to benefit from the project and even if most of the commercial streets that 
are currently occupied by the beautifully restored and converted houses were 
commercial in the past as well, the newly formed situation sees in the transformation 
of almost everything in the town an unexpected and unprecedented intensity that has 
hardly anything to do with the old Venetian Rethemnos. Understanding such an 
intense socio-spatial polarization between the highly coveted commercial and tourist 
spaces and a largely decaying and degrading housing zone, in line with the devices 
and Mobius bands of consumerism is useful I think, in that it allows to make sense of 
the tension between the two collided worlds, that of the repressed and that of the 
seduced. For as Bauman, wittingly sums it up, these two worlds sit, “at opposite 
poles, which are increasingly out of touch with each other -  much as the no-go areas 
of contemporary cities are carefully fenced off and bypassed by the traffic lines used
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for the mobility of the well-off residents” (Bauman, 1997: 25, cited in Clarke and 
Bradford, 1998: 876).
To that extent, the unprecedented commodification of the Old Town should be seen 
not only as the result of the conflictual histories of a place currently swept up by the 
commercial and globalized flows of capital, and some altered identities of non-poetic 
meanings that are viciously threatened by the nation-state ideology, but must be 
related to the interconnected processes of aesthetic and cognitive spacings en route 
from a period of anomie and illegal restorations to one of a full-blown consumer 
society that falls under the jurisdiction of a Venetian aesthetic. That not all residents 
were able to benefit from the restoration project is not probably a surprise. But that 
the brave new world of consumerism should be extremely uneven, polarized and 
unjust is a matter that deserves closer and acute scrutiny. AROOT’s recent 
interventionist turn illustrates exactly such a displacement in society and space 
advanced by consumerism. Having witnessed the emancipation of capital from labour, 
and the fact that capitalism necessitates the socialization of the masses, chiefly, as 
consumers rather than producers, the ability to intervene freely and restore a house is 
vital in sketching out the unevenly formed and socially polarized posturban landscape 
of Rethemnos. The original restoration of the Venetian properties that was partly 
funded by the state constituted a safety net for the poor but only to the extent that they 
were willing to carry on the required restoration works prescribed and engineered by 
the fierce and compulsory proselytizing cognitive charting and gardening of the city 
that the state administered. The marked contrast, therefore, between those who finally 
managed to rebuild their properties and the rest of the residents, who found 
themselves unable to make something of the museumization of the Old Town, 
intensifies not only the dichotomy between users and residents of the town, with the 
balance shifting from the latter to the former, but, above all, explicates how the 
socially excluded poor residents can be easily characterized as the ‘undeserving poor’, 
which is a highly moral accusation against all those who allegedly fail to respect, 
appreciate and understand the historical importance of Rethemnos, destroying its 
architectural heritance with their uncaring constructions. The restoration program 
intended, indeed, to protect the monumental character of the town, and yet it only 
managed to block every single intervention from the side of the poor as the highly 
demanding rebuilding prerequisites required not only the Archaeology Service’s
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permission but different and more expensive materials than those normally used in 
properties that were not considered to be of architectural significance.
As I bring this peregrination to an end, attention should be also drawn to the fact that 
en route from the sociogenesis of consumerism, the splaying out of place and the 
cognitive/aesthetic/moral spacings to the ethnography of the event, the episodes 
sketched out above are only meant to offer an empirical and practical, so to speak, 
way of dealing with the Mediterranean city, which is currently in the middle of a new 
type of transition associated with the meaning of the postmodern. What is still 
required to take things further after grappling above and groping around with the 
irresistible forces and pressures of the consumer society is to locate in the middle of 
such a turmoil of exquisite alienation whether or not there is a truly generic and 
undecidable subject which will be forced to emerge alongside the transpearing events 
that are yet to come and which pertain to a truth procedure beyond the sedentary 
poetic of honourable subjects. Such an ambition however necessitates turning to the 
choreoethnographies of the event, and the affirmative, responsible, non-servile 
servility and undecidable subject that outwits shame, honour, poetics, womanhood 
and coffee-shop commensality. I have already attempted in Chapters 3 and 4 to 
deconstruct and set in motion such a Mediterraneanist identification by taking up on 
differential repetitions, becoming-woman, and counterfeit transactions. It remains, 
therefore, to affirm the generic multiplicity of the Mediterranean identity, which by 
being faithfully connected to the differential calculus of some undecidable events, 
creates a hole in the restoration and monumentalization knowledge by way of what 
Badiou’s subtractive ontology calls subject. It is to this task that I, finally, turn, in 
order to attempt to draw a fuller picture of the subject which despite being submitted 
to the effective spacing of the cognitive/aesthetic confines, may still have a chance of 
happening.
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CHAPTER NINE: THE CONTESTED IDENTIFICATION
9.1 Introduction
The point, therefore, is not to explain Rethemnos but to follow its actors, events and 
undecidable features that might affect or not, the Old Town problem. My intention 
was not, in other words, to prove that Rethemnos had been a historical type of 
problem that desperately needed or required that kind of explanation but that 
Rethemnos is not what you think. I got interested in Rethemnos, however, out of a 
purely theoretical interest; that is, from having read Michael Herzfeld’s (1991) 
influential book, A Place in History. As an undergraduate student in the Department 
of Geography at the University of the Aegean in Mytilini, I had, moreover, had the 
chance to attend some of the seminars of the department of Anthropology, of which a 
great part, in a rather celebratory and enthusiastic manner, had been entirely devoted 
to Herzfeld’s theory, which at the time had been extremely well received by Greek 
scholars. It still felt, however, that many parts of such a theory required considerable 
revision and reconsideration. First, because even when reading such a systematic 
attempt as Herzfeld’s, seeking to undo the unequal power relations between the one 
who represents and the one who is represented, one still had the feeling (or at least I 
did) that there is something missing in his dense ethnographic accounts, and that the 
Greek identity was still represented as something relying on notions of lack, loss, and 
misery and in need of constant ‘compassion’, ‘protection’ and ‘care’. And second, 
because, after having read Said’s (1978) ground-breaking Orientalism, a cultural as 
much as a deeply geographical work, I understood that geography and space were, to 
say the least, poorly represented in Herzfeld’s various ethnographic experiments.
Yet, as Peckham (1999: 167) has queried with respect to such an antagonistic space of 
representation of travel writing, “Was Greece European, Oriental or Balkan?” This 
was a constant problem I had come across while I was undertaking fieldwork in 
Rethemnos, not only because, for my part, I wanted to decode or specifically explicate 
how the flows of such interpenetrating identities had been mutually co-dependent, but 
also because, among the Rethemniots, there seemed to be little agreement on issues of 
recognizing preeminent differences on the basis of the social context within which 
they have come to grow. Greece, therefore, it seemed to me, had come to play a 
fundamentally key role in determining and further unpacking how the relationship
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between East and West articulates, shaping the residents’ attitudes toward the Greek 
state; and Rethemnos, moreover, within the context of Greece could bring into 
particularly sharp focus similar issues. Such was my place within the context of 
Rethemnos.
As Sandra Harding put it, in a rather programmatic form, there should be a distinction 
between ‘perspective’ and ‘standpoint’, with the latter being something more of a task 
or a right one had to earn, achieve or accomplish (2004: 604), rather than a point of 
view that could be unproblematically assigned to a certain solid and crystal identity. It 
is in a similar manner that my own understanding of what is ‘Greek’, 
‘Cretan/Rethemniot’ and ‘Mediterranean’ would finally come to materialize. And 
Said (1978) too in his various responses to all those who criticized his work for 
misconstruing, essentializing or even totalizing the ‘Orient’ -  interestingly there have 
been some critics who have accused him of doing the exact opposite -  replied that the 
‘Orient’ and the ‘Occident’ are not meant as empirical categories that correspond to 
certain, palpable, real or physical borders/boundaries, but involve mostly 
‘abstractions’, having considerable material implications nevertheless, that merge 
with the imaginative geographies of inventing, producing and learning the ‘Orient’. It 
is in a similar vein that the permutations between the ‘Greek’, the ‘Rethemniot’ and 
the ‘Mediterranean’ are played out below.
For Kant, however, in his Critique o f Pure Reason truth is defined as the alliance 
between knowledge and its object. For Badiou, on the other hand, truth is the work of 
a subject which is faithfully connected to an event in a manner which breaks with the 
established order of things and the knowledge of a fully deployed situation. Chapters 
3 and 4 endeavoured to show that Mediterraneanist identifications of shame, honour, 
friends of the heart and poetics, rely on dialectical schemata, rational epistemologies 
and digestive philosophies without changing one iota in the mind that contemplates 
them. This is why I pursued a differential conception of repetition, the counterfeit and 
becoming-woman paving the way for a differential theory of the subject that 
deconstructs and sets in motion the romantic and nostalgic Mediterraneanist 
subjectivities. Such a discussion, however, is not complete unless a fuller theorization 
of what matters to subjects is further taken up, for simply by arguing that differences 
matter, does not avoid a simplistic relativism (different ideas mean different things to
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different people), whereas differences should be true or should not be differences at 
all. On the face of such an intuition, Badiou’s theorization is particularly useful in that 
it allows grasping what a subject amounts to and whether or not it deserves such a 
name without categorizing, discerning or associating it with unity, identity or 
substance.
In previous chapters I have also set out to map the subject in accord with the blocks of 
becoming, the haecceities and the singularities by way of Deleuze’s and Guattari’s 
schizophrenic machines, rather than by drawing on Mediterraneanist representations 
and meanings. Blocks of becomings however, are not merely discursive practices but 
constitute multifarious projections of one’s ability to draw lines of flight of 
affirmative transfiguration, beyond the illusory stability of identity. The subject, as 
was shown, in schizoanalysis is affirmative and differential “implying other forms of 
expression than those of myth” (Deleuze and Guattari, 1987: 237). Building on this 
discussion I now want to propose that the deconstructive and affirmative ex­
appropriation of the almost absolute proximity of the event is useful in that it can help 
us to come to terms with a) the non-identity that holds beyond the notorious 
Mediterranean atomism/egoism -  which is an integral part of the discourses and 
values of shame-and-honour -  once an affirmative responsibility is taken seriously b) 
a subject which is, purely and simply, work in progress beyond the alleged ‘servility’ 
and dependency on tourism, and that the distinction between the innocent period (of 
non-servility) and a post-poetic period (of servility) amounts to an interruption- 
without-interruption; and c) that truth, which is what the Rethemniot subject follows, 
is ambivalent, indiscernible and undecidable once however difference is written on 
hollow ground, that is once “we understand it otherwise” (Lyotard, 1993: 51), without 
picking or clinging on the certainties, identifications and strictures of shame, honour 
and poetics.
I could still pursue the mapping of the subject in line with Deleuze’s becoming, or 
Derrida’s affirmative deconstruction. I prefer hereinafter to open up identity to 
Badiou’s subtractive ontology. While deconstruction, schizoanalysis, and the BwO 
affirm difference, there is still a need to determine, but without naming, point, but 
without categorizing, and identify, but without establishing an identity, the difference 
that matters to subjects and what makes space for a truth procedure on the side of
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which the subject may be found to rest. What matters is not some naive perception of 
difference (as was shown by way of many Mediterraneanist occasions in previous 
chapters) but rather a truth which is a procedure that opens up a hole in the knowledge 
of a fully deployed historical situation. Truth, on the other hand, is possible due to an 
intervention which remains faithfully connected to a generic multiple and the post- 
evental occurrences of some unanticipated events. In order to make sense of the 
subject thus one needs to map the traces that such a truth procedure leaves behind. Put 
differently, an event occurs, when is named by an intervention and once the subject 
declares its fidelity to it. Events, according to Badiou, occur in historical situations 
(love, art, science and politics) and the role of philosophy is to make sense of such 
conditions, despite the fact that philosophy itself does not chime up, necessarily, with 
or generates truth procedures.
What the ethnography of the event allows, in other words, is to open up new ways in 
getting to grips with truth procedures that unfold Rethemnos’ identity without 
wounding or maiming the undecidability, indiscemibility and ambivalence of its 
manifold and differential calculi of experiences. And yet while Deleuze argues that 
Badiou’s thought is analogical in that it discovers the meaning and means of 
philosophy outside philosophy -  in the historical situations mentioned above -  Badiou 
counterclaims that set theory (the theory of being) is not mystical in that it does not 
take being as presence, which has to be constantly postponed -  a point which also 
applies to Derrida’s deconstruction of metaphysics. Deleuze’s and Derrida’s works 
are useful in that they deconstruct but without destroying an already existent body of 
work -  a movement which I have already demonstrated, explained and executed in 
relation to shame, honour, poetics and friendship -  by inhabiting a certain structure 
from within, destabilizing -  not without care -  a holding formation on the move, by 
setting in motion and loosening what appears to be solid, durable and stable, and by 
rendering apparent what the structure conceals or attempts to hide. It could be argued, 
accordingly, that Badiou takes up exactly from where Deleuze’s and Derrida’s 
becomings and supplements withdraw and hold back, explicating the reinscription of 
a depersonalized and deindividuated difference on its way back from 
Mediterraneanism, in an attempt to de-consist the true difference that matters to the 
Rethemniot subject. The ethnography of the event offers, in short, a chance of 
grappling with truth procedures by unpacking how innumerable and unnameable
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events mark the inconsistent multiplicities that compose the Rethemniot identity. It is 
through the lens of such a driftwork, based on mathematical ontology and set theory 
that I set out to map the Rethemniot subject.
Hereinafter, events are neither simply discursive nor immaterial but follow the ethic 
of becoming-otherwise, sliding past each other as incomprehensible and strange 
occurrences whose potential remains to be actualized in manifold yet unknown and 
infinite manners. As was already shown in Chapter 2, Badiou’s mathematical 
ontology includes among other things, the axiom of foundation, the axiom of choice 
and the matheme of the indiscernible. It is on the basis of these formulas that I will 
pursue the Rethemniot multiplicity materializing another understanding of difference. 
But even if the present thesis is not about mathematics, it is still felt that since 
Badiou’s analysis rests heavily on mathematics in order to establish what is-not- 
being-qua-being, a considerable part of the present exposition should be devoted to 
the formal logic taken up by Badiou.
The aleatory Rethemniot subject-event will not be defined or decided, but will still 
have a chance of happening by way of the axioms of set theory in-consisting in what a 
pure multiple is. Set theory can help us to think of being by hinting at the event 
without, however, naming it for every time the event is explicitly defined, its 
difference falls under the jurisdiction of the One and the One is not according to 
Badiou; for the task of subtractive ontology is to subtract from all possible forms of 
Oneness. What is, therefore, is always a multiple of multiples, a set of sets, 
presentation of presentation, in short, pure inconsistent multiplicity. This is why 
axiomatization is required such as to affirm “the multiple left to the implicitness of its 
counting rule, be delivered without concept, that is, without implying the being-of- 
the-one” (Badiou, 2005: 43).
Badiou’s theory should be, carefully, therefore, unfolded below in accord especially 
to the ontological language of the axiom of foundation, the axiom of choice, and the 
matheme of the indiscernible, which are not the only formulas on which Badiou 
draws, but constitute, as will be explained below, the cornerstone of his entire 
ontology. Such a theorization, I shall try to demonstrate, resonates, moreover, with the 
philosophical language of affirmative responsibility, the non-servile servility and the
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ambivalent/undecidable multiplicity to whose stimulating effects I will submit the 
Rethemniot subject. I am not saying that Derrida’s and Deleuze’s work should be, 
necessarily, reconciled with Badiou’s set theory, but what I am proposing to 
encounter is whether or not there is something useful in the deconstruction of 
Mediterraneanism, which can be further disseminated by the de-coupling of being and 
event, once however the mathematical threads of Badiou’s performances are pulled 
together by way of the thrust of a generic and undecidable truth.
And thus Badiou’s subtractive ontology opens up the Rethemniot subject to 
affirmation/responsibility (the ultra-one), non-servile-servility (the intervention), and 
the indiscernible (the undecidable). I offer a separate account of each of the above 
cognitions and demonstrate how each one of them can be grounded in the 
philosophical language of difference with respect to the theory already deployed in 
terms of the deconstruction of Mediterraneanism. I equip, moreover, such a writing of 
difference with a three-fold choreoethnography on the basis of the following 
occurrences that reflect and irradiate my own experience of Rethemnos: the liar- 
episode/advice episode, the non-servile servility episode and the discount episode. 
There is still a need, thereby, to offer a more sustained account of Badiou’s 
philosophy, not only because it is by recourse to his ontology that the Rethemniot 
subject should be unfolded, but most importantly, because it is such a theorization that 
will point in the direction of the differences that truly matter to the Mediterranean 
subjects beyond any poetic fashion.
9.2 Alain Badiou: A Symptom of Difference
Badiou argues that being is multiple and cannot be thought of outside presentation for 
“the one is no t’ (Badiou, 2005: 23) and thus the ontological situation is the 
presentation of presentation (Badiou, 2005: 27). It is Cantor’s set theory that managed 
to provide “a theory of the multiple as the general form of the presentation of being” 
(Badiou, 2005: 42). Set theory is chiefly structured on the basis of relations of 
belonging (written e); everything is a multiple of multiples or a set of sets. Ontology, 
by implication, that is, the science of being qua being, begins from void, from a 
multiple of nothing (written 0 , the proper name of being) for if there were a multiple
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of something that would have to be the one and the one according to Badiou’s 
ontology is not.
A multiple, however, can be thought of not only in terms of belonging but also in 
terms of inclusion. The difference between the two is of paramount importance and 
concerns two ways of counting the multiple and not two different ways of thinking the 
multiple (Badiou, 2005: 83). In rough terms, inclusion is the second count, that is, a 
metastructure in that it gathers together all the sub-multiples of the original multiple, 
while belonging comprises the first count, in that it counts the original, so to speak, 
presentation -  the presented multiples. The difference between belonging and 
inclusion lies in that the former counts the presentation of being, while the latter 
counts represenation. I will return to the difference between inclusion and belonging 
in due course. Suffice it to say, for the moment that belonging and inclusion mark the 
impasse of being, exactly because belonging is still what counts the multiples of a 
situation, whereas inclusion is what counts the sub-sets of the multiple by way of 
which there is always something excessive; sub-sets, for example, do not have, 
necessarily, to belong to the situation. In other words the count of the state, the 
metastructure and represenation are on the side of inclusion, while structure, 
represenation and elements are on the side of belonging. As we will see below, it is 
such a gap between the two counts that makes an intervention possible, which comes 
down to saying that makes a subject possible. This is because the multiple of subsets 
is, essentially, larger than the initial set and the elements that belong to it. In Badiou’s 
words “The non-coincidence of inclusion and belonging signifies that there is an 
excess of inclusion over belonging; that it is impossible that every part of a multiple 
belongs to it” (Badiou, 2005: 89). What is crucial to note in the very schematic 
exposition of being above, is that certain sub-multiples that are included in a situation 
do not, necessarily, belong to it. Although Badiou’s ontology comes to terms with 
being and event (that which-is-not-being-qua-being), in what follows, I do not take 
up, at least in any direct manner, on any of the detailed analysis of being, but focus 
instead on the event -  even if this is tremendously difficult, not least because it may 
not be methodologically or even philosophically proper to isolate, locate or pin down 
such a break in Badiou’s theory. Such a decision, however, is useful for the purposes 
and scope of the current argument in that the event in the manner presented below
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constitutes a means to an end, that is, it seeks to trace the truth-procedure on the side 
of which the Rethemniot subject will come to reside.
For an event to exist, however, an evental site is necessary. The evental site is a 
“multiple such that none of its elements are presented in the situation” (Badiou, 2005: 
175). The difference between a historical situation and a natural situation lies exactly 
in the fact that in historical situations an evental site may occur (Badiou, 2005: 177). 
An event nonetheless is possible only by way of some kind of intervention which can 
be locally determined and thus an evental site, while being a condition of the event, 
does not immediately possesses or impregnates an event. An event, moreover, is 
composed of elements of the site and the signification of itself, yet whether an event 
belongs to a situation remains deeply undecided. As Badiou (2005: 181) put it “only 
an interpretative intervention can decide that an event is presented in a situation; as 
the arrival in being of non-being, the arrival amidst the visible of the invisible”. And 
thus if the event belongs to the situation, it “is separated from the void by itself. This 
is what we will call being ‘ultra-one’” (Badiou, 2005: 182); if it does not belong to the 
situation then “nothing has taken place except the place” (Badiou, 2005: 182). At this 
juncture, one may be tempted to ask whether there is a being of the event. Is, in other 
words, the being of the event possible?
The axiom of foundation, as Badiou demonstrates, prohibits being’s event. What the 
axiom of foundation states is that there is a halting point in being and that even if 
presentation is infinite, being “is always marked by finitude, when it comes to its 
origin” (Badiou, 2005: 187). Such a mathematical formulation permits, in other 
words, that a historical situation can be founded and based on a multiple as long as it 
is not void. A non-void multiple is what makes a historical situation possible or what 
allows it to be founded blocking the infinite regression of being. In Badiou’s wording 
“Deciding that [an event] belongs to the situation is a wager: one can only hope that 
his wager never becomes legitimate inasmuch as any legitimacy refers back to the 
structure of the situation” (Badiou, 2005: 201). By implication, then, what is termed 
intervention is “any procedure by which a multiple is recognized as an event”. 
Recognition would mean, however, both recognition of the event and deciding over 
its belonging. Yet if both these conditions were satisfied the event would be annulled. 
It is exactly such a condition that prompts Badiou (2005: 209) to argue that “An
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intervention is what presents an event for the occurrence of another. It is an evental 
between-two”. This is why there is probably no original or radical beginning, for “the 
intervention is a line drawn from one paradoxical multiple, which is already 
circulating, to the circulation of another, a line which scratches out. It is a diagonal of 
the first” (Badiou, 2005: 210).
Badiou puts at the service of intervention the axiom of choice. Ontology in itself is 
not able to think of truth, but it can think the being of truth. “In its final form it posits 
that given a multiple of multiples, there exists a multiple composed of a 
‘representative’ of each non-void multiple whose presentation is assured by the first 
multiple” (Badiou, 2005: 224). I will have the chance to return to the above formulas 
in subsequent sections with respect to the choreoethnography of an interruption- 
without-interruption and the non-servile servility of the Rethemniot identification. 
Suffice it to note for the moment, that the axiom of choice ‘chooses’ without actually 
saying anything about whether there is a rule of how to choose. It does not inscribe, in 
other words, a rule of choice. What follows is what Badiou calls fidelity, that is, “the 
set of procedures which discern, within a situation those multiples whose existence 
depends upon the introduction into circulation (under the supernumerary name 
conferred by an intervention) of an evental multiple” (Badiou, 2005: 232). But it 
should be noted at the outset that there is no general type of fidelity, for “Fidelity is a 
functional relation to the event” (Badiou, 2005: 233). And as Badiou observes, “the 
closer a fidelity comes, via its operator to the ontological connections -  belonging and 
inclusion, presentation and represenation, e and C -  the more statist it is” (Badiou, 
2005: 237). Accordingly, spontaneist is a fidelity that demands those who invented 
the event to be the only ones taking part in it; dogmatic is a fidelity that demands 
every multiple to depend on the event; and generic is a fidelity that is not assigned to 
a defined function of the state of the situation.
As mentioned already, in order to decode the process through which a possible 
Rethemniot subject will come to blossom, I will be focusing on those aspects of 
identity that fly from egoism and agonistic poetics in favour of an affirmative 
responsibility; I will be also stretching the need to conceiving of a non-servile 
servility beyond the submission/servility allegations; and I will incline toward the
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suffusion of an indiscernible and undecidable subject that outwits the imagination of a 
totally complete Mediterranean identity. Such a theorization will make sense when 
brushed against the mathematical ontologies of the axiom of foundation, the axiom of 
choice and the matheme of the indiscernible, which in turn will be put at the service 
of the following episodes from the field: the liar-episode/advice-episode, the non- 
servile servility, and the discount-episode. I have already argued that in Badiou’s 
theory the one is not, that mathematics is ontology, that being is multiple, void, 
infinite, and excessive and that that which is not-being-qua-being is the event founded 
by an intervention to which a subject declares its fidelity through forcing, by 
affirming the new that happens in being. What is required to take things further is to 
understand how the indiscernible works in Badiou’s ontology, hoping that such a 
strategy will make it possible to point in the direction of a Rethemniot subject without 
name, identity, unity, sufficiency and integrity.
The generic multiple, which as Badiou admits constitutes one of the most significant 
parts of his philosophy, allows ontology to think of the undecidable. Its meaning, 
however, necessitates further unpacking. Fidelity, as was mentioned above, marks and 
refers to the manner in which an event named after an intervention, is connected to a 
multiple. Yet a situation knows nothing of the event. What Badiou terms veridical is a 
situation which is answerable by knowledge, while truth, by contrast, is a process, 
which is related to the event and the intervention -  and cannot be discerned or 
acknowledged by the situation (Badiou, 2005: 332). Knowledge thus has nothing to 
do with truth. For “A truth (if it exists) must be an infinite part of the situation, 
because for every finite part one can always say that it has already been discerned and 
classified by knowledge” (Badiou, 2005: 333). What truth manages to do, in other 
words, is group together “all the terms o f the situation which are positively connected 
to an event” (Badiou, 2005: 335). Put differently, if there are multiples connected to 
an event that are not already determined by the language of the situation, and thus 
multiples that are unclassifiable and un-assignable to knowledge, then “truth would be 
irreducible to veridicity” (Badiou, 2005: 338). And thus what is inscribed by a generic 
truth in a situation is the indiscernible, for even if the discernible, as Badiou argues, is 
verified, the indiscernible is true (Badiou, 2005: 339). “Of course” as Badiou points 
out “mathematics cannot think a procedure of truth, because mathematics eliminates 
the event. But it can decide whether it is compatible with ontology that there be
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truths” (Badiou, 2005: 341). Again it can get extremely difficult to follow Badiou’s 
following of Cohen’s strategy in construing the matheme of the indiscernible. I shall 
return to the above in a subsequent section by way of the choreoethnographies of 
Rethemnos. Suffice it to underline for the moment that an indiscernible exists, once a 
generic procedure, which is included in a situation is forced by a subject to form in a 
situation to come the true and to which the indiscernible will, from now on, belong 
(Badiou, 2005: 342). I am now in a position to map how the three planes of difference 
mentioned above (plane 1: affirmative/responsible multiplicity, interruption-without- 
interruption, undecidable; plane 2: axiom of foundation, axiom of choice, and 
matheme of the indiscernible; and plane 3: liar-episode/advice-episode, non-servile 
servility, and discount-episode) unfold, extend and expand over and onto each other. 
To recap, Badiou’s philosophy declares first by way of being, that the one is not, and 
that being is multiple, infinite, natural, excessive and void; and second by way of 
event, that the event is not-being-qua-being, prohibiting being’s event (axiom of 
foundation), while choosing without inscribing a rule of choice (the axiom of choice) 
by affirming a diagonal intervallic intervention between events and by finally, 
asserting that a generic multiple will be true for a subject, once it is forced -  from a 
situation within which is included -  to form in situation to come a true subject, 
remaining, however, crucially indiscernible and thus marking in that way the non­
place and non-being of the undecidable. I shall argue, accordingly, that by 
scrutinizing the relationships and interconnections between the three planes of 
difference mentioned above, will make it possible to de-consist what the true identity 
of the Rethemniot subject is -  beyond shame, honour, poetics, spontaneity, friends of 
the heart, and poetics of womanhood.
The affirmative/responsible subject whose inconsistency is implied by the axiom of 
foundation stipulates that beyond shame, honour and poetics there is always the ultra- 
one of an original Two. Badiou’s take on set theory, as was already shown, 
acknowledges that it is “necessary to abandon all hope of explicitly defining the 
notion of set” (Badiou, 2005: 43). As Badiou (2005: 45) put it “the theory indicates, 
without definition, that it does not speak o f the one, and that all that it presents, in the 
implicitness of its rules, is multiple”. I decided to unpack the affirmative and 
responsible subject with respect to the axiom of foundation, because it is in there that 
the event starts in-consisting. The axiom of foundation states that “within an existing
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one-multiple, there always exists a multiple presented by it such that this multiple is 
on the edge of the void relative to the initial multiple” (Badiou, 2005: 185). 
Formulaically,
“given any existing multiple whatsoever (thus a multiple counted as one in accordance with the Ideas 
of the multiple and the existence of the name of the void), there always belongs to it -  if, o f course, it is 
not the name of the void itself in which case nothing would belong to it -  a multiple on the edge of the 
void within the presentation that it is. In other words: every non-void multiple contains some Other” 
(Badiou, 2005: 186).
The belonging of the event to the situation, as was mentioned, is undecidable. 
Foundation, however, insists that for every sentiment, word or discourse that implies 
honour, shame or poeticity, there is always an affirmative and responsible subject that 
gives considerable pause to the infinite regression of being. It is worth remembering 
with Badiou (2005: 180) again that “The event is [...] clearly the multiple which both 
presents its entire site, and, by means of the pure signifier of itself immanent to its 
own multiple, manages to present the presentation itself, that is, the one of the infinite 
multiple that it is”. The undecidability of the ultra-one thus is marked, precisely, by 
the uncertainty of the event’s belonging to the situation, which works as a “double 
function” (Badiou, 2005: 182). Foundation affirms that every multiple contains and 
necessitates its other and that beyond or underneath the usual characteristics of the 
cartography of the Mediterranean personality -  shame, honour, poetics etc. -  there is 
always an affirmative and responsible other, which takes flight from the stability, 
illusory fixity and pointillism of identity. To put it in a nutshell, an event is founded 
“inasmuch as a multiple always belongs to it which is Other than it” (Badiou, 2005: 
186). To that extent the Rethemniot subject inconsists in the Two of affirmation and 
responsibility attaining to the fact that “every existent multiple -  besides the name of 
the void -  occurs according to an immanent origin, positioned by the Others which 
belong to it” (Badiou, 2005: 187). I will have the chance to unfold the axiom of 
foundation by recourse to the liar-episode and the advice-episode. Let us turn, for the 
moment, to the non-servile servility that unsettles and undoes the Mediterraneanist 
suspicion of a servile subject that has allegedly lost its poetic affiliations and has been 
submitted to the devastated effects of tourism, commodification, corruption, and 
usurpation.
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The difference of such a non-servile servility resonates with what was termed on 
another occasion an ‘interruption-without-interruption’ (Doel, 1992). I have suggested 
in Chapter 4, that the subject is always already cracked open, fractured and split and 
that the question should not be about a docile servant that depends on tourist capital as 
the poetic model zealously strives to forge by means of informal history. The 
ontological language on the basis of which the non-servile servility, of which the 
subject is only a part, can be exemplified, is the axiom of choice. Programmatically, 
the axiom of choice,
“In its final form posits that given a multiple o f multiples, there exists a multiple composed o f a 
‘representative’ of each non-void multiple whose presentation is assured by the first multiple. In other 
words one can ‘choose’ an element from each of the multiples which make up a multiple, and one can 
‘gather together’ these chosen elements: the multiple obtained in such a manner is consistent, which is 
to say it exists” (Badiou, 2005: 224).
To put it in a rather formulaic manner as Badiou avers, choice guarantees, “the 
existence of a set y composed of a representative of each non-void element of a” 
(Badiou, 2005: 224). Yet what such a formula does is simply to stretch the existence 
of a set of choice, without naming or pinpointing which set is about, and in that way it 
undoes the allegations over the assumed servility of the Mediterranean subject. 
Mediterraneanist writings, recall, have claimed that the immense tourist development 
forced the Rethemniots to abandon their original values and morals, losing all pride 
and seeking only to make money -  ‘we sold our soul to the devil for money’ as an old 
Rethemniot told me once, expressing his anger against the monumentalization of the 
town. Yet it is one thing to unfold the meaning and theorize the way in which 
Rethemnos’ public spaces are transformed and face a rapidly commodified capitalist 
landscape which is now subject to the logic of the market, and completely another to 
produce a sort of poetic history that attacks the alleged subjection of local history to 
tourism and consumption, arguing over some unobtrusive poetic quality which gets 
involuntarily distorted by an exoteric evil. Put bluntly, usurpation has already begun 
in Rethemnos and what choice facilitates is a fuller appreciation of the fact that there 
is no clear-cut boundary between a period of poetic pride and a period of servility and 
that pride is relentlessly and always already interrupted by the almost absolute 
proximity of servility, but without actually being interrupted in a linear, chronological
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or hierarchical sense, to the extent that both moments are imbricated with and hugely 
implicated into each other. Thus whilst Mediterraneanist writings seem to be keen to 
totally separate and distinguish between a poetic period and a period of corrupted 
Cretan ideals, for my part I propose that corruption and innocence, and servility and 
non-servility involve irreducible disjoined conjunctures and thus the unprecedented 
commodification of the Old Town’s geohistory need no longer be a problem of 
choice. For as Badiou has it in terms of such infinite sets “there is something un- 
delegatable” (Badiou, 2005: 225) about them.
A non-servile servility is, exactly, the impossibility of choosing between a non 
servile/poetic period and a corrupted period of mass tourism, which is exactly what 
the axiom of choice affirms; that is, the existence of a choice-multiple, which without 
having to choose between a servile period and a non-servile period acknowledges 
simply that some interventions may take place. The existence of the choice-multiple 
affirms, in other words, the non-inscription of a rule of choice, the unnameable of a 
delegate and the non-existence of a law of presentation. Having briefly unfolded the 
axiom of foundation, the axiom of choice and the manner in which these formulas 
correspond with the affirmative, responsible and non-servile subjectivations, it is time 
to turn to the matheme of the indiscernible and the generic multiple and infinite truth 
of the non-place and non-being of an undecidable other.
Being indiscernible means that in a situation certain multiples exist that are positively 
connected to an event and thus are not classified from the standpoint of the 
encyclopaedia (Badiou, 2005: 336). The indiscernible of truth is not about truth, 
however, but about the being of truth (Badiou, 2005: 355). Ontology, which is 
mathematics, is compatible with the being of the indiscernible due to Paul Cohen’s 
work on the continuum hypothesis, of which some of the basic components will be 
now briefly sketched out. In the quasi-complete situation one constructs names for all 
multiples and for the indiscernible as well, but without knowing which the 
indiscernible is. A general set of conditions for the indiscernible would involve “a 
multiple n of the fundamental situation S which is destined to belong to the 
indiscernible (the function of material) and whatever the case may be, to transmit 
some ‘information’ about this indiscernible (which will be a part of the situation S)” 
(Badiou, 2005: 362). Such a set of conditions, according to Badiou following of
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Cohen’s thought, is dominated by the principle of information and the principle of 
compatibility. Without getting into formal logic, a set of conditions would be 
dominated by the materiality of the indiscernible, the existence of more precise 
conditions than the ones we already know, the coherency which is required to 
describe the indiscernible, and the fact that there are real choices in describing the 
indiscernible (Badiou, 2005: 365). A correct set of conditions, in addition, aims at a 
correct part (5) of a set © of conditions, but if a correct part 8 is discerned by a 
property X and obeys Rdi and Rck (which are rules of conditions), for every element 
of 8 (every 7tie8), two incompatible conditions m  and 713 exist. As Rd2 prohibits both 
7C2 and 7i3 from belonging to the same correct part 8, one of them should not belong to 
it. Let us call this 7C2; 8 accordingly will be dominated by a condition 7T2 such that ~X 
(712). Domination consequently, is “a set of conditions such that any condition outside 
the domination is dominated by at least one condition inside the domination” (Badiou, 
2005: 369). And hence the capital definition of the indiscernible: “a correct set $ will 
be generic for S if, for any domination D which belongs to S we have D n $ ^ 0 ” 
(Badiou, 2005: 370).
Cohen’s continuum hypothesis, which is what the theorem above vaguely drew upon, 
in a manner which shall require more coherent explanation, is taken up in more detail 
in a subsequent section. It deserves to be mentioned though that the manner in which 
this formula is used is strictly operational, that is, it makes sense in accord with the 
three planes of difference mentioned above and with reference to the construction of 
the argument pursued in the present chapter along with the overall scope and aim of 
the present thesis. Suffice it to note for the moment, that the indiscernible points to the 
undecidable on condition that such an undecidable subject is always on the side of a 
generic truth. Put differently, the undecidable Rethemniot individual and the discount- 
episode to which this truth corresponds owe their existence to a generic multiple that 
rests on the plane of the indiscernible and can be relayed by what Cohen’s 
mathematical formula above dis-allows.
Having laboured a means to map and unfold the vicissitudes of the Rethemniot 
subject, it is time to unpack the interleavings and permutations between the three 
planes of difference and the interconnections and implications of the various multiples
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that inhabit each plane. As was already suggested, once such a truth procedure is 
revealed it will become possible to tell the difference that matters to subjects when 
truth is at stake. The various aspects of the identity process I am about to map, do not 
necessarily constitute facets of the same individual or characteristics of a person’s 
behaviour, but form instead folds that compose and orchestrate the lines drawn out by 
a subject once truth is called forth. The reader therefore, will be probably 
disappointed if he/she thinks that by way of such a procedure the present thesis will 
finally pinpoint or associate an individual with a specific, solid or constant identity. I 
would have hoped, at least, to able to show how ontology makes space for such a 
differential subjectivation that despite being confined to the effective spacing of 
consumption and the restoration project, will still have a chance of telling the truth.
9.3 Affirmation/Responsibility: Axiom of Foundation -  Liar-Episode/Advice- 
Episode
Mediterraneanist accounts of difference, whether discourses and values of shame-and- 
honour or the poetic model assert that the poetic ability of the subject is linked to 
some atomistic/egoistic drives of a Mediterranean psyche that seeks to exhibit 
excellence. What matters to the poetic model, in other words is not an action or a 
deed, but the verbal rhetoric put forward or being at the service of it in order to 
explain how and why the duty was carried out. I argued in Chapters 3 and 4 that 
poststructuralist accounts of difference -  differential repetitions, the counterfeit, 
becoming-woman and the hauntology of use-value -  insist on the subject’s countless 
and infinite voyages in place that are not about the return of a poetic person but about 
a subjectivation process slightly phased. The joy, ala Lyotard, of multiplicity, 
affirmative ex-appropriation and differentiation of such differences are far beyond the 
integrity of the Mediterranean values of shame, honour and poetics, which are fraught 
with various sorts of pointillist obsessions failing to think the innumerable spectra and 
experiments of difference or to decide from the side of the undecidable. The twists 
and turns of the dialectic and the poetic model, I have argued, in-appropriate, un­
become and betray difference according to a digestive logic that yearns for 
accommodation and identity by means of a solid, fixed, integral and representational 
aspiration. Mapping the trajectory of the Rethemniot multiplicity beyond shame, 
honour and poetics, and in line with Badiou’s strategy that subtracts from the Oneness
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of a fully deployed situation, means not so much to destroy the Mediterranean 
identities, but rather to invent, intervene and reverse in the middle of things, lending 
consistency to an affirmative and responsible subject, and setting in motion and 
destabilizing the domestication of servility.
The axiom of foundation allows to think of a historical ground -  responsibility, 
affirmation -  on which when a subject is founded, will manage to remain affirmative 
and asymmetrical and not closed in on itself like honour, shame and poeticity. A 
foundational responsibility is both affirmative, in that it is excessive and 
asymmetrical, and mathematical, in that it resonates precisely for this reason, with 
Badiou’s axiom of foundation. Now, as we have already seen, foundation states that 
“given any existing multiple whatsoever [...] there always belongs to it a multiple on 
the edge of the void within the presentation that it is. In other words: every non-void 
multiple contains some Other” (Badiou, 2005: 186). This is because “The axiom of 
foundation is the ontological proposition which states that every existent multiple -  
besides the name of the void -  occurs according to an immanent origin, positioned by 
the Others which belong to it” (Badiou, 2005: 187). What is more, foundation brings 
“forth that-which-is-not-being-qua-being as a point of impossibility of the discourse 
on being-qua-being, and it exhibits its signifying emblem: the multiple such as it 
presents itself, in the brilliance, in which being is abolished, of the mark-of-one” 
(Badiou, 2005: 190). For if there were a being of the event, it would not necessitate an 
Other and thus the event would be formalized by the void. Yet according to the axiom 
of foundation, a set a, should have an element {a} whose intersection with a, must not 
be the void. And thus if being is void (the definition of being in terms of set theory) 
and the event is composed of elements of its site and itself (the definition of event), 
there is no formal language of the event. In other words, being is multiple and void 
whereas the axiom of foundation founds otherness inasmuch as a multiple is not void 
and by that prevents the eventness of being or assigns to being the prohibition of 
event.
An affirmative/responsible multiplicity in the light of the above should be, therefore, 
both foundational (historical and relative) and what goes beyond the void. It should 
not be represented, calculable, or counted as Lyotard (1993) promulgated, but at the 
same time, it should be locally determined blocking the infinite regression of being.
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The affirmative and responsible other involves an unanticipated and unexpected 
multiplicity to the extent, of course, that “responsibility is excessive or it is not 
responsibility” (Derrida, 1995: 286). What the foundational non-void Other inconsists 
in Rethemnos is pure indecision -  and certainly not the decision of shame, honour or 
poetics. For “Indecision happens. One grapples with indecision” (Derrida, 1995: 146). 
This is why it “will always keep within it, and it must do so, this absolutely 
undetermined messianic hope at its heart, this eschatological relation to the to-come 
of an event and of a singularity, of an alterity that cannot be anticipated” (Derrida, 
1994: 65). Let us further illustrate the above theorization with the following image 
from the field in an attempt to open up the undecidable Rethemniot subject to a 
procedure on whose generic truth the subject would be, hopefully, forced, to be 
faithful.
Once, in the Street of Souliou a shopkeeper was accusing the shopkeepers trading in 
the street of Arabatzoglou -  which is a very popular street at the historical centre of 
the Old Town -  of being ‘liars’. The shopkeeper insisted that the Arabatzoglou 
shopkeepers ‘pretended not to have customers’ when the case was, in his estimations, 
the opposite. The complaint did not exclusively involve a moral concern. It was of a 
pragmatic origin, a general statement about the current situation and the small 
numbers of visitors that have recently arrived on Rethemnos. The shopkeeper meant 
that ‘if these people trading in the street of Arabatzoglou complain about the current 
situation then imagine how bad things are’. The Street of Arabatzoglou is one of the 
most commercial streets in the Old Town and the tourists that come and go, more 
often than not, are attracted not so much by the shops but mostly because of the 
picturesque beauty of the area. To the extent that commercial relations are highly 
antagonistic and competitive, one should not foreclosure the possibility that the 
statement was made in order to ‘trick’ the Souliou shopkeepers. Yet, the fact remains 
that the ‘liar accusation’ questions an established state of affairs -  the fact that the 
Arabatzoglou shopkeepers do not attract as many customers as they used to attract in 
the past. On the other hand, such a statement does not deny the fact that tourists are 
fewer nowadays. And still one cannot tell whether the liar-episode is a lie or not. For 
one thing, because it can be determined only locally but was rendered explicit when I 
overheard it; and yet for another, in that its status is, purely and simply, undecidable 
inasmuch as one cannot say whether such an accusation, ‘of being liars’, is a lie or
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not; and whether it was expected to remain within a restricted social circle, or was 
meant to be heard; and whether it referred to the shopkeepers or to the fact that 
tourists are now fewer.
The aporia and Twoness of Badiou’s event is now imperceptibly given over to the 
undecidable depiction of the above incident without necessarily inclining toward the 
poetic negativity and rhetorical performances of excellence as depicted by 
Mediterraneanist imaginations. En route from affirmation to responsibility, a careful 
unfolding of the liar accusation on the back of the theorization of the event is now 
possible. Affirmation and responsibility constitute processes that hold for a genuine 
Twoness at the heart of the ultra-one, which is what belongs to the situation and 
counts itself twice, once as a presented multiple and once as a multiple presented in its 
own presentation. And thus, while “on the one hand, the subject is a figure of 
universalization [...] the place to which all human traits indexically refer and defer (I 
am -  subject)” (Doel, 1995: 230) -  I am a shopkeeper, in a bad economic situation as 
the tourists do not spend as much as they used to spend or do not visit as often as they 
did in the past -  on the other hand, “the subject is also a figure of individuation in so 
far as it can only express itself through bodies and faces” (Doel, 1995: 230). I argue 
that the liar accusation is a trace of a suspended deindividuation -  between these two 
moments of universalization and singularization -  affirming the contested and 
undecidable nature of the complaint on tourism rather than disclosing a latent poetics. 
The event, above all, is a space of general relativity affirming the differend of the 
crisis of tourism (Is it happening?) (Lyotard, 1988). The liar-episode is neither poetic, 
nor honorific but purely differential and affirmative; neither a negative conception of 
identity nor a positive identification; neither reactionary, nor revolutionary as the 
forced and illusory stabilizations of poeticity, honour and shame assume or expect 
from the subject; rather it comprises a double bind, which “affirms the destabilization 
on the move which Opens (the place of) the subject to that which is wholly Other” 
(Doel, 1995: 234). Seen through the lens of affirmation, therefore, the liar accusation 
ought not to be considered in a poetic fashion.
One could probably complain that I am probably producing a whole story out of 
something that needs no further ado or much thinking (the residents’ relationships are 
complex and contested). However, it is my conviction that philosophy is exactly about
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producing something where lay or popular knowledge sees nothing. Hence, such an 
episode converges with another occurrence, once I was buying cigars from a shop in 
the Old Town, and the tobacco salesman informed me that the brand I was looking for 
was available at a shop near the Lozza building. To argue that the information given 
to me is an equivalent of altruism substituting for an irreducible or pure friendship (of 
the heart), hospitality and the rest of the Mediterranean values and discourses is one 
of the possible ways to interpret it. It can be unfolded however, in an altogether 
differential manner. The relationships among the residents are never crystallized and 
tied down, as was shown in terms of the liar accusation above, but are instead 
perpetually kept under suspense, movement and threat, without being simply agonistic 
or poetic. Such experimental, inventive, conditional, interdependent, indeterminate 
and undecidable relationships, involve always work-in-progress resisting the forced 
stabilization and identification policies of integrative poetics. The information given 
to me in the light of this, is I propose a matter of responsibility, which is infinitely 
open allowing for something else to come to pass.
Agonistic poetics and hospitable subjects, is not the only way to theorize what is 
going on among the Rethemniots. Every now and then, the two-fold of affirmation 
and responsibility interrupt, intervene and block the grid of the rigid lines of poeticity 
taking flight from the doctrines of any historical situation. The Rethemniot 
chaosmotic subjectivity is neither about honour nor about shame but, primarily, about 
a ‘way of being’ through which the undecidability of an event holds sway. An 
affirmative responsibility, which I argue should replace the gist of poetics and 
hospitality, resonates with a multiple which is “both a work-in-progress and a social 
apparatus, undergoing the continuous variation of Becoming-Other through a 
motionless voyaging in place. It is therefore both nomadic (without home or refuge) 
and rhizomatic (without roots or anchorage). In short the subject endures through the 
continuous variation of ex-appropriation and Becoming-Other. Schizoanalysis” (Doel, 
1995: 235). Affirmation and responsibility splay out solidarity, egoism, honour, 
shame and enmity through a stuttering and interminable difference-producing 
repetition that knows only of experimentation and unintelligibility. It is not for 
nothing, therefore, that I argue that the subject leaks in all possible directions -  liar, 
friend, but also poetics, excellence and rhetoric -  and not only in terms of agonistic 
poetics and hospitable aspirations. For the ultra-one of Two is neither poetic nor
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honorific, nor anti-poetic -  that is a reactionary, negative, and destructive theorization 
-  but pure becoming.
I have started to map the Rethemniot subject through the traces it leaves behind a 
truth procedure once a haptical genericity of Two (affirmation and responsibility) 
defies the subjectification and signification processes of Mediterraneanist 
representations, simply by working, exquisitely and remarkably, on another level, 
which is not, necessarily, superior to the Mediterraneanist positivities, but first and 
foremost, different to the level of poetics. At the dawn of the ethnography of the 
event, the liar-episode and the advice-episode are not about two different subjects. 
The affirmative responsible subject which utters ‘liar’ and the subject which 
responded to my inquiry, hold true only once a mode of subjectivation is submitted to 
the effective de-individuation which dwells on the plane of consistency, rather than on 
the dwindling poetic identification. An affirmative responsibility, in other words, is 
only too eager to affirm that at stake in subjectivation processes “there is a whole 
geography in people, with rigid lines, supple lines, lines of flight etc.” (Deleuze and 
Pamet, 1987: 10), and not just a metaphysical personality of poetic ideals.
Badiou’s (2005: 180) formula of the event, written ex {x/xe X, ex}, will help us to 
clarify further the above point in what I think is rather even if remotely a plausible 
translation of the advice episode. An event, we already know, has both to present its 
entire site and to present the presentation itself. I will argue that the Two of 
affirmation and responsibility, on the basis of which the liar-episode constitutes the 
first count of the ultra-one event, posits itself between itself and the void, whose 
second count is the responsible advice-episode. Now, lets us see how the above can be 
further unfolded. The ultra-one “‘mobilizes’ the elements of its site but it adds its own 
presentation to the mix” (Badiou, 2005: 182). The liar-episode belongs to the 
situation, to the extent that it is part of the alleged tourist crisis; and thus “It counts the 
same thing as one twice: once as a presented multiple [the tourist crisis] and once as a 
multiple presented in its own presentation [liar]” (Badiou, 2005: 182). On the other 
hand, the advice-episode does not belong to the situation, to the extent that while there 
is a presented multiple (advices have been given many times) the multiples that 
compose the presented multiple are not represented in the situation (the brand I was 
looking for). The advice-episode which holds beyond hospitality would now entail
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that “nothing is presented by it” (Badiou, 2005: 182). It adds itself to the void, to 
nothing (the advice given by the shopkeeper) but it is not presented from the 
standpoint of the situation, “because no presentable multiple responds to the call of 
such name” (Badiou, 2005: 182) (the brand I was looking for was not on sale). The 
Two of affirmation and responsibility thus results neither in unity nor in identifying a 
person with a certain behavioural quality, but in a way which founds (axiom of 
foundation) an origin, which opens the subject to a wholly Other. The liar-episode 
affirms the tourist crisis once as a presented multiple (Is the tourist crisis happening?) 
and once as a multiple presented in its own presentation (liar: the crisis is not 
happening and even if it is, it does not affect you). The ad vice-event, by contrast, 
offers an unlimited and infinite advice (open to the void) being simply and purely 
dissymmetrical; and hence as Mallarme put it, ‘nothing has taken place except the 
place’.
To affirm, however, means to create and evoke rather than to divide, compare or draw 
a segmented line. To affirm is neither about consensus (tourist crisis) nor about 
contradiction, negation or dispute (there is no tourist crisis: liar). On the contrary, 
affirmation says ‘yes’ to that which happens -  the existence of differences between 
the various estimations and evaluations on tourism -  learning how to let go. The liar- 
episode of the Street of Arabatzoglou (Fig. 10) challenges the shopkeeper’s evaluation 
but not simply by opposing rhetorically or poetically the knowledge of a given state of 
affairs. Rather the liar-episode sets traps in what it thinks of as a mischaracterization 
of the situation by letting forth “from inconsistent being and the interrupted count, the 
incandescent non-being of an existence” (Badiou, 2005: 183). It is at this juncture that 
affirmative deconstruction resonates with Badiou’s foundational axiom, which 
prohibits being’s event, by founding an origin which is groundless, light, baseless and 
undecidable.
By the same token, the advice-episode of the Titou Petichaki square (Fig. 11) 
insinuates an inchoate and yet to-come performance of responsibility. The tobacco 
salesman, even if he never intended to stock such a brand of cigars or did not reckon 
having customers asking for this specific brand, responded in a responsible manner 
trying to be worthy of the request. The subject, in the case of the tobacco, is neither 
negative (honour/shame), nor catastrophic/suicidal (vendetta subject), nor
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antagonistic/creative (poetic). It is not about an individual either or an identity but 
about the traces a truth procedure leaves behind once the question is no longer posed 
in terms of hospitality, altruism, or a eudemonistic scenario of the friends of the heart. 
Responsibility cannot, in other words, be retrospectively, offered as a recipe of 
morality and goodness, for the responsible person is precisely the person who is 
always in doubt on whether he/she has been moral enough. This is because “which 
line of flight to follow in any particular context of forced stabilization can only be 
determined through a cast of the dice. Shake. Rattle. Roll” (Doel, 1995: 240). 
Responsibility, accordingly, is a line of flight which one may draw; a latent ability or 
a potential that remains to be actualized and one which materializes and delivers once 
the various boundaries of a poetic mapping are finally blocked and have been hitherto 
crossed. Both episodes are defiant of the unrestrained poetic ability that has occupied 
a characteristically large place in the sedentary Mediterraneanist imaginary. By 
contrast, the affirmative/responsible mode of subjectivity I am currently delving in, is 
undecidable and indiscernible starting, imperceptibly, to hint at a true process on the 
side of which -  if and when is verified by a situation to come -  a subject may be 
found. What is required, therefore, to take things further is an explication of how the 
openness and dissymmetry of such an affirmative responsibility, forces a 
choice/intervention to be faithfully connected to a generic multiple, and to point in the 
direction of a radically undecidable Rethemniot. We already know, however, that if 
the event is undecidable “deciding that it belongs to the situation is a wager: one can 
only hope that this wager never becomes legitimate, inasmuch as any legitimacy 
refers back to the structure of the situation” (Badiou, 2005: 201); and thus an 
interpretive intervention is required, that is, “any procedure by which a multiple is 
recognized as an event” (Badiou, 2005: 202).
As I have already stressed, the aetiological reasoning behind the poetic ontologies 
assume that the identification processes which the Rethemniot multiplicity goes 
through, has been severely altered by the unrestrained, uncontrolled and ongoing 
consummation process of the Venetian history. Accordingly, the Rethemniot subjects, 
lured in and seduced by foreign capital, have abandoned all values and inner-directed 
motivation with which their lives have been hitherto associated and which made them 
distinguishingly proud. My proposition and what I have been incessantly struggling to 
insert in all the preceding pages, is that a subject instead of being servile or
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subversive, takes place beyond the space composed o f the contradictory features o f 
servility versus non-servility, within a territory which 1 prefer to call a non-servile 
servility in that it guarantees the non-choice of a choice which ‘fails’ to decide or to 
preside over the belonging o f the event to a situation. Such a chaosmotic subjectivity, 
hereinafter, being heretofore affirmatively responsible will be neither servile nor non- 
servile, but will involve a period of interruption without interruption. It is to this task 
that I now turn.
Figure 11: The Street o f  A rabatzoglou  (top)
Figure 12 Titou Petichaki square  (above) (pictures taken by the author)
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9.4 Beyond Servility: Axiom of Choice -  Interruption without Interruption
Choice, as was briefly exposed in the introduction of the present chapter, refuses to
draw a clear-cut line throughout the passage from non-servility to servility, and it goes 
without saying, to distinguish a period of innocence, integration, embeddedness and 
poetic transparency, from a period of corruption, commodification, supplementarity, 
addition, suppletion and simulacra. The commodification of Rethemnos’ geohistory 
prompted many commentators -  populist and lay thought and Mediterraneanist 
writings alike -  to agree on a rhetoric which claims that due to the recent intense 
commodification of the town, its identity is now largely abandoning the traditional 
system of shared values, namely the pride and honesty of Cretan hospitality. Drawing 
on the growing disaffection and dissidence created by the monumentalization of the 
town, this same rhetoric argued that by surrendering the town to the forces 
perpetuated by tourism, the heretofore undisputed and well-entrenched ideals of the 
unproblematic and genuine ‘Cretan way of life’ will be irrevocably lost in the place of 
which foreign influences will be manufactured. Of that romantic, innocent and 
homogenous period of a well-established, unthreatened and unchallenged identity 
building process which should be carefully and by all means and at all costs guarded 
and preserved, the rhetoric continued, what is now exactly at the edge or in danger of 
being dissolved, is above all, pride. The restoration project and the concomitant 
aesthetic domination and gardening of the town, therefore, have all created or 
contributed to the construction of an identity which is servile and docile, and which is 
highly irreconcilable and incommensurable with the original poetic denigrations and 
myths on the back of which many generations of Cretans were bred and acculturated.
What the axiom of choice has come thus to offer is a mathematical formula, that is, 
the ontological grounds that allows to avoid such a strict and one-dimensional choice 
between the two periods -  servility and non-servility -  letting, in other words, a 
choice to take place without actually choosing or without inscribing a rule of choice. 
In the light of this, the axiom of choice is at the service of a subject which trembles, 
stutters, and hesitates before any decision, deforming the integrity of identities and 
escaping the binary rigidities and oppositions between a spontaneous/poetic subject 
and a docile servant of foreign capital. The axiom of choice states that from a 
collection of sets that include at least one element (non-empty), a selection of 
elements of each set, despite of the infinity of multiples, can be subtracted. As Badiou
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(2005: 224) puts it “for every existent multiple a, there corresponds an existent 
function, which ‘chooses’ a representative in each of the multiples which make up a: 
(Va) (Ef) [( |3 ea)> f(p )eb ]”.
Without having to dip into formal/mathematical logic, suffice it to distinguish the 
following stages of the thought of intervention. First, there is a multiple x which 
belongs to the site X, “unpresented element of the presented one of the site” (Badiou, 
2005: 204). Second, there is a signifier of x, that is, the ex, whose only limitation is 
that “the name of the event must emerge from the void” (Badiou, 2005: 205). Third, 
since it remains difficult to subtract a name for the event from the situation, the only 
possibility would be to apply a proper name of the kind ‘it belongs to the site’. Fourth, 
the choice of intervention interrupts the state of law inasmuch as what is selected as a 
name for the event is subtracted from the unpresented multiples of the situation. We 
know, however, that the name belongs to the site (e.g. servility vs non-servility) but 
the situation (e.g. the broader social context of Rethemnos) does not recognize these 
terms (we have already seen a dispute of this kind in terms of the liar-episode). There 
are people, of course, who depend on the situation (e.g. the shopkeepers) but the state 
of Rethemnos is defiant of such an intervention (e.g. the fact that Rethemniot identity 
is actually servile, non-poetic, corrupted). The intervention, in other words, can be 
recognized only by its consequences -  that is by the events that follow once a dispute 
(Is the tourist crisis happening?) takes place. This is why “It will, therefore, always 
remain doubtful whether there has been an event or not except to those who intervene, 
who decide its belonging to the situation” (Badiou, 2005: 207). And thus the differend 
(Lyotard, 1988): is the liar accusation about the shopkeepers or about the number of 
the tourists?
As was already shown, the Twoness of the affirmative/responsible ultra-one was 
founded upon the prohibition of being when it comes to an event. The interventional 
choice constitutes also “an originary Two, an interval of suspense, the divided effect 
of a decision” (Badiou, 2005: 206-207). From the standpoint of the state (the 
commodification/corruption of Rethemnos) the intervention of the Two of affirmation 
and responsibility (Is the crisis happening or is it a lie?) remains unacknowledged and 
hard to encapsulate. The intervention for its part “is a line drawn from one
242
paradoxical multiple, which is already circulating, to the circulation of another, a line 
which scratches out [...] a diagonal of the situation” (Badiou, 2005: 210). A choice, 
in other words, does not have necessarily to choose in the strict sense of the term (e.g. 
one does not have to admit that the tourist crisis is happening). An intervention is pure 
alterity just like the liar-episode and the advice-episode portrayed above through the 
ultra-one of the Two of affirmation and responsibility are open from the off to 
differance and spacing. It is on the back of such a groundless ground that an 
intervention need no longer be in-scribed by way of a rule of choice in Rethemnos.
That the intervention of the evental ultra-one of the Two (affirmation/responsibility- 
liar-event/advice-event) is based upon the fuzziness and undecidability of the 
servile/non-servile event, which remains to be decided on whether it signals a period 
of pride (poetics, meaning, shame, honour) or a period of corruption (official time, 
commodification, monumentalization) is what ontology allows us to think when it 
comes to an event. The axiom of choice is associated with the irreducible split 
between servility and non-servility, in exactly the same way the processive origami, 
taken up in Chapter 6, was about a disjoined split marking in the Old Town a non- 
dialectical understanding of a place’s identity beyond the anthropological strictures 
and constancies of history. On the face of the disjunctive logic of such an irreducible 
and incurable break between a servile subject and a non-servile subject, choice offers 
the ontological grounds on which an interruption without interruption takes hold.
For every servile or non-servile allegation (multiples), there is an interventional 
choice which chooses a representative of every multiple. Yet given that multiples 
refer to differences, prosthetic supplements, traces and unbreachable divisions, choice 
says nothing on how to choose a delegate, but only affirms the existence of a choice 
which crucially will not choose between two multiples. In Badiou’s words, “The 
axiom of choice juxtaposes to the existence of a multiple the possibility of its 
delegation without inscribing a rule for this possibility that could be applied to the 
particular form of the initial multiple” (Badiou, 2005: 227). For “there is a 
representative but it is impossible to know which one it is” (Badiou, 2005: 229). The 
Rethemniot subjectivity thus neither refers to a docile and servile subject nor to some 
poetic or revolutionary individual who resists monumental time. It involves, above all, 
the new that happens in a situation (e.g. the Rethemniots evaluation of tourism) under
243
the jurisdiction of a genuine Two (‘tourist crisis’ versus ‘liar’), which does not have to 
decide over an interruption (non-servile servility). The difference a non-servile 
multiplicity makes is, therefore, irreducible, uncalculated and undecidable for the 
evental ultra-one of Two, is not about a decision on whether tourism jeopardizes or 
not an already established poetic idealism, but about a moment that should be lived, 
however stressful it may sound, in all its indeterminacy.
When the subject is seen through the structural nostalgia of poetics, it is mistakenly 
taken as servile and a result of a place’s economic dependency on foreign capital, 
which corrupts the proud and hospitable character of the rebellious and undisciplined 
Cretans. Anthropological accounts, as was shown, conceive of the Mediterranean 
subject as being in the middle of such a crisis, between two periods which tirelessly 
fight each other (the proud and independent period of poetic non-servility and the 
period of corruption) and which turned the Rethemniot individual into the 
unbecoming social standing of a servant. In Herzfeld’s (1991) pointillistic account of 
social and monumental time, as was also shown, such a break takes the form of a 
clash between official and informal understandings of the Venetian past. Inversely, 
the non-servile servility drawn upon by way of the axiom of choice and through the 
deconstructive and decompressed event of an interruption-without-interruption, is 
obliged to refuse to choose between a servile subject and a non-servile subject. The 
period of servility should be rather taken as a mark that iterates, supplants and recites 
differences, always returning to the ungroundlessness of a foundational Other that 
bifurcates into the liar-episode and the advice-episode. The original and foundational 
ultra-one of affirmation and responsibility stands, therefore, neither for enmity 
(egoism/atomism) nor sympathy (altruism/friendship), but serves as the backcloth of a 
particular multiple that twists free of the allegations of servility. Choice, in short, in 
Badiou’s universe, is a mode of intervention through which a multiple exists without 
having to pick between an innocent period and a corrupted period of mass tourism. As 
Badiou (2005: 224) put it, “given a multiple of multiples, there exists a multiple 
composed of a ‘representative’ of each non-void multiple whose presentation is 
assured by the first multiple”. An intervention is required, therefore, in order to name 
a representative of each of the elements of sets (poetics, monumentalization, etc.), 
without having to admit or succumb, at the same time, to the logic and rhetoric of a 
Cretan identity of poetic, or honourific origin and ideals. The axiom of choice
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grounds ontologically a decision on the basis of which a subject will emerge that will 
stand for the unanticipated, uncalculated and unnameable other with reference to an 
affirmative responsibility that withdraws and resists the forced stabilization of 
servility. As Badiou (2005: 227) suggests “within ontology, the axiom o f choice 
formalizes the predicates o f  intervention”. But while “There is a representative, [...] it 
is impossible to know which one it is; to the point that this representative has no other 
identity than that of having to represent the multiple to which it belongs” (Badiou, 
2005: 229). To put it in a nutshell, choice simply states that “there are some 
interventions” (Badiou, 2005: 230).
I have been arguing so far that Rethemniot multiplicity is borne out of chaosmosis and 
must be subtracted from what is already available rather than represented, scripted, 
narrated or interpreted in a poetic or ethnographic fashion. On that score, relaying the 
Rethemniot subject as a docile subject that depends on foreign capital, or as a poetic 
rebellious individual that opposes formal interpretations and discourses of history, is 
ill-founded and sterile, because it fails to take into account the true difference that 
matters to subjects. By contrast, what deconstruction sets in motion, is the affirmation 
of an incalculable, rhythmical and antigenealogical difference, transgressing the 
binary determinations and permutations between servility and non-servility in favor of 
pluralistic, polysemic and affirmative deterritorializations that deform the 
Mediterraneanist representations of shame, honour, poetics, friends of the heart and 
the two-fold historical interpretations of social and monumental time. A non-servile 
servility is beyond such an illusory ambition of accomplishing and administering a 
comprehensive and durable identity. For identities, as was shown in Chapter 4, are 
currently swept up by the infinite procrastination and perpetual regret of relations of 
speed “below and above the threshold of perception” (Deleuze and Guattari, 1987: 
281). The period of servility thus is a non-reducible, non-finalized and imperceptible 
event bound to infinite substitution, and subject to the status of a suspended 
nomination, which withholds a decision between a servile subject and a poetic subject 
of non-servility. Servility, in other words, is a non-originary trace inconsisting in a 
non-dialectical manner that which returns, re-inscribes and reverses differences, that 
is, the non-being of an intervention amid the innocence of a poetic past and the 
innocuous stuttering and stammering unfamiliarity of a servile present that is to come 
and which seems to be strange, unfamiliar and hard to decode. Such is the resonance
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of a non-reductive servility, which obeys the deconstructive logic of interruption 
without interruption, and which is ontologically supported by the interventional 
formula of choice. Let us further illustrate the point with a snapshot that will span the 
above theorizations with an experience stemming from the field.
When I hired a taxi in the Old Town, the driver asked me if there was a problem with 
letting some more people on, as there were many tourists queuing for a taxi. Once a 
foreign couple waved, the driver got out of the taxi and opened the door for them, 
though by the moment he was back in his seat he was already explaining to me why 
he let them in. He went on defending himself, although no comment had been made 
by me, saying that ‘things have changed, and that tourists are only a few nowadays 
and that some years ago it was the tourists begging for a taxi’. The driver was making 
an attempt to be excused for adopting an attitude that in all likelihood should be at 
least considered inappropriate within the general Mediterraneanist problematic, trying 
to get rid of the burden of servility by making an appeal to the needs and scarcity of 
the current competitive economic context, and the fact that tourists were fewer in 
number.
But unlike any dialectical opposition and resolution of difference, en route from non­
servility to servility, the driver’s story above is constantly situated and reinstated 
always already before and/or after the servile-non servile boundary. It is neither a 
theological mark nor a linear or chronological periodization of a history of presence. 
The driver’s remarks intended to recite differences that are already postponed and 
suspended, subtracting, on the one hand, pride and affluence from the innocent period 
by explaining the needs of his profession and the discontents it generates, whilst, on 
the other hand, by reconstructing, re-inscribing and reversing pride in novel ways. For 
example, to the extent that tourists are fewer nowadays, servility must somehow be 
excused as the opening of the door was not necessary in the past because of the 
greater numbers of tourists and not because of the innate and untamed character of the 
Rethemniots. Seen through this theorization, servility is not a recognizable and 
discernible space/time break but a trace of non-origin, a differance that ceaselessly 
destabilizes on the move the absolute proximity of self-presence, domestication, and 
domesticity.
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The non-presence of the trace of servility allows the four-fold movement of difference 
-  the chiasmus (%) -  to hold sway first, by way of a doubly-folded exclusion (reversal: 
opening the door) and second, by recourse to a doubly-folded affirmation 
(reinscription: the tourist/crisis-fewer/tourists). Servility thus is a mark always already 
broached by difference, a condition of the non-possibility of choice between 
interruption and non-interruption. Such is the resonance of the ontology of choice, 
which comes by means of the ultra-one of Two, and in association with the liar- 
episode and the advice-episode. The difference between the two periods is neither 
dialectical nor transitional, nor is it about an economic crisis. Even if it were about a 
crisis, it would involve a crisis of crisis, a crisis of versus and contradiction, a crisis, 
in short, folded around other crises. The decision between servility and non-servility 
is an instance of procrastination “always an undecidable and irreducible double [...] It 
suspends itself between these two possibilities; as these two possibilities” (Doel, 
1992: 166). Neither teleological closure nor ontological presence but the making 
possible of their dis-articulation, which affirms the experience of the impossible, a 
radical experience o f ‘perhaps’ (Derrida, 1992).
The axiom of choice forms an exemplary basis, therefore, in order to think or reflect 
on an event named after an intervention, without taking sides, and without naming or 
subjecting the event to the oneness, void and infinity of being. For the subject, as 
Badiou argues, is always on the side of truth. In his words, “I term subject any local 
configuration of a generic procedure from which a truth is supported” (Badiou, 2005: 
391). Truth, however, is global and infinite while the subject is local and finite. It is 
not for nothing, therefore, that I preferred to focus on truth procedures rather than on 
identity and represenation, for a subject that deserves such a name, is a process 
through which a multiple is forced from a current situation to be faithfully connected 
to the newness of a situation to come. Yet knowledge fails to decide over the truth’s 
belonging and it is by way of what Badiou calls forcing -  the fundamental law of the 
subject -  that the connection between subject and truth becomes possible. As Badiou 
(2005: 406) avers “A subject is a knowledge suspended by a truth whose finite 
moment it is”.
The ontology of forcing as Badiou (2005: 412) himself admits is too ‘calculatory’ to 
be exposed here. I shall return to the logic of forcing directly below, but not to its
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technique or formal/mathematical writing. Suffice it to note for the moment, that a 
truth is followed by a subject in that it is affirmed by a generic procedure opened up 
by an event named after an intervention. Accordingly, “A subject is much rather taken 
up in fidelity to the event, and suspended from truth; from which it is forever 
separated by chance” (Badiou, 2005: 406). The subject thus is a militant which 
decides from the side of the undecidable -  whose ontological situation is the 
indiscernible -  over a situation’s generic multiple -  which occurs after the event of an 
intervention -  about whether or not it constitutes the true in a situation to come. It 
should be clear by now why the metaphysical ethnographies of poetics are 
unbecoming and indifferent; for the chance Badiou talks about, which separates truth 
and subject, would never had a chance of happening therein.
A non-servile servility which was taken up above due to the undecidability of the 
interval between the already divided and withheld decision of the liar-event, the 
advice-event and the servility-event, is now ready to materialize. What is required to 
take things further is to compose the generic multiple on the side of which the 
Mediterranean subject is to emerge. Again the strategy would be to expose and 
carefully unfold Badiou’s laborious following of the mathematician Paul Cohen’s 
continuum hypothesis, on whose thought I slightly touched in the introduction of the 
present chapter. I will be then in a position to pick the Rethemniot multiplicity, in a 
way which will, ultimately, swerve away from the domestic images of 
Mediterraneanism, bearing always in mind that we are in the middle of process, at the 
other receiving end of which, a subject may be waiting.
9.5 Undecidability: The Matheme of the Indiscernible -  The Discount-Episode
I have argued so far, that the subject is indiscernible and that any poetic or
ethnographic inquiry cannot unfold what really matters to subjects. The indiscernible, 
therefore, is not going to represent a subject but must be constructed by way of a 
generic multiple of a truth, forced after the naming of an event which trembles and 
stutters before indecision. I have already shown that the event, the ultra-one of Two 
(affirmation/responsibility: liar-episode/advice-episode: the axiom of foundation) and 
the stuttering indecision of an interruption without interruption (non-servile-servility: 
the axiom of choice) potentialize and actualize various multiplicities with respect to
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such a wholly other. Of this same process, a variety of other pieces, fragments and 
occurrences are now to emerge with respect to the undecidable. When it comes to 
truth ontology can hardly deliver a concept or make space for a true difference; yet it 
can think of being and to that extent, ontology that is the theory of pure multiple, is 
crucial in understanding how the experience of the subject is transformed. 
Accordingly, what needs further unpacking is to construct, though not necessarily to 
define or name, such an indiscernible place within which a subject can be firmly de­
posited.
The matheme of the indiscernible allows Badiou to think the way in which, from an 
already established and fully deployed situation, a truth, that is, a generic extension of 
a statement-multiple, can be subtracted -  by forcing -  in order to verify the new in a 
situation to come. It is Godel’s constructible hypothesis (the incompleteness theorem 
which says that a theory cannot prove its own efficiency) that permits Badiou to 
move, from the indiscernible to the undecidable. I am not going to refer to this 
complex mathematical construction despite it being a pivotal step in Badiou’s 
ontology in his attempt to think of the undecidable. It takes, however, a more careful 
and painful approach to stipulate the mathematical formula of the indiscernible, which 
arguably points in the direction of the true difference I am engaging in so far. That the 
Rethemniot subject should be founded -  that is its place and the territory it occupies -  
on the side of truth without having to be interpreted or represented in a poetic fashion, 
is what I have been striving to establish so far. That the subject, moreover, of shame, 
honour, friendship, poetics, and womanhood is about differences, does not simply 
qualify for the true or generic multiple by way of which the new will be forced in a 
situation to come after being named by an intervention, unless it is specified which 
are the differences that matter to such a process which deserves the name of the 
subject.
A truth procedure requires “thinking the relation -  which is rather a non-relation -  
between, on the one hand, a post-evental fidelity, and on the other hand, a fixed state 
of knowledge, or what I term below the encyclopaedeia of the situation” (Badiou, 
2005: 327). Such an encyclopaedia, can be easily found in Rethemnos in the 
Archaeology Service, which houses the documentation and the files regarding the 
Venetian properties and their restoration; it is the encyclopaedia per se from which
249
the generic multiple, according to what I have already presented will, finally, deliver 
the infinite, un-nameable and bound to a post-evental fidelity, subject. That I take the 
Archaeology Service as a historical situation and a possible evental site does not, 
necessarily, mean that it is the only possible way to come to terms with a structured 
situation in Rethemnos. Given however, that I heavily focused on how the built 
environment changes with reference to a full-blown consumer society and how the 
restoration project shapes and reflects the geography of the town, and given, 
moreover, that the Old Town is pronounced a scheduled monument, which means that 
any possible information concerning the built environment should be contained in 
there, the Archaeology Service is a useful site on the back of which the undecidable 
may be subtracted. It is not a representative site, therefore, and is not meant to 
constitute the only historical situation within which events, subjects and identities 
merge. It resonates, however, with the previous theorization and the manner in which 
the preceding conceptualizations were glued together in accomplishing a differential 
unfolding of the Old Town problem, exposing in a very formal manner everything one 
should know of the Old Town problem.
In our effort to construct the indiscernible, it is crucial to be able to ‘distinguish’ in a 
situation the multiples that are not discerned from the standpoint of the encyclopaedia 
and which, hopefully, will be those multiples to which a generic fidelity will be 
ultimately assigned. Veridical, as Badiou (2005: 332), has already proposed, is what is 
controlled by knowledge, whereas true is what is controlled by the event and the 
intervention. The question, accordingly, “is the following: on what condition can one 
be sure that set of terms of the situation which are positively connected to the event is 
in no manner already classified within the encyclopaedia of the situation?” (Badiou, 
2005: 336). The answer seems to rest on the multiples that given a certain enquiry, 
avoid determination from the standpoint of the situation, for, “There is no reason, in 
any case, for an enquiry not to exist which is such that the multiples positively 
evaluated therein by the operator of faithful connection form a finite part which 
avoids a determinant; the reason being that an enquiry, in itself, has nothing to do 
with any determinant whatsoever” (Badiou, 2005: 337). The above comes down to 
saying that the definition of truth is “the infinite positive total [...] o f a procedure o f  
fidelity which, for each and every determinant o f the encyclopaedia, contains at least 
one enquiry which avoids it” (Badiou, 2005: 338, italics in original). And thus
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“everything hangs on the possibility of the existence of a generic procedure of 
fidelity” (Badiou, 2005: 339). By picking up on the Archaeology Service I hope to be 
able to stress the baselessness and undecidability of a generic fidelity of a post-evental 
occurrence, that hesitates before a non-servile-servility and which will be, finally, true 
rather than poetic, generic rather than shameful, affirmative rather than honourific, 
responsible rather than egoistic and genuine rather than hospitable. Before turning to 
the encyclopaedia of the Archaeology Service, however, the indiscernible should be 
constructed.
I have established that an intervention, drawn upon the axiom of choice and the non- 
servile-servility, implies an inconsistent multiplicity founded originally by the ultra- 
one of Two that is, the liar-event and the advice-event, once affirmation and 
responsibility take over. What remains to be seen is whether such inconsistent 
multiplicities are compatible with a generic fidelity bound to a truth procedure in such 
a manner which will avoid any determination from the standpoint of the 
encyclopaedia. I have already argued that the Archaeology Service is such an 
encyclopaedia, but the question remains whether ontology can think a generic 
multiple, which is to say, an unnameable, un-constructible, and indiscernible multiple. 
To make sense, therefore, of the manner in which the knowledge of the Archaeology 
Service nourishes such a multiple that may, depending on the enquiry, produce the 
undecidable and true difference beyond shame, honour, and poetics is the task of the 
present section. Again this is not going to be, strictly speaking, an interpretation or a 
represenation of the Rethemniot identity but will only, by way of truth, indicate the 
real difference that allows and makes space for a generic subject. Moreover, the way 
Cohen’s mathematics are taken up below, I should stress once again, are far from easy 
to comprehend, but still I believe worthy of giving it a try and making something of 
them.
The symbol for this unnamable indiscernible is the symbol 2 [generic multiple (G)]. 
Badiou acknowledges that “the possible filling in of its absence -  the construction of 
its concept -  can only be a procedure, a procedure which must operate inside the 
domain of the nameable of the fundamental situation” (Badiou, 2005: 356). There is 
thus a multiple, on the basis of which the indiscernible will emerge as part of the 
situation S, and which is termed a “quasi-complete situation” (Badiou, 2005: 357). In
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the quasi-complete situation, certain multiples are conditioned -  but not named -  by 
the language of the situation in order “that the multiple thus described and composed 
cannot be named or discerned in the original quasi-complete situation” (Badiou, 2005: 
357). Let us term one of such conditions that transmits information on the 
indiscernible a multiple n. As Badiou put it “a correct set 2 will be generic for S if, 
for any domination D which belongs to S we have D n  J  ^ 0  (the intersection of D 
and $ is not empty)” (Badiou, 2005: 370). The above needs, however, careful 
elaboration and further unpacking.
The indiscernible necessitates the existence in a situation (S) of a multiple which 
functions in a double way, first, as the basic material for the indiscernible and second, 
as a vector of information of what belongs to it. “The hope is that certain groupings of 
conditions, conditions which are themselves, conditioned in the language o f the 
situation, will make it possible to think that a multiple which counts these conditions 
as one is incapable, itself, of being discernible” (Badiou, 2005: 357). The 
indiscernible thus will be found to exist but without having to be named from the 
standpoint of the situation. Let us call S2 the set of values 'for a fixed supposed 
indiscernible” (Badiou, 2005: 358). The multiple S should verify the axioms of set 
theory, separation and replacement, and should be also transitive and infinite (Badiou, 
2005: 359, 360). Arguably “the striking paradox of our undertaking is that we are 
going to try to name the very thing which is impossible to discern. We are searching 
for a language for the unnameable” (Badiou, 2005: 376).
To the extent that the being of truth exists, truth can be thought. Following Badiou’s 
take on Cohen’s strategy, as was shown above, we can now agree on the following. 
There is a situation, called the quasi-complete situation, and which includes the 
indiscernible; there are conditions that de-limit the quasi-complete situation, 
determining in a double way the indiscernible once through the material conditions 
and once again through the information they transmit for the indiscernible; there is 
also a correct subset or a part 6 of the set of conditions that is able to perform such a 
double function, which will be axiomatically defined by a set of rules that specify it; 
and there are rules of conditions that determine that a set of conditions does not 
belong to the correct subset 6.
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Now, domination, which holds a key role in the construction of the indiscernible, is “a 
set of conditions such that any condition outside the domination is dominated by at 
least one condition inside the domination” (Badiou, 2005: 369). As Badiou (2005: 
370) points out “the idea is that, in S, the correct part 2> intersecting every 
domination, contains, for every property supposed to discern it, one condition (at 
least) which does not possess this property”. Let us pursue the latter in a more detailed 
manner. In a quasi-complete situation there exists a multiple S which a) verifies all 
the axioms of set theory, b) verifies the axioms of infinite sets, c) is transitive and d) 
is infinite but denumerable. A set of conditions is “a multiple % of the fundamental 
situation S which is destined to possibly belong to the indiscernible 2 (the function of 
material) and, whatever, the case, may be, to transmit some ‘information’ about this 
indiscernible which will be a part of the situation S” (Badiou, 2005: 262). That 
information is given in terms of an indiscernible multiple means simply that a 
condition ia is stronger than a condition n2. The principle of compatibility states that 
contradictory information cannot be given once we have established that one set is 
stronger than another. Suffice it to say thus that a set of conditions © (© G S)
comprises “a. A set of sets noted ni, Tt2, Kn [...] b. If ni [is an extension of] t z 2 , we
will say that the condition tt2 dominates the condition ni [...] c. Two conditions are 
compatible if they are dominated by the same third condition [...] d. Every condition 
is dominated by two conditions which are incompatible themselves [...]” (Badiou, 
2005: 364). The above four-fold conditioning of the indiscernible reads in the 
following way: “Statement a formalizes that every condition is material for the 
indiscernible; statement b that we can distinguish more precise conditions; statement c 
that the description of the indiscernible admits a principle of coherency; statement d  
that there are real choices in the pursuit of the description” (Badiou, 2005: 365).
A correct set of conditions will be, accordingly, “a set of conditions which aim at the 
one-multiple of a part 6 of ©” (Badiou, 2005: 365). The two rules of correction that 
define the ‘rightness’ of such a correct set will be Rdi stating that “if a condition 
belongs to this set then all the conditions that the first condition dominates also belong 
to it” (Badiou, 2005: 366), and Rd2 declaring that “given two conditions of 6, there 
exists a condition of 6 which dominates both of them” (Badiou, 2005: 366). In 
Badiou’s (2005: 367) words again, which deserve to be quoted at length,
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“Take a correct set o f conditions 6. It is part of ©, it obeys the rules R dl and Rd2. Moreover, it is 
discernible, and it coincides with what is separated, within © by a formula X [...] In particular for a 
condition nl G 8, we have two dominating conditions, j v 2 and t z 3 which are incompatible between 
themselves. The rule Rd2 o f correct parts prohibits two incompatible conditions from both belonging to 
the same correct part. It is therefore necessary that either n2 or n3 does not belong to 5. Let’s say that 
it’s 7t2 . Since the property X discerns 8, and z2  does not belong to 8, it follows that n2 does not possess 
the property expressed by X. We thus have: ~X (n2). We arrive at the following result, which is decisive 
for the characterization o f an indiscernible: if  a correct part 8 is discerned by a property X, every 
element of 8 (every 7r e d) is dominated by a condition n2 such that ~X (n2y\
Such a mathematic logic put forward by Cohen and reproduced by Badiou, needs 
additional and sufficient philosophical unpacking -  though I cannot explain any 
further the formal logic a bit too typologically exhibited above. Herzfeld’s version of 
Venetian history, as was shown, maintains that there is a distinction between social 
conceptions of history and bureaucratic interpretations of history; and that a socially 
embedded poetic history is subversive of the nationalist discourses promoted by the 
Statist ideology that takes the Venetian history as the only history that matters in 
town. Yet the bureaucrat (the Statist ideology/identity) whether in Athens or in 
Rethemnos is ceaselessly involved in a perpetual negotiation of difference; and it is 
such a multiplication and potentialization of the interimplication between the resident 
(the poetic identity) and the bureaucrat (the Statist identity) that matter with respect to 
the undecidable Rethemniot subject (resident of Rethemnos versus Athens-based 
bureaucrat; Rethemnos-based bureaucrat versus resident of Rethemnos; Rethemnos- 
based bureaucrat versus Athens-based bureaucrat). While a part-time archeologist told 
me once that ‘you know you are in Greece’, meaning that I should not expect much 
from the organization of the Archaeology Service’s files, what I suggest now is that 
local bureaucracy is always already contaminated, intoxicated and invaginated by the 
informality, fluidity, sliding and ‘weaknesses’ of the Rethemniot life world. The 
bureaucrat of Rethemnos, in other words, if this is at stake in terms of the formal 
history of the town is “always already becoming-other, becoming-undecidable and 
becoming-imperceptible” (Doel, 2000: 122), for even if bureaucracy is hugely 
ineffective and problematic in Greece, especially in the manner in which monumental 
time is construed by the manipulative and proselytizing mechanisms of the Greek 
state, it nonetheless remains contestable whether the bureaucrat is the rational, 
absolute and totalitarian figure, the Mediterraneanist imaginary assumes.
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It is conceivable, therefore, that a ‘good’ side of bureaucracy is always implicated in 
the ‘bad’ side of it, like a Mobius bands which ploughs, complicates, remarks and 
reinscribes the inside into the outside and the outside into the inside. What matters, 
accordingly, in mapping the contested history and trajectory of the manifold 
multiplicity of Rethemnos “is the fissure: the necessity of interval, the harsh law of 
spacing” (Derrida, 1976: 200). Formal and informal relationships, the bureaucrat and 
the resident, social and monumental times are always already enmeshed and caught 
up within a general network of relational flows and innumerable lines of flight that are 
anonymous, uprooted and unattached. A choreographic ethnography, by implication, 
is neither poetic, nor domestic. The binary oppositions of the formal/informal 
rigidities and the grist of typical/atypical dilemmas of social history versus 
monumental time are unbecoming and indifferent, precisely because they insist on the 
fixities, constancies and identities of a domestic identity, whereas in the aftermath of 
deconstruction, schizoanalysis and the ethnography of the event, everything is out of 
joint (Derrida, 1994). The differential processive subjectivity of the indiscernible 
subjectivation amid conditions of chaos and osmosis will come to undo and unsettle 
the politics of separation, negativity and contradiction preventing and blocking them 
from taking place.
For difference, as was already argued, has nothing to do with identity. Instead 
“difference is a process o f involution and ex-tension, not a calibration o f deviation or 
distance [...] DIFFERENCE GROWS” (Doel, 1993: 379). To be worthy of such a 
formless ground, therefore, on which difference should be written but in a way 
through which it will allow difference to be simply given over to the fragility of 
heterology, dedomestication, deconstruction, disintegration and the non-calculation of 
‘dromology’ (from the Greek dromos, way/race) (Virilio, 1991) is what I will be 
construing below. In other words, I will argue that one cannot have an identity 
without having at the same time a certain speed, vibration, dis-articulation, writing, 
sliding supplement, differentiation, trace, prosthesis, supplement, and a graphe -  be it 
either the corruption of mass-tourism or the strict official and ethnocentric perceptions 
of the Venetian past. Failing to acknowledge that alterity, ambivalence and usurpation 
have already begun, comes down to saying that one leans toward an 
ontotheoteleological understanding of identity, reducing the metamorphic deformation
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of difference to the poetic equivalence, shameful stabilization, pointillistic integration 
and permanent solidity of Mediterraneanism.
Defamilialization and defamiliarization are the rule rather than a deviance of a 
standard model that deliberately produces in Rethemnos identities, similarities, 
homologies and rigities. The Rethemniot individual is neither about the bureaucrat 
(one) nor about the resident (other) nor about the masses/tourists (many). It is neither 
pure good nor ultimate and transparent evil, but that which has been already given 
over to the affirmative and expressive lines of flight that avoid representation, 
internalization, crystallization, permanence and sameness. It is worthwhile recalling 
here with Deleuze and Guattari (1987: 103) that “Tow will never find  a homogeneous 
system that is not still or already affected by a regulated, continuous, immanent 
process o f variation”. Hence the fact that it is hard to tell whether Rethemnos is a 
bureaucratic space or a domestic place exploited by the recent commodification of the 
Old Town that ignores and neglects the needs of the inhabitants. The differential 
repetition and continuous variation of difference whose effective spacing I will try not 
to be staved off, is now surrendered to becoming-bureaucrat, becoming-resident, 
becoming-otherwise. For Rethemnos, as was already mentioned, is not what you 
think; and like a Body without Organs, one may say, it is “what remains when you 
take everything away. What you take away is precisely the phantasy and 
significations as a whole” (Deleuze and Guattari, 1987: 151).
The identities of the bureaucrat and the resident are blended, mixed and superimposed 
and thus rather than representing identities, one should start reckoning with such an 
identification processes as the one advanced by Badiou, which leads astray and leaks 
in all possible directions. It is at this juncture that the matheme of the indiscernible 
resonates with the philosophy of difference. Let me further illustrate the point with a 
snapshot joggled due to my field experience. On one occasion in the Archaeology 
Department’s bookshop, I wanted to buy Dimakopoulos’s (1977) book on the 
Venetian houses of Rethemnos. A 50% discount is usually applied to Archaeology 
students, but when I complained that Geography students should also have the same 
discount, the clerk cynically replied that if I wanted the discount I could get it by 
having someone from the 28th Inspectorate of Byzantine and Postbyzantine 
Antiquities -  which replaced the small and less autonomous branch that existed in
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Rethemnos, part of the 13 Inspectorate based on Herakleion -  making a call for me. 
Given that I knew many of the employees of the Archaeology Department, where I 
spent time searching the files and studying the changes, renovations and restorations 
of the Venetian properties, I finally, had someone from the Department to make the 
call. It was then that the clerk insisted that the discount was 40%! Since I was with the 
person who was making the call, I intervened and reminded the bookseller that the 
discount was 50% -  this was, actually, the discount I finally received.
Ontology can help us to unfold the consequences of the above occurrence. As I have 
already proposed, the bureaucratic network is not as homogeneous as it is often 
assumed by theories that overemphasize the embeddedness, domestication, 
territorialization and transparency of a place’s identity. The power-hierarchies, routes, 
rhizomes, and informal connections between the folds of the resident and the 
bureaucrat are manifold events of interconnectivity, and this is why there is a need for 
a careful reconstruction of identity beyond territorial conceptualizations. Making 
sense of the subject requires, therefore, a rigorous reconsideration of the flows and 
connections, and the rhizomes and folds that are by and large, non-organizational, 
non-constant, non-integral and non-originary, but instances or performances that cut 
across the body of the informal and atypical economy of Greece in a diagonal manner 
traversing and deconstructing both the inside (rebellious resistance from the side of 
local history) and the outside (official/bureaucratic conceptions from the side of the 
state).
Thinking the subject through such a true procedural intervention is possible on the 
face of what we have already established, that is, the axiom of choice (non-servile 
servility), and the ultra-one of Two (liar-event/advice-event) which will now inconsist 
in the encyclopaedia of Rethemnos. It is worth recalling with Badiou (2005: 355) that 
“any truth is post-evental” and that it “escapes ontology”, insofar as it “comes from 
the standpoint of an undecidable supplementation”. Mapping the indiscernible on the 
grounds of the blended performances of the bureaucrat and the resident in the wake of 
the conflict over the Venetian history of the town offers, therefore, a more fruitful and 
productive grasp of the undecidability, fuzziness, and excrescence of the differences 
and simulacras which emerge with respect to the traces a subject leaves behind. And 
thus the discount-event is given over now to an undecidable multiple, on whose true
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side the Rethemniot multiplicity will comfortably sit. For any straightforward, 
hierarchical, immediate and linear relationship from the local to the global, from the 
resident to the bureaucrat or from bottom to top, should be always seen with 
suspicion. Hence the bureaucratic-apparatus is connected to the informal-apparatus 
and the official history-apparatus is connected to the poetic imaginary. The 
indiscemibility and ambivalence of such manifold trajectories and multiplicities 
curve, complicate, intervene and multiply differences, rather than simply interpret or 
represent identities in a unitary fashion. The clerk suggested that I should have the 
discount, after the intervention of the phone-call, but then attempted to reduce it to 
40%. Formal agencies get to grips with the current need to adjust to the highly 
dynamic socio-economic environment by way of exception (it will only happen once), 
which means that the formality of the bureaucratic-rule (which specifies who is 
eligible for a discount) is only temporarily disarticulated or disabled. The discount- 
event, points in the direction of such a disarticulation calling the impasse of ontology 
when it comes to presentation and represenation, belonging and inclusion, being and 
event and structure and metastructure. The discount that was originally refuted but 
was finally given on condition and due to the external intervention of the supervisor, 
seems to be an entry point, through which the count of inclusion surpasses belonging, 
a multiple of subsets no longer belongs to the initial set, and representation traverses 
presentation. It is necessary, therefore, to return to Badiou (2005: 362) and what he 
termed k, a condition of the situation S (the Archaeology Service), which belongs to 
the indiscernible (the trace the discount-event leaves behind), aiming at the discount- 
event on the basis of which a multiplicity will allow the undecidable to be subtracted. 
To draw the fuzzy boundaries within which the true difference that matters to subjects 
lies, means to follow its traces as it unfolds and deconstructs, in a fully deployed 
historical situation composed of evental sites, of which the encyclopaedia, knows 
nothing.
As previously stated, Badiou’s (2005: 356) quasi-complete situation should satisfy at 
least “a multiple which is very rich in properties (it ‘reflects’ a significant part of 
general ontology) yet very poor in quantity (it is denumerable)”. And as was also 
mentioned above, a set of conditions assigns the indiscernible to a four-fold 
conditioning: “every condition is material, [...] we can distinguish more precise
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conditions, [...] the description of the indiscernible admits a principle of coherency, 
[...] there are real choices in the pursuit of the description” (Badiou, 2005: 365).
In the light of the above, the discount-episode can be further unpacked in the 
following manner. It involves a certain materiality (the body-politic in the form of the 
personnel of the Archaeology Service), specificity and particularity in terms of the 
discount (Archaeology students deserve the discount), coherence in terms of what the 
event stands for (students should be granted affordable access to the encyclopaedia) 
and last but not least, real choices (one can accept the reduced discount or let it go). 
The axiomatization of a correct set of conditions, symbolized after Badiou (2005: 
366) Rd, when brushed against the above background includes two rules of correction. 
The first rule Rdi stating that if “a condition belongs to this set then all the conditions 
that the first condition dominates also belong to it” (Badiou, 2005: 366), which in our 
case reads nl and will go in the following way: for every Archaeology student, the 
50% discount should be granted; and the second rule, Rd2 of a correct set 8 stating 
that “given two conditions of 8, there exists a condition of 8, which dominates both of 
them” (Badiou, 2005: 366), which in our case will read k2 and goes as follows: not all 
students deserve the discount. A third condition ix3 is now possible on the face of the 
above stating the following: not everyone deserves the discount.
Let us fix the terminology, but in a linear kind of manner for the sake of convenience. 
There is a quasi-complete situation S, which should obey, according to Badiou, a 
four-fold conditioning. It should name a set of condition © constituted by conditions 
nl, n2, and n3 whose correct part 8 may aim at the indiscernible on the basis of Rdi 
and Rd2. Given that the principle of choice states that “every condition is dominated 
by two incompatible conditions” (Badiou, 2005: 367), one of the n2, n3 should not 
belong to the property X, which is the property that names the discernible, because 
Rd2 prohibits incompatible conditions from belonging to the same property. It should 
be 7T2 that does not belong to the property X and thus points in the direction of the 
indiscernible. Let us see why. First of all, it is such a statement that does not specify 
who deserves the discount. Second, en route from the strictest condition ni (only 
Archaeology students are eligible for a discount) to the less strict n2 and n3, the last 
two are dominating but incompatible. They are dominating because they satisfy and 
obey the first condition, but they are incompatible inasmuch as the second one does
259
not belong to X (the property which specifies who is eligible for a discount), and 
which allows the discernible to exist. Third, the second statement by claiming that not 
all students should have the discount is close to something unknown. Fourth, the third 
statement in its generality is also discernible, in that it states that not everyone may 
appeal for a discount for it is common sense to know that any given discount is set 
always and works by discrimination (e.g. only students, only men’s wear, only the 
summer collection etc.). To recap, in an attempt to trace the generic multiple of the 
indiscernible discount-event, I wanted to come to terms with an event without name 
or classification. The axiom of choice suggests that for every property X which 
discerns a correct set 8 for the discernible, there has to be also a statement which is 
un-determined and does not satisfy the property X; for every element of 8, recall, is 
also dominated by ~X (the non-satisfaction of X). The correct part of the indiscernible 
intervention contains at least one condition that does not contain the property X (the 
principle which determines who gets the discount); which partly explains the original 
refusal of the clerk to offer the discount.
From the standpoint of poetics, the resident and the bureaucrat comprise two separate 
individuals whose identificatory performances heavily contradict each other. By 
contrast, from the standpoint of the generic multiple, the a-signifying episode above 
“implicates one in the other, extends one into the other, and radicalizes each by way 
of the other” (Doel, 2003: 154). In the wake of such a generic multiple of the 
undecidable truth on the back of ontology, social histories and poetic individuals are 
subject to the disembedding and disencumbering mechanisms of a radical 
deterritorialization. The interventional-phone call says simply yes to that, which 
happens, following, in other words, the rhythmanalysis and differential repetitions of 
a smooth space of broken boundaries which unsettles and upsets bureaucracy beyond 
the rigidities, fixities and constancies of the same. Whether in the case of affirmation 
and responsibility (the ultra-one event of Two) or hesitating and stuttering before 
indecision (non-servile servility: the axiom of choice), a generic multiple will be 
ultimately called forth to bear upon the undecidability and becoming-otherwise of an 
inconsistent multiplicity, amidst the singularized and a-signifying discount that 
surges, through and due to its adestination, in the Archaeological Encyclopaedia.
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It should be clear by now why Mediterraneanist identities and their sedentary, 
unbecoming and pointillist nature deconstruct once the events of schizoanalysis and 
the consumer society hold sway. I have attempted to start engaging in such a 
deconstruction in Chapters 3, 4 and 5 first, by way of the counterfeit, which 
dismantled the accounts of the friends of the heart; second, by recourse to becoming- 
woman, which challenged and set in motion the poetics of womanhood; and third, by 
way of the speciality of use-value, and the spatial art of origami, which deconstructed 
spontaneity and the oppositional bureaucratic conceptions of history. What bounds 
together the instances above with the fidelity of a truth procedure of 
affirmation/responsibility (rather than the agonistic poetics of animal theft in Glendi) 
and the non-servile servility (rather than the social and monumental dichotomies) is 
the indiscernible, that is, the generic devotion and fidelity of a multiple which 
stubbornly enough remains without name or identity (Is the discount-event 
happening?). In the light of the above, the Rethemniot subject takes its full form 
bifurcating in the Twoness of the liar-episode and the advice-episode, on the face of 
the non-servile servility of a discount-event.
Is that theorization adequate or sufficient in order to explain what a subject is about? 
No, if the subject is taken up along the lines of representation and interpretation. Yes, 
if one takes seriously the subtractive universe of Badiou, in which the subject is a 
process or a “local configuration of a generic procedure from which truth is 
supported” (Badiou, 2005: 391). That truths exist does not mean, necessarily, that 
they are discernible from the standpoint of the situation, even if it is only on the basis 
of and by way of the indiscernible that the subject is attracted to truth; a process 
which Badiou calls “confidence” (Badiou, 2005: 397). Subjectivation, however, is 
beyond agonistic poetics and social-monumental dilemmas of history. It works chiefly 
as an operator, faithfully, connected to a discount that takes place in the Archaeology 
Service, that is, in the gap opened up by an affirmative/responsible ultra-one, which 
marks an interruption-without-interruption intervening in the middle of a 
servile/poetic dispute (Is the tourist-crisis happening or is it a lie?).
At this juncture it is worth quoting Badiou once again (2005: 401), and what he calls 
the necessity of the fundamental law of the subject.
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“if a statement of the subject-language is such that it will have been veridical for a situation in which a 
truth has occurred, this is because a term of the situation exists, which both belongs to that truth 
(belongs to the generic part which is that truth) and maintains a particular relation with the names at 
stake in the statement [...] it suffices to verify the existence of one term linked to the statement in 
question by a relation that is itself discernible in the situation. If such a term exists, then its belonging 
to the truth (to the indiscernible part which is the multiple-being of a truth) will impose the veracity of 
the initial statement within the new situation”.
One needs, in other words, to invent a term in order to name the relation between the 
subject’s statement -  post-evental fidelity to the discount-event of truth -  and the 
situation, that is, the Archaeology Service. Such a term will allow the subtraction of 
the undecidable from the indiscernible. It is such a relationship that Badiou (2005: 
403) calls “forcing” and by way of which he means three possible liaisons between 
the indiscernible and the undecidable: i) The statement cannot be forced, ii) The 
statement can be forced, iii) The forcing of a statement can be achieved, depending, 
however, on incalculable conditions and enquiries. One can argue, accordingly, that 
the truth procedure to which the Rethemniot multiplicity is subject, regarding the 
discount-event cannot be other than the third possibility. If it were for the first, the 
discount-event would lose legitimacy (Archaeology students only are eligible for the 
discount). If it were for the second possibility, all students would be given the 
discount, something however, which would erode both nl, k3 which are determined 
by the property X, which in turn has given us the indiscernible, that is the ~X(n2) -  the 
non-satisfaction of X (the fact that not all students can appeal for a discount). In the 
light of the above, forcing a statement in order to be realized in a situation to come 
depends on conditions exclusively determined by chance. For it is evidently, only by 
chance that the ultra-one of the Two hesitates before the stammering non-servile 
servility, which paves the way for an undecidable discount. The Rethemniot 
multiplicity, the traces of which I have attempted to map in several occasions in the 
preceding pages, beyond agonistic poetics, spontaneous spatializations and historical 
dilemmas, is precisely the subject “which decides the undecidable from the standpoint 
of an indiscernible” (Badiou, 2005: 407), once however, it is subtracted from the 
ontological language of the encyclopaedia of the Archaeology Service.
Forcing, as previously stated, is about linking the subject’s indiscemibility to the truth 
of a post-evental occurrence, in order for the new to be verified in a situation to come.
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As Badiou himself admits (2005: 412) “Cohen’s presentation of forcing is too 
‘calculatory’ to be employed here”. Consequently, I shall only refer to the general 
meaning of forcing rather than the formal logic of it. Let us see how Badiou reads 
Cohen’s formula. “Although an inhabitant of the situation does not know anything of 
the indiscernible and so of the extension, she is capable of thinking that the belonging 
of such a condition to a generic description is equivalent to the veracity of such a 
statement within the extension. It is evident that this inhabitant is in the position of a 
subject of truth: she forces veracity at the point of the indiscernible” (Badiou, 2005: 
411). A statement of the kind all students should be credited with the discount is not 
presented in the fundamental situation of the Archaeology Service, for it would be 
prohibited by %3 which says that not everyone should receive the discount. Yet for a 
statement such as 712 which says that not all students should have the discount another 
statement may also hold true, which says this time that there may be some students 
that may appeal for a discount. Let us call it X (pi) for if this is the undecidable from 
the standpoint of the generic multiple, it should deserve the name R $ (pi). As Badiou 
(2005: 411) points out “we are looking for [a] statement of the genre: ‘If in the 
situation, there is such a relation between some condition and the statement X (pi), 
then the belonging of these conditions to the part $ implies in the corresponding 
generic extension, the veracity of X (R $ Cm/ ) ) ” . It may be said, accordingly, that 712 is 
a condition that forces -  (written =) -  the statement X (pi); and that 712 belongs to the 
indiscernible $ (the discount-event) -  written 7r2 e $ -  verifying in such a way a 
statement which goes like this, there are some students that may appeal for a discount 
in the generic extension -  written S ($).
Without having to follow Badiou’s formal calculation of forcing, I am now in a 
position to point in the direction of the undecidable (Badiou, 2005: 427, 428), with 
respect to Rethemnos’ multiplicity and the territory it occupies on the side of a truth 
procedure en route from the affirmative responsibility of Two, through the 
intervention of a non-servile servility, to the indiscemibility and, ultimately, 
undecidability of the discount-event. Given a quasi-complete S (the Archaeology 
Service) there is a set of conditions © whose parts nl (archaeology students are 
eligible for a discount), itl (not all students are eligible for the discount) and 7c3 (not 
everyone is eligible for the discount) may avoid determination from the standpoint of 
the situation. What is generic, evidently, in the above encyclopaedia should not be
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calculated, predicted, prognosticated or named from the standpoint of the situation. 
The subject-inhabitant (the clerk) of the situation in the discount-episode is not able to 
tell which of the conditions-statements above make a hole in knowledge. The 
undecidable is that which names a subject in a generic extension but is not discerned 
therein. The statement there maybe some students that are eligible for the discount is 
the undecidable subtracted from the indiscernible discount-event, once it is 
acknowledged that not all students should be credited the discount. The relationship 
between the two statements above is an instance of forcing. It is clear that the former 
statement is something totally new, which cannot be predicted from the standpoint of 
the situation. In the light of the above, the indiscemibility which is evident in 712 is 
turned into the undecidability of X, (R $ (pi)) en route from n2 to the statement there 
may by some students who are eligible for a discount. In Badiou’s words “an 
undecidable statement of ontology is veridical therein, thus decided” (Badiou, 2005: 
428). Accordingly, the true Rethemniot subject bound to a post-evental occurrence 
(the discount-event) which was initially launched on the face of the ultra-one of Two 
amidst conditions of a stuttering intervention that hesitates before servility, is decided 
insofar as from the indiscernible, written ~X (7r2), the undecidable, written, X (R 5 
(pi)), is subtracted: some students may appeal for a discount -  and they do not have 
to be Archaeology students.
It should be stated once again, that the discount-event is not an equivalent of an 
identity or a representation. “As such, subjectivation is that through which a truth is 
possible” (Badiou, 2005: 393). The episode sketched out above therefore, either 
affects you or does not affect you. For it is possible to do justice to the ethics of the 
event once, however, the integrity and stability of poetics, shame, and honour are 
swept away. The discount-event departs from Mediterraneanist images of thought, 
and embarks on a form of thought which traverses and deconstructs both the inside 
and the outside of identity unleashing the spatiality and immanent relations that come 
between the holding formations of the bureaucrat and the resident, in the same way 
that an undecidable Mobius band opens up difference to continuous variation, 
differential repetition and infinite variability. For, a discount works both for and 
against a situation, without admitting to a hero, or a person and without preventing the 
possibility of a true intervention by separating and pinning down identities, and
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behaviours, that would have to pinch in turn on persons such as the resident, the 
bureaucrat, the student, etc.
The discount-event is beyond the constant knowledge of the identification processes 
of Mediterraneanist discourses. The subject, when brushed against the grain of such a 
subtraction, is a slightly phased differential and affirmative other that trembles, and 
stutters as it bathes in the indecision of a non-servile servility believing that “there is a 
truth and this belief occurs in the form of knowledge” (Badiou, 2005: 397). A subject 
is neither substance, nor point, nor experience, nor presentation, but difference always 
already displaced. The ethnography of the event thus into which I have been delving 
in the preceding pages draws upon a ‘way of being’ in which the ultra-one of 
affirmation and responsibility, the non-servile servility and the indiscernible of the 
discount-generic multiple deconsist. Hence the need to slacken the hold of 
Mediterraneanism in order for something else to come to pass. Once Rethemnos, 
therefore, is set in motion through origami (Chapter 6), and the division between the 
repressed and the seduced (Chapter 7) and an irreducibly undecidable truth is called 
forth, the poetic and honourable individuals and the spontaneous and parasitic socio- 
spatial structures no longer hold sway. The legitimate discount, as was shown above, 
is undecidable (despite the clerk’s effort to the contrary) and the subject that deserves 
such a discount (or such a name), however passionately the encyclopaedia refused to 
be submitted to its seductive sliding and heterogeneity, is a boundary already 
crisscrossed -  and so is identity; and yet one should be confident that truth is still 
possible (Badiou, 2005: 393). The discount-event is disadjusted and dislocated, an 
indefinite, incomplete and suspended chaosmos whose hinges are dislodged and led 
astray by the fierce monumentalization process that sutured the town 40 years ago. 
The undecidable discount, however, sets in motion the Rethemniot identity, blocking 
any naive appeal to social times, monumental restrictions, and poetic excellence 
insofar as any difference is irreducible, unnameable and unclassified. On the back of 
the consumer society and the drift of differential repetitions (eternal return), 
schizoanalysis (becoming-woman), origami, (the folding, unfolding and refolding of 
social space) and the counterfeit (non-reciprocal exchange) such a discount affirms a 
truth which remains to come.
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Can the above be taken as the true, real and authentic difference that matters in the 
Mediterranean region? Is it a theory that predicts the manner in which differences 
should be mapped? Is it the only way to acknowledge how subjects act and perform 
amidst the highly changing socio-spatial context of Rethemnos? I can only say that it 
is impossible to define what a subject is once truth is at stake. After all as Badiou 
acutely (2005: 399) noticed, “It is quite impossible to anticipate or represent a truth, 
because it manifests itself solely through the course of the enquiries, and the enquiries 
are incalculable; they are ruled, in their succession, only by encounters with terms of 
the situation”.
As I have established so far the ultra-one of Two, which hesitates before the decision 
of servility can be ontologically supported by the indiscernible, once the liar-episode 
and the advice-episode of affirmation and responsibility are led by the effective 
spacing of an unanticipated language to defy any knowledge presided over or 
stemming from the encyclopaedia. Prior to that, I have already deconstructed 
Mediterraneanism because of the way in which it treats difference. I have, moreover, 
set in motion the shame-and-honour model and the poetic model drawing on 
differential repetitions, the counterfeit and becoming-woman. And I have set out to 
loosen the spontaneous and parasitic capitalism without capitalists on the grounds of a 
non-parasitic consumption by way of the speciality of use-value, the division 
between the repressed and the seduced and the spatial art of origami. In addition, I 
have brought these theoretical peregrinations to bear upon the Old Town problem, and 
the contested restoration project of the Venetian properties, in an attempt to map first, 
the trajectory that such a displacement marks in society and space and second, in an 
effort to explore the way in which the subject experiences such a metamorphosis and 
deformation unleashed by the irresistible forces of consumerism. I have argued, 
finally, that what is required to take things further once the changing attitude of the 
residents is explained as a result of the far-reaching implications the restoration 
project has for space, place and the subject, is a differential theory of subject 
formation beyond the banalities of identity, represenation, and the prosopopoiea of 
poetic ontologies. The events drawn upon above were not meant to represent or 
constitute three separate accounts of a person or even worse three distinguished 
subjects, but comprise only stages of a truth procedure to which a subject is submitted 
once it declares its fidelity to the eventness of a generic multiple that remains
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indiscernible and undecidable. Ontology supports the ultra-one of Two of affirmation 
and responsibility not by denying the servility assertions, but by opening up the 
subject to a totally and wholly indiscernible Other, which in its radical alterity and 
otherness swerves away from -  unbeknownst to the subject -  the symmetry, 
calculation, anticipation, and enumeration of any kind of identification.
Having said that, the true Rethemniot subject is a process whose consequences are 
revealed, once an event makes a hole in the already established domain of knowledge. 
It is the individual who follows such an event to whom the name of the subject should 
be assigned. The events drawn upon above are fractures subtracted from such a 
procedure that set out to trace an operation through which the ultra-one of a stuttering 
non-servile-servility will lead to the indiscernible discount-event. Does this mean that 
the subject is anti-poetic? Does it imply that the true Rethemniot identity is beyond 
shame and honour? Is it possible to argue that the coffee-shops parea should be 
altogether abandoned along with the monumental-social dichotomies? And are, 
ultimately, the modes of individuation sketched out above defiant of Mediterraneanist 
identifications?
As it should be clear by now, Badiou’s ontology does not to pinch a subject but only 
seeks to allow thinking that a subject is possible. What ontology purports and with 
which I totally agree is simply that the difference a subject makes can be associated 
with the deconstructive writing of what is performed by way of the counterfeit, 
becoming-woman, and the spiral Moebius bands of a non-parasitic spontaneity which 
bifurcates into the repressed-seduced theoretical-practice and the spatial art of 
origami. The question, therefore, is not about destroying the representations and 
identities of which the foundational situation of the Mediterranean is composed, or 
about opposing the poetic itself, but about opposing the opposition on the basis of 
which the poetic has come to blossom -  the meaningful sheep-raid versus massive 
raids; the innocent hospitality versus the commodified tourism development; the 
parasitic consumption and spontaneous spatializations versus the capitalism-without- 
capitalists. I denounced the shame-and-honour model because it fails to make space 
for a difference without concept or identity and because a radical and differential 
theory is still required in order to take into account of a differential, repetitive and 
manifold event, that is, a difference in the Idea beyond any rigidity, stability,
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constancy, permanence and calculation. I set out, moreover, to make space for such a 
differential difference through a four-fold task first, by invoking a non-reciprocal, 
non-economic and infinite exchange (the counterfeit) beyond gift-exchange and the 
obligations and power hierarchies of subjects; second, by running aground on 
becoming-women in order to exorcize the domestication and negative poetics of 
women’s suffering; third, by explicating the systemic nature of consumption, the 
spectrality of use-value and the repressed-seduced division; and fourth, by taking up 
on the spatial art of origami, that is, the folding, unfolding and refolding of social 
space. Finally, I brought the above models to bear upon the Old Town problem and 
the residents’ changing reception of the restoration imperatives in an attempt to 
reconstruct the meaning of the Old Town problem in accord to the bands and events 
of postmodernism and poststructuralism. The ethnography of the event, I argued, 
resonates with such a deconstructive writing of difference in that it performs the 
necessary reinscription and reterritorialization of the singularity and undecidability of 
an inconsistent multiplicity, to which the name of the subject may be assigned. And as 
Badiou (2005: 406) avers “A subject is a knowledge suspended by a truth whose finite 
moment it is”. A true and generic Rethemniot subject thus is faithfully connected to 
such a radical otherness and inconsistent multiplicity implied by the grafting onto 
Rethemnos of what the knowledge of the encyclopaedia fails to make sense of when it 
comes to an undecidable discount.
Truth, in other words, if this is at stake in subtracting the multiple from the 
encyclopaedia of Rethemnos, is composed of multiples on the side of which a subject 
maybe found. Truth and subject are not necessarily linked though. They may be 
associated, however, once a generic extension, emerges. Accordingly, one should not 
be looking for a charismatic, poetic or rebellious subject in Rethemnos, in some 
anthropological fashion, but should map instead and explore the traces of a procedure 
left behind by the event (Two), of a non-chosen servility when the indiscernible- 
discount is decided from the standpoint of the undecidable. In short, with the Two of 
affirmation/responsibility and its stuttering non-servile-servility that ventures in an 
indiscernible topology, an undecidable, may be ultimately, named. Any truth 
procedure, in other words, remains indifferent and irreducible to any foundational 
knowledge. This comes down to saying that a subject is faithfully connected to an 
event, once it is named after an intervention, affirming the hole that happens in
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knowledge. The axiom of foundation, as was shown, prohibits being’s event but in 
that prohibition the liar-event and the advice-event break with the fundamental 
ontology of a fully deployed historical situation (the tourist crisis) by placing 
affirmative responsibility in the middle of some agonistic poetics (the alleged 
Mediterranean antagonism between the shopkeepers) and the alleged Mediterranean 
hospitality (the pure and authentic place that resists commercialization). In sum, the 
Rethemniot generic multiple is linked to the Two of affirmative responsibility -  which 
prevents agonistic poetics (the axiom of foundation) -  through the intervention of an 
interruption-without-interruption (the axiom of choice) -  once it is forced en route 
from the indiscernible {not all students should be credited with the discount) to the 
undecidable {there may be some students that may appeal for a discount) -  and they 
do not have to be Archaeology graduates!
As was already stated at the outset, the subjectivation process run through in the 
preceding pages is not about representational identities. I only strived, however, to be 
worthy of such a truth procedure centred upon incalculable, unnameable and 
undecidable occurrences on the basis of which a subject will be allowed to emerge. 
The reader thus who would have probably expected to end up reading a work in 
which a Mediterranean identity of a particular substance will be firmly defined, may 
be disappointed. Sadly or otherwise, there is little to say and even less to do about any 
disappointment the read might feel. In Badiou’s universe, however, there is only one 
possible way to define a subject and that is by judging by his/her confidence and 
militancy devoted to an event. As it should be clear by now subjects are truly 
differential multiplicities that are locally decided, within an evental site of a fully 
deployed historical situation, always in the process of indetermination by means of 
which the undecidable is subtracted. When everything is said and done, therefore, and 
the question still remains ‘who is actually the true subject of Rethemnos?’ as Badiou 
put it, the answer should be: “that man, in a sense that he invents, [whom] is all of us 
at once” (Badiou, 2005: xv).
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CONCLUSION
My peregrinations in the preceding pages have led me to events and encounters 
nourished in the wake of deconstruction, schizoanalysis, the consumer society and the 
choreoethnography of the event. Mediterraneanism, I have argued, is a discourse of 
the Mediterranean region rather the Mediterranean itself, which should be altogether 
abandoned in favour of differential, repetitive, becoming, affirmative, and 
deconstructive conceptions of difference qua difference. Mediterraneanism, I have 
also suggested is a sedentary image of thought, which produces a conceptual kind of 
difference, subjecting it to integration, domesticity, analogy, representation and 
contradiction. Such an intuition that ultimately subjugates difference to the 
jurisdiction of a spontaneous and flexible space-economy is fraught with the 
rationality of political economy, the naturalization of use-value, the idealization of a 
revolutionary class-struggle, the teleology of history, the mythology of production, 
the ontotheology of presence and the negativity of parasitism. Parasitism, however, 
once given over to the Moebius bands of use-value, seduction and symbolic exchange, 
starts charting even if prematurely, the conditions pertinent to a full-blown consumer 
society.
Difference as has been argued, is neither positive, nor negative, nor oppositional, nor 
contradictory but affirmative, multiple, irreducible, joyful and undecidable, manifold, 
displaced, and disadjusted. A Moebius band of thought, as was also stressed, is the 
one-sided curved surface which confuses, ploughs and complicates difference, 
conceiving of it in terms of a displacement, in the manner in which the subject is 
deformed (from egoism, honour, and poetics to affirmation, responsibility, non- 
servile-servility and the indiscemible-undecidable) and, a displacement in the manner 
in which the co-relation of society and space dis-articulates (from spontaneity, 
repression, and social history to consumerism, seduction, and origami). Such 
differential writings of difference defy constancy, presence and fixity and lend 
consistency to the folding, unfolding and refolding of the Mediterranean space, 
subtracting from the nth dimension («-l), through a chiasmic (x) deconstructive 
reading that affirms the redoubled ethics of deconstruction rather than the 
metaphysics of shame and honour; the responsibility of an infinite other which is 
relentlessly in the process of becoming rather than the negativity of mourning (the 
poetics of womanhood); and the indiscernible, and undecidable generic multiplicity,
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rather than the rhetorics of excellence (the poetics of manhood) that separate, isolate, 
oppose, identify and associate a certain subject with consciousness, transcendence and 
substance.
Mediterraneanists insist that “we do not take the Mediterranean as geographically 
homogenous but only as coherent in epistemological terms” (Peristiany and Pitt- 
Rivers, 1992: 6). This is precisely the problem. Writing the Mediterranean on hollow 
ground by way of a thought that draws on and is driven by excess, destruction and 
squandering allows letting the illusions of fixity, planning, stability, development and 
prognostication of such an epistemological unity, go. It means, moreover, to 
destabilize on the move the reactionary parasitism, capitalism without capitalists, 
poetic male subjects, shameful, subversive and silent woman and the banal poetics of 
womanhood. Bauman, Baudrillard, Badiou, Deleuze, Guattari, and Derrida are only 
symptoms of such a writing that sets out to loosen and deconstruct Mediterraneanism 
which remains nihilistic, pointillistic and unbecoming, without necessarily being fake 
or false. It is above all a mode of representation, which is dialectical (contradiction: 
the one versus the other) as in the poetics of manhood; nihilistic (subversion, bad 
conscience) as in the poetics of womanhood; ethnocentric (the essentialisation of 
certain geographical idiomorphies) as in the spontaneous, parasitic and capitalist 
glosses; and metaphysical (the metaphysics of presence, transparent-crystalline 
society not already broached by differance) as in the shame-and-honour model.
The symptoms exhibited above supplant and supplement a differential play of writing, 
launching and staging Ideas of difference that are multiple, affirmative, singular and 
untimely. There is no portable postructuralist theory, however, which by means of its 
application will attest to its own validity. The events of deconstruction, consumerism, 
and schizoanalysis, therefore, simply intervene in the middle of a certain 
Mediterranean state of affairs, that is, a foundational historical situation within which 
an event may happen, in order to destabilize difference through repetitions, the 
counterfeit, becoming-woman, the Body without Organs, the division between the 
seduced and the repressed, origami and the differential calculi of some unanticipated 
choreoethnographies. Yet such a strategy is neither about dismantling, nor about 
destroying/reconstructing the Mediterranean discourses; rather it is about saying ‘yes’ 
-  the affirmative difference of learning to let go -  to the joyful solicitation and
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iteration of difference en route from the strictures and binaries of poetics, shame-and- 
honour and so on, to the differential and generic multiples of an evental Rethemnos.
The ultra-one of the Two of affirmation and responsibility, the interruption without 
interruption of non-servile servility and the indiscemible/undecidable discount-event 
is not the end of the story. Such events refer to de-individuations, which by means of 
becoming are confronted with the undecidability of an intervention subtracted from a 
fully deployed historical situation, which nourishes, however inadvertently, the void, 
excess, and infinity of being and the generic, indiscernible undecidability of the 
subject. The events that have come to blossom and upon which I drew above can, 
certainly, be unpacked in innumerable other ways, to the extent that philosophies of 
difference offer an infinite number of ways to get to grips with episodes that remain to 
come, breaking with the official language and state of a situation, and engaging in 
novel truth procedures that may -  or may not, but this is precisely the challenge -  call 
forth an unexpected and wholly other. The subject is neither a point, nor a substance 
but, above all, a process that should be made always by subtracting from an already 
existent dimension. The subject, moreover, is found on the side of truth when it is 
faithfully connected to an event, after an intervention is forced by a generic 
undecidable. It is to that extent that I have found the differential repetitions, 
becoming-woman, spectral use-values, repressed/seduced theoretical-practice, 
origami, and the choreoethnographies of the event an exemplary basis for 
deconstructing Mediterraneanism. Through their irreducible and undecidable status, 
such snags affirm the crisis of versus, opposing not shame, honour, poetics and 
spontaneity but their oppositional and contradictory strategy, dialectical sublation, 
negative reversal and ultimate resolution of difference. In all the events discussed 
above, I have only tried to be worthy of the affirmation/responsibility, non-servile 
servility and interminable undecidability of a generic multiple Mediterranean 
difference. Therefore, the question is no longer about denying the usefulness of 
poetics, parasitism and so on, but about learning how to let go, during which 
something wholly other may come to pass.
In the wake of postmodernism and poststructuralism, the ethic of the event of 
Rethemnos frustrate the Oneness of identity (shame and honour), the Oneness of 
place (spontaneity) and the Oneness of time (social and monumental histories) by way
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of subtraction (the non-poetic, non-presence ontology of set theory, and the 
historicity, indiscemibility and undecidability of the generic multiples). The essential 
indecision of the discount-event, as was shown, deconstructs the alleged egoism, self- 
sufficiency and wholeness of the Archaeology Service and makes a hole in the way in 
which the Rethemniot multiple conceives of the other. For the subject in the post- 
evental universe of fidelity is a militant of truth connected to an event named after an 
intervention, and swept up by motionless trips and voyages in a way that affirms that 
which is still to come, that is the radical otherness of a discount, which in its 
unanticipated and unpredicted imminence challenges the knowledge of the 
Archaeology Service. My sole obsession in unblocking the events above was not, 
however, interpretation, but a fascination for multiplicity, that is, a fascination for 
events with a consistency all of their own that cross over into each other. And thus the 
above unfolding is not complete and does not mean to settle matters once and for all. 
What future research might proceed to unveil, therefore, is to affirm innumerable and 
infinite differential and unpredictable becomings that are different to those already 
anticipated.
No small wonder then, that the systemic role of consumption, deconstruction, 
schizoanalysis and the ethnography of the event, which set Rethemnos in motion 
allowing space, place and the subject to take place, escape the forced domestication of 
identity and stability. For by dwelling on chance, becoming, and consistency, the 
events drawn upon above de-consist within a zone of immanence and intensity, 
without opposing Mediterraneanism, mapping thus the folding, unfolding and 
refolding of the trajectories of the subject in the wake of consumer parasitism, which 
holds back and withdraws the productivist, rationalist and teleological discourse of 
political economy, social and monumental histories, spontaneity, the friends of the 
heart and so on. For events and differential repetitions slide past each other, opening 
new ways in making sense of the unknown and the unnameable. And thus rather than 
destroying Mediterraneanism, the double b(l)inds and chiasmus of the four-fold of 
deconstruction (reversal and reinscription -  % -  neither/nor-both/and) affirm that 
identity, splace and place are always out o f joint.
I have tried to think and make space for exactly such an idea of difference, which 
repeats and affirms the eternal return of that which is not already contradiction,
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opposition, and poetic presence; a difference, in short, which is not included in any 
kind of conceptual or identity politics and is not already representation; a difference 
conforming neither to the Same, nor to the One, nor to the Many, nor to Resemblance. 
The eternal return of the affirmative-responsible and non-servile servility of an 
indiscemible-undecidability, one might argue, is exactly about such a difference; it 
goes hand in hand with the division between the repressed and the seduced and the 
origamic unfolding of the Old Town; and chimes with the image of thought of 
Badiou’s mathematical ontology, which construed a truth procedure forced by a 
generic fidelity to be connected to an event making a hole in the subjective knowledge 
of poetic identities and the restoration project. Finally, such a thought has come to 
materialize with respect to the events discussed above, regarding the interminable 
stuttering of a difference-producing repetition through which an experience of an 
impossible discount-event becomes a radical experience of perhaps on the back of the 
driftwork of indiscemibility and undecidability.
The blocks of becoming are not, therefore, simply oppositional with respect to 
Mediterraneanist identifications of homology, dialectics and domesticity. Becomings 
regard incalculable multiplicities and rhythmanalyses subtracted from an ineffaceable 
threshold of affirmation, responsibility, and the generic multiple ex-appropriation of 
undecidability. The ethnography of the event challenges the authenticity and 
pointillism of mainstream ethnography and Mediterranean anthropology that dictate, 
block and suppress everything that swerves away from constancies, binary 
oppositions and dialectics; and also breaks with and takes flight from 
Mediterraneanist images of thought; being itself purely submitted to the differential 
calculus and interval of the events of Rethemnos, affirming manifold 
choreo(zthno)graphies -  italicized thus to emphasize the choreographic essence of 
any ethnography and the difficulty of writing it in a truly differential manner.
Hence the Old Town problem was twice unfolded in a doubly-folded manner. Once, 
as it was subject to an exhaustive understanding of the systemic structuration of the 
consumer society, the fetishism and speciality of utility, the structural organization of 
needs and the origamic dis-junction of space. And, once again, as it was taken hostage 
by a theory of the multiple, the irreducible and radical alterity, otherness and 
difference that are immanent first, to affirmation and responsibility (the ultra-one
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event of Two); second, to a non-servile servility (against synthesis and the versus of 
the poetic dialectic); and third, to becoming-indiscernible, beyond the pointillism of 
hospitality, and the performative excellence of official history. Admittedly, the 
residents’ shifting attitudes toward the Greek state, from a hostile resistance to a 
demand for constant and increasing state intervention, is intricately linked to a 
broader socio-spatial restructuring, which is increasingly related to the emancipation 
of capital from labour and the spatialization of the division between the repressed and 
the seduced. And thus the trajectory from the anti-intervention period of the former 
Old Town Houses Owners Association (OTHOA) to an interventionist period marked 
by the newly founded housing association (AROOT), which is forcefully set against 
the Old Town’s recent commodification and aesthetization, marks in a profound 
manner the postmodern transformation and metamorphosis of the urban affairs of the 
town. No small wonder then that the resident, as I have already argued, should have 
said ‘THERE IS NOTHING TO SEE’, nothing to interpret in the Old Town, for every 
attempt to terminate the interminable Old Town, arguing over its alleged uniqueness, 
neglects the irreducible conjunctive and infinite ANDs (Old Town AND New Town 
AND...AND) that come on the back of deconstruction, schizoanalysis and 
consumerism.
Deconstruction, schizoanalysis and the ethnography of the event, on the other hand, 
do not form clear-cut theoritical divisions that are easily and unobtrusively pinned 
down as methodological recipes. An origamic spatial theory which deals with the 
effective power of space and spacing is not so much about a conflict in historical 
terms but rather concerns the irreducible split, double bind, and interwoven 
implication of the Old Town and the New Town. The origami, in short, does not 
efface the incontestable and irreparable singularity of spatial differentiation and the 
undecidable split of Rethemnos, but seeks to sophisticate the uninsurable manifold 
spacing of a decompressed disparate between the Old Town and the rest of 
Rethemnos. Hence the fact that the Mediterranean, and Rethemnos by implication, 
“can never be always present, it can be, only, i f  there is any, it can be only possible, it 
must even remain a can-be or maybe in order to remain a demand” (Derrida, 1994: 
33). The Mediterranean, if there is any, “would be a matter of linking an affirmation 
(in particular a political one) [...] to the experience of the impossible, which can only 
be a radical experience of the perhaps” (Derrida, 1994: 35). Yet such
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problematizations do not, necessarily, resonate with or are applicable to all 
Mediterranean formations. My aim and scope, after all, was to establish that the 
Mediterranean is nothing but a symptom, an analytics of power, governed and forced 
by a powerful discourse which sought to disclose the truth of the Mediterranean or its 
secret, in other words, to force the Mediterranean into confessing what makes it so 
special.
The Moebius bands of thought deployed above reverse, however, not only such a 
symptomatology of social and monumental history, but also reinscribe the 
undecidability, imperceptibility and procrastination of the restoration project, and in 
that redeployment, such confessions and secrets become thin, imperceptible, and 
noble, rather than oppressive, contradictory, emancipatory or revolutionary. The 
almost absolute proximity of differance beyond the point of exception (shame-and- 
honour) and extremity (poetics) work in favour of traces of non-origin that affirm 
simply that the current grasp of the Mediterranean will not be another traumatic 
confession. En route from Mediterraneanism to the event of Rethemnos I have only 
striven to be worthy, and worthy alone, not a voice or a medium, of what the 
Mediterranean wishes to let go, dislodge or unleash. Accordingly, this is not going to 
be the end of Mediterraneanism. Moreover, it does not mean, necessarily, that one 
should work only with the terms or the theory deployed above. What it does mean, 
however, is that there is a constant need to destabilize Mediterraneanism, first, by 
reversing shame, honour, the poetic, spontaneity and parasitism, and second, by 
affirming the reinscription of the counterfeit, becoming-woman, the spatialization of 
the division between the repressed and the seduced, origami and the affirmative, 
responsible, non-servile and indiscemibly undecidable Rethemniot subject. 
Rethemnos, as promised, was ultimately, not what one would have thought. For 
Rethemnos is always becoming-other than what one thinks; always already 
differential. At this juncture, in one but doubly-folded stroke, I am done with 
Rethemnos, once because this is the end of the thesis but not the end of matters and, 
once again, because everything is still open to re-iteration, soli-citation, 
experimentation and complication.
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APPENDIX
Table 1: Use of Properties
U se Frequency Percent
Shop 45 25,7
Residence 106 60,6
Abandoned 4 2,3
Preserved 1 ,6
Monument 1 ,6
Public A 2,3
building
Total 161 92,0
M issing 0 14 8,0
Total 175 100,0
Table 2: Type of Reconstruction/Restoration
Type Frequency Percent
General 70 40,0
Restoration 13 7,4
Illegal 7 4,0
Permission 8 4,6
N o  change 57 32,6
Expropriation 1 ,6
Tranform to shop 4 2,3
Transform to rent
1 ,6rooms
Total 161 92,0
M issing 0 14 8,0
Total 175 100,0
Table 3: Geographical Location of Properties
Area Frequency Percent
Historical
Centre 67 38,3
Rest o f  Town 108 62,7
Total 175 100,0
T able 4: U se o f  P roperties before and after 1994
Year Total
U se until 1994 after 1994
Shop 16 29 45
35,6% 64,4% 100,0%
Residence 90 16 106
84,9% 15,1% 100,0%
Abandoned 3 1 4
75,0% 25,0% 100,0%
Preserved 1 0 1
100,0% ,0% 100,0%
Monument 1 0 1
Public
building
100,0%
4
,0%
0
100,0%
4
100,0% ,0% 100,0%
Total 115 46 161
71,4% 28,6% 100,0%
Table 5: Geographical Location of Properties before and after 1994
Year Total
Area until 1994 after 1994
Historical
45 22 67
Centre
67,2% 32,8% 100,0%
Rest o f  Town 84 24 108
77,8% 22,2% 100,0%
Total 129 46 175
73,7% 26,3% 100,0%
T able 6: T ype o f  R estoration  before and a fter 1994
Year Total
Type o f  Restoration until 1994 after 1994
General 43 27 70
61,4% 38,6%
100,0
%
Restoration 8 5 13
61,5% 38,5%
100,0
%
Illegal 3 4 1
42,9% 57,1%
100,0
%
Permission 3 5 8
37,5% 62,5%
100,0
%
N o change 56 1 57
98,2% 1,8%
100,0
%
Expropriation 0 1 1
,0% 100,0%
100,0
%
Tranform to shop 1 3 4
25,0% 75,0%
100,0
%
Transform to rent
1 0 1
rooms
100,0% ,0%
100,0
%
Total 115 46 161
71,4% 28,6%
100,0
%
T ab le 7: U se o f  P roperty  and G eographical L ocation
U se o f  Property
Area Total
Historical
Centre
Rest o f  
Town
Shop 28 17 45
62,2% 37,8% 100,0%
Residence 27 79 106
25,5% 74,5% 100,0%
Abandoned 4 0 4
100,0% ,0% 100,0%
Preserved 1 0 1
100,0% ,0% 100,0%
Monument 1 0 1
100,0% ,0% 100,0%
Public 2 o A
Building
z
50,0% 50,0% 100,0%
Total 63 98 161
39,1% 60,9% 100,0%
Table 8: Type of Restoration and Geographical Location
Area Total
Type o f  Restoration
Historical
Centre
Rest o f  
Town
General 27 43 70
38,6% 61,4% 100,0%
Restoration 5 8 13
38,5% 61,5% 100,0%
Illegal 3 4 7
42,9% 57,1% 100,0%
Permission 2 6 8
25,0% 75,0% 100,0%
N o change 23 34 57
40,4% 59,6% 100,0%
Expropriation 1 0 1
100,0% ,0% 100,0%
Tranform to shop 2 2 4
Transform to rent 
rooms
50,0%
0
50,0%
1
100,0%
1
,0% 100,0% 100,0%
Total 63 98 161
39,1% 60,9% 100,0%
